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PRECIS 
I t i s the purpose o f t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n t o 
analyse the l o g i c o f e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , p a r t i -
c u l a r l y t h a t of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s . One o f the c e n t r a l 
problems which has confronted e t h i c a l analyses f o r the 
l a s t century has been a concern t o avoid the two forms 
o f " n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y , " set f o r t h by David Hume and 
G o E o Moore, and t h i s has caused s p e c i a l problems f o r 
r e l i g i o u s e t h i c s i n which e t h i c a l imperatives are 
r e l a t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y t o statements of f a c t . The s e t t i n g 
f o r t h i s study of the r e l a t i o n of i n d i c a t i v e and impera-
t i v e i n C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s i s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussion of 
the ways i n which moral philosophers have accounted f o r 
the l o g i c of decision.. A f t e r e x p l a i n i n g the two versions 
of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y , the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t account 
of e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n i s examined, since i t s primary p r o -
ponent, R„ M„ Kare, has developed, by means of the 
p r a c t i c a l s y l l o g i s m , an understanding of the r e l a t i o n o f 
f a c t t o value and imperatives which avoids these f a l l a -
cies.. Two challenges t o p r e s c r i p t i v i s m and t o the 
v a l i d i t y of bot h versions of n a t u r a l i s m are then analysed? 
one o f which r e l i e s upon the dual l o g i c a l f o r c e of e t h i c a l 
language and the other of which examines the l o g i c o f 
self- i n v o l v e m e n t and the r o l e of a t t i t u d e s i n d e c i s i o n -
making. Prom t h i s a n alysis we w i l l conclude t h a t a 
i i i 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n d i c a t i v e and imperative i s poss i b l e 
and indeed e s s e n t i a l i n r e l i g i o u s moral d e c i s i o n and i t i s 
a r e l a t i o n s h i p which the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c i e s do not 
destroy. The w r i t i n g s of f o u r contemporary C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c i s t s w i l l then be examined "to show the l o g i c o f 
d e c i s i o n which i s i m p l i c i t i n each account. Pour dis= 
t i n c t s t y l e s of moral d e c i s i o n w i l l emerge from t h i s 
a n a l y s i s which we have c a l l e d o n t o l o g i c a l e t h i c s , impera» 
t i v e e t h i c s , d i a l e c t i c a l e t h i c s , and e x i s t e n t i a l e t h i c s , 
corresponding r e s p e c t i v e l y t o the work of Paul T i l l i c h , 
Emil Brunner, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Rudolf Bultmann<, 
Some conclusions w i l l then be drawn regarding the r e l a -
t i o n s h i p of r e l i g i o u s t r u t h - c l a i m s t o moral imperatives 
and the f i n a l challenge of n a t u r a l i s m w i l l be assessed» 
i v 
INTRODUCTION 
I n h i s a n a l y s i s of the nature of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , 
R . B o B r a i t h w a i t e o f f e r e d an i n t e r e s t i n g suggestion 
regarding the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l i g i o u s 
statements and moral imperatives which has been the 
source of a good deal of discussion and reflection,"*" 
Having accepted the v e r i f i c a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e of meaning 
as appropriate t o the understanding o f o r d i n a r y language, 
B r a i t h w a i t e claimed t h a t i t was c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s 
empiricism t o accept a3 w e l l the sup p o s i t i o n t h a t meaning 
could be determined by the use to which language wa3 puts 
R e l i g i o u s statements, he s a i d , are u n v e r i f i a b l e by the 
standard methods and i n t h i s sense they are s i m i l a r t o 
moral p r i n c i p l e s , f o r these l i k e w i s e are n e i t h e r " s t a t e -
ments about pa r t i c u l a r . . m a t t e r s of e m p i r i c a l f a c t , 
s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses <> o o [ n o r ] the l o g i c a l l y necessary 
statements of l o g i c and mathematics „' . „ We need t o 
ask t h e r e f o r e what f u n c t i o n r e l i g i o u s and moral statements 
serve and t h i s i s a f u n c t i o n which can be observed and 
v e r i f i e d i n a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d e m p i r i c a l way« 
1R„ B. B r a i t h w a i t e , "An E m p i r i c i s t ' s View o f 
Rel i g i o u s B e l i e f " (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, Cambridge, 
1955)9 r e p r i n t e d i n Ian T„ Ramsey, ed„, C h r i s t i a n E t h i c s 
and Contemporary Philosophy (SCM Press, London, 1 9 6 6 ) , 
P o 53-73= See also the discussion which f o l l o w s by 
J o N„ S c h o f i e l d , D* M. Mackinnon, and I a n T , Ramsey, w i t h 
a response by B r a i t h w a i t e , p* 7^=91+. 
B r a i t h w a i t e , op, c i t . , p. 55° 
B r a i t h w a i t e i n s i s t e d t h a t previous understandings 
of t h i s use were inadequate because they had centred on 
the emotive use of language,, I t had been assumed t h a t 
moral language was used t o express one's f e e l i n g s about 
an o b j e c t or a c t i o n , while r e l i g i o u s language, as f o r 
example the a s s e r t i o n "God i s our Heavenly Father," was 
used to express and evince the f e e l i n g s of the b e l i e v e r 
toward the o b j e c t o f h i s belief» This a n a l y s i s , B r a i t h = 
waite argued, does not do j u s t i c e t o the nature of the 
asser t i o n s themselves nor does i t stand up t o a c a r e f u l 
examination of the actions o f the b e l i e v e r or the moral 
agento What such an examination shows i s t h a t moral and 
r e l i g i o u s a s s e r t i o n s are used t o express an i n t e n t i o n t o 
act a c e r t a i n way, or t o f o l l o w a p a r t i c u l a r way of l i f e , 
and thus they have conative r a t h e r than emotive meaning 
Thus "the meaning of a r e l i g i o u s a s s e r t i o n i s given by 
i t s use i n expressing the asser t e r ' s i n t e n t i o n t o f o l l o w 
a s p e c i f i e d p o l i c y o f behaviour,, " 2 Furthermore, t h i s 
i n t e n t i o n to adopt the appropriate behaviour i s not 
evoked or caused by one's b e l i e f i n moral and r e l i g i o u s 
a s s e r t i o n s , but r a t h e r i s what gives r i s e t o the asser~ 
t i o n s i n the f i r s t p l a c e . B r a i t h w a i t e argued t h a t " i t i s 
the i n t e n t i o n t o behave which c o n s t i t u t e s what i s known 
as r e l i g i o u s conviction,, "3 
1 I b i d , , p. 60=61„ 
2 
I b i d o , p„ 6 l = 2 0 
3 I b i d . s p. 62. , 
v i 
I t i s the uniqueness of a r e l i g i o u s m o r a l i t y , 
B r a i t h w a i t e claimed, t h a t i t consists of b o t h propo-
s i t i o n s and in t e n t i o n s , , Whereas m o r a l i t y i s a matter 
of expressing one's i n t e n t i o n s t o act i n c e r t a i n ways 
through the use of value-judgements, moral p r i n c i p l e s , 
and i m p e r a t i v e s , a r e l i g i o u s way of l i f e i n v o l v e s the 
t e l l i n g of s t o r i e s which serve as the background f o r 
decisions,, Thus, f o r example, the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c 
i n v o l v e s n ot only a c e r t a i n set of i n t e n t i o n s t o act 
a g a p e i s t i c a l l y , b ut also a c o l l e c t i o n of s t o r i e s i n 
which t h a t l o v i n g way of l i f e i s i l l u s t r a t e d and r e i t -
e r a t e d , "To assert the whole set of as s e r t i o n s of the 
C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n i s both t o t e l l the C h r i s t i a n 
d o c t r i n a l s t o r y and t o confess a l l e g i a n c e t o the C h r i s t i i 
way o f l i f e o " 1 The important f e a t u r e of these s t o r i e s , 
by which B r a i t h w a i t e makes h i s major p o i n t regarding the 
nature of r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f , i s t h a t , though they are i n 
the form of s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y e m p i r i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , 
they need not and cannot be proven t r u e since they are 
not subject t o e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n . Indeed, there i s 
no need f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n the C h r i s t i a n set of 
s t o r i e s , f o r example, t o be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h one another, 
f o r the sole c r i t e r i o n o f t h e i r meaningfulness i s not 
t h e i r t r u t h b ut t h e i r a b i l i t y t o express the commitment 
of b e l i e v e r s . What i s important f o r the C h r i s t i a n i s t o 
e n t e r t a i n the s t o r i e s , t o t h i n k about them, and thereby 
to allow them t o motivate and i n s p i r e moral a c t i o n . 
•*"Ibid ., p. 66. 
v i i 
Indeed, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n d i c a t i v e s and 
imperatives w i t h i n the C h r i s t i a r ^ way- of l i f e i s he l d by 
B r a i t h w a i t e t o be a p u r e l y causal or p s y c h o l o g i c a l one. 
Thus, 
. o o i f the r e l i g i o u s s t o r i e s need not be 
b e l i e v e d , what f u n c t i o n do they f u l f i l l i n 
the complex s t a t e of mind and behaviour known 
as having a r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f ? How i s enter= 
t a i n i n g the s t o r y r e l a t e d t o r e s o l v i n g t o 
pursue a c e r t a i n way o f l i f e ? My answer i s 
t h a t the r e l a t i o n i s a ps y c h o l o g i c a l and 
causal one. I t i s an e m p i r i c a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
f a c t t h a t many people f i n d i t e a s i e r t o resolve 
upon and t o c a r r y through a course of a c t i o n 
which i s con t r a r y t o t h e i r n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n s 
i f t h i s p o l i c y i s associated i n t h e i r minds 
w i t h c e r t a i n s t o r i e s . 1 
What i s primary i n the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c , and what i s indeed 
common to t h e i s t i c r e l i g i o u s m o r a l i t i e s , i s the e n t e r t a i n ^ 
ment of the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t when one f u l f i l l s a c e r t a i n 
course of behaviour one i s doing the w i l l of God. Thinking 
of t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n can motivate the b e l i e v e r t o act i n 
the appropriate ways; the p r o p o s i t i o n thus produces "a 
s t a t e of mind i n which i t i s easier t o c a r r y out a 
2 
p a r t i c u l a r course of a c t i o n . . . . The causal connec-
t i o n also operates i n the other d i r e c t i o n , however: t h a t i s , 
from the i n t e n t i o n t o the h o l d i n g of r e l i g i o u s p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
" I n r e l i g i o u s c o n v i c t i o n the r e s o l u t i o n t o f o l l o w a way of 
l i f e i s primary; i t i s not derived from b e l i e v i n g , s t i l l 
l ess from t h i n k i n g o f , any e m p i r i c a l s t o r y . R e l i g i o u s 
b e l i e f s are thus formed by the deepest i n t e n t i o n s of the 
I b i d . , p. 68. 
» 
" I b i d . , po 70. 
' I b i d . , p. 71 o 
v i i i 
b e l i e v e r t o f u l f i l l c e r t a i n p a t t e r n s o f human behaviour 
and i n t e r a c t i o n and i t i s the value of r e l i g i o u s asser-
t i o n s t h a t they express t h i s commitment 0 
I n the background of B r a i t h w a i t e " s analysis i s 
an assumption regarding the r e l a t i o n s h i p of f a c t and 
valu e , i n d i c a t i v e s and i m p e r a t i v e s d e s c r i p t i v e and 
e v a l u a t i v e meaning, which i t i s the i n t e n t i o n of t h i s 
t h e s i s to examine and crit i c i s e < > This assumption has 
two important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . On the one hand, i t i s 
argued t h a t statements of f a c t , and i n d i c a t i v e r e l i g i o u s 
p r o p o s i t i o n s regarding h i s t o r i c a l events or metaphysical 
r e a l i t i e s , i n and of themselves cannot y i e l d moral impera-
t i v e s f o r a c t i o n , f o r these l a t t e r depend upon an e x t r a 
element described by B r a i t h w a i t e as " i n t e n t i o n . " Thus, 
i n discussing Matthew Arnold's parable o f the three Lord 
Shaftesburies, he argues t h a t 
. o o even when the s t o r y i s l i t e r a l l y b e l i e v e d , 
when i t i s b e l i e v e d t h a t there i s a magnified 
- Lord Shaftesbury who commands or desires the 
c a r r y i n g out o f the behaviour p o l i c y , t h a t 
i n i t s e l f i s no reason f o r c a r r y i n g out the 
p o l i c y ; i t i s necessary also t o have the i n t e n t i o n 
of doing what the magnified Lord Shaftesbury 
commands or d e s i r e s . 1 
We need t h e r e f o r e t o examine the character of these 
r e l i g i o u s i n d i c a t i v e s and i n so doing t o determine i n what 
sense i t i s t r u e t o say t h a t moral imperatives cannot be 
derived from statements of f a c t . This w i l l r e q u i r e n ot -
only an a n a l y s i s of the nature o f decision-making i n 
general i n which imperatives are o f t e n q u i t e e x p l i c i t l y 
^ I b i d . , p. 70; underlines mine. 
i x 
r e l a t e d i n various ways t o i n d i c a t i v e statements, but 
also an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the d e r i v a t i o n of imperatives 
w i t h i n the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s p e c i f i c a l l y . I n so doing 
we w i l l be seeking some i n s i g h t i n t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of f a i t h and a c t i o n and i n t o the r o l e which b e l i e f s 
about matters of f a c t can and do play i n moral d e c i s i o n -
making„ 
On the other hand, an a n a l y s i s l i k e B r a i t h w a i t e f s 
i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by the l a c k of a s u f f i c i e n t e x p l a n a t i o n 
of the f o r m a t i o n of moral i n t e n t i o n s . As f a r as one can 
gather from t h i s p a r t i c u l a r essay, i n t e n t i o n s are j u s t 
something which we choose and which are a r t i c u l a t e d i n 
the expression of moral b e l i e f s and p o l i c i e s of a c t i o n . 
Since " . . . the adoption of a set o f moral p r i n c i p l e s 
i s a matter o f the personal d e c i s i o n t o l i v e according t o 
these p r i n c i p l e s . . . " and since m o r a l i t y i s fundamentally 
" n o n - p r o p o s i t i o n a l , " then i t i s assumed t h a t d e ciding i s 
somehow i t s own j u s t i f i c a t i o n . ^ - Thus B r a i t h w a i t e claims 
t h a t "An i n t e n t i o n . . . cannot be l o g i c a l l y based upon 
anything except another i n t e n t i o n . " Such an assumption 
regarding the nature of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g we w i l l t r y t o 
show i s unnecessarily l i m i t e d and f i n a l l y inadequate. 
For what can be seen by examining the l o g i c of d e c i s i o n 
i s t h a t matters of f a c t do bear a s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n t o 
i n t e n t i o n s , a r e l a t i o n which i s i m p l i c i t w i t h i n charac-
t e r i s t i c moral a t t i t u d e s . We w i l l examine t h e r e f o r e the 
l o g i c of a t t i t u d e s and t h e i r expression i n onlooks and 
w i l l attempt a c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the r o o t a t t i t u d e 
which informs the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c . I n t h i s way the 
l i m i t s , source and foundat i o n of a way o f l i f e may 
perhaps be b e t t e r understood and i t s character more 
f u l l y appreciated,, 
To proceed i n t h i s a n a l y s i s , we w i l l begin by 
examining the two versions of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y 
which have been suggested i n the w r i t i n g s of G, E. Moore 
and David Hume. This w i l l f u r n i s h the contemporary back~ 
ground f o r some of the prev a l e n t assumptions regarding 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p of " i s " and "ought," F o l l o w i n g t h i s 
e x p o s i t i o n , we w i l l examine three d i f f e r e n t analyses o f 
the l o g i c of e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n c e n t r i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y on 
t h i s problem o f the r e l a t i o n between i n d i c a t i v e s and 
imp e r a t i v e s . We w i l l analyse f i r s t the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t 
account of R, M„ Hare from which moral d e c i s i o n emerges 
as a matter o f i n f e r e n c e from general moral p r i n c i p l e s t o 
s p e c i f i c imperatives of a c t i o n . The d i f f i c u l t i e s 
i n v o l v ed i n h i s p o s i t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h regard t o the 
fo r m a t i o n of moral p r i n c i p l e s and w i t h regard t o h i s 
restatement of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y , w i l l then be 
examined by stu d y i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e account „ The descrip=» 
t i v i s t s c laim t h a t some statements of f a c t , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
those regarding s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s or r o l e s , can e n t a i l 
or a t l e a s t s t r o n g l y imply i m p e r a t i v e s , thus arguing t h a t 
moral d e c i s i o n can be a n o n = i n f e r e n t i a l m a t t e r Q I t w i l l 
then be important t o examine another element i n moral 
x i 
d e c i s i o n which i s not made e x p l i c i t i n the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t 
or d e s c r i p t i v i s t accounts, namely the c e n t r a l i t y of 
a t t i t u d e s . We w i l l attempt, by using the work of J „ L . 
A u s t i n and Donald Evans, t o suggest a way i n which i n d i -
c a t i v e s and imperatives are r e l a t e d i n d e c i s i o n due t o 
the performative f o r c e of language,' and i t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the s e l f " i n v o l v i n g character of t h i s language which i l l u m i = 
nates some of the most important f e a t u r e s of r e l i g i o u s 
m o r a l i t y . 
I n the second h a l f of the work, we w i l l examine 
t h i s r e l a t i o n of i n d i c a t i v e and imperative i n f o u r contem° 
porary theologians who have described the nature and con-
t e n t of s p e c i f i c a l l y C h r i s t i a n n otions of God, the w o r l d , 
and human existence and who have drawn out the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of these b e l i e f s f o r the moral behaviour of those who 
adhere t o them. I n conclusion, we w i l l summarise the 
r e l a t i o n s of i n d i c a t i v e and imperative w i t h i n C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c s and assess the f i n a l challenge o f the n a t u r a l i s t i c 
f a l l a c y t o an understanding of the l o g i c of e t h i c a l 
d e c i s i o n . 
x i i 
CHAPTER I 
THE NATURALISTIC FALLACIES 
A gre a t deal o f the debate i n moral philosophy 
i n t h i s century has centered on the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y 
and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r moral reasoning,, Some p h i l o s o -
phers have attempted t o develop understandings of e t h i c s 
which avoid t h i s f a l l a c y and i n so doing have served t o 
sharpen the debate now ensuing regarding the character 
of "naturalism." I t i s i n t o the midst of t h i s debate 
t h a t we now step i n order to a r r i v e a t a c l e a r compre-
hension of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y and, once t h i s under-
standing i s reached, t o look c a r e f u l l y a t the consequences 
of i t s acceptance f o r an analysis of the l o g i c o f d e c i s i o n . 
. Upon close examination of the f a l l a c y o f n a t u r a l -
ism, i t becomes obvious t h a t one must speak of two ver-
sions of the f a l l a c y and t h a t one must p i c k a way care-
f u l l y through the confusion of terms and phrases which 
r e s u l t s . Indeed our study o f the r e l a t i o n of i n d i c a t i v e 
and imperative w i l l be dependent t o a gre a t extent upon 
a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of two other phrases w i t h which i n d i c a t i v e 
and imperative are e a s i l y c o n f l a t e d , namely f a c t and value 
and i s and ought. I t may be w i t h regard t o e x p l i c a t i n g 
the l o g i c o f e t h i c a l decision-making the terms i n d i c a t i v e 
and imperative can provide the c l e a r e s t i n s i g h t i n t o the 
v a l i d i t y and appropriateness of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y 
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i n e i t h e r o f i t s v e r s i o n s . The use o f the other two sets 
of terms i n the d e f i n i t i o n o f t h i s f a l l a c y t h e r e f o r e 
needs t o be explained and evaluated. 
I t was t o d i s t i n g u i s h the r e l a t i o n s h i p of f a c t 
and value t h a t G. E. Moore wrote h i s P r i n c i p i a E t h i c a 
i n 1903J^ so i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t i n attempting t o 
a r r i v e at a concise d e f i n i t i o n of the nature of value, 
s p e c i f i c a l l y "good," he should come t o the r e a l i s a t i o n 
t h a t i t was l o g i c a l l y and e t h i c a l l y mistaken to confuse 
f a c t and value w i t h each other. Therefore, we f i n d here 
one v e r s i o n of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y which demands 
clo s e r examination. Moore's method o f i n q u i r y concerning 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p of f a c t and value i s t o seek f i r s t f o r 
the unique subject matter of e t h i c s and then to e s t a b l i s h 
b o t h the character o f t h i s s u b j e c t matter and the means 
by which i t i s known or perceived by us. He takes as the 
primary concern of e t h i c s the n o t i o n of "good conduct." 
Since Moore takes the a d j e c t i v e "good" t o be a p p l i c a b l e 
to t hings other than conduct, he proposes t o devote the 
g r e a t e r p o r t i o n of h i s e f f o r t t o understanding "good" 
i t s e l f ; o n l y then w i l l he explore the s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a -
t i o n of t h i s a d j e c t i v e to conduct. 
•^ G. E. Moore, P r i n c i p i a E t h i c a (Cambridge Univer-
s i t y Press, Cambridge, 1903). 
2 
I b i d . , p. 2. 
^ I b i d . , p 0 2=3. I t i s i n chapter f> t h a t Moore devotes h i m s e l f t o the concerns o f p r a c t i c a l e t h i c s , a 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n which he takes to be appropriate only a f t e r 
the character o f good i t s e l f and the nature of p r o p o s i t i o n s 
regarding good have been thoroughly examined. 
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I t i s t h e r e f o r e t o h i s search f o r the nature o f 
value t h a t we now t u r n . Moore d i v i d e s h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
of good i n t o two questions; "What i s the nature of the 
p r o p o s i t i o n : 'This i s good i n i t s e l f ? " and "What 
things are good i n themselves? 1 , 1 I n considering the 
nature o f the good, Moore i s seeking f o r a way o f under-
standing the meaning of t h i s word. O r d i n a r i l y , t h a t i s 
w i t h most words, meaning i s explained by means of d e f i n i -
t i o n s and p a r t i c u l a r l y those which "describe the r e a l 
nature o f the o b j e c t or n o t i o n denoted by a word." Yet, 
Moore claimed, t h i s k i n d of d e f i n i t i o n w i l l only s u i t 
those o b j e c t s or notions which are complex and which 
t h e r e f o r e can be analysed i n t o the simplest q u a l i t i e s or 
p a r t s o f which they are composed. To define t h e r e f o r e 
i s t o analyse or break down and i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s 
which cannot be done w i t h good. Good i s "a simple and 
i n d e f i n a b l e q u a l i t y " ; * * i t i s one o f the simple q u a l i t i e s 
out o f which more complex objects or notions are composed 
and may t h e r e f o r e be p a r t of the an a l y s i s or d e f i n i t i o n 
of such o b j e c t s . The reverse however i s not t r u e j the 
meaning of good cannot be given i n terms of other o b j e c t s 
or notions to which i t i s a p p l i e d . I t i s one o f the 
" u l t i m a t e terms by reference t o which whatever i s 
1 I b i d . , p. 1 1 * 2 - 6 . 3 I b i d . , p. 7 , 9 = 1 0 . 
2 Ii I b i d . , p. 7 o I b i d . , p. 1 0 . 
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capable o f d e f i n i t i o n must be defined."' 1' P r o p o s i t i o n s 
about good are t h e r e f o r e s y n t h e t i c , never a n a l y t i c , and 
to f i n d any meaning i n t h i s word at a l l one must recog= 
ni s e t h a t good i s d i f f e r e n t from those t h i n g s t o which 
p 
i t i s applied as a p r e d i c a t e . • 
I n g i v i n g reasons f o r h i s claim regarding the 
meaning of good, Moore states h i s v e r s i o n o f the 
n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y . Naturalism i s the attempt o f moral 
philosophers to e s t a b l i s h the v a l i d i t y of some q u a l i t y or 
value which i s considered to be good by c l a i m i n g t h a t 
goodness i s equi v a l e n t t o or t h a t i t s meaning i s t o t a l l y 
d efined by t h a t q u a l i t y . To make t h i s claim i s to render 
a l l p r o p o s i t i o n s about good tautologous and t o make the 
task o f moral philosophy s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . For, on the one 
hand, i t must s u r e l y be p o s s i b l e to disagree about the 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the pre d i c a t e "good" to any subject; i t 
must be a matter of some r e f l e c t i o n , r a t h e r than a simple 
e x p l i c a t i o n of s e l f - e v i d e n t t r u t h s , whether t h i s p r e d i c a t e 
i s a p p r opriate to the matter i n question. I f good i s 
defined as the o b j e c t i n q uestion, then no standard o f 
judgement i s a v a i l a b l e t o provide the basis of s i g n i f i c a n t 
disagreement. Thus, " i f good i s defined as something 
els e , i t i s then impossible e i t h e r t o prove t h a t any other 
d e f i n i t i o n i s wrong or even t o deny such a d e f i n i t i o n . " ^ 
1 I b i d . 
2 I b i d . , p. 7, 11*. 
3 I b i d . , p. 10=11. 
One aspect o f Moore's v e r s i o n of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y -
i s t h e r e f o r e a c r i t i c i s m of those moral philosophers who 
would make p r o p o s i t i o n s regarding good mere t a u t o l o g i e s 
and i t was the r e s u l t o f h i s a n a l y s i s t h a t he considered 
t h e o l o g i c a l e t h i c s as i n v a l i d a t e d as w e l l . 
On the other hand, Moore argues, e t h i c a l issues 
must be matters o f some s i g n i f i c a n c e and moral philosophy 
as a d i s c i p l i n e must s u r e l y be d e f e a t i n g i t s e l f by reduc-
t i o n i s m i n so f a r as the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y i s committed. 
I f i t i s assumed t h a t the task of a moral philosopher i s 
not only t o provide some i n s i g h t i n t o what i s good but 
also t o be convincing or persuasive, then such persuasion 
cannot be done e f f e c t i v e l y when good i s reduced to some 
othe r o b j e c t or quality., The r e d u c t i o n can only lead t o 
the conclusion t h a t to be moral i s to know the d e f i n i = 
t i o n s of t h i n g s or at l e a s t t o know the way people use 
words and s p e c i f i c a l l y the way they use the word good* 
To help us i n t h i s understanding, we need the sciences, .. 
or those d i s c i p l i n e s whose purpose i s d e s c r i p t i v e , r a t h e r 
than moral philosophy. Moore appeals t o our experience 
as ones who r e f l e c t on matters o f d e c i s i o n t o argue t h a t 
when we i n q u i r e a f t e r what i s good we are asking f o r 
something other than a d e f i n i t i o n of the matter under 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . "Everyone does i n f a c t understand the 
question 'Is t h i s good? 1 When he t h i n k s o f i t , h i s s t a t e 
of mind i s d i f f e r e n t from what i t would be, were he asked 
•Is t h i s pleasant, or d e s i r e d , or approved?' I t has a 
d i s t i n c t meaning f o r him, even though he may not recognise 
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i t i s d i s t i n c t . " 1 The other aspect o f Moore's v e r s i o n of 
the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y i s thus the. claim t h a t good i s 
unique or autonomous'and every attempt t o reduce i t t o 
something else not only destroys t h i s uniqueness but 
defeats the task o f moral philosophy, the need f o r which 
i s e s t a b l i s h e d on the basis o f our experience of dilemma 
and d e c i s i o n . Moore's v e r s i o n of t h i s f a l l a c y i s t h e r e -
f o r e a p p r o p r i a t e l y l a b e l l e d "the n o n = r e d u c i b i l i t y o f 
good" and we w i l l see the ways i n which t h i s v e r s i o n 
d i f f e r s from another proposed by Hume l a t e r on i n t h i s 
chaptero 
Before proceeding, however, we should also 
examine the way i n which Moore applied the understanding 
of t h i s f a l l a c y t o the second major•concern o f e t h i c s , 
namely t o provide some i n s i g h t i n t o what t h i n g s are good 
i n themselves. I t was Moore's f i r s t concern i n t h i s 
a p p l i c a t i o n t o show t h a t the moral philosophy of some 
of h i s predecessors, p a r t i c u l a r l y Spencer, M i l l , and 
Sidgwick, i s g u i l t y of committing t h i s f a l l a c y i n 
i d e n t i f y i n g good w i t h some n a t u r a l o b j e c t . I n t h i s 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , the n a t u r a l o b j e c t or q u a l i t y i s con= 
sidered t o be the one t h i n g which i s good i n i t s e l f and, 
i t i s assumed, t h a t i n knowing t h i s one t h i n g one knows 
the meaning o f good. Now i t was c e r t a i n l y not Moore's 
i n t e n t i o n t o maintain t h a t we cannot say at a l l what i s 
good i n i t s e l f simply because good i s i n d e f i n a b l e ] 
r a t h e r he i s attempting t o separate out the two questions 
1 I b i d . , p. 1 6 = 1 7 . 
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which are confused i n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of good w i t h 
some n a t u r a l o b j e c t . The one question i s t o ask about 
the meaning of good; the second i 3 t o ask what t h i n g s 
are good 0 
That a t h i n g should be good, i t has been 
thought, means t h a t i t possesses t h i s s i n g l e 
p r o p e r t y ; and hence ( i t i s thought) only what 
possesses t h i s p r o p e r t y i s good. The i n f e r -
ence seems very n a t u r a l ; and y e t what i s meant 
by i t i s s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y o For those who 
make i t f a i l t o perceive t h a t t h e i r conclusion 
"what possesses t h i s p r o p e r t y i s good" i s a 
s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o s i t i o n : t h a t i t does not 
mean e i t h e r "what possesses t h i s p r o p e r t y , 
possesses t h i s p r o p e r t y " or "the word 'good' 
denotes t h a t a t h i n g possesses t h i s property,," 
And y e t , i f i t does not mean one or other o f 
these two t h i n g s , the infer e n c e c o n t r a d i c t s 
i t s own premise.! 
I n those systems o f e t h i c s which Moore c a l l s " n a t u r a l i s t i c 
e t h i c s " goodness i s seen "to co n s i s t i n a r e l a t i o n t o 
something which e x i s t s here and now . . however^ h i s 
c r i t i c i s m i s e q u a l l y f o r c e f u l against metaphysical 
systems of e t h i c s i n which goodness i s defined i n rela° 
t l o n t o a transcendent or non-natural o b j e c t or q u a l i t y . 
I t i s here t h a t h i s c r i t i c i s m i s d i r e c t e d against the 
S t o i c s , Spinoza, Hegel and Kant and several important 
p o i n t s are f u r t h e r made regarding the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
the discovery o f t h i s f a l l a c y f o r the task of e t h i c s . 
Metaphysical e t h i c s are those systems which "use 
some metaphysical p r o p o s i t i o n as a ground f o r i n f e r r i n g 
some fundamental p r o p o s i t i o n of E t h i c s . The task o f 
the metaphysician, as Moore i n t e r p r e t s i t , i s thus not 
1 2 I b i d . , p, 3 8 < . I b i d . , p. 1 1 0 . 
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only t o describe or d e f i n e the nature of a supersensible 
r e a l i t y which i s not a p a r t o f the n a t u r a l world but t o 
maintain as w e l l t h a t p r a c t i c a l e t h i c a l t r u t h s can be 
l o g i c a l l y derived from such d e s c r i p t i o n s . Such a deriva= 
t i o n i s made on the grounds t h a t the "Supreme Good" can 
be defined i n metaphysical terms and the i n s i s t e n c e i s 
t h a t "Ethics should be 'based' on Metaphysics, 1 , 1 or 
"tha t the question 'What i s r e a l ? ' has some l o g i c a l 
b earing upon the question 'What i s good?'" Moore's 
c r i t i c i s m of metaphysical e t h i c s i s thus t h a t ; 
To ho l d t h a t from any p r o p o s i t i o n a s s e r t i n g 
" R e a l i t y i s o f t h i s n a t u r e " we can i n f e r , or 
o b t a i n c o n f i r m a t i o n f o r , any p r o p o s i t i o n 
a s s e r t i n g "This i s good i n i t s e l f " i s t o 
commit the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y . And t h a t a 
knowledge of what i s r e a l supplies reasons 
f o r h o l d i n g c e r t a i n t h i n g s t o be good i n them-
selves i s e i t h e r implied or expressly asserted 
by a l l those who d e f i n e the Supreme Good i n 
metaphysical terms.3 
Now Moore i s here faced w i t h the d i f f i c u l t y of e x p l a i n i n g 
p r e c i s e l y why metaphysics cannot be r e l e v a n t t o e t h i c a l 
concerns and two of h i s reasons are o f s p e c i a l importance 
t o r e l i g i o u s e t h i c s . His f i r s t argument i n v o l v e s the 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t metaphysics could be r e l e v a n t t o p r a c t i c a l 
e t h i c s i f i t could t e l l us about the p o s s i b l e existence 
i n the f u t u r e of some r e a l i t y which our actions now could 
e f f e c t . Since p r a c t i c a l e t h i c s i s concerned w i t h means, 
then the d e s c r i p t i o n of some f u t u r e end t o which our 
1 3 I b i d . , p. l l l j , . I b i d . , p. 1 1 1 * . 
2 I b i d o , p. 1 1 3 o 
actions may be d i r e c t e d w i l l be h i g h l y r e l e v a n t t o answer-
i n g the p r a c t i c a l question, "What ought we t o do?"^ Moore 
seems i n t h i s p a r t of h i s argument t o be assuming t h a t the 
goodness of t h i s f u t u r e goal w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d independ-
e n t l y of the d e s c r i p t i o n and t h e r e f o r e w i l l not be the 
r o l e o f metaphysics t o j u s t i f y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , as Moore 
p o i n t s out, metaphysics i s not s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h i s r o l e o f 
d e s c r i b i n g the f u t u r e , but i s r a t h e r i n t e r e s t e d i n d e s c r i b -
i n g the nature of e t e r n a l r e a l i t y . Therefore i t cannot be 
r e l e v a n t t o e t h i c s ; "For i t i s p l a i n t h a t what e x i s t s 
e t e r n a l l y cannot be a f f e c t e d by our a c t i o n s ; and only what 
i s a f f e c t e d by our acti o n s can have a bearing on t h e i r 
value as means." 
I t i s here- t h a t Moore has again separated two 
questions which are considered i n metaphysical e t h i c a l 
systems t o have some bearing upon one another? the 
question "What i s r e a l ? " and the question "What i s good?" 
Indeed the consequence o f t h i s separation i 3 t h a t a 
l o g i c a l gap i s seen t o e x i s t between the two such t h a t 
answers t o one cannot be also answers t o the oth e r . 
Moore was prepared t o go so f a r as t o say t h a t i m a g i n a t i o n 
or f i c t i o n has more relevance t o e t h i c s than metaphysics. 
The metaphysical c o n s t r u c t i o n of R e a l i t y would 
t h e r e f o r e be q u i t e as u s e f u l , f o r the purposes 
of E t h i c s , i f i t were a mere c o n s t r u c t i o n of an 
I b i d . , p. 1 1 5 . Moore claims here t h a t "The 
C h r i s t i a n d o c t r i n e s o f heaven and h e l l are i n t h i s way 
h i g h l y r e l e v a n t t o p r a c t i c a l e t h i c s . " 
2 I b i d . , p. 1 1 7 . 
imaginary Utopia; provided the kind o f t h i n g 
suggested i s the same, f i c t i o n i s as u s e f u l as 
t r u t h , f o r g i v i n g us matter, upon which t o 
exercise the judgment o f v a l u e , 1 
And l a t e r i n the same s e c t i o n he claims t h a t the " w i l d e r " 
the speculations and d e s c r i p t i o n s of metaphysics are, the 
more u s e f u l they are f o r e t h i c s , but the l e s s u s e f u l f o r 
metaphysics. Now i t i s p r e c i s e l y the reason f o r t h i s 
a s s e r t i o n regarding the r o l e of imagination i n e t h i c a l 
d e c i s i o n t h a t we need t o discover and i n so doing t o 
understand the nature of t h i s gap which Moore b e l i e v e d 
t o e x i s t between goodness and r e a l i t y . This reason f o r 
Moore i s t i e d up w i t h the f a c t t h a t what already e x i s t s 
i s not t o be a f f e c t e d by e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n ; on the other 
hand, what can be ."suggested" i s e n t i r e l y r e l e v a n t t o the 
concern of e t h i c s w i t h what ought t o be. The gap i s 
t h e r e f o r e t h a t what is_ the case i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n i t s e l f 
but can have no bearing on what ought t o be the case. 
Before l e a v i n g Moore's discussion o f the n a t u r a l -
i s t i c f a l l a c y , we need t o look c a r e f u l l y a t h i s argument 
concerning Kant and the attempt t o e s t a b l i s h the knowl= 
edge of e t h i c a l demands by the f a c t t h a t something i s 
w i l l e d or commanded. Here again, according t o Moore, the 
mistake i s made t h a t "what i s good" i s made to seem 
i d e n t i c a l w i t h "being w i l l e d , " and the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
t h i s time between a p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t and the good i s 
again f a l l a c i o u s . Moore's argument hinges on h i s i n t e r ~ 
p r e t a t i o n of Kantian epistemology. He takes Kant t o be 
1 I b i d . , p. 1 2 1 . 2 I b i d . 
saying not j u s t t h a t " w i l l i n g i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n 
f o r the c o g n i t i o n of goodness," but "t h a t t o w i l l a 
t h i n g , or t o have a c e r t a i n f e e l i n g towards a t h i n g , i s 
the same t h i n g as to t h i n k i t good." 1 i n other words, 
goodness and v o l i t i o n are connected c a u s a l l y , a p o s i t i o n 
Moore i s prepared t o accept, as w e l l as by i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . 
Moore argues against Kant t h a t Kant confuses what are 
ps y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t s w i t h a d e f i n i t i o n o f what i s good and 
he does so i n t h i s way; Kant takes as a model f o r moral 
knowledge what Moore considers t o be an u t t e r l y f a l s e 
n o t i o n of o r d i n a r y knowledge, namely "t h a t f o r a t h i n g 
t o be_ t r u e i s the same t h i n g as f o r i t t o be perceived 
or thought o f i n a c e r t a i n way."^ Kant, Moore maintains, 
has t r e a t e d moral knowledge i n an analogous way and has 
thus made the t r u t h of a thi n g ' s goodness dependent upon 
i t s being f e l t or w i l l e d i n a c e r t a i n way. For Moore, 
the t r u t h or r e a l i t y of goodness i s independent of the 
presence i n one's mind o f some f e e l i n g or o t h e r ; though., 
t h i s f e e l i n g or v o l i t i o n may cause one to recognise what 
i s good i n i t s e l f , i t cannot be a c r i t e r i o n f o r the good= 
ness o f t h a t o b j e c t o r q u a l i t y . - ^ Moore has attempted t o 
show t h a t , on the grounds of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y , 
metaphysics and e t h i c s must be kept a p a r t . The gap i s 
t h e r e f o r e e s t a b l i s h e d between f a c t and value, between 
what i s t r u e or r e a l and what i s good or what ought t o 
be the case. 
•'"Ibid., p. 1 3 1 o I b i d . , p. 1 3 7 - 8 o 
I t remains only f o r us to describe the way i n 
which Moore beli e v e d the good i n i t s e l f t o be known, i f 
i t cannot be known through i d e n t i f y i n g i t w i t h any 
n a t u r a l object or q u a l i t y already known nor through meta-
p h y s i c a l knowledge, Moore has by h i s c r i t i c i s m of other 
e t h i c a l systems determined the two major problems which 
h i s own view w i l l have to meet s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . On the 
one hand he must i n d i c a t e the way i n which good can be • 
known since our knowledge o f n a t u r a l or metaphysical 
f a c t s cannot e n t a i l any conclusion regarding what i s good 
i n i t s e l f . On the other hand he must s p e c i f y the s i g n i f i -
cance o f such moral knowledge both i n so f a r as disagree-
ment i s concerned and w i t h regard to i t s relevance f o r 
p r a c t i c a l decisions about what we ought to do. 
Moore appeals t o experience t o make h i s f i r s t 
p o i n t , t h a t good i s known by each of us t o be a unique 
and i n d e f i n a b l e o b j e c t . This awareness of the uniqueness 
of good sounds very much l i k e i n t u i t i o n i s m and although 
Moore d i s s o c i a t e d h i m s e l f from several aspects o f the 
i n t u i t i o n i s m of h i s predecessors, i t seems he cannot 
avoid r e s t i n g h i s own understanding of moral knowledge 
upon the same f o u n d a t i o n . 1 He asks each o f us t o r e f l e c t 
on the meaning of the good and would r e s t h i s case on the 
v a l i d i t y o f such i n t r o s p e c t i o n . Yet, as W. D. Hudson has 
asked, 
•'•Moore here comes close to c o n t r a d i c t i n g h i s e a r l i e r 
arguments against n a t u r a l i s t i c d e f i n i t i o n s of good, by 
cl a i m i n g t h a t some basic t r u t h s about good are indeed s e l f -
e v i d e n t . Cf. G. J. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy 
(Macmillan, London, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. i | - 5 » 
. . . do a l l men have before t h e i r minds t h i s 
unique o b j e c t when they t h i n k about good? I n 
order to answer t h a t we would have t o do two 
t h i n g s : one, t o decide what are the appro~ 
p r i a t e c r i t e r i a f o r determining when a man has 
t h i s unique o b j e c t before h i s mind and when he 
has n o t j and the o t h e r , t o t e s t a l l men by 
these c r i t e r i a i n order to see whether or not 
they a l l do have t h a t unique o b j e c t before 
t h e i r minds when they t h i n k of good. I t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o decide what such c r i t e r i a could 
be; and c e r t a i n l y no one has ever conducted 
the consequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
Moore's appeal to our i n t u i t i o n of the good provides the 
basis o f h i s argument regarding the Supreme Good i n the 
f i n a l chapter o f h i s book. Our understanding of those 
o b j e c t s or q u a l i t i e s which are good i n themselves i s 
derived i n the f o l l o w i n g ways 
I n order to a r r i v e at a c o r r e c t d e c i s i o n on the 
f i r s t p a r t of t h i s question ( i . e . "What things 
have i n t r i n s i c value . . . " ) , i t i s necessary 
t o consider what t h i n g s are such t h a t , i f they 
e x i s t e d by themselves, i n absolute i s o l a t i o n , 
we should y e t judge t h e i r existence t o be good; 
and, i n order to decide upon the r e l a t i v e degrees 
o f value o f d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , we must s i m i l a r l y 
consider what comparative value seems t o a t t a c h 
t o the i s o l a t e d existence o f each.2 
This method of reasoning i s used by Moore i n h i s c r i t i q u e 
o f hedonism i n which he argues t h a t the i s o l a t i o n of our 
"consciousness of pleasure" p l a i n l y shows us t h a t i t i s 
not the sole o b j e c t which i s good i n i t s e l f . ^ The good 
i s thus known by our i n t u i t i o n which allows us t o appre= 
hend the uniqueness o f good as a q u a l i t y or o b j e c t and t o 
W. D„ Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (Doubleday, 
Garden C i t y , New York, 1 9 7 0 ) , p. b"3. 
Moore, op. c i t . , p. 1 8 5 . 
I b i d . , p. 9 5 = 6 „ 
focus our a t t e n t i o n on those p a r t i c u l a r o bjects or q u a l -
i t i e s which i n i s o l a t i o n would seem t o us t o belong t o 
the Supreme Good. 
However, the d i f f i c u l t y w i t h Moore's statement of 
i n t u i t i o n i s m i s not only t h a t there i s no way o f t e s t i n g 
the t r u t h of h i s fundamental premise but also t h a t there 
are no o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a by which we might disagree about 
what i s good i n i t s e l f . Moore wants t o claim on the one 
hand t h a t i n t u i t i o n s can be t r u e or f a l s e . His argument 
against n a t u r a l i s t i c and metaphysical e t h i c s r e s t s on h i s 
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t they are based on a d e f i n i t i o n o f good 
which does not allow any t e s t o f i t s own v a l i d i t y . How-
ever, h i s understanding of the Supreme Good does not a l l o w 
such an o b j e c t i v e t e s t ; indeed, can i t be otherwise i f 
i n t u i t i o n i s the mode of apprehending the good? His 
argument i s c i r c u l a r t o the extent t h a t the t r u t h or 
f a l s i t y of our i n t u i t i o n of t h a t which i s good i n i t s e l f 
i s known by i n t u i t i o n i t s e l f ; our i n t u i t i o n becomes the -
c r i t e r i o n f o r the t r u t h of what we so i n t u i t . This 
method o f reasoning i s e s p e c i a l l y c l e a r i n Moore's f i n a l 
chapter on "The I d e a l . " 
By f a r the most valuable t h i n g s , which we know 
or can imagine, are c e r t a i n s t a t e s o f conscious-
ness, which may be roughly described as the 
pleasures o f human i n t e r c o u r s e and the enjoyment 
of b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t s . No one, probably, who has 
asked h i m s e l f the question, has ever doubted 
t h a t personal a f f e c t i o n and the a p p r e c i a t i o n o f 
what i s b e a u t i f u l i n A r t or Nature, are good i n 
themselves; nor, i f we consider s t r i c t l y what 
things are worth having p u r e l y f o r t h e i r own 
sakes, does i t appear probable t h a t any one w i l l 
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t h i n k t h a t anything else has n e a r l y so great a 
value as the t h i n g s which are included under 
these two heads. 1 
Although Moore does not commit the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y 
h i m s e l f i n t h i s chapter by c l a i m i n g t h a t our agreement 
as to those t h i n g s which we would a l l apprehend as being 
good i n themselves i s the d e f i n i t i o n of or the c r i t e r i o n 
f o r t h e i r being good i n themselves, nevertheless he 
appeals t o a mode o f apprehension of good which can only 
be j u s t i f i e d on i t s own grounds. I f the metaphysical task 
of d e s c r i b i n g the good which i s so i n t u i t e d i s considered 
i r r e l e v a n t t o e t h i c s , then by what procedures can i n t u i -
t i o n c o r r e c t or r e f i n e i t s e l f ? Moore hopes to convince us 
but can o f f e r no o b j e c t i v e reasons f o r h i s statement t h a t 
these t h i n g s (that" i s , personal a f f e c t i o n and beauty) are 
"truths""and " t h a t they are the r a i s o n d'etre of v i r t u e j 
t h a t i t i s they . . . t h a t form the r a t i o n a l u l t i m a t e end 
of human a c t i o n and the sole c r i t e r i o n of s o c i a l progress 
!f 2 
° • o o The r e s u l t o f Moore's r e j e c t i o n of any ethics' 
g u i l t y of committing the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y i s thus an 
i n t u i t i o n i s t view o f moral knowledge i n which the gap 
between f a c t and value i s a f f i r m e d and upheld. 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e important a t t h i s p o i n t to describe 
another view o f the nature o f moral knowledge and d e c i s i o n 
which i s a r e s u l t o f Moore's r e f u t a t i o n of n a t u r a l i s m . The 
emotive theory o f e t h i c s , as J. 0 . Urmson has pointed o u t , 
•4bid., p. 1 8 8 = 9 . 
2 I b i d . , p. 1 8 9 . 
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i s based on two primary p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . The f i r s t has 
t o do w i t h a theory of meaning which was suggested by 
2 
I . A. Richards and C. K. Ogden and l a t e r by Susan 
•j 
Stebbing. I n both of these works the suggestion i s made 
t h a t some kinds of language, and e t h i c a l language i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , have another k i n d o f use than d e s c r i p t i v e or 
s c i e n t i f i c language. I t i s maintained t h a t t h i s use t o 
which language i s put i s d i f f e r e n t than the r e f e r e n t i a l 
one upon which Moore's r e j e c t i o n o f n a t u r a l i s m i s based 
and t h i s use may be more appropriate to our understanding 
of moral language. As Hudson has argued, t h i s view o f 
the d i f f e r e n t uses of language i s t i e d up w i t h the l o g i c a l 
p o s i t i v i s t s ' claim t h a t f o r p r o p o s i t i o n s t o be meaningful 
they must e i t h e r be a n a l y t i c a l l y t r u e or e m p i r i c a l l y 
v e r i f i a b l e . ^ Now Moore had argued, as we have j u s t seen, 
J. 0 . Urmson, The Emotive Theory of E t h i c s 
(Hutchinson U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y , London, 196b). 
2 
I . A. Richards and C. K. Ogden, The Meaning of 
Meaning (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1 9 2 3 ) , p. 1 2 5 > . 
'*'Good ' i s alleged to stand f o r a unique, unanalyzable 
concept . . . [which] i s the subject matter of e t h i c s . 
This p e c u l i a r e t h i c a l use o f 'good' i s , we suggest, a 
p u r e l y emotive use. When so used the word stands f o r 
nothing whatever, and has no symbolic f u n c t i o n . " 
^Susan Stebbing, A Modern I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Logic 
(Methuen, London, 1 9 3 0 ) , p. 1 9 » "When tlanguage] i s used 
i n order to arouse an emotional a t t i t u d e i n the hearer, 
t o i n f l u e n c e him i n any way other than by g i v i n g him 
i n f o r m a t i o n , then i t s use i s emotive." 
Hudson, op. c i t . , p. 1 0 7 = 1 1 » 
t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n s about the good cannot be mere t a u t o l -
ogies because they become i n s i g n i f i c a n t nor can they be 
subjected t o an o b j e c t i v e t e s t of t h e i r v a l i d i t y such as 
the ones o f f e r e d by e m p i r i c a l v e r i f i c a t i o n . Ayer's 
answer t o t h i s dilemma i s t o r e j e c t any po s s i b l e meaning 
f o r e t h i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s a t a l l . 1 His argument against 
Moore i s thus a r e j e c t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y o f some non-
v e r i f i a b l e , yet s y n t h e t i c , knowledge of good which has 
absolute v a l i d i t y . While accepting the gap between f a c t 
and value, Ayer r e j e c t s the p o s s i b i l i t y of some "myster-
ious ' i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n 1 " by which good i s known. 
A f e a t u r e of t h i s theory, which i s seldom recog-
nized by i t s advocates, i s t h a t i t makes s t a t e -
ments o f value u n v e r i f i a b l e . For i t i s n o t o r i o u s 
t h a t what seems i n t u i t i v e l y c e r t a i n t o one person 
may seem d o u b t f u l , or even f a l s e , t o another. So 
t h a t unless i t i s possible t o provide some c r i -
t e r i o n by which one may decide between c o n f l i c t i n g 
i n t u i t i o n s , a mere appeal t o i n t u i t i o n i s worth-
less as a t e s t of a p r o p o s i t i o n ' s v a l i d i t y . 3 
The stage i s now set f o r a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the use t o which 
e t h i c a l language i s put i f i t i s not t o s t a t e anything 
s i g n i f i c a n t about the nature o f the world which could be 
shown t o be tr u e or f a l s e . I n Ayer's words, " . . . we 
have seen t h a t sentences which simply express moral 
judgments do not say anything. They are pure expressions 
of f e e l i n g and as such do not come under the category of 
"''A. J. Ayer, Language, T r u t h and Logic ( V i c t o r 
Gollancz, London, 1 9 5 5 » second e d i t i o n ) , Chapter 6 , 
" C r i t i q u e o f E t h i c s and Theology." 
2 I b i d . , p. 1 0 6 . 
I b i d . 
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t r u t h or falsehood. They are u n v e r i f i a b l e f o r the same 
reason as a c r y o f p a i n or a word of command i s u n v e r i -
fiable--because they do not express genuine p r o p o s i t i o n s . "^ 
Here we have then the statement of the emotive use t o 
which language can be put i n which the separation between 
f a c t and value i s even more complete than i n Moore» 
This new understanding o f the use o f moral language 
i s also seen as a way o f avoiding the a l t e r n a t i v e s which 
Moore had posed f o r e t h i c s and t h i s i s i t s second presup-
p o s i t i o n . As Urmson st a t e s t h i s , " . . . the o r i g i n a l 
ground f o r the proposal of the emotive theory was the 
need t o f i n d some way out from the unacceptable dichotomy 
of n a t u r a l i s m and non-naturalism. The emotive account 
of morals i s c r i t i c a l of the weak p o i n t i n Moore's a n a l y s i s , 
t h a t moral knowledge i s the i n t u i t i o n of a unique k i n d o f 
non-natural f a c t , and since i t accepts Moore's c r i t i q u e o f 
n a t u r a l i s m , t h i s emotive account i s borne out of 
"epistemological d e s p a i r , " 3 As Urmson f u r t h e r makes 
c l e a r , however, there i s p o s i t i v e reason as w e l l f o r the 
emergence of t h i s account. Moore had given l o g i c a l and 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l reasons f o r the r e j e c t i o n o f n a t u r a l i s m 
i n favour of h i s account of i n t u i t i o n i s m . The emotive 
account i s an attempt to understand the power or "magnet «= 
ism" of moral judgements which does not seem t o f o l l o w 
^ b i d . , p. 1 0 8 - 9 . 
^Urmson, op. c i t . , p. l 8 „ 
3 I b i d . , p. 19. 
l o g i c a l l y from e i t h e r the d e s c r i p t i o n of a set o f n a t u r a l 
f a c t s nor the a s s e r t i o n of our i n t u i t i v e knowledge of 
some non-natural f a c t s . 1 The e m o t i v i s t account i s thus 
i n t e r e s t e d i n the r o l e which our f e e l i n g s and a t t i t u d e s 
p l a y i n moral knowledge and d e c i s i o n and i n so d e s c r i b i n g 
t h i s r o l e w i l l attempt t o avoid the a l t e r n a t i v e s which 
Moore had suggested. 
Both these concerns of the e m o t i v i s t account can 
be seen i n the work o f C. L. Stevenson who developed an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f e t h i c s i n which the n a t u r a l i s t i c 
f a l l a c y was taken s e r i o u s l y w h i l e an a l t e r n a t i v e to 
p 
i n t u i t i o n i s m was proposed. The f i r s t premise o f 
Stevenson's work i s t h a t e t h i c a l language i s the expres= 
sio n o f personal a t t i t u d e s and these are to be d i s t i n = 
guished from expressions o f b e l i e f , which are given i n 
f a c t u a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , and from expressions o f emotion. 
I t i s -important to emphasize here, as Hudson p o i n t s o u t , 
t h a t Stevenson takes e t h i c a l language t o be p r i m a r i l y 
expressive, not i n d i c a t i v e . ^ I f e t h i c a l judgements were 
^ I b i d . , p. 2 0 j Hudson, op. c i t . , p. ll£. 
2 
C. L. Stevenson, E t h i c s and Language (Yale 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, New Haven, 19kh) and Facts and Values 
(Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, New Haven, 1 9 6 3 7 " ° ~~ 
3 
A f u l l e r account o f Stevenson's d i s t i n c t i o n s 
here between a t t i t u d e s , emotions, and b e l i e f s w i l l be 
given l a t e r i n our discussion of the n o t i o n o f onlooks. 
Here we are o n l y i n t e r e s t e d i n showing how Stevenson's 
account r e a f f i r m s the f a l l a c y o f n a t u r a l i s m i n e t h i c s 
and y e t avoids i n t u i t i o n i s m . 
^Hudson, op. c i t . , p. 1 1 7 » 
merely taken as r e p o r t s of i n n e r a t t i t u d e s or i f i t were 
considered t o be the speaker's i n t e n t i o n t o describe to 
others the f a c t s o f h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l make-up, then t h a t 
language would not only be g u i l t y o f reducing values t o " 
f a c t s b ut i t would also have been misunderstood. 
Doubtless there i s always some element o f 
d e s c r i p t i o n i n e t h i c a l judgments, but t h i s i s 
by no means a l l . Their major use i s not t o 
i n d i c a t e f a c t s but t o create an i n f l u e n c e . 
Instead of merely d e s c r i b i n g people's i n t e r e s t s 
they change or i n t e n s i f y them. They recommend 
an i n t e r e s t i n an o b j e c t , r a t h e r than s t a t e 
t h a t the i n t e r e s t already e x i s t s . 1 
According t o t h i s a n a l y s i s there are b a s i c a l l y two uses 
to which language can be p u t , d e s c r i p t i v e and expressive, 
or i n d i c a t i v e and dynamic. Though e t h i c a l language i s 
o f t e n i n the form of i n d i c a t i v e statements, i t s meaning, 
according t o Stevenson, i s expressive or dynamic. The 
model f o r e t h i c a l language i s t h e r e f o r e t h a t the proposi= 
t i o n "This i s good" means " I approve of t h i s ; do so as 
2 
w e l l . The i m p e r a t i v e - f u n c t i o n of the language i s thu3 
emphasized as the proper means of avoiding the n a t u r a l -
i s t i c f a l l a c y , i n place o f Moore's co n t e n t i o n t h a t t h i s 
language i s i n d i c a t i v e o f a s p e c i a l i n s i g h t . ^ 
Stevenson, Facts and Values, p. 1 6 . Cf. E t h i c s 
and Language, p. 3 3 « 
2 
Stevenson, E t h i c s and Language, p. 2 1 . I n h i s 
l a c k of emphasis on the d e s c r i p t i v e elements i n e t h i c a l 
language, Stevenson's a n a l y s i s i s le s s s u b t l e than t h a t 
of R. M o Hare, as we s h a l l see. 
- j 
J T h i s imperative f u n c t i o n i s dependent upon 
Stevenson's analysis o f the "meaning" o f language i n 
general i n which the causal power of t h a t language i s 
the c r i t e r i o n by which meaning i s judged. See Urmson, 
op. c i t . , chap. k> Hudson, op. c i t . , p. 121= 5 * and 
Warnock, op. c i t . , p. 2 1 = l + 0 
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Stevenson's discussion of the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
a t t i t u d e and b e l i e f shows most c l e a r l y h i s r e v i s i o n of 
Moore. An a t t i t u d e " i s a d i s p o s i t i o n t o act i n c e r t a i n 
ways and t o experience c e r t a i n f e e l i n g s , r a t h e r than 
i t s e l f a c e r t a i n a c t i o n or f e e l i n g . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n 
i s brought out most c l e a r l y by disagreements. Here 
Stevenson argues t h a t there i s an independent element i n 
e t h i c a l disagreements which cannot be 's e t t l e d w i t h r e f e r -
ence t o our b e l i e f s about the f a c t s of the s i t u a t i o n . I n 
t h i s way Stevenson hopes t o show t h a t the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
o f good w i t h some n a t u r a l or metaphysical f a c t i s 
f a l l a c i o u s , n ot because good i s mysterious and i n d e f i n a b l e 
but because i t s r e c o g n i t i o n i s dependent upon our a t t i -
tudes. The s u b j e c t i v e element i n moral judgements and 
p r a c t i c a l decisions i s not the personal i n t u i t i o n of what 
i s good i n i t s e l f , but i s r a t h e r our d i s p o s i t i o n , a compli-
cated phenomenon i n v o l v i n g f e e l i n g s , emotions, b e l i e f s , 
and so on, t o be f o r or against something. I n speaking 
about the good, one's i n t e n t i o n i s to give approval, not 
to describe the obj e c t t o which good i s a p p l i e d , nor t o 
o f f e r a d e f i n i t i o n of good i t s e l f . "A person who recog-
nises X t o be 'good' must ipso f a c t o acquire a stronger 
Stevenson, E t h i c s and Language, p. 90. Cf. also 
p. 60. An a t t i t u d e "designates any p s y c h o l o g i c a l dispo° -
s i t i o n o f being f o r or against something." Facts and 
Values, p. 1=2. On page 3 o f E t h i c s and Language, i n a 
f o o t n o t e , he claims t o be using t h i s word i n "the same 
broad sense t h a t R. B. Perry gives t o ' i n t e r e s t ' " i n h i s 
General Theory of Value (Longmans, Green, London, 1926). 
tendency t o act i n i t s f a v o r than he otherwise would have 
hado"^" Moore's i n t e n t i o n t o give an account o f e t h i c s 
which avoids the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y i s thus b e t t e r 
achieved by an an a l y s i s of t h i s s u b j e c t i v e element and 
t h i s a n a l y s i s , according t o Stevenson, re q u i r e s t h a t the 
magnetic power of e t h i c a l language and the r o l e o f a t t i = 
p 
tudes i n judgements and decisions be understood,, 
The second v e r s i o n o f the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y 
which deserves our a t t e n t i o n i s the one suggested by 
David Hume i n h i s T r e a t i s e on Human N a t u r e a J I n a con= 
el u d i n g paragraph of one s e c t i o n Hume w r i t e s ; 
I n every system o f m o r a l i t y which I have h i t h e r t o 
met w i t h , I have always remark'd, t h a t the author 
proceeds f o r some time i n the o r d i n a r y way o f 
reasoning, and_ es t a b l i s h e s the being o f a God, or 
makes observations concerning human a f f a i r s ; when 
of a sudden I am s u r p r i z ' d t o f i n d , t h a t instead 
o f the usual copulations o f p r o p o s i t i o n s , is.* and 
i s n o t , I meet w i t h no p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t i s not 
connected w i t h an ought, or an ought n o t . This 
change i s i m p e r c e p t i b l e ! but i s , however, of the 
l a s t consequence. For as t h i s ought or ought n o t , 
expresses some new r e l a t i o n or a f f i r m a t i o n ^ ' t i s 
necessary t h a t i t should be observ'd and e x p l a i n ' d j 
and a t the same time t h a t a reason should be gi v e n , 
f o r what seems a l t o g e t h e r i n c o n c e i v a b l e , how t h i s 
new r e l a t i o n can be a deduction from o t h e r s , which 
Stevenson, Facts and Values, p 0 13» 
2 
This i s the main thread of Stevenson's argument 
w i t h Moore i n h i s a r t i c l e , "Moore's Arguments against 
C e r t a i n Forms o f E t h i c a l N a t u r a l i s m " i n P„ A. S c h i l p p , 
E d o , The Philosophy o f G. E. Moore, V o l , IV o f the L i b r a r y 
o f L i v i n g Philosophers (Northwestern U n i v e r s i t y Press, 
Evanston, I l l i n o i s , 191+2), p. 71=90, See also Moore's 
"Reply to my C r i t i c s " i n the same volume, p. 535°5U° 
Do Hume, Tr e a t i s e on Human Nature, Book I I I , 
P art I , t r a n s , by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y 
Press, London, 1955)» 
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are e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from i t . But as authors 
do not commonly use t h i s p r e c a u t i o n , I s h a l l 
presume t o recommend i t t o the readers; and am 
persuaded t h a t t h i s small a t t e n t i o n wou'd sub~ 
v e r t a l l the v u l g a r systems of m o r a l i t y , and 
l e t us see, t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n o f v i c e and 
v i r t u e i s not founded merely on the r e l a t i o n s 
o f o b j e c t s , nor i s perceiv'd by reason.1 
Hume's c r i t i c i s m here appears t o be d i r e c t e d against those 
who would d e r i v e statements about what ought or ought not 
t o be the case from those regarding what i s or i s n o t the 
case by deduction. This v e r s i o n of the n a t u r a l i s t i c 
f a l l a c y can t h e r e f o r e be l a b e l l e d the " n o n - d e d u c a b i l i t y " 
of good. Yet p r e c i s e l y what Hume meant by h i s c r i t i c i s m 
i s s t i l l the subject o f co n t i n u i n g debate. To understand 
the nature o f t h i s v e r s i o n of the f a l l a c y we must t h e r e -
f o r e examine the two major l i n e s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which 
are c u r r e n t l y taken and see the consequences o f each w i t h 
regard t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p of " i s " and "ought." 2 
The standard i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hume has been taken 
by philosophers whose views on the nature o f moral language 
d i f f e r w i d e l y but who acknowledge the acceptance of Hume's 
non - d e d u c a b i l i t y p r i n c i p l e as one o f the major premises o f 
t h e i r accounts. Among the i n t u i t i o n i s t s P richard quotes 
the above paragraph from Hume i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the 
I b i d . , p. U69-70. 
2 
A comprehensive c o l l e c t i o n of these a r t i c l e s i s 
t o be found i n W. D. Hudson, Ed., The Is/Ought Question 
(Macmillan, London, 19&9), Part I . The s u b t i t l e o f t h i s 
work i n d i c a t e s the importance which many moral philoso° 
phers ascribe t o t h i s f a l l a c y ; i t i s "A C o l l e c t i o n o f 
Papers on the Central Problem i n Moral Philosophy." See 
also Hudson, op. c i t . , p. 2l|.9-6U» 
2h 
nature of moral o b l i g a t i o n , , 1 He takes Hume t o be askings 
What di s t i n g u i s h e s , our a s s e r t i o n , e.g., t h a t X 
ought t o be educating h i s son Y—where "ought" 
i s being used i n the moral sense==from our 
a s s e r t i o n , e.g., t h a t X i s educating h i s son Y? 
Prichard argues t h a t there i s no unique r e l a t i o n between 
X and h i s act o f educating Y i n the former a s s e r t i o n which 
i s not so of the l a t t e r , as Hume suggests. "Ought" t h e r e -
f o r e does not express a d i f f e r e n t r e l a t i o n o f subject and 
pre d i c a t e which i s not i m p l i e d by " i s . " Rather, according 
t o P r i c h a r d , 
. o . what seems to d i s t i n g u i s h the second 
a s s e r t i o n from the f i r s t i s t h a t i n i t we are 
a t t r i b u t i n g t o the same subject o f a t t r i b u t e s 
X, i . e . a s s e r t i n g him t o possess, an a t t r i b u t e 
o f a d i f f e r e n t k i n d , v i z . t h a t o f being under 
an o b l i g a t i o n t o educate Y, as d i s t i n c t from 
t h a t o f educating Y, so t h a t Hume's question 
becomes? "What i s the being under an o b l i g a t i o n 
t o do some a c t i o n ? " as d i s t i n c t from doing some 
a c t i o n . And i f t h i s be r i g h t , the nature of the 
thought which we express by a statement o f the 
form "X ought t o do so and so" i s more c l e a r l y 
expressed by s u b s t i t u t i n g a statement o f the 
form "X i s under an o b l i g a t i o n t o do so and so."3 
I t i s then the nature of t h i s o b l i g a t i o n which Prichard 
w i l l attempt t o describe and i n so doing w i l l m aintain 
t h a t a s s e r t i o n s about "ought" are s u i generis. 
Proponents o f the emotive theory o f e t h i c s also 
appeal to Hume on t h e i r b e h a l f . This i s seen f o r example 
i n the w r i t i n g o f Ayer, who claims s 
XH„ A. P r i c h a r d , Moral O b l i g a t i o n (Oxford Univer° 
s i t y Press, Oxford, 1968). 
2 I b i d J L , p. 92. 
3 I b i d . 
25 
I n f a c t the ( e m o t i v i s t ) theory only explores the 
consequences of a sound and respectable p o i n t of 
l o g i c which was already made by Hume; t h a t 
normative statements are not d e r i v a b l e from 
d e s c r i p t i v e statements, or, as Hume puts i t , 
t h a t "ought" does n o t f o l l o w from " i s . " To say 
t h a t moral judgments are not f a c t - s t a t i n g i s not 
to say t h a t they are unimportant, or even t h a t 
there cannot be arguments i n t h e i r f a v o u r . But 
these arguments do not work i n the way t h a t 
l o g i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c arguments d o . l 
Ayer's argument here and i n Language, T r u t h and Logic 
r e s t s on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hume as a r a d i c a l s c e p t i c 
who would h i m s e l f have i m p l i c i t l y agreed w i t h Ayer's 
c e n t r a l t h e s i s regarding the c r i t e r i a f o r meaning. A f t e r 
q u o t i n g Hume's d i a t r i b e against the w r i t i n g s o f theology 
or metaphysics, Ayer asks: 
What i s t h i s but a r h e t o r i c a l v e r s i o n o f our own 
t h e s i s t h a t a sentence which does not express 
e i t h e r a f o r m a l l y t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n or an e m p i r i -
c a l hypothesis i s devoid of l i t e r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e ? 2 
Whatever s i g n i f i c a n c e moral language i s t o have i s due 
s o l e l y t o i t s expressive value and language which expresses 
emotions or sentiments can su r e l y not be deriv e d l o g i c a l l y 
from language which does n o t . I n s t r e s s i n g the emotive 
f o r c e of e t h i c a l language and p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s p r a c t i c a l 
importance i n making decisions, Ayer accepts Hume's 
A. J . Ayer, L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s m (Free Press, 
Glencoe, I l l i n o i s , 1 9 5 9 ) , p. 22. 
2 
Ayer, l o c . c i t . , p. 5U-5» This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of Hume i s supported by Anthony Flew i n h i s essay "On the 
I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Hume" i n Philosophy, V o l . XXVIII ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 
r e p r i n t e d i n V/. D. Hudson, The Is/Ought Question, p. 6 1 | = 9 . 
Flow's concluding sentence i s ; I t i s j u s t t h i s s o r t of 
b r i l l i a n t harshness which sometimes makes one want t o 
describe the T r e a t i s e as Hume's Language, T r u t h and 
Logic." 
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" f a l l a c y " as meaning t h a t any metaphysical or even 
i n t u i t i o n i s t questions i n v o l v i n g a d e s c r i p t i o n o f value 
are out of place i n e t h i c s . I n h i s essay, "On the 
Analysis o f Moral Judgments," he d i s t i n g u i s h e s once and 
f o r a l l the separate domains o f d e s c r i p t i v e and p r e s c r i p -
t i v e language and t u r n s the n o t i o n o f the "non-deducability 
of good" to h i s favour i n d i s c l a i m i n g h i s own account as 
" s u b j e c t i v e . " 
The problem i s not t h a t the s u b j e c t i v i s t denies 
t h a t c e r t a i n w i l d , or domesticated animals, 
" o b j e c t i v e v alues," e x i s t and the o b j e c t i v i s t 
t r i u m p h a n t l y produces them; or t h a t the objec-
t i v i s t r e t u r n s l i k e an e x p l o r e r w i t h t a l e s from 
the kingdom of values and the s u b j e c t i v i s t says 
he i s a l i a r . I t does not matter what the 
expl o r e r f i n d s or does not f i n d . For t a l k i n g 
about values i s not a matter o f d e s c r i b i n g what 
may or may not be t h e r e , the problem being 
whether i t r e a l l y i s the r e . There i s no such 
problem. The moral problem i s ; What am I t o 
do? What a t t i t u d e am I t o take? And moral 
judgments are d i r e c t i v e s i n t h i s sense. 
The r e s u l t o f flyer's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hume and h i s accept-
ance of the claim t h a t "ought" cannot be l o g i c a l l y derived 
from " i s " i s t h a t n ot only the substance but also the 
language o f f a c t and value are s t r i c t l y separated so t h a t 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between them becomes problematic. 
Stevenson was another e m o t i v i s t who took Hume's 
discussion of " i s " and "ought" t o lend support t o h i s own 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of e t h i c a l language. As Toulmin has 
pointed o u t, Ayer's account of e t h i c s and Stevenson's are-
d i f f e r e n t and t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s perhaps most c l e a r l y seen 
Ayer, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgments," 
Horizon, V o l . XX, No. 117 (19^9), r e p r i n t e d i n Ph i l o s o -
p h i c a l Essays (1963)* p. 2i+2e 
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i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Hume's account*'*" Stevenson 
argues t h a t Hume "has most c l e a r l y asked the questions 
t h a t here concern us, and has most n e a r l y reached a con= 
e l u s i o n t h a t the present w r i t e r can accept. As opposed 
t o Ayer, who i n t e r p r e t s Hume as denying any r o l e f o r 
reasonable i n q u i r y about the f a c t s i n determining matters 
o f m o r a l i t y , J Stevenson accuses Hume o f reducing value t o 
fact.** "Good" means f o r Hume "approved by most people"; 
and again, " . . . according to Hume, t o recognize t h a t 
something i s 'good' i s simply t o recognize t h a t the 
m a j o r i t y approve of i t . "^ Stevenson e a r l i e r argues t h a t 
Hume has made normative e t h i c s a n a t u r a l science by h i s 
a s s e r t i o n t h a t the statement "Anything i s good i f and only 
i f the vast m a j o r i t y of people, on being f u l l y and c l e a r l y 
informed about i t , would have approbation f o r i t " i s 
a n a l y t i c a l l y t r u e . 6 i t i s here t h a t Stevenson's debt to 
Hume becomes c l e a r f o r the d i s t i n c t i o n between b e l i e f s 
a n d " a t t i t u d e s which Hume suggests by the words "informed" 
and "approbation" i s taken up by Stevenson and st r e t c h e d 
f a r t h e r than Hume would have intended. Stevenson argues 
t h a t Hume has not made enough o f the d i s t i n c t i o n and has 
*S. E. Toulmin, The Place o f Reason i n E t h i c s 
(Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, Cambridge, 191*8)» Chapters 
2 
Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 273o 
-^Toulmin, op. c i t . , p. Sh°S" 
^Stevenson, Facts and Values, p. 11=1^0 
^ I b i d . , p. 11, 13. 
^Stevenson, E t h i c s and Language, p. 276. 
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t h e r e f o r e made e t h i c a l disagreements matters which could 
be solved by f a c t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n . He paraphrases Hume 
i n the f o l l o w i n g ways 
"X i s a v i r t u e " has the same meaning as '^C 
would be the o b j e c t of approbation o f almost 
any person who had f u l l and c l e a r f a c t u a l 
i n f o r m a t i o n about X„"l 
Thus i n Stevenson's view, Hume stresses e t h i c a l disagree^ 
ments as disagreements i n b e l i e f s which, i f solved, w i l l 
lead t o agreement about the " f a c t s " as w e l l as t o agree-
ment i n approbation or s u b j e c t i v e approval. He even 
includes Hume among the " n a t u r a l i s t s " who, although they 
stress the r o l e o f a t t i t u d e s i n e t h i c s , y e t imply " t h a t 
disagreement about what i s good i s disagreement i n b e l i e f 
about a t t i t u d e s . " I n t h i s sense, Stevenson i s able t o 
apply Moore's c r i t i q u e t o Hume. 
I t i s i n the w r i t i n g s o f R„ M, Hare t h a t Hume's 
ve r s i o n o f the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y i s advocated most 
„_ s t r o n g l y ; indeed we f i n d him speaking o f "Hume's law" 
w i t h reference t o the f a l l a c y o f deducing "ought" from 
" i s . " 3 He declares: 
1 I b i d . , p. 27l|. 
p 
Stevenson, Facts and Values, p. 3 « Flew would 
disagree w i t h Stevenson's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n here f o r he 
claims t h a t Hume would not have d i s t i n g u i s h e d what he 
sees t o be the case through a p s y c h o l o g i c a l analysis o f 
human behaviour from a l o g i c a l i n q u i r y r egarding the 
meaning of moral language. To take Hume as saying t h a t 
the meaning o f e t h i c a l language i s t h a t i t r e p o r t s our 
b e l i e f s about t h i n g s , and thus t h a t he reduces value t o 
f a c t , i s t o take him out of h i s own i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t e x t . 
Hume i s thus not o f f e r i n g d e f i n i t i o n s but making obser-
v a t i o n s . See A. Flew, op. c i t . , p a 6 8 „ 
^R. M o Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y 
Press, Oxford, 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 1 0 8 . Cf. also " U n i v e r s a l i s a b i l i t y , " 
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I have been i n the past, and s t i l l am, a st o u t 
defender o f Hume's do c t r i n e t h a t one cannot 
deduce moral judgements from non-moral s t a t e -
ments o f f a c t ; and also of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f the d o c t r i n e which says t h a t 
one cannot deduce moral judgements of substance 
from statements about the uses o f words or about 
the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s between concepts. 1 
I n h i s e a r l i e r book, a f t e r arguing against two forma o f 
moral reasoning which he claims would dispose o f "the 
v u l g a r systems of m o r a l i t y , " Hare again b r i n g s Hume t o 
hi s a i d . These two forms of reasoning ares 1) to regard 
moral p r i n c i p l e s as merely f a c t u a l , and 2) t o regard 
moral p r i n c i p l e s a s s e l f - e v i d e n t . 
A few g r e a t w r i t e r s , such as A r i s t o t l e , Hume, 
and Kant, though i t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d 
here and there i n t h e i r works tr a c e s o f these 
de f e c t s , can y e t , i f studied i n the r i g h t way,_ 
be seen t o avoid them i n t h e i r main d o c t r i n e s . 
Hare's use o f Hume thus d i f f e r s fundamentally from Steven-
son's, a d i f f e r e n c e which may perhaps be due t o the f a c t 
t h a t Stevenson does not quote the passage i n question i n 
e i t h e r of h i s books, nor i n h i s a r t i c l e discussing 
Moore's v e r s i o n of the f a l l a c y . The b e l i e f t h a t moral 
arguments must be deductive i s one o f the major presup-
p o s i t i o n s o f Hare's e x p l a n a t i o n of moral language i n terms 
of p r e s c r i p t i v i s m , and thus he w i l l seek an account o f 
moral language which takes t h i s n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y (and 
Proceedings o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n 'Society, V o l . LV (195k-5S)t 
P o 303. ' 
1 I b i d . , p. 186-7o 
^Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y 
Press, Oxford, 1952), p. kU-5° 
Moore'3 as w e l l ) s e r i o u s l y . As Hudson has r i g h t l y s t a t e d 
these three d i f f e r e n t accounts o f e t h i c s do not funda-
mentally d i f f e r i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the above-
mentioned passage from Hume. 
I n t u i t i o n i s t s , e m o t i v i s t s , and p r e s c r i p t i v i s t s 
who c i t e him have taken h i s word "deduction" 
to mean l o g i c a l entailment and h i s phrase 
"seems a l t o g e t h e r i n c o n c e i v a b l e " t o be a 
t y p i c a l l y i r o n i c a l understatement f o r " i s 
a l t o g e t h e r i n c o n c e i v a b l e . " They have taken 
h i s p o i n t t o be t h a t , from the premises 
( i ) "ought" cannot be e n t a i l e d by " i s " and 
( i i ) arguments are e i t h e r deductive or defec-
t i v e , the conclusion f o l l o w s t h a t there i s an 
impassable l o g i c a l g u l f between moral judgments 
and statements o f n a t u r a l , or s u p e r n a t u r a l , 
f a c t . l 
Now i t i s p r e c i s e l y the existence o f t h i s l o g i c a l g u l f 
which i s c a l l e d i n t o question by those who would o f f e r 
an a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Hume. Indeed these new 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s have been a major impetus f o r the most 
recent account of moral reasoning, d e s c r i p t i v i s m , which 
has been suggested as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o Hare's 
p r e s c r i p t i v i s m . I t w i l l be worthwhile t o examine two o f 
these new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f Hume t o complete the back-
ground f o r our discussion of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of i n d i c a -
t i v e and imperative i n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n . 
One o f these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i s o f f e r e d by 
A. C. Maclntyre who contends t h a t Hume cannot be con-
sidered j u s t l y t o be "an exponent of the autonomy of 
m o r a l i t y " on the grounds o f h i s own breach o f the "Law" 
Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 2fj>l. 
now so s t r i c t l y observed. Maclntyre centres h i s c r i t i -
cism of the standard i n t e r p r e t a t i o n around a dis c u s s i o n 
of the n o t i o n o f deduction i n Hume's thought, a n o t i o n 
which he takes t o mean simply "inference. " I f Hume does" 
mean t o say t h a t moral conclusions,"ought," cannot be 
deduced from f a c t u a l premises, " i s , " then perhaps i t was 
h i s i n t e n t i o n i n h i s own account of m o r a l i t y t o show how 
"ought" i s i n f e r r e d from " i s . " Two p o i n t s are mentioned 
i n p a r t i c u l a r to support t h i s view. One argument i s t h a t 
Hume was not discussing r u l e s o f l o g i c but was r a t h e r 
observing human behaviour. "His work i s f u l l o f anthro-
p o l o g i c a l and s o c i o l o g i c a l remarks, remarks sometimes 
ascribed by commentators t o the confusion between l o g i c 
and psychology w i t h which Hume i s so o f t e n c r e d i t e d . " 
Instead of making a l o g i c a l p o i n t , Hume i s o f f e r i n g a 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f the way i n which f a c t s are r e l e v a n t t o 
moral d e c i s i o n s , though t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not one o f 
deduction. Therefore, and t h i s i s Maclntyre's second 
p o i n t , Hume need not be c o n t r a d i c t i n g h i m s e l f as he i s 
considered t o do on the standard i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Maclntyre comes close here t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which 
Stevenson gives t o Hume, f o r he says, " . . . the n o t i o n 
of 'ought' i s f o r Hume only e x p l i c a b l e i n terms o f the 
n o t i o n o f a consensus of i n t e r e s t . " 3 Therefore a t the 
1A. C. Maclntyre, "Hume on ' I s ' and 'Ought'," 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, Vol . L X V I I I (1959), r e p r i n t e d i n 
Hudson, The Is/Ought Question, p. 36. 
I b i d . , p. 39. 
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basis of Hume's exp l a n a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y i s a "necessary 
t r u t h " from which "ought" can indeed be i n f e r r e d . 
Maclntyre then summarizes h i s argument i n t h i s matter 
by sayings 
Hume, then, i n the celebrated passage does 
not mention e n t a i l m e n t . What he does i s to 
ask how and i f moral r u l e s may be i n f e r r e d 
from f a c t u a l statements, and i n the r e s t o f 
book I I I o f the T r e a t i s e he provides an 
answer t o h i s own que s t i o n . ^ 
The gap between " i s " and "ought" i s thus closed by Hume, 
according t o Maclntyre, by h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t c e r t a i n 
kinds o f f a c t s , i . e . those which describe our passions, 
needs, d e s i r e s , i n t e r e s t s , and so f o r t h , can indeed 
p 
serve as l e g i t i m a t e reasons f o r moral i m p e r a t i v e s . 
Geoffrey Hunter o f f e r s another a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of Hume i n which he st a t e s even more e x p l i c i t l y 
than Maclntyre t h a t Hume h i m s e l f closed the gap between 
" i s " and "ought" by i d e n t i f y i n g some statements o f f a c t 
w i t h moral statements. " I n s h o r t , " he says, " i t i s a 
c e n t r a l p a r t o f Hume's moral theory t h a t moral judgements 
are statements o f f a c t . " 3 Thus Hume was not only uncon-
cerned about the s t r i c t entailment o f moral judgements 
from statements o f f a c t , he was n o t speaking o f an 
"*"Ibid., p. 
I b i d . , p. lj.6. 
3 
Geoffrey Hunter, "Hume on ' I s ' and 'Ought'," 
Philosophy, V o l . XXXVTII ( 1 9 6 2 ) , r e p r i n t e d i n Hudson, 
The Is/Ought Question, p. 6 0 . Hunter makes t h i s s t a t e -
ment on the basis of Hume's argument i n h i s Enquiry 
Concerning the P r i n c i p l e s of Morals. 
i n f e r e n c e a t a l l ; h i s i n t e n t i o n was r a t h e r t o show the 
i d e n t i t y o f the two. The problem w i t h such an i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n o f Hume i s t h a t i t makes Hume a s u b j e c t i v i s t 
i n h i s account of m o r a l i t y . He would, on t h i s reading, 
be saying t h a t moral judgements and imperatives are q u i t e 
simply r e p o r t s on my needs, wants, or f e e l i n g s and i n 
t h i s sense none o f h i s i n t e r p r e t e r s would have understood 
him at a l l . I n r e p l y i n g to Hunter's argument, Anthony 
Flew upholds the e m o t i v i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Hume, 
suggested by Ayer, and maintains th a t s 
o . . Hume's c e n t r a l i n s i g h t was: t h a t moral 
judgements are not statements o f e i t h e r l o g i -
c a l l y necessary t r u t h s or f a c t s about the 
n a t u r a l (or supernaturaTT universe around us; 
and, hence, t h a t " A l l m o r a l i t y depends upon 
our sentiments" ( T r e a t i s e , I I I , i i , 5 ) • 
I t would seem t h a t Hunter's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s an extreme 
one which few other commentators on the w r i t i n g s of Hume 
are prepared t o take» 
I n the midst o f t h i s confusing array o f i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n s , i t i s important t h a t we c l e a r the a i r some-
what by suggesting the major p o i n t s which Hume's 
d e s c r i p t i o n of a n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y r a i s e s f o r our 
co n s i d e r a t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n o f i n d i c a t i v e and impera-
t i v e . Regardless o f the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n placed upon 
Hume's own i n t e n t i o n i n p o i n t i n g out t h i s p a r t i c u l a r mode 
of moral reasoning, t h a t i s , whether or not Hume h i m s e l f 
considered t h i s reasoning as f a l l a c i o u s , i t does challenge 
Flew, op. c i t . , p. 66. 
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us t o s t a t e p r e c i s e l y what the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s between 
p r o p o s i t i o n s regarding what i s the case and those 
regarding what ought to be the case. Questions which 
w i l l be c r u c i a l to our anal y s i s o f t h i s problem w i l l bes 
whether or not the r e l a t i o n s h i p between " i s " and "ought" 
i s or can be one of s t r i c t e n t a i l m e n t ; whether there can 
be any form of deduction i n moral reasoning w i t h premises 
i n v o l v i n g both " i s " and "ought"; and i n what sense "ought" 
i s separated from " i s " by a l o g i c a l gap i n which the 
"autonomy o f val u e " takes i t s stand. 
I t i s su r e l y t h i s l a t t e r p o i n t , namely the 
autonomy of value or the autonomy of good, which has 
become a major issue i n contemporary discussions o f moral 
reasoning and which w i l l be i n the foreground o f our con= 
s i d erations here. I n p a r t i c u l a r such a gap between f a c t 
and value poses problems f o r an an a l y s i s o f r e l i g i o u s 
e t h i c a l systems. I t w i l l be necessary f o r us to consider 
i n our ana l y s i s the nature o f the claim t h a t the w i l l o f 
God i s good, as w e l l as the n o t i o n t h a t goodness has 
something t o do w i t h the law inh e r e n t i n man's na t u r e . 
Secondly, the gap between p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n t a i n i n g " i s " 
and those c o n t a i n i n g "ought" presents problems t o those 
r e l i g i o u s e t h i c i s t s who would derive some imperatives f o r 
a c t i o n from statements of what i s the case or who would 
o f f e r as a reason f o r some moral a c t i o n t h e f a c t t h a t 
something i s t r u e or p o s s i b l e . This an a l y s i s can only 
be done adequately when we have examined the v a l i d i t y of 
the two versions of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y i n d e c i s i o n -
making and t o t h i s task we now t u r n n 
CHAPTER I I 
THE PRESCRIPTIVIST ACCOUNT OP 
ETHICAL DECISION 
The n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y i n b o t h i t s versions 
has been considered r e l e v a n t to an account of moral 
reasoning by some modern moral philosophers who have 
attempted t o describe t h a t reasoning i n such a way as 
to avoid committing the f a l l a c y . Other moral p h i l o s o -
phers have accounted f o r moral reasoning i n order to 
show t h a t b o t h versions of the f a l l a c y are misleading 
and could d i s t o r t an accurate d e s c r i p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l 
moral decision-making. These two d i f f e r i n g views o f 
moral reasoning have been l a b e l l e d " p r e s c r i p t i v i s m " and 
" d e s c r i p t i v i s m . " Let us t h e r e f o r e consider the way i n 
which each view characterises moral d e c i s i o n and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n d i c a t i v e and 
imperative which i s c e n t r a l to t h a t d e c i s i o n . Then we 
w i l l be able t o compare the two views b o t h w i t h regard 
t o the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y and w i t h regard t o the 
adequacy o f the d e s c r i p t i o n o f decision-making which 
i s o f f e r e d . 
The p r e s c r i p t i v i s t account i s l i n k e d most c l o s e l y 
w i t h the work of R. M. Hare. I n numerous a r t i c l e s and i n 
h i s two major books, Hare has sought t o take s e r i o u s l y 
the charges o f the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y and, a t the same 
35 
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time, t o extend the e m o t i v i s t account of m o r a l i t y as 
given by Stevenson» Of primary importance i n t h i s 
p u r s u i t h a s been Hare's understanding of the nature 
of language i n general and the character o f moral 
language i n p a r t i c u l a r , an understanding from which the 
term p r e s c r i p t i v i s r a i s d e r i v e d . I n g i v i n g h i s account 
of the language o f morals, Hare i s concerned t o avoid 
two dangers which thre a t e n our ana l y s i s of t h i s language 
and t h e r e f o r e do not render an accurate p i c t u r e o f 
decision-making. On the one hand, h i s concern i s t h a t 
moral language be considered both meaningful and v a l i d . 
His argument here i s against those v e r i f i c a t i o n i s t s l i k e 
Ayer who argue t h a t "moral judgements do not o r d i n a r i l y 
f u n c t i o n i n the same way as the class of i n d i c a t i v e 
sentences marked out by . . „ v e r i f i c a t i o n - c r i t e r i o n , 
and, because o f t h i s , have no meaning or v a l i d i t y . Hare 
maintained t h a t such a narrow d e f i n i t i o n of the c r i t e r i o n 
f o r meaning could d i s t o r t our normal use o f words i n the 
moral and non-moral spheres. He understands the v e r i f i = 
c a t i o n i s t s t o be saying t h a t "a sentence does not have 
meaning unless there I s something t h a t would be the case 
i f i t were t r u e . " However, 
i f t h i s c r i t e r i o n of meaningfulness, which i s 
u s e f u l i n the case o f statements o f f a c t , i s 
appl i e d i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y t o types o f utterance 
which are not intended t o express statements o f 
f a c t , t r o u b l e w i l l r e s u l t . Imperative sentences 
Hare, Language of Morals, p. 9» 
2 I b i d . , p. 80 
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do not s a t i s f y t h i s c r i t e r i o n , and i t may be 
t h a t sentences expressing moral judgements do 
not e i t h e r ; but t h i s only shows t h a t they do 
not express statements i n the sense defined 
by the c r i t e r i o n , and t h i s sense may be a 
narrower one than t h a t o f normal usage 0 I t 
does not mean t h a t they are meaningless, or 
even t h a t t h e i r meaning i s of such a character 
t h a t no l o g i c a l r u l e s can be given f o r t h e i r 
employment,1 
The consequence o f t h i s view i s t h a t only sentences i n 
the indicative.mood have been subjected t o a l o g i c a l 
i n q u i r y , w hile a l l other sentences are c a l l e d "'emotive, ' 
'n o n = f a c t - s t a t i n g , ' 'evocative,' e t c The l a t t e r are 
held not to s t a t e genuine p r o p o s i t i o n s , and t h e r e f o r e , 
since p r o p o s i t i o n s are the b r i c k s out of which a l o g i c a l 
system i s b u i l t , t o be a l t o g e t h e r beyond the pale o f 
such a system„" Hare maintained t h a t such an ex c l u s i o n 
was not appropriate, t o i n c r e a s i n g our understanding o f a 
great p o r t i o n of the language we use. He s t a t e s t h a t 
o . o i t i s an important discovery, i f t r u e , 
t h a t e t h i c a l sentences do not t e l l us t h a t 
P something i s the case; but the r i g h t t h i n g t o 
do a f t e r making such a discovery i s t o ask what 
they do t e l l us, and how t o frame them so t h a t 
t h i s t e l l i n g i s done w i t h o u t ambiguities and 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s j i n f a c t , t o f i n d out what are 
the l o g i c a l r u l e s f o r t a l k i n g ethically«3 
The t h r u s t o f Hare's work then i s t o expand the n o t i o n o f 
l i n g u i s t i c meaning from one based on reference t o one 
determined by use so t h a t the meaning o f e t h i c a l language 
xIbid„ 
2 
Hare, "Imperative Sentences," Mind, Vol„ L V I I I 
(191*9), p. 21. 
3 I b i d . , p. 2 3 « 
becomes c l e a r and, f u r t h e r , t o develop the l o g i c a l r u l e s 
by which the v a l i d i t y o f such language can be judged„ 
The second danger which Hare recognised i s a 
consequence of t h i s f i r s t , namely, the attempt o f 
Stevenson and the e m o t i v i s t s t o describe moral language 
as b o t h expressive and as having causal power., As we 
have seen, Ayer had suggested the expressive nature of 
moral language as a r e f u t a t i o n of "mysterious i n t u i t i o n -
i s m . H o w e v e r , Hare f i n d s t h i s n o t i o n confusing. He 
claims, 
. o o t o say t h a t imperatives express wishes 
may lead the unwary t o suppose t h a t what 
happens when we use one, i s t h i s ; we have 
w e l l i n g up i n s i d e us a k i n d of l o n g i n g , t o 
which, when the pressure gets too g r e a t f o r 
us t o bear, we give vent by saying an impera-
t i v e sentences 2 
Hare considered i t not only misleading t o t h i n k of moral 
language as expressing a k i n d of "warm f e e l i n g " w i t h i n us, 
but also question-begging i n t h a t i t i s the meaning of 
the sentence i t s e l f which needs t o be understood. He 
argues t h i s also against the claim t h a t moral language 
expresses our a t t i t u d e o f approval towards something, a 
view which he considers not i m p l a u s i b l e , but simply not 
able t o cope w i t h the p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m p l e x i t i e s which 
a r i s e from i t . 
•'•See above, p. 1 7 - 1 8 0 
p 
Hare, Language o f Morals, p. 1 0 . Cf. also h i s 
argument regarding an expression o f emotion, such as 
David's pl e a , "Would God I had died f o r you, 0 Absalom, 
my son, my son," which d i f f e r s markedly from such a " d u l l 
command" as "Come i n " i n which the expression o f emotion 
may be minimal. "imperative Sentences," p. 3 8 - 9 ° 
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Sentences c o n t a i n i n g the word "approve" are so 
d i f f i c u l t of a n a l y s i s t h a t i t seems perverse 
to use t h i s n o t i o n to e x p l a i n the meaning o f 
moral judgements which we l e a r n t o make years 
before we l e a r n the word "approve"; and s i m i ~ 
l a r l y , i t would be perverse t o e x p l a i n the 
meaning of the imperative mood i n terms o f 
wishing or any other f e e l i n g or a t t i t u d e ] f o r 
we l e a r n how t o respond t o and use commands 
long before we l e a r n the comparatively complex 
notions of "wish, " " d e s i r e , " "aversion," e t c . l 
The danger Hare saw i n such a view i s t h a t i t could lead 
one t o assume the i r r a t i o n a l i t y of language i f such 
language i s derived from f e e l i n g s , emotions, a t t i t u d e s 
and so f o r t h . As Hare argues throughout h i s w r i t i n g s , 
m o r a l i t y i s a r a t i o n a l matter and t o view i t as simply a 
way o f expressing our a t t i t u d e s o f approval i s t o reduce 
i t s seriousness and t o exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y o f reason-
able moral argument. He claims, 
. . . i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the f i r s t e f f e c t 
o f modern l o g i c a l researches was t o make some 
philosophers despair of morals as a r a t i o n a l 
a c t i v i t y . I t i s the purpose o f t h i s book t o 
show t h a t t h e i r despair was premature.3 
The second problem w i t h the e m o t i v i s t account i s 
the confusion which r e s u l t s when the p s y c h o l o g i c a l cause 
f o r the u t t e r i n g of moral sentences i s confused w i t h and 
indeed taken as the c r i t e r i o n f o r the meaning o f these 
I b i d . , p. 1 2 . 
2 
Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 2 - 3 • Hare con-
s i d e r s , as Hudson has po i n t e d out, t h a t Stevenson's emotive 
account r e s u l t s i n the fundamental i r r a t i o n a l i t y of moral 
language f o r which reasoned arguments are not a p p r o p r i a t e . 
Modern Moral Philosophy, p. l f ? f > ~ 9 . Cf. Hare, "Freedom o f 
the W i l l , " The A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, Supplementary Volume 
XXV ( 1 9 5 D , p. 2 1 0 - 1 1 . 
3 
Hare, Language o f Morals, p. U 5 » 
sentences themselves. Indeed the confusion i s c a r r i e d 
even f u r t h e r by the n o t i o n t h a t moral language has the 
causal power t o evince, evoke, s t i m u l a t e , or arouse i n 
the hearer as w e l l a f e e l i n g or a t t i t u d e o f moral 
approvalo Here not only i s the. issue o f freedom i n 
f o r m u l a t i n g moral judgements r a i s e d , but also the 
d e f i n i t i o n of meaning i n terms of the e f f e c t s o f language 
i s questionedo Hare argues t h a t "The processes o f t e l l i n g 
someone t o do something, and g e t t i n g him t o do i t , are 
q u i t e d i s t i n c t , l o g i c a l l y , from each o t h e r , "^ To confuse 
the two n o t i o n s i s t o confuse moral language w i t h propa~ 
ganda and t o rate the v a l i d i t y o f a moral imperative on 
the basis o f i t s a b i l i t y t o persuade or galvanize i n t o 
a c t i o n . Moral language i s r e a l l y more l i k e advice than 
persuasion, the fundamental d i f f e r e n c e being s t a t e d as 
f o l l o w s % 
, . o t o say " I advise you , . ." i s a l l t h a t 
i s r e q u i r e d i n order t o advise, j u 3 t as t o say, 
i n due form, " I promise . . „" i s a l l t h a t i s 
re q u i r e d i n order t o promise. Advising i s a 
p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c performance. On the other 
hand, to say " I persuade . , would n o t be 
a l l t h a t was r e q u i r e d i n order t o persuade; t o 
persuade, we have t o b r i n g about an e f f e c t , a 
change i n the hearer's behaviour; i f we do not 
b r i n g about an e f f e c t , we have not persuaded 
him, and b r i n g i n g about an e f f e c t i s n o t j u s t 
t a l k i n g , but something f u r t h e r . 3 
" * " I b i d , p. 13. 
2 
I b i d . , p, l l ; ~ l 5 o See also "Freedom of the W i l l , " 
p. 211-12, 
3Hare, "Freedom of the W i l l , " p. 207. 
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I n persuasion, the success o f the utt e r a n c e c o n s t i t u t e s 
i t s v a l i d i t y , and i t i s c o n t r a d i c t e d not by being f a l s e , 
nor by reasons which do n o t support i t , but by i t s 
f a i l u r e t o have the intended e f f e c t . Hare argues f o r 
the advice-model o f moral language because i t i s t h i s 
which appeals t o the freedom and r a t i o n a l i t y o f the moral 
a g e n t H o w e v e r , he also contends t h a t , i f taken too 
s e r i o u s l y , the d e f i n i t i o n of meaning i n terms o f i t s 
causal e f f i c a c y can become a r e d u c t i o ad absurdum. For, 
i s i t n ot the i n t e n t i o n of a l l our language to have some 
k i n d o f e f f e c t , or t o a l t e r i n some way the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h our hearers? I f t h i s i s so, then what i s being said 
about moral language i n p a r t i c u l a r except t h a t i t p a r t i c i -
pates i n t h i s f a c t o f language i n general? 
I n the weak sense, a sentence might be said to 
be evocative i f i t i s intended t o , or does, 
produce any change i n the hearer's s t a t e o f 
mind or behaviour. I n t h i s sense i t would be 
hard t o f i n d any sentence t h a t was n o t evoca-
t i v e . At the l e a s t s a sentence t h a t i s heard 
and understood must produce the d i s p o s i t i o n a l 
p r o perty c a l l e d "understanding the sentence."^ 
Hare's argument against the e m o t i v i s t s i s t h e r e f o r e t h a t 
e i t h e r they are not saying anything important or unique 
about moral language i t s e l f , or they have lumped i t 
together w i t h propaganda as a technique o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
persuasion from which moral language r e q u i r e s , l o g i c a l l y , 
t o be separated. I t i s j u s t t h i s which Hare w i l l attempt 
to do i n h i s own account o f p r e s c r i p t i v i s m . 
^ I b i d . 
2 
Hare, "Imperative Sentences," p D 3 9 = 
A p r e s c r i p t i o n i s an answer to the questio n , 
"What s h a l l I do?" and i t i s t h i s p r a c t i c a l purpose 
which i s served by moral language. Both value judgements 
and imperatives, the two major c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s o f moral 
language, are used t o p r e s c r i b e some course o f a c t i o n or 
some a t t i t u d e and the meaning of these forms o f language 
should be judged i n terms o f t h i s use. Hare defines 
p r e s c r i b i n g as " g i v i n g advice or i n s t r u c t i o n , or i n 
general . . . g u i d i n g c h o i c e s , " 1 and t h i s f u n c t i o n can 
be served both by imperatives t e l l i n g what one ought t o 
do or by value~words commending some o b j e c t or a c t i o n . 
This n o t i o n of p r e s c r i p t i v i t y i s Hare's way o f avoiding 
a d e f i n i t i o n of the uniqueness of moral language e i t h e r 
i n terms o f some set o f f a c t s which e n t a i l some moral 
q u a l i t y or i n terms o f some i n t u i t i o n regarding the 
unique ob j e c t s or q u a l i t i e s of m o r a l i t y . Both value 
judgements and imperatives "have i t as t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n e i t h e r t o commend or i n some other way to guide 
choices or a c t i o n s ; and i t i s t h i s e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e 
which d e f i e s any an a l y s i s i n pu r e l y f a c t u a l terms." I f 
the p r e s c r i p t i v e f u n c t i o n of moral language i s i t s 
primary f u n c t i o n , more basic than i t s d e s c r i p t i v e 
f u n c t i o n , and i s the reason f o r the "supervenience" of 
t h i s language, then the r e l a t i o n between p r e s c r i b i n g and 
de s c r i b i n g needs to be f u r t h e r e l u c i d a t e d . 
^Kare, Language o f Morals, p. 1 5 5 • 
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I t i s i n Hare's discussion of value judgements 
t h a t he addresses h i m s e l f to t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r 
e v a l u a t i o n i s one form o f p r e s c r i p t i o n . He s t a t e s , 
there are two s o r t s o f thi n g s t h a t we can say, 
f o r example, about s t r a w b e r r i e s ; the f i r s t 
s o r t i s u s u a l l y c a l l e d d e s c r i p t i v e , the second 
s o r t e v a l u a t i v e , Examples o f the f i r s t s o r t o f 
remark are, "This strawberry i s sweet" and "This 
strawberry i s l a r g e , red, and j u i c y . " Examples 
of the second s o r t o f remark are "This i s a good 
strawberry" and "This strawberry i s j u s t as 
strawb e r r i e s ought to be."-*-
There are two important fe a t u r e s o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between these s o r t s o f statements, between, l e t us say, 
"This strawberry i s sweet," and "This i s a good straw-
b e r r y . " The f i r s t i s t h a t we o f t e n use the d e s c r i p t i v e 
statement as a reason f o r making the e v a l u a t i v e statement; 
when asked why some strawberry i s good, we can l e g i t i = 
mately r e p l y by making a f a c t u a l statement about i t , 
namely, t h a t i t i s sweet. However, and t h i s i s the 
second f e a t u r e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p , we do not simply 
mean by "good" the f a c t t h a t the strawberry i s sweet. 
The i n t e n t i o n of our e v a l u a t i v e statement i s to commend 
the strawberry and t h i s commending extends beyond a mere 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f the strawberry. Hare explains t h i s second 
f e a t u r e using another examples 
I f "P i s a good p i c t u r e " i s held t o mean the 
same as "P i s a p i c t u r e and P i s C, " then i t 
w i l l become impossible to commend p i c t u r e s f o r 
being C; i t w i l l be po s s i b l e o n l y t o say t h a t 
they are C . . . t h i s ( s i c ) i s because, what-
ever d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s we choose, t h i s 
o b j e c t i o n a r i s e s , t h a t we can no longer commend 
an o b j e c t f o r possessing those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
1 I b i d . , p. 111. 2 I b i d . , p. 8 5 o 
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This indeed would be t o commit Moore's v e r s i o n of the 
n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y , by i d e n t i f y i n g "good" w i t h some 
set o f d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; b u t , f o r Hare, the 
reason t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s f a l l a c i o u s i s because 
"good" i s used f o r commending and t o commend i s t o do 
more than describee 
Value-terms have a s p e c i a l f u n c t i o n i n lan= 
guage, t h a t o f commending; and so they 
p l a i n l y cannot be defined i n terms o f other 
words which themselves do not perform t h i s 
f u n c t i o n ; f o r i f t h i s i s done, we are deprived 
of a means o f performing the f u n c t i o n . ^ 
Any attempt t o reduce value judgements t o d e s c r i p t i o n s 
i s t h e r e f o r e t o be avoided„ 
However, value judgements and d e s c r i p t i o n s (which 
Hare w i l l l a t e r c a l l d e s c r i p t i v e judgements) do have 
common fe a t u r e s which i n d i c a t e a close r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between an ob j e c t ' s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and our e v a l u a t i o n 
of i t . Both the statements, "This strawberry i s sweet" 
and "This i s a good strawberry," "can be, and o f t e n are, 
used f o r conveying i n f o r m a t i o n of a p u r e l y f a c t u a l or 
d e s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r . " 3 Assuming a common standard o f 
judgement, one f o r determining the sweetness o f f r u i t and 
the other f o r determining i t s goodness, these two st a t e = 
ments can t e l l us something about the o b j e c t i n question* 
Secondly, Hare p o i n t s out t h a t both statements can teach 
how such words as "sweet" and "good" are t o be used and 
1 I b i d p o 91 o 
'Hare, Freedom and Reason, p» 10. 
3 Hare, Language o f Morals f als, p . 112„ 
thus, i n some sense, t o give the meaning of these words, 1 
T h i r d l y , value-words and d e s c r i p t i v e terms share a 
tendency t o "vary as regards the e x a c t i t u d e or vagueness 
of the i n f o r m a t i o n which they do or can convey." I n 
t h i s sense, t h e r e f o r e , value words are not n e c e s s a r i l y 
more vague than d e s c r i p t i v e ones, nor do we need t o r e l y 
on some moral i n t u i t i o n to l e a r n the c r i t e r i a f o r t h e i r 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y . What Hare has done i n h i s a n a l y s i s of 
e v a l u a t i v e language i s t o show t h a t i t s uniqueness l i e s 
i n i t s a b i l i t y t o commend ob j e c t s or recommend courses 
of a c t i o n but t h a t t h i s uniqueness i n no way separates 
e v a l u a t i v e language completely from d e s c r i p t i v e , "The 
t r u t h i n n a t u r a l i s m , " Hare claims, " i s t h a t moral terms 
do indeed have d e s c r i p t i v e meaning. I t i s not the only 
element i n t h e i r meaning, and i t i s t h e r e f o r e misleading 
t o r e f e r t o i t , as do the n a t u r a l i s t s , as the meaning o f 
o f a moral term , , . . "3 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p o f d e s c r i b i n g to e v a l u a t i n g , or 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p of matters of f a c t to those o f value, i s 
perhaps best seen i n Hare's d e s c r i p t i o n of the l o g i c of 
p r a c t i c a l reason. The importance o f reason i n moral 
matters, or any other matters of p r a c t i c a l concern, l i e s 
^ I b i d . , p. 1 1 3 - l l j . Hare warns against t a k i n g t h i s 
phrase "the meaning of" too s t r i c t l y f o r we can only 
e x p l a i n the meaning of good i n terms of "conveying or 
s e t t i n g f o r t h the standard of goodness . . . " w i t h regard 
t o s t r a w b e r r i e s f o r example. 
2 I b i d , , p, lll*„ 
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p r e c i s e l y i n the a b i l i t y t o give reasons f o r commending 
something and these reasons are i n the form of the non-
moral p r o p e r t i e s of the o b j e c t or a c t i o n i n q u e s t i o n , 
Factual matters, or d e s c r i p t i o n s o f t h i n g s , are t h e r e -
f o r e c l o s e l y bound up w i t h value judgements and can serve 
as l e g i t i m a t e reasons f o r p r e s c r i p t i o n s . There are, i n 
other words, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of obj e c t s or actions which 
can be c a l l e d "good-making c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , " i n the 
absence of which a p o s i t i v e word of commendation would 
not be a p p r o p r i a t e , "These are the p r o p e r t i e s which con-
s t i t u t e t h a t about the obj e c t which makes i t a s u i t a b l e 
o b j e c t f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s moral p r e d i c a t e . " 3 
These c r i t e r i a f o r the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the value word, 
"good" f o r example, are learned i n a s o c i a l context and 
may indeed need to be learned anew f o r each class o f 
obje c t s which we evaluate. What i s important t o remember, 
Hare argues, i s t h a t the meaning of "good" which i s i t s 
a b i l i t y t o commend, must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the 
c r i t e r i a f o r i t s use; we can know t h a t t o use t h i s word 
i s to commend something, but the p a r t i c u l a r c r i t e r i a f o r 
This i s obviously t o r e j e c t a s t r i c t Humean 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of reason as "the discovery of t r u t h and 
falsehood." See the comparison o f Hare and Hume regarding 
" p r a c t i c a l reason" i n Roy Edgley, Reason i n Theory and 
Pra c t i c e (Hutchinson U n i v e r s i t y L i b r a r y , London, 19&9) 9 
p„ 20=0o 
2 
Hare, Language of Morals, p. 9 U ° 
3 Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 20« 
applying i t t o one o b j e c t or another must be learned 
and may even be disputed or changed. i t i s the c r i t e r i a 
f o r using value words, c r i t e r i a such as " i n t r i n s i c w o r t h , " 
" i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y , " or " f u n c t i o n a l worth," which can be 
confused or even i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the meaning of these 
words, and t o do t h i s i s to commit the f a l l a c y o f 
2 
n a t u r a l i s m . Thus, t o continue our example, t o know t h a t 
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s r ed, j u i c y , sweet, plump, and so 
f o r t h are the p r o p e r t i e s by v i r t u e of which we c a l l a 
strawberry "good" i s t o understand the f a c t u a l or 
d e s c r i p t i v e reasons which underly an e v a l u a t i v e judgement*, 
Hare continues h i s a n a l y s i s o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
however, u n t i l two more aspects of i t become c l e a r . On 
the one hand, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these c h a r a c t e r -
i s t i e s and the value-word "good" i s not one o f entailments 
I n t h i s respect, Hare maintains h i s fundamental agreement 
w i t h Hume's v e r s i o n o f the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y . The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the statement, "This strawberry i s 
sweet," and "This i s a good strawberry" i s not t h a t the 
former e n t a i l s the l a t t e r . 
The problem may also be put i n t h i s way: i f we 
knew a l l the d e s c r i p t i v e p r o p e r t i e s which a 
xHare, Language of Morals, see e s p e c i a l l y Chap-
t e r 6. 
Hudson st a t e s t h i s p o i n t s "To r e c a l l Moore's 
p o i n t against the n a t u r a l i s t s , whatever reason i s given 
why something i s good ( i . e . , whatever d e s c r i p t i v e meaning 
the word may have) i t i s always open to. a reformer t o 
propose a new standard o f goodness ( i . e . a new d e s c r i p t i v e 
meaning). There i s no standard, S, such t h a t 'Whatever i s 
an instance of S i s good' i s tautologous. 'Is whatever 
i s an instance of S good?' always makes sense." Op. c l t . , 
p. 17U-
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p a r t i c u l a r strawberry had (knew, of every 
d e s c r i p t i v e sentence r e l a t i n g t o the straw-
b e r r y , whether i t was t r u e or f a l s e ) , and i f 
we knevf also the meaning of the word "good," 
then what else should we r e q u i r e t o know, i n 
order t o be able t o t e l l whether a strawberry 
was a good one? . o . We should r e q u i r e to be 
given the major premiss.1 
This major premise, which would give the c r i t e r i a f o r the 
use o f "good" w i t h regard t o s t r a w b e r r i e s , can be c a l l e d 
a p r i n c i p l e and could be s t a t e d i n the f o l l o w i n g forms 
" A l l s t r a w b e r r i e s which are red, j u i c y , sweet, or plump 
are good s t r a w b e r r i e s . " This standard f o r judgement i s 
a necessary p a r t of the move from d e s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r ^ 
i s t i e s t o the a p p l i c a t i o n o f value-words and i l l u s t r a t e s 
the k i n d o f l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s which, Hare claimed, are 
appropriate t o one type o f moral language, value judge= 
merits. For here we see t h a t an i n f e r e n c e i s p o s s i b l e i n 
moral language and an inf e r e n c e which s a t i s f i e s the normal 
r u l e s of a s s e r t o r i c l o g i c . From the major premise s t a t e d 
above and the minor premise, "This p a r t i c u l a r strawberry 
i s sweet," we are e n t i t l e d t o draw the conclusion t h a t 
"This strawberry i s good*" 2 The inference i s only v a l i d 
when t h i s major premise i s present! the d e s c r i p t i o n o f 
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c alone cannot e n t a i l the conclusion o f 
a value=judgement. 
^Hare, Language of Morals, p. 111. 
I b i d . , p. 11+5=6. Since the major p o r t i o n o f 
Hare's discussion of inference from p r i n c i p l e s has t o do 
w i t h the other primary form of moral language, i m p e r a t i v e s , 
we w i l l reserve a more complete discussion o f t h i s matter 
f o r the second h a l f o f t h i s chapter. 
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On the other hand, the d e s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
which f u r n i s h the c r i t e r i a f o r the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of a 
value-word also serve as the basis f o r the u n i v e r s a l i s ^ 
a b i l i t y of t h a t standard of judgement. I n other words, -
the reasons which are given f o r c a l l i n g t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
strawberry good must be capable of being generalised t o 
include a l l s t r a w b e r r i e s which are l i k e t h i s one i n the 
r e l e v a n t respects. This i s t r u e o f moral judgements i n 
the same sense as i t i s t r u e f o r d e s c r i p t i v e judgements; 
" i n so f a r as moral judgements do have d e s c r i p t i v e meaning, 
i n a d d i t i o n t o the other k i n d of meaning which they have, 
they share t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , which i s common to a l l 
judgements which c a r r y d e s c r i p t i v e meaning." 1 Hare appeals 
here t o a general -rule o f language, t h a t t o know something 
i s "X" i s t o be committed t o the view t h a t anything l i k e 
i t i n the r e l e v a n t respects would also be "X". This same 
holds t r u e of value judgements; " . , . when one has been 
d e l i v e r e d , e.g., 'X is/good,' i t i s ; (a) always l o g i c a l l y 
l e g i t i m a t e t o ask why X i s good; and (b) never l o g i c a l l y 
l e g i t i m a t e , when the answer i s gi v e n , t o deny t h a t anything 
2 
else l i k e X i n the r e l e v a n t respects i s also good," Here 
again the d i s t i n c t i o n between meaning and c r i t e r i a i s 
important f o r the p r i n c i p l e which s t a t e s the c r i t e r i a and 
which i s u n i v e r s a l i s a b l e does n o t give a d e f i n i t i o n o f 
"good," The f a l l a c y o f n a t u r a l i s m i s t o consider t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e "a d e s c r i p t i v e meaning-rule which exhausts the 
^Hare, Freedom and Reason, p, 10 0 
2 
Hudson, op. c l t . , p. l 8 2 0 
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meaning of the moral term used; whereas i n my own view 
the r u l e , though i t i s very analogous t o a d e s c r i p t i v e 
meaning—rule, and though, t h e r e f o r e , i t i s q u i t e l e g i t i -
mate t o speak of the ' d e s c r i p t i v e meaning' of moral terms a 
does n o t exhaust t h e i r meaning. "•*• i n Hare's account, 
t h i s p r i n c i p l e i s a s y n t h e t i c statement g i v i n g the 
c r i t e r i a by which reasons f o r the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of v a l u e -
words might be judged and, because o f t h i s , i t s u n i v e r -
s a l i s a b i l i t y i s a l o g i c a l f a c t which one who chooses the 
p r i n c i p l e i s bound l o g i c a l l y t o accept as w e l l . 
I n Hare's discussion o f value judgements as one 
type o f moral language, he has argued f o r the extension 
of the class of sentences c a l l e d i n d i c a t i v e statements t o 
i n c l u d e those i n d i c a t i v e s i n which an e v a l u a t i o n i s given<. 
These i n d i c a t i v e s are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e by t h e i r use, which 
i s t o commend or p r e s c r i b e , but they share w i t h d e s c r i p -
t i v e i n d i c a t i v e s enough c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t o be included i n 
t h e . r u l e s o f normal a s s e r t o r i c l o g i c . Every value judge-
ment, whether i t be an e x p l i c i t one c o n t a i n i n g "good" or 
" r i g h t " or a more su b t l e one using words l i k e " t i d y , " 
" i n d u s t r i o u s , " " f r i e n d l y , " and so f o r t h , has d e s c r i p t i v e 
meaning and each i s l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d by a minor premise 
s t a t i n g the f a c t s or d e s c r i b i n g the o b j e c t i n question and 
by a major premise i n which the standard o f judgement i s 
g i v e n . Reasoning about value judgements i s t h e r e f o r e 
s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning i n which an e v a l u a t i v e premise, i . e . 
the standard o f judgement, and a f a c t u a l premise e n t a i l 
"4iare, Freedom and Reason, p. 21 c 
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the e v a l u a t i v e conclusion. I n t h i s sense, Hare accepts 
"the idea t h a t r u l e s of in f e r e n c e are a n a l y t i c and 
t h e r e f o r e v e r b a l , not s u b s t a n t i v e , so t h a t the meaning 
of the conclusion of a v a l i d argument must be contained 
i n the meaning of the premises? a l l v a l i d i n f e r e n c e s , 
and i n general a l l l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s , are a n a l y t i c or 
deductive. " x Hare does not deny, as we have seen, t h a t 
p r a c t i c a l judgements cannot v a l i d l y be i n f e r r e d from 
d e s c r i p t i v e premises, which he i n t e r p r e t s Hume t o be 
saying. What he does deny i s t h a t t h i s excludes moral 
language from having l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s at a l l and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y from f u n c t i o n i n g i n v a l i d i n f e r e n c e s . That 
such inferences are v a l i d , deductive ones i s due t o the 
d e s c r i p t i v e meaning o f value-judgements and principles which, 
though i t i s secondary t o the e v a l u a t i v e meaning, allows 
one t o reason from mixed premises t o an e v a l u a t i v e con~ 
e l u s i o n on the basis o f the meaning of terms alone» 
w i t h regard t o value judgements which bear a good deal of. 
resemblance t o f a c t u a l i n d i c a t i v e statements. This t h e s i s 
i s much more d i f f i c u l t t o show w i t h regard t o moral impera-
t i v e s , the other major c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f moral language, 
and t h e r e f o r e we need t o examine the n o t i o n o f the prac-
t i c a l or imperative i n f e r e n c e as Hare i n t e r p r e t s i t . I n 
h i s a r t i c l e , "Imperative Sentences," Hare claims t h a t 
We have seen how Hare was able t o argue h i s case 
Edgley, o 
3? o f Morals, p= 32 
1 c i t See also Hare, Language 
See above, p a 29° 
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"sentences are t r a d i t i o n a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o three classes, 
statements, commands, and questions."^- I t i s h i s i n t e n -
t i o n i n discussing the imperative mood t o deal w i t h the 
second category, commands, t o describe them i n both t h e i r 
s i n g u l a r and u n i v e r s a l forms, and t o o u t l i n e the r e l a t i o n -
ship between i n d i c a t i v e s and imp e r a t i v e s . The form o f 
language which i s used f o r expressing statements i s c a l l e d 
i n d i c a t i v e ] t h a t form which i s used f o r expressing com° 
mands i s c a l l e d i m p e r a t i v e . Hare claims t h a t s 
Both are used f o r t a l k i n g about a subject=matter, 
but they are used f o r t a l k i n g about i t i n dif° 
f e r e n t ways. The two sentences "You are going 
t o shut the door" and "Shut the door" are b o t h 
about your s h u t t i n g the door i n the immediate 
f u t u r e ! but what they say about i t i s q u i t e 
d i f f e r e n t . An i n d i c a t i v e sentence i s used f o r 
t e l l i n g someone t h a t something i s the case! an 
imperative i s n o t - ~ i t i s used f o r t e l l i n g some-
one to make something the case. 2 
An imperative sentence i s one which a r i s e s out o f a s i t u a -
t i o n o f dilemma i n which a choice must be made and i t 
i n d i c a t e s , when spoken, the d e c i s i o n t h a t has been made 
by the speaker. Imperatives are t h e r e f o r e r e l a t e d t o 
a c t i o n while i n d i c a t i v e s are n o t ; or i n A r i s t o t l e ' s 
terminology, imperatives have t o do w i t h p r a x i s and p o i e s i s 
w h i l e i n d i c a t i v e s are concerned w i t h t h e o r i a . 
An i n d i c a t i v e sentence i s ah answer t o the ques-
t i o n "What i s the case?"; an imperative sentence 
i s an answer t o the question "What i s t o be the 
case?" or "What am I t o make the case?". The 
Hare, "imperative Sentences," p. 2I+. 
^Hare, Language o f Morals, p. 5 » 
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f i r s t question presupposes that there i s some 
u n a l t e r a b l e f a c t to be s t a t e d ; the second 
question, on the c o n t r a r y , presupposes t h a t 
there i s a choice between a l t e r n a t i v e facts„ 
i . e . , between a l t e r n a t i v e courses of a c t i o n . 
To ask the second s o r t of question i s to 
d e l i b e r a t e ; to answer i t i s e i t h e r to choose, 
i f the question was asked about our own 
a c t i o n , or to command, i f i t was asked about 
someone e l s e ' s . l 
We have here a g e n e r a l d e s c r i p t i o n of i m p e r a t i v e s as 
answers to the p r a c t i c a l q uestion "What s h a l l I do?" and 
these are r e l e v a n t both to one's own d e c i s i o n and a c t i o n 
as w e l l as to t h a t of o t h e r s , i n which case i m p e r a t i v e s 
take the form of ad v i c e . 
I t i s i n comparing and c o n t r a s t i n g the imp e r a t i v e 
and the i n d i c a t i v e t h a t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i m p e r a t i v e s 
as a grammatical form are brought out. I n h i s e a r l i e r 
a r t i c l e , Hare compared the two sentences? 
(1) Mary, p l e a s e show Mrs. Prendergast h e r room. 
(2) Mary w i l l show you your room, Mrs. Prendergast. 
Both sentences have a common element which can be c a l l e d 
the " d e s c r i p t o r " i n which the sentence performs i t s 
d e s c r i p t i v e f u n c t i o n . I n t h i s case, t h a t d e s c r i p t o r i s 
"Showing of her room to Mrs. Prehdergast by Mary at time 
t . " ^ i n h i s l a t e r book, Hare changed the terminology and 
Hare, "Imperative Sentences," p. 25>° 
^ B a s i l M i t c h e l l r a i s e s o b j e c t i o n s here to Hare's 
d e f i n i t i o n of i m p e r a t i v e s c l a i m i n g t h a t i t i s too broad; 
many other forms of sentence besides commands can supply 
answers to the que s t i o n "What s h a l l I do?" and the f u n c t i o n 
of i m p e r a t i v e s i n g i v i n g advice can a l s o be performed by 
other grammatical forms. These c r i t e r i a alone t h e r e f o r e 
are perhaps n e c e s s a r y but are not s u f f i c i e n t f o r under~ 
standing p r e c i s e l y what i m p e r a t i v e s a r e . " V a r i e t i e s of 
I m p e r a t i v e , " The A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , Supplementary Volume 
XXXI (1957), p. 175=190. "~ 
% a r e , "Imperative Sentences," p. 2?» 
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r e f e r r e d to t h i s d e s c r i p t o r as the "phrastic,," a word 
d e r i v e d from the Greek s meaning "to p o i n t out or 
indicate.. T h i s p h r a s t i c i n an i n d i c a t i v e sentence 
" i s what would be the case i f the sentence were t r u e " 
and i n an impe r a t i v e sentence "what would be the case i f 
i t were o b e y e d . i n p o i n t i n g out t h i s common element, 
Hare i s concerned to show that imperatives and i n d i c a -
t i v e s a l i k e have d e s c r i p t i v e meaning, and both can be 
judged f o r meaningfulness on the b a s i s of the r e f e r e n t 
so d e s c r i b e d . He i s i n agreement w i t h the v e r i f i c a t i o n -
i s t s to the extent t h a t a sentence must have d e s c r i p t i v e 
meaning i f i t i s to be used f o r "the conveying of i n f o r -
mation or o r d e r s " but he does not accept the corresponding 
notion "that sentences which are not t r u e - o r = f a l s e are 
meaningless, even d e s c r i p t i v e l y , " 3 on the b a s i s of t h i s 
a n a l y s i s , Hare w i l l argue f o r the i n c l u s i o n of impe r a t i v e s 
i n the r u l e s of normal a s s e r t o r i c l o g i c , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
those of i n f e r e n c e and entailment.^ 
The second element which i s p r e s e n t i n these two 
sentences i s , however, one which the i n d i c a t i v e and the 
•'•Hare, Language of Morals, p. I 7 ~ l 8 „ 
% I a r e , "imperative Sentences," p. 29. 
3 I b i d . 
^Arguments f o r a s p e c i a l l o g i c to d e a l w i t h 
imperative i n f e r e n c e can be found i n B„ A. 0 . W i l l i a m s , 
"Imperative I n f e r e n c e , " A n a l y s i s , Supplementary Volume 23 
(1963), p. 30-1+2; P 0 T. Geach, "Imperative and Deontic L o g i c , " A n a l y s i s , V o l . 18, Part 3 (1958), p. 1+9-56,' 
A. Ross, "Imperatives and L o g i c , " Philosophy of •Science, 
V o l . 11 (191+U), p. 30-1+6. 
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imperative do share with each other but which determines 
the d i s t i n c t i v e mood of the sentence. Our two sentences 
could be w r i t t e n ; 
( I d ) Showing of her room to Mrs. Prendergast 
by Mary at time t , please., 
(2 .1) Showing of her room to Mrs. Prendergast 
by Mary a t time t , y e s 0 
Hare begins by c a l l i n g t h i s second element, t h a t i s the 
words "yes" and " p l e a s e , " by the name " d i c t o r " s i n c e " i t 
i s they t h a t r e a l l y do the saying (the commanding, s t a t i n g , 
e t c . ) which a sentence does." 1 L a t e r , he changed t h i s 
term to " n e u s t i c , " again from the Greek meaning "to nod 
a s s e n t . " i t i s only by t h i s element t h a t the i n d i c a t i v e 
and imperative d i f f e r from one another i n t h a t , what con-
s t i t u t e s a s s e n t to these sentences i s d i f f e r e n t i n each 
c a s e . 
I f we assent to a statement we are s a i d to be 
s i n c e r e i n our a s s e n t i f and only i f we b e l i e v e 
that i t i s true ( b e l i e v e what the speaker has 
s a i d ) . I f , on the other hand, we a s s e n t to a 
second=person command addressed to ourselves> 
we are s a i d to be s i n c e r e i n our a s s e n t i f and 
only i f we do or r e s o l v e to do what the speaker 
has t o l d us to do; i f we do not do i t but only 
only r e s o l v e to do i t l a t e r , then i f , when the 
occasion a r i s e s f o r doing i t , we do not do i t , 
we are s a i d to have changed our mindj we are no 
longer s t i c k i n g to the a s s e n t which we p r e v i o u s l y 
expressed.3 
Hare, "Imperative Sentences," p. 28„ 
% a r e , Language of Morals, p. 18. Assent to t h i s , 
second example r e q u i r e s obedience so t h a t i t w i l l be true 
i n a f u t u r e s t a t e of a f f a i r s . Hare has s i n c e then changed 
the terra again to " t r o p i c . " See A. J„ Kenny, " P r a c t i c a l 
I n f e r e n c e , " A n a l y s i s , V o l . 26, No. 3 (1966), p. 68j Hudson, 
pp. c i t o , p. 231-lj.; Hudson g i v e s a more- complete statement 
of Hare's r e v i s i o n of terms i n as y e t unpublished w r i t i n g s . 
3 I b i d . , p. 19=20. 
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The n e u s t i c element i n the imperative sentence i n d i c a t e s 
the unique f u n c t i o n of moral language to advise or 
commend! i n the case of commands, " p l e a s e " i s i n d i c a t i v e 
of the attempt to e f f e c t a c t i o n by "inducing the r e c i p ~ 
l e n t to a d e l i b e r a t e , i n t e n t i o n a l r e s p o n s e , " 1 What con= 
s t i t u t e s a s s e n t i n the case of i n d i c a t i v e s i s t h e r e f o r e 
b e l i e f ; i n i m p e r a t i v e s , a s s e n t r e q u i r e s and e n t a i l s 
p 
a c t i o n . 
T h i s understanding of the p h r a s t i c and n e u s t i c 
elements i n i n d i c a t i v e and imperative sentences e x p l a i n s 
Hare's disagreement w i t h two attempts to reduce impera-
t i v e s to i n d i c a t i v e s , f o r i n both attempts t h i s unique 
n e u s t i c element i s overlooked. The f i r s t attempt i s made 
by those who c l a i m " t h a t i m p e r a t i v e s are r e a l l y i n d i c a t i v e 
statements regarding the s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e of mind of the 
speaker. Thus, the command "Shut the door" i s represented 
as being e q u i v a l e n t to " I want you to shut the door." 
What i s misunderstood by t h i s view, according to Hare, i s 
tha t the p h r a s t i c of the imperative r e f e r s to the s h u t t i n g 
of the door; i t has the same r e f e r e n t as the p h r a s t i c of 
the i n d i c a t i v e 'You are going to shut the door." Hare 
remarks t h a t " I n both cases i t seems strange to r e p r e s e n t 
a remark about s h u t t i n g the door as a remark about what i s 
^Nicholas Rescher, The L o g i c of Commands (Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1966), p. 29. " 
2 
The problem involved i n c l a i m i n g t h a t a c t i o n s 
can be e n t a i l e d i n i n f e r e n c e s and t h a t they can be con-
c l u s i o n s i n p r a c t i c a l s y l l o g i s m s has been d i s c u s s e d by 
Edgley, op. c i t . 
going on i n my mind." Furthermore, t h i s claim does not 
r e a l l y serve to e x p l a i n anything about imperatives at a l l 
f o r the question s t i l l remains as to the l o g i c of the 
sentence " I want you to shut the door. " Hare claims tha"t 
"unless we understand 'Shut the door* we are u n l i k e l y to 
understand ' I want you to shut the door.'" 2 For t h i s 
purpose, an a n a l y s i s of imperatives qua imperatives i s 
n e c e s s a r y and nothing has been accomplished by t h e i r 
r e d u c t i o n to i n d i c a t i v e sentences.-^ 
Secondly, i t might be claimed t h a t the command 
"Shut the door" means the same as " E i t h e r you are going 
to shut the door, or X w i l l happen."** T h i s " e i t h e r / o r " 
statement r e f e r s to the consequences of the s h u t t i n g or 
not s h u t t i n g of the door, consequences such as p l e a s u r e 
or avoidance of p a i n , and what i s meant by the command 
"Shut the door" can r e a l l y be s t a t e d without any l o s s of 
meaning by s t a t i n g what the a c t i o n of s h u t t i n g the door 
i s conducive to. I n many c a s e s , however, the consequences 
Hare, Language of Morals, p. 6 0 
2 I b i d . 
3 
I b i d . , p. 6=7» Hare t u r n s t h i s same o b j e c t i o n 
a g a i n s t the approval theory of value~judgements by which 
the sentence "A i s r i g h t " i s represented as e q u i v a l e n t to 
" I approve of A." Thus, " I f I ask 'Do I approve of A? ' 
my answer i s a moral d e c i s i o n , not an obse r v a t i o n of 
i n t r o s p e c t i b l e f a c t . " 
^ I b i d o , p. 7o Hare r e f e r s here to an a r t i c l e by 
H. G 0 Bohnert, "The Semiotic S t a t u s of Commands," Philosophy of Scien c e , V o l . 12 (19U5), p. 302=31^. 
are not so e a s i l y r e c o g n i s a b l e and such a theory becomes 
i m p l a u s i b l e . Furthermore, as Hare argues, the conse= 
quences themselves are considered good or bad as a r e s u l t 
of value judgements and, i n the end, even t h i s theory 
r e q u i r e s an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the l o g i c of p r e s c r i p t i v e 
language. To understand t h a t the statement " E i t h e r you 
are going to shut the door or i t w i l l become very c o l d 
i n t h i s room" has the same imperative f o r c e as the command 
"Shut the door" depends upon our understanding of the 
value judgement attached to the coldness of rooms, so 
t h a t , again, nothing has been gained by the attempted 
r e d u c t i o n . 1 
Having shown the s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s 
between i n d i c a t i v e and imperative sentences and having 
broken down the content of each i n t o the two elements, 
p h r a s t i c and n e u s t i c , Hare then proceeds to d e s c r i b e the 
way i n which i m p e r a t i v e s may be i n f e r r e d from other 
i m p e r a t i v e s , as w e l l as from premises c o n t a i n i n g both 
i n d i c a t i v e s and i m p e r a t i v e s . I t i s by v i r t u e of the 
d e s c r i p t i v e element i n i m p e r a t i v e s , t h a t i s the p h r a s t i c , 
t h a t l o g i c a l entailment r e l a t i o n s are p o s s i b l e among them 
and t h a t they are capable of c o n t r a d i c t i n g one another.^ 
I b i d . , p. 7 ° 8 . Obviously then i f the e i t h e r / o r 
statement i s not understood to have imperative f o r c e then 
something has been l o s t i n the t r a n s l a t i o n and an equiva-. 
l e n c e of meaning has not been achieved. Other attempts to 
reduce imperatives to i n d i c a t i v e s can be found i n P. T„ 
Geach, op. c i t . , an attempt which he l a t e r claimed to be 
mistaken (see h i s r e p l y to W i l l i a m s ' a r t i c l e , op. c l t . g p. 37-i | 2)j P. C. Gibbons, "Imperatives and I n d i c a t i v e s , " 
The A u s t r a l a s i a n J o u r n a l of Philosophy, Volo 38 s Nos. 2=3 (1960), p. 107=19, 207=17» 
2 
I b i d . 9 p. 23. Hare g i v e s an example from 
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Hare def i n e s entailment i n the f o l l o w i n g ways 
A sentence P e n t a i l s a sentence Q, i f and only 
i f the f a c t t h a t a person a s s e n t s to P but 
d i s s e n t s from Q, i s s u f f i c i e n t c r i t e r i o n f o r 
saying t h a t he has misunderstood one or other 
of the sentences.1 
Hare o f f e r s as an example of such entailment w i t h regard 
to i m p e r a t i v e s the f o l l o w i n g ? 
Suppose I say to someone, "Use an axe or a 
saw," and then, f e a r i n g t h a t he may cut o f f 
h i s l e g , say "No, don't use an axe." He 
w i l l , without f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n , i n f e r t h a t 
he i s to use a saw. T h i s s y l l o g i s m , t r a n s -
l a t e d , becomes, 
Use of axe or saw by you s h o r t l y , p l e a s e . 
No use of axe by you s h o r t l y , p l e a s e 0 
Use of saw by you s h o r t l y , p l e a s e . ^ 
I t was Hare's contention t h a t the v a l i d i t y of t h i s 
s y l l o g i s m i s due to the entailment r e l a t i o n s between the 
p h r a s t i c s of these commands| the n e u s t i c could t h e r e f o r e 
be e i t h e r yes or p l e a s e without fundamentally a l t e r i n g 
the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s at a l l . "Thus most i n f e r e n c e s are 
i n f e r e n c e s from d e s c r i p t o r to d e s c r i p t o r , and we could 
add whichever s e t of d i c t o r s we p l e a s e d a n The entailment 
r e l a t i o n of i m p e r a t i v e s may be f o r m a l l y s t a t e d as f o l l o w s s 
L e t C be a command, and l e t S be a statement 
w i t h the same d e s c r i p t o r . L e t 0 ^ 0 2 . c n be 
commands which can be i n f e r r e d from C ( i . e . 
whose d e s c r i p t o r s d e s c r i b e s t a t e s of a f f a i r s 
V i s c o u n t Cunningham's A S a i l o r ' s Odyssey (p. 162) i n which 
two commands are given simultaneously; "Hard 'a p o r t " and 
"Hard 'a s t a r b o a r d 0 " These commands are c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n ' the same way as two i n d i c a t i v e statements, such as 'You 
are going to turn hard 'a p o r t " and 'You are going to t u r n 
hard 'a s t a r b o a r d . " The con j u n c t i o n of the two commands 
i s s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . 
•'•Ibid., p. 25„ 3 l b i d . , p 0 33. 
Hare, "imperative Sentences," p. 31. 
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which l o g i c a l l y must be the case i f the s t a t e 
of a f f a i r s d e s c r i b e d by the d e s c r i p t o r of C i s 
the case) j analogously f o r S and s - j ^ 0 1 , 0 s n ° 
Then i f we command C we command C]_C2 »». c n j 
t h a t i s to say, i f we command to be the case 
what i s de s c r i b e d by the d e s c r i p t o r s of C, we 
command to be the case what i s desc r i b e d by the 
d e s c r i p t o r s of c ^ C j . c n ° ^ 
The i n f e r e n c e s c o n t a i n i n g mixed premises are the 
other form of imperative i n f e r e n c e which Hare analysed 
and i t i s from A r i s t o t l e ' s notion of the p r a c t i c a l s y l -
logism that he d e r i v e s h i s understanding of t h i s form of 
moral reasoning. Hare suggests i n h i s a r t i c l e on "Impera-
t i v e Sentences" t h a t such a s y l l o g i s m i s p o s s i b l e , but i t 
i s not u n t i l The Language of Morals t h a t he o f f e r s a com-
p l e t e a n a l y s i s of t h i s i n f e r e n c e T h e r e are two impera-
t i v e s which may serve as the major premise of such a 
syllog i s m s one of them i s a u n i v e r s a l imperative and the 
other i s a p r a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e . An example o f a u n i v e r s a l ' 
imperative i s "Take a l l the boxes to the s t a t i o n " from 
which many s i n g u l a r commands may be derived (e.g. "Take 
t h i s box to the s t a t i o n , " "Take t h a t box to the s t a t i o n , " 
and so f o r t h ) . P r a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s are a form of u n i v e r -
s a l i mperative and often contain the word "ought"j s i n c e 
they are a form of p r e s c r i p t i v e language they are intended 
I b i d . , p. 32. A p o s s i b l e misunderstanding i s 
here c l a r i f i e d by Hare as he p o i n t s out t h a t we cannot 
deduce some commands, obey them, and assume t h a t we have 
f u l f i l l e d the o r i g i n a l command, any more than we can 
v e r i f y some of the statements e n t a i l e d by S and assume 
t h a t we have v e r i f i e d S i t s e l f . We can, however, i n f e r 
"that u n l e s s we f u l f i l l a t l e a s t the deduced commands we 
have not done a l l t h a t we were t o l d to do." Gf. A. Ross, 
op. c i t . , p. Ulffo 
I b i d . , p. 3fyo 
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to guido a c t i o n s and d e c i s i o n s and can t h e r e f o r e a l s o 
be c a l l e d p r i n c i p l e s of conduct. Examples might bes 
"Never t e l l l i e s , " or "Love your neighbour as y o u r s e l f . " 
Hare considered i t a matter of d e f i n i t i o n that u n i v e r s a l 
i m p e ratives and p r i n c i p l e s e n t a i l i m p e r a t i v e s or simple 
commands; i f p r e s c r i p t i v e language i s to be a c t i o n - g u i d i n g 
then by d e f i n i t i o n i t must e n t a i l i m p e r a t i v e s by which 
one decides on a course of a c t i o n . Hare c l a i m s ? 
I propose to say t h a t the t e s t , whether someone 
i s u s i n g the judgement " I ought to do X" as a 
value-judgement or not i s , "Does he or does he 
not recognize that i f he a s s e n t s to the judge-
ment, he must a l s o assent to the command "Let 
me do X " ? 1 
The p r e c i s e way i n which such a s i n g u l a r command i s 
assented to, and thereby a d e c i s i o n rendered regarding 
some f u t u r e a c t i o n or a t t i t u d e , i s i n Hare's view b e s t 
understood w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the p r a c t i c a l s y l l o g i s m . 
The minor premise of the s y l l o g i s m can be an 
i n d i c a t i v e sentence which d e s c r i b e s p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s and 
th e r e f o r e f u r n i s h e s the context f o r the c o n c l u s i o n which 
i s drawn. T h i s premise together w i t h the p r i n c i p l e or 
u n i v e r s a l i mperative e n t a i l the imperative c o n c l u s i o n . 
Such a s y l l o g i s m would look l i k e ; 
1) Take a l l the boxes to the s t a t i o n . 
T h i s i s one of the boxes. 
Take t h i s box to the s t a t i o n . 
2) Never t e l l l i e s . 
T h i s p a r t i c u l a r statement i s a l i e . 
Do not say t h i s p a r t i c u l a r statement 0 
3) Love your neighbour as y o u r s e l f . 
T h i s man i s your neighbour. 
Love t h i s man as you love y o u r s e l f . 
Hare, Language of Morals, p. 1 6 8 - 9 ° 
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I t i s p o s s i b l e to see now that Hare considered such 
imperative i n f e r e n c e s as v a l i d deductions and as being 
p u r e l y a n a l y t i c i n c h a r a c t e r ; t h a t i s , the v a l i d i t y of 
the deduction i s dependent upon the meaning of the terms 
i n v o l v e d . 1 
I f we had to f i n d out whether someone knew the 
meaning of the word " a l l " i n "Take a l l the 
boxes to the s t a t i o n , " we should have to f i n d 
out whether he r e a l i z e d t h a t a person who 
assented to t h i s command, and a l s o to the 
statement "This i s one of the boxes" and y e t 
refused to assent to the command "Take t h i s to 
the s t a t i o n " could only do so i f he had mis~ 
understood one of these three sentences. I f 
t h i s s o r t of t e s t were i n a p p l i c a b l e the word 
" a l l " ( i n imperatives as i n i n d i c a t i v e s ) would 
be e n t i r e l y m e a ningless.2 
L i k e w i s e , as we have alr e a d y mentioned, to understand the 
meaning of e i t h e r of the p r a c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s i n 2) and 3 ) 
above i s to understand both t h a t they are p r e s c r i p t i v e 
( i . e . a c t i o n - g u i d i n g ) and t h a t t h i s guidance i s i n the 
form of s i n g u l a r i m p eratives addressed to o n e s e l f or 
others which are e n t a i l e d by the p r i n c i p l e s . 
I t remains to be s t a t e d p r e c i s e l y what the r u l e s 
f o r such p r a c t i c a l i n f e r e n c e s a r e . The f i r s t i s : 
No i n d i c a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n can be v a l i d l y drawn 
from a s e t of premisses which cannot be 
v a l i d l y drawn from the i n d i c a t i v e s among them 
alone.3 
The j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s r u l e i s again the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n 
t h a t deductive i n f e r e n c e s are a n a l y t i c . 
I b i d . , p. 3 2 - 3 * 
2 I b i d . , p. 25. 
3 I b i d . , p. 28. 
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We have, t h e r e f o r e , to say t h a t t h e r e must be 
nothing s a i d i n the c o n c l u s i o n which i s not 
s a i d i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y i n the premisses, 
except what can be added s o l e l y on the s t r e n g t h 
of d e f i n i t i o n s of terms. 1 
T h i s r u l e would e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of drawing the 
c o n c l u s i o n i n example 1) above, "You w i l l take t h i s box 
to the s t a t i o n , " To draw t h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s to add some-
th i n g which i s not i m p l i c i t or e x p l i c i t i n the premises. 
T h i s r u l e has been c r i t i c i s e d by N. Rescher who claims 
t h a t some i n d i c a t i v e statements can be v a l i d l y i n f e r r e d 
from i m p e r a t i v e s . Prom the imperative "John, d r i v e your 
c a r home" we might d e r i v e the i n d i c a t i v e "John owns a c a r " ; 
from the p r i n c i p l e "Never do anything i l l e g a l " and the 
command "Don't do A" we can v a l i d l y i n f e r t h a t "A i s 
i l l e g a l . " I n both c a s e s , these i n d i c a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s 
are i m p l i c i t i n the i m p e r a t i v e s s i n c e they are the p r e -
s u p p o s i t i o n s f o r these i m p e r a t i v e s being given and t h e r e -
f o r e Hare's r u l e does r\pt exclude t h e i r v a l i d i n f e r e n c e . 
I t i s Hare's second r u l e which " i s the l o g i c a l 
mainstay of h i s moral philosophy" 3 and which i s i n d i c a t i v e 
I b i d . , p. 33. T h i s again i s to r e v i s e the n o t i o n 
that v a l i d i n f e r e n c e s are only p o s s i b l e f o r statements 
whose t r u t h - v a l u e i s known or can be discovered, f o r 
c l e a r l y t h i s cannot be done w i t h i m p e r a t i v e s . L o g i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s among imp e r a t i v e s are based on c o n s i s t e n c y o r 
"command coverage." See Edgley, op. c i t . , p. 31=33, and 
Rescher, op. c i t . , Chapter o B 
Rescher, op. c i t . , p„ 92-3 , 96=7, T h i s second 
example w i l l only work a g a i n s t Hare i f the i n j u n c t i o n , 
"Don't do A.'" c a r r i e s moral f o r c e , f o r i t could be 
merely a matter of pe r s o n a l t a s t e or p r e f e r e n c e . 
Hudson, op. c i t . t p. 235>. 
of h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hume's v e r s i o n of the n a t u r a l -
i s t i c f a l l a c y . T h i s r u l e i s ; 
No imperative c o n c l u s i o n can be v a l i d l y drawn 
from a s e t of premisses which does not con t a i n 
at l e a s t one i m p e r a t i v e 0 1 
I n t h i s r e s p e c t , i n f e r e n c e s from an i n d i c a t i v e statement 
of f a c t which does not have any p r e s c r i p t i v e meaning or 
which does not con t a i n the n e u s t l c p e c u l i a r to impera-
t i v e s to an imperative c o n c l u s i o n are i n v a l i d l o g i c a l l y o 
Hare c l a i m s ; 
I n t h i s l o g i c a l r u l e , again, i s to be found 
the b a s i s of Hume's c e l e b r a t e d o b s e r v a t i o n 
on the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of deducing an "ought 
p r o p o s i t i o n from a s e r i e s of " i s " - p r o p o s i t i o n s 
= =an o b s e r v a t i o n which, as he r i g h t l y s a y s , 
"would subvert a l l the v u l g a r systems of 
m o r a l i t y , " and not only those which had 
al r e a d y appeared i n h i s day»2 
The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s r u l e i s found i n the f a c t t h a t , 
again by d e f i n i t i o n , no i n d i c a t i v e statement can answer 
the q u e s t i o n "What s h a l l I do?" Imperatives perform t h i s 
f u n c t i o n and Hare o f f e r s three reasons "for holding t h a t 
by no form of i n f e r e n c e , however l o o s e , can we get an 
answer to the question 'What s h a l l I do? * out of a s e t 
of premisses which do not co n t a i n , a t any r a t e i m p l i c i t l y , 
an i m p e r a t i v e , 
The f i r s t p o s i t i o n a g a i n s t which Hare argues i s 
t h a t which would r e p r e s e n t as a v a l i d i n f e r e n c e the 
f o l l o w i n g ; 
Hare, Language of Morals, p„ 280 
S i s f a l s e . 
Therefore, do not say S. 
According to t h i s view, we do not need an imperative 
premise but only a " s p e c i a l r u l e of i n f e r e n c e " by which 
a d e f i n i t i o n of " f a l s e " i s g i v e n . The i n f e r e n c e i s 
represented t h e r e f o r e as a matter of knowing the meaning 
of words alone. Hare c l a i m s , r i g h t l y , t h a t t h i s d e f i n i -
t i o n of " f a l s e " which could be o f f e r e d would simply be an 
imperative i n d i s g u i s e and h i s r u l e would s t i l l be v a l i d . 
Secondly, Hare r e j e c t s the n o t i o n t h a t p r i n c i p l e s which 
serve as the major premise i n Hare's p r a c t i c a l i n f e r e n c e 
are r e a l l y " l oose" r u l e s of i n f e r e n c e by which the move 
from a statement of f a c t to an imperative can be con= 
s i d e r e d " g e n e r a l l y " v a l i d . T h i s view would not claim 
the s t r i c t entailment of imperatives from i n d i c a t i v e 
premises but would allow exceptions to be made so th a t 
one might c o n t r a d i c t o n e s e l f to say "This i s a f a l s e 
statement, but say i t anyway." Hare's argument w i t h t h i s 
view i s t h a t i t does not take i n t o account the "dynamic 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the exceptions and the p r i n c i p l e s " 
which i s e f f e c t e d by the d e c i s i o n of the moral agent to 
t r e a t c e r t a i n c l a s s e s of cases as belonging to another 
p r i n c i p l e other than the one i n q u e s t i o n . 2 F i n a l l y , 
u n d e r l y i n g these two o b j e c t i o n s to any attempt to d e r i v e 
i m p e r a t i v e s from i n d i c a t i v e premises alone i s Hare's 
contention t h a t d e c i s i o n i s of the essence of m o r a l i t y 
and i t i s d e c i s i o n alone which can make use of an 
imperative i n f e r e n c e to guide action,, 
When someone s a y s , e i t h e r , " T h i s i s f a l s e , so 
I won't say i t , " or "This i s f a l s e , but I ' l l 
say i t a l l the same, and make an exception to 
my p r i n c i p l e , " he i s doing a l o t more than 
i n f e r r i n g . A process of i n f e r e n c e alone would 
not t e l l him which of these two things he was 
to say i n any s i n g l e case f a l l i n g under the 
p r i n c i p l e . He has to decide which of them t o 
say. I n f e r r i n g c o n s i s t s i n saying t h a t i f he 
t e l l s a falsehood he w i l l be breaking the 
p r i n c i p l e , whereas i f he t e l l s the t r u t h he w i l l 
be observing i t . T h i s i s a p e r f e c t l y good 
deductive i n f e r e n c e , and nothing f u r t h e r need 
be s a i d about i t . The r e s t of what he does i s 
hot i n f e r e n c e a t a l l , but something q u i t e 
d i f f e r e n t , namely, deciding whether to a l t e r 
the p r i n c i p l e or n o t . 1 
I n f e r e n c e s c o n t a i n i n g i n d i c a t i v e premises alone cannot 
account f o r the f a c t o r of d e c i s i o n f o r which the c o n c l u ~ 
s i o n to the i n f e r e n c e r e p r e s e n t s a choice made regarding 
a f u t u r e a c t i o n . Unless a p r i n c i p l e f o r judging the 
re l e v a n c e of the i n d i c a t i v e premise to the c o n c l u s i o n 
i s p r e s e n t , then the i n f e r e n c e cannot be drawn a t a l l 
and no d e c i s i o n i s made. 
Nicholas Rescher has o u t l i n e d i n h i s monograph 
on The Logic of Commands the l o g i c of t h i s entailment of 
commands as i t r e l a t e s to the p r a c t i c e of computer pro° 
gramming, and h i s a n a l y s i s confirms the r u l e s which Hare 
has d e s c r i b e d . Rescher bases h i s n o t i o n of i n f e r e n c e 
upon "command t e r m i n a t i o n " ! a command c o n c l u s i o n may be 
I b i d . , p. 55» Cf. Rescher's argument t h a t 
a s s e r t o r i c statements cannot provide any of the e s s e n t i a l 
f a c e t s of commands and t h e r e f o r e commands cannot be 
e n t a i l e d by them alone. Op. c i t . , Chapter 2. 
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v a l i d l y derived from another command premise when the 
t e r m i n a t i o n of the covering command n e c e s s a r i l y means 
the t e r m i n a t i o n of the covered commands„ Command 
coverage ( i . e . whether a covering command a c t u a l l y 
e n t a i l s i t s covered commands) i s based upon three 
requirements % 
1) t h a t those addressed i n the f i r s t command 
inc l u d e a l l of those addressed i n the second, 
2) t h a t the f i r s t command c a l l 3 f o r r e a l i z i n g 
e v erything t h a t the second command c a l l s f o r , 
and 
3) t h a t every time a t and c o n d i t i o n under which 
the second command becomes operat i v e i s a l s o 
the time and c o n d i t i o n f o r the operation of 
the f i r s t commando 
Gi v i n g an example from a computer program, Rescher a l s o 
argues f o r the n o t i o n of a mixed premise inferenceo 
Command A may be given t o be c a r r i e d out whenever s u i t -
able c o n d i t i o n s B are p r e s e n t ; the f i r s t premise i s t h e r e -
f o r e "Do A whenever Bo" I n the course of i t s operations 
the computer keeps a s k i n g , " I s B p r e s e n t ? " , l e t t i n g a 
time u n i t elapse betwe&n each a c t of q u e s t i o n i n g , u n t i l . 
a p o s i t i v e answer i s given and the presence of B i s 
affirmedo The second premise then becomes "B i s p r e s e n t , " 
and the command c o n c l u s i o n "Do A now" i s d e r i v e d . Rescher 
s t a t e s the v a l i d i t y of heterogeneous command i n f e r e n c e s 
thuss 
The i n f e r e n c e whose c o n c l u s i o n i s the command 
C and whose premisses i n c l u d e the commands C i , 
C£ 0 0 o C n i s v a l i d i n the context of (or reads 
c o n t e x t u a l l y v a l i d given) the a s s e r t o r i c p r e -
misses S-j^, o 0 0 S m i f the command c o n c l u s i o n 
C can be decomposed—^either a b s o l u t e l y or i n 
the context of S-^ , S 2 , oo« S m - - i n t o the s e t of 
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commands C^ //, C 2#, C k# i n such a way t h a t 
each C J L # can be covered by some of the Cj 
e i t h e r by simple coverage or by c o n t e x t u a l 
coverage given the a s s e r t o r i c statements 
, S2 0 0 0 0 O ^ 
The n e c e s s a r y s but not s u f f i c i e n t , c o n d i t i o n f o r the 
v a l i d i t y of these i n f e r e n c e s i s thus t h a t the command 
c o n c l u s i o n be terminated whenever a l l command premises 
are terminated and a l l a s s e r t o r i c premises are tr u e * 
What the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t account has done i s to 
make moral reasoning a matter of deducing i m p e r a t i v e s 
which w i l l guide one's a c t i o n s from e i t h e r u n i v e r s a l 
i m p e r a t i v e s or p r i n c i p l e s , i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a s e t of 
f a c t s , a deduction which i s p o s s i b l e on the b a s i s of the 
d e s c r i p t i v e meaning of moral language 0 There i s a two-way 
process o c c u r r i n g here; one i s a matter of de c i d i n g 
which p r i n c i p l e s to adopt as one's own and the other i s 
a matter of deducing p a r t i c u l a r i m p e r a t i v e s from such 
p r i n c i p l e s i n s p e c i f i c situations» The f i r s t p r ocess 
Hare d e s c r i b e s as the e x p l o r a t o r y c h a r a c t e r of moral 
reasoning, s i m i l a r to the process i n s c i e n c e of reasoning 
towards a hypothesis which one i s prepared to accept as 
t r u e . "What we are doing i n moral reasoning i s to look 
f o r moral judgements and moral p r i n c i p l e s which, when we 
have considered t h e i r l o g i c a l consequences and the f a c t s 
of the case, we can s t i l l a c c e p t . Acceptance of such -
Rescher, op. cit„, p„ 80 e 
2 I b i d O J p. 88-9* 
^Hare, Freedom and Reason, p a 88„ Cfo s i m i l a r 
statements on p. 92, 193° 
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p r i n c i p l e s means,, l o g i c a l l y , that one i s prepared to act 
consistently upon them, that i s , to use them f o r making 
p r a c t i c a l decisions, and to recognise t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y 
to new situations which are covered by the descriptive 
content of the principles» 
When we are t r y i n g , i n a concrete case, to 
decide what we ought to do, what we are look<=> 
ing f o r (as I have already said) i s an action 
to which we can commit ourselves {p r e s c r i p t 
t i v i t y ) but which we are at the same time 
prepared to accept as exemplifying a p r i n c i p l e 
of action to be prescribed f o r others i n l i k e 
circumstances (universalizability)„ I f , when 
we consider some proposed action, we f i n d t h a t , 
when universalized, i t yields prescriptions 
which we cannot accept, we r e j e c t t h i s action 
as a solution to our moral problem=~if we 
cannot universalize the p r e s c r i p t i o n , i t 
cannot become an "ought.,"-*-
The search f o r such p r i n c i p l e s i s a process i n which the 
moral agent exercises his freedom to choose the moral 
pr i n c i p l e s that w i l l best serve as a guide to h i s future 
action and i n which he r a t i o n a l l y considers the reasons 
f o r and consequences of pri n c i p l e s so that his decision 
to accept one over another i s not purely arbitrary.. To 
do t h i s i s to play by the "rules of the game," that i s , 
to abide by the l o g i c of prescriptive languageo 
Once a p r i n c i p l e of action i s adopted i t i s then 
axiomatic that s p e c i f i c singular imperatives can b© 
deduced from i t according to the rules of imperative 
inference.. A moral agent acts i n accordance w i t h his 
pr i n c i p l e s i n a kind of "dynamic i n t e r a c t i o n " of prin= 
ciples and decision., Hare claimss 
1 I b i d , , p. 90o 
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A l l decisions except those, i f any, that are 
completely a r b i t r a r y are to some extent deci-
sions of p r i n c i p l e . . . . Suppose that we 
have a p r i n c i p l e to act i n a ce r t a i n way i n 
cer t a i n circumstances. Suppose then that we 
f i n d ourselves i n circumstances which f a l l 
under the p r i n c i p l e , but which have certain 
other peculiar features, not met before, which 
make us ask "Is the p r i n c i p l e r e a l l y intended 
to cover cases l i k e t h i s , or i s i t incompletely 
s p e c i f i e d — i s there here a case belonging to a 
class which should be treated as exceptional?" 
Our answer to t h i s question w i l l be a decision, 
but a decision of p r i n c i p l e , as i s shown by the 
use of the value-word "should."1 
Each dilemma which the moral person faces then i s charac-
terised by the need to decide which of one's p r i n c i p l e s 
i s appropriate to the s i t u a t i o n at hand and, i n deciding, 
to act i n the f u l f i l l m e n t of that p r i n c i p l e . I n such a 
decision the in t e r p l a y of the descriptive and evaluative 
meaning of moral language i s also noticeable. The 
descriptive content of the p r i n c i p l e and the statement of 
f a c t which serves as the minor premise give us the neces-
sary reasons f o r the evaluative conclusion to be drawn, 
but i t i s the decision to accept the conclusion and act 
upon i t that alone f u l l y j u s t i f i e s the conclusion and 
constitutes the s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r the v a l i d i t y of 
the inference. I t i s the task of the l o g i c i a n of ethi c s , 
which Hare considers himself to be, to describe precisely 
the way i n which f a c t s or statements of f a c t are relevant 
to matters of morality, both i n making value-judgements 
and i n g i v i n g imperatives, while avoiding any i d e n t i f i -
cation of f a c t and value and any deduction of evaluative 
1 Hare, Lan, f Morals, p. 65>. uase o s 
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conclusions from purely descriptive premises«, We sh a l l 
see whether Hare's p r e s c r i p t i v i s t account i s the most 
adequate f o r understanding t h i s complex re l a t i o n s h i p 
of i n d i c a t i v e and imperative„ 
CHAPTER I I I 
THE DESCRIPTIVIST ACCOUNT 
OP ETHICAL DECISION 
Hare claims near the end of Freedom and Reason 
that his account of the l o g i c of moral language i s 
morally neutral and that from i t s description, which i s 
the task of ethics, no substantive moral prescriptions 
can be derived,, 
On my view, there i s absolutely no content f o r 
a moral pr e s c r i p t i o n that i s ruled out by lo g i c 
or by the d e f i n i t i o n of terms. Another feature 
of my p o s i t i o n , a l l i e d to t h i s one, i s that 
there i s no statement of f a c t that a moral 
p r e s c r i p t i o n , taken singly, can be inconsistent 
with„l 
I t i s j u s t t h i s aspect of Hare's prescriptivism which has 
prompted a serious challenge to his work and to his i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of Hume's version of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y . 
This challenge can be labelled the d e s c r i p t i v i s t account 
of morality*^ Hudson defines a d e s c r i p t i v i s t as follows; 
Hare, Freedom and Reason, p. 1 9 5 ° 
^Hare, "Descriptivism," Proceedings of the 
B r i t i s h Academy ( 1 9 6 3 ) , reprinted i n Hudson, The Is/Ought 
Question. Hare takes t h i s term from J„ L, Austin who 
suggested "the descriptive f a l l a c y " was "supposing that 
some utterance i s descriptive when i t i s not „ „ „ 
'descriptivism,' then, can perhaps be used as a generic 
name f o r philosophical theories which f a l l i n t o t h i s 
f a l l a c y . " (p. 2l[0) The reference from Austin i s to be 
found i n Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1 9 6 1 ) , p. 7 1 . 
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„ o o someone who holds at least these two 
opinions? ( i ) that i t i s not always l o g i c a l l y 
possible to separate the descriptive and the 
evaluative meanings of a moral judgment; and 
( i i ) that the c r i t e r i a applied i n moral judg= 
ment are not i n the l a s t analysis merely a 
matter of free choice,-*-
I t i s important f o r us to examine t h i s new account of 
moral reasoning since i t offers not only the chance f o r 
some c r i t i c a l evaluation of prescriptivism but also some 
suggestions about the rela t i o n s h i p of i n d i c a t i v e and 
imperative i n the logic of moral decision,, 
A radi c a l c r i t i c i s m of Hare's prescriptivism has 
come from Philippa Foot who i n her wri t i n g s has taken up 
the two challenges mentioned above: that descriptive and 
evaluative meanings cannot be so s t r i c t l y separated as 
Hare had hoped and-that one i s not t o t a l l y free w i t h 
regard to the choice of c r i t e r i a by which one commends 
thingso In r a i s i n g both these issues, Foot hopes to 
close the gap between f a c t and value and to point out a 
d i f f e r e n t kind of rel a t i o n s h i p between them. Moral 
philosophers since Moore have, i n Foot's opinion, pre= 
supposed that there are two d i s t i n c t categories of f a c t 
and value and correspondingly that there are two d i s t i n c t 
sorts of ways one can t a l k about' things, evaluatively and 
descriptively,, The accounts of Hare and Stevenson both 
"are governed by the thought that there i s no l o g i c a l 
connection between statements of fa c t and statements of 
value, so that each man makes his own decision as to the 
^"Hudson, op. c i t o , p„ 2 9 5 -
Ik 
facts about an action which are relevant to i t s evalua~ 
t i o n . " ^ This contrast between f a c t and value i s brought 
out by these philosophers, Foot claims, i n t h e i r con-
siderations, of what i s to count as evidence f o r fact u a l 
and evaluative conclusions. With regard to the former, 
i t i s assumed thats 
The t r u t h or f a l s i t y of statements of f a c t i s 
shown by means of evidence; and what counts as 
evidence i s l a i d down i n the meaning of the 
expressions occurring i n the statement of f a c t 
. . . I t follows that no two people can make 
the same statement and count completely d i f f e r e n t 
things as evidence; i n the end one at least of 
them could be convicted of l i n g u i s t i c ignorance. 
When matters of f a c t are concerned there i s , on t h i s view, 
l i t t l e freedom of choice w i t h regard to what w i l l count 
as evidence since t h i s i s determined already by the con= 
ventions of l i n g u i s t i c usage. Thus, i n Foot's example, 
"the meaning of 'round* and ' f l a t ' made Magellan's voyages 
evidence f o r the roundness rather than the flatness of the 
Earth; someone who went, on questioning whether the evidence 
was evidence could eventually be shown to have made some 
l i n g u i s t i c mistake. "-* A dispute about an empirical matter 
can therefore be resolved f i r s t l y by seeking to v e r i f y the 
t r u t h or f a l s i t y of the claim and secondly, i f t h i s does 
not end the disagreement, by r e f e r r i n g to the accepted 
c r i t e r i a f o r the use of words. To use words d e s c r i p t i v e l y 
"''Foot, "Moral Arguments," Mind, Vol. 67 ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 
reprinted i n Thomson and Dworkin, Ethics (Harper and Row, 
New York, 1 9 6 8 ) , p. 1 0 . 
2Foot, "Moral B e l i e f s , " Proceedings of the 
A r i s t o t e l i a n Society, Vol. LIX ( 1 9 5 8 ) , reprinted i n 
Hudson, op. c i t . , p. 1 9 6 . 
3 I b i d . 
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then, according to Foot, i s to use them according to 
accepted l i n g u i s t i c rules and to be able to give evidence 
when required to do so, the c r i t e r i a f o r which are l a i d 
down by the meaning of the words used. 
I t i s her claim that Hare and Stevenson i n 
p a r t i c u l a r have not taken t h i s to be true of the evalua= 
t i v e use of words. She takes them to be sayings 
An evaluation i s not connected l o g i c a l l y w i t h 
the f a c t u a l statements on which i t i s based. 
One man may say that a thing i s good because 
of some f a c t about i t , and another may refuse 
to take that f a c t as any evidence at a l l , f o r 
nothing i s l a i d down i n the meaning of "good" 
which connects i t with one piece of "evidence" 
rather than another.l 
Evaluative words i n general and moral words i n p a r t i c u l a r 
have a kind of autonomy from the f a c t s , an autonomy which 
i s represented as a function of eith e r the "pro-attitude" 
of the user or the "action-guiding" or p r a c t i c a l character 
of evaluative words. These "non~naturalists" are con-
cerned to define that unique q u a l i t y or character of 
evaluative language by which i t stands apart from descrip= 
t i v e language and by which, according to Foot, i t s l o g i c a l 
r e l a t i o n s with descriptive language are severed. Whereas 
disputes regarding matters of f a c t are capable of resolu° 
t i o n , disputes over moral or evaluative matters u l t i m a t e l y 
break down and cannot be resolved. There comes a point i n 
a moral argument when no fu r t h e r appeals to evidence or 
reasons can be made and when the only j u s t i f i c a t i o n l e f t 
f o r holding the claim i n dispute i s e i t h e r that one has a 
•'"Ibid. 
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" p r o - a t t i t u d e " towards the thing i n question or that one 
has f r e e l y chosen the pr i n c i p l e s by .which to guide 
choices and actions Consistently„ "In the end everyone 
i s forced back to some moral p r i n c i p l e which he simply 
asserts==and which someone else- may. simply deny. I t can 
therefore be no reproach to anyone that he gives no 
reasons f o r a statement of moral p r i n c i p l e , since any 
moral argument must contain some undefended premise of 
t h i s kind."^ Evidence f o r evaluative conclusions i s , on 
Hare's and Stevenson's accounts, simply a matter of choice 
and there i s complete freedom here i n that there are no 
l o g i c a l l i m i t s to what can count as evidence. 
Foot argues that such a view of descriptive and 
evaluative meaning not only allows f o r and j u s t i f i e s 
moral e c c e n t r i c i t y but also seems to contradict some 
f a i r l y common observations about our use of words. She 
therefore c r i t i c i s e s the non-naturalist p o s i t i o n f o r two 
mistaken assumptions? 
Assumption ( 1 ) i s that some i n d i v i d u a l may, 
without l o g i c a l e r r o r , base his b e l i e f s about 
matters of value e n t i r e l y on premises which no 
one else would recognise as giving any evidence 
at a l l . Assumption ( 2 ) i s that , given the kind 
of statement which other people regard as e v i -
dence f o r an evaluative conclusion, he may 
refuse to draw the conclusion because t h i s does 
not count as evidence f o r him.^ 
I n his account of contemporary moral philosophy, G. J. 
Warnock has drawn a t t e n t i o n to these assumptions as w e l l . 
1 
Foot, "Moral Arguments," p. 10. 
2Foot, "Moral B e l i e f s , " p. 197. 
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The " a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t s " maintain "not merely that descrip-
t i o n and evaluation are d i f f e r e n t , but that they are i n 
an important sense independent.Warnock's i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n of t h i s independence has also to do w i t h the freedom 
which the a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t s claim f o r choosing the standards 
or c r i t e r i a f o r the use of evaluative words. He 
describes t h e i r p o s i t i o n as follows? 
. . . no one, i t i s suggested, i s ever l o g i c a l l y 
obliged to accept any given feature as a standard 
or c r i t e r i o n , or any general proposition jas a 
rule or p r i n c i p l e of judgment . . . There can be 
description, but no evaluation, without the adop-
t i o n or recognition of standards| but i f so, since 
one cannot be l o g i c a l l y obliged to adopt any 
pa r t i c u l a r facts or features, or even any at a l l , 
as standards f o r favourable or unfavourable judg-
ment, the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of facts or features i n a 
description cannot l o g i c a l l y lead to any p a r t i c u l a r 
evaluation, or even any at a l l . 2 
These assumptions of non-naturalism are c r i t i c i s e d by Foot 
and Warnock on the basis of three considerations and i t i s 
important that we examine each of these i n t u r n . They ares 
(1) that descriptive and evaluative meanings are i n some 
instances l o g i c a l l y t i e d to one another, (2) that there i s 
a l i m i t to the kinds of things which are relevant to 
evaluative judgements, and ( 3 ) that the c r i t e r i a f o r the 
use of good and some other evaluative words are determined 
by factors other than those-established by choice or 
preference. 
x G o J . Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy 
(Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1967 K P« 61+. 
2 I b i d . , p. 6 5 . 
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I n her argument against such a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the evaluative and the descriptive meaning of 
words, Foot claims to be able to show through some 
examples of non-moral evaluation the disappearance of any 
clear boundaries between them. Non-naturalists, she 
claims, have said that "any statement of value always 
seems to go beyond any statement of f a c t " and that i t i s 
"one thing to say that a thing i s so, and another to have 
a p a r t i c u l a r a t t i t u d e towards i t s being so; one thing to 
see that certain effects w i l l f o l l o w from a given action, 
and another to care . . . . 1 , 1 The conclusion of t h i s view 
i s that "with an evaluation there was a committal i n a new 
dimension" and t h i s commitment i s evidenced, i n the w r i t i n g s 
of Hare f o r example, i n that the speaker uses t h i s evalua-
t i o n to guide his own actions and decisions. To say "X i s 
a good action" i s , as we have seen, to commit oneself 
whenever possible to giving oneself an imperative, "Let me 
do X," and to so acting. Foot presents two arguments 
against such a view. The f i r s t i s that i n some cases i t 
does not make sense to describe an action f u l l y and then 
to decide whether or not to commend that action. As an 
example, she of f e r s the descriptive-evaluative sentence 
"X i s a courageous man." Non-naturalists w i l l argue, 
Foot claims, 
that a f t e r the facts have been accepted==say that 
X i s the kind of man who w i l l climb a dangerous 
mountain, beard an i r a s c i b l e employer f o r a r i s e 
Foot, "Moral B e l i e f s , " p. 206o 
i n pay, and i n general face the f e a r f u l f o r the 
sake of something he thinks worth while=~there 
remains the question of "commendation" or 
"evaluation." I f the word "courage" i s used 
they w i l l ask whether or not the man who speaks 
of another as having courage i s supposed to have . 
commended him.^-
Now i t is j u s t such a question, the answer to which i s 
assumed to be independent of the description already 
offered, which Foot claims to be inappropriate and mistaken. 
What sense can be made, however, of the question 
"does he commend?" What i s t h i s extra element 
which i s supposed to be present or absent a f t e r 
the facts have been settled? I t i s not a matter 
of l i k i n g the man who has courage, or of t h i n k i n g 
him altogether good, but of "commending him f o r 
. his courage." How are we supposed to do t h a t ? 2 
Foot would point out that a great number of words i n our 
language are words l i k e "courageous" i n which the descrip-
t i v e and evaluative meanings are too closely intertwined 
to be c l e a r l y distinguished. As Warnock argues, 
Since . . . there are i n ordinary discourse com-
paratively few regimented d i s t i n c t i o n s between 
one speech-activity and another, one might expect 
to f i n d description and evaluation so i n e x t r i c a b l y 
intermingled as to c o n s t i t u t e , as i t were, a seam-
less garment; and there cannot be l o g i c a l l y inde-
pendent parts of a t r a c t of discourse which has, 
i n the required sense, no distinguishable parts.3 
The commendation involved i n the statement "X i s a 
courageous man" i s w r i t t e n r i g h t i n t o the description of 
X and of his a c t i v i t i e s so that to o f f e r t h i s description 
i s a l l that one needs do to commend X. To go f u r t h e r than 
I b i d . , p„ 2 0 8 o 
2 I b i d . 
3 
Warnock, op. c i t . , p. 61^. 
t h i s , that i s , to say that one cannot commend without 
accepting an imperative f o r one's own action based on 
the same p r i n c i p l e , i s unnecessary. " I can speak of 
someone else as having the v i r t u e of courage, and of 
course recognise i t as a v i r t u e i n the proper sense, 
while knowing that I am a complete coward, and making no 
resolution to reform." 1 Indeed, evaluation does have an 
"action-guiding force" but t h i s has been misunderstood by 
the non-naturalists to be a function of the unique element 
of evaluative language which i s superadded to the descrip° 
tiv.e element. 
Foot's argument goe3 even f u r t h e r than t h i s , 
however, and t h i s i s her second point against the l o g i c a l 
separation of descriptive and evaluative meaning. Non= 
n a t u r a l i s t s claim that the conclusion of a syllogism can 
only have evaluative meaning when the premises taken 
together have evaluative meaning as well and that "unless 
t h i s i s so i t w i l l always be possible to assert the 
premises and yet deny the conclusion „ . <, ."2 To show 
that t h i s claim i s false Foot analyses the nature of the 
Foot, "Moral B e l i e f s , " p. 209. Hudson argues 
that here Foot's point i s t r i v i a l i f she means to imply 
that we suffer "weakness of w i l l " and so may not f u l f i l l 
the imperative given to ourselves—indeed Hare himself 
allows f o r t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y — o r else her point i s 
mistaken since Hudson takes i t to be axiomatic that " I f I 
am (a) sincere and (b) able, i t i s to be expected t h a t , 
having commended Smith f o r being courageous, I s h a l l be, 
or at least t r y to be courageous myself." Op. c i t . , 
p. 296=7- " 
"Foot, "Moral Arguments," p D 13„ 
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statement "That behaviour i s rude." "Rude," she says, 
i s an evaluative word which "expresses, f a i r l y mild, 
condemnation" and i t i s used i n cases "where cer t a i n 
descriptions apply. 1 , 1 What she wishes to know i s that 
not j u s t any evidence w i l l count as evidence f o r rude 
behaviour, a claim which she accuses the non-naturalists 
of making, but rather that i n making evaluative state-
ments we must abide by the c r i t e r i a of rudeness estab- • 
lished by social convention i n defining t h i s word. 
Given that t h i s reference to offence i s to be 
included i n any account of the concept of rude-
ness, we may ask what the r e l a t i o n i s between 
the assertion that these conditions of offence 
are f u l f i l l e d - — l e t us c a l l i t 0--and the state-
ment that a piece of behaviour i s rude--let us 
c a l l i t R. Can someone who accepts the propo-
s i t i o n 0 (that t h i s kind of offence i s caused) 
deny the proposition R (that the behaviour i 3 
rude)? I should have thought that t h i s was j u s t 
what he could not do, f o r i f he says that i t i s 
not rude, we s h a l l stare, and ask him what sort 
of behaviour would be rude; and what i s he to say?^ 
Not only do the conditions f o r offence give evidence f o r 
the conclusion that some behaviour i s rude, but t h i s con= 
elusion i s entailed by the descriptive premises which 
state the offence. 
I conclude that whether a man i s speaking of 
behaviour as rude or not rude, he must use the 
same c r i t e r i a as anyone else, and that since 
the c r i t e r i a are s a t i s f i e d i f 0 i s true, i t i s 
impossible f o r him to assert 0 while denying R. 
I t follows that i f i t i s a s u f f i c i e n t condition 
of P's e n t a i l i n g Q that the assertion of P i s 
inconsistent with the denial of Q, we have here 
an example of a non-evaluative premise from 
which an evaluative conclusion can be deduced.-^ 
1 I b i d . , p. 1J+, 3 I b i d . „ p. l £ = l 6 . 
2 I b i d . 
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Foot concludes therefore that the use of the word "rude" 
and other evaluative words l i k e i t i s dependent, not upon 
one's a t t i t u d e towards the behaviour i n question nor upon 
one's adopting a p r i n c i p l e f o r one's own fut u r e behaviour, 
but rather upon the presence or absence of cer t a i n condi-
t i o n s , conditions which are explained i n the description 
of the behaviour and which, i n the end, are a purely 
f a c t u a l matter. I f t h i s view can be shown to be true of 
many evaluative words, then the gap between evaluative 
and descriptive meaning supposed by non-naturalists can 
be closedo 
The analysis which Foot has offered of descriptive 
and evaluative i n d i c a t i v e statements has the consequence 
not only of closing t h i s gap between them but also of 
l i m i t i n g the range of considerations which are relevant 
to evaluative and moral statements. The mistaken notion 
that such a range i s unlimited comes as a r e s u l t of two 
erroneous presuppositions made by non-naturalists t 
( 1 ) that evaluation bears an external r e l a t i o n to i t s 
objects and ( 2 ) that moral judgements i n p a r t i c u l a r are 
distinguishable by t h e i r form only, not by t h e i r content. 
With regard to the f i r s t point, Foot contends that such a 
hypothesis i s untenable J » . there i s no describing 
the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, 
or anything of the s o r t , without f i x i n g the object to 
which they are supposed to be attached." 1 To understand 
Foot, "Mbral B e l i e f s , " p. 1 9 8 . 
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the nature of evaluation and to understand i t s action-
guiding character requires a consideration of the object 
to which an evaluation r e f e r s . Such a consideration w i l l 
be descriptive of the object i n question but w i l l reveal 
that an "i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n " exists between the object and 
the evaluation of i t . Foot offers the examples of rude-
ness (which we have already discussed), pride, and danger 
to argue that the evaluation i m p l i c i t i n these words i s a 
function of the object i t s e l f and therefore i s " l o g i c a l l y 
vulnerable" to the f a c t s . 1 In considering pride f o r 
example Foot attempts to show that "there are l i m i t s to 
the things a man can be proud of, about which indeed he 
can f e e l p r i d e . " 2 A rough survey of these things w i l l 
show us that there" are two factors especially which are 
common to them. "The ch a r a c t e r i s t i c object of pride i s 
something seen (a) as i n some way a man's own, and (b) as 
some s.ort of achievement or advantage! without t h i s object 
pride cannot be described." 3 The presence of such a 
personal achievement i s j u s t i f i a b l e reason f o r adopting 
the a t t i t u d e of pride and likewise, the a t t i t u d e i s 
dependent upon or r e s t r i c t e d to the presence of i t s 
peculiar object. I n the same way, to claim that something 
i s dangerous i s dependent upon the presence of an object 
which can be described as i n j u r i o u s and since, Foot argues, 
"the range of things which can be called i n j u r i e s i s quite 
1 I b i d . , p 0 201. 3 I b i d P. 199. 
2. I b i d . , p 0 198 0 
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narrowly r e s t r i c t e d , the word 'dangerous' i s r e s t r i c t e d 
i n so f a r as i t i s connected with i n j u r y * " 1 These 
examples are intended to i l l u s t r a t e the way i n which 
"mental a t t i t u d e s " are l o g i c a l l y related to t h e i r objects 
and i t i s assumed that the a t t i t u d e of commendation which 
i s of special importance i n making moral evaluations i s 
t i e d to i t s objects i n the same way. 
The use of moral value words, and i n p a r t i c u l a r ' 
the use of "good," i s l o g i c a l l y t i e d to those objects or 
actions which can be shown to have "a p o i n t " and by show-
ing the rather l i m i t e d range of those things which can be 
considered to have a moral "point" both Foot and Warnock 
hope to argue that morality i t s e l f i s l i m i t e d to those 
objects. Moral judgements according to t h i s view are thus 
to be distinguished by t h e i r content. For the non-
n a t u r a l i s t s the point of using the word "good" or of 
t a l k i n g about moral v i r t u e s i s eit h e r to express one's 
pro-attitude (as i n the case of emotivism) or to commend 
something (as i n the case of p r e s c r i p t i v i s m ) | f o r the 
d e s c r i p t i v i s t s the point of using moral language i s to 
indicate the way i n which some object or action leads to 
human good or avoids harm. " I t i s surely clear that moral 
virtu e s must be connected w i t h human good and harm," Foot 
argues and she claims to show that such reasons as "harm, 
advantage, b e n e f i t , importance, etc." can f u r n i s h the 
necessary and s u f f i c i e n t conditions f o r any moral judge-
ment. Warnock argues that the point of morality has to 
1 I b i d . , p. 2 0 3 * 
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do w i t h "the we l f a r e of human beings" and t h a t "the 
relevance of considerations as t o the w e l f a r e o f human 
beings cannot, i n the context of moral debate, be denied„ 
Not only i s i t the case t h a t moral judgements have t h i s 
k i n d of p o i n t but conversely one who asserts such a 
judgement must, i f he intends h i s judgements t o be taken 
s e r i o u s l y or t o be understood, be able t o describe the 
p o i n t o 
I do not know what could be meant by saying t h a t 
i t was someone's duty t o do something unless 
there was an attempt t o show why i t mattered i f 
t h i s s o r t o f t h i n g was not done. How can ques-
t i o n s such as "what does i t matter?", "what harm 
does i t do?", "what advantage i s there i n . 0 .?", 
"why i s i t important?", be set aside here?^ 
While Foot argues t h a t moral language simply cannot be 
taken s e r i o u s l y i f the importance o f the o b j e c t or a c t i o n 
i s not i n d i c a t e d , Warnock claims t h a t t h i s language i s n o t 
understood unless we can understand how i t i s r e l a t e d t o a 
person's wants.^ 
Warnock, op. c i t . , p. 67. Cf. G. E. M, Anscombe, 
"Modern Moral Philosophy," Philosophy, V o l . 33 (1958), 
r e p r i n t e d i n Thomson and Dworkin, op. c i t . She suggests 
t h a t the p o i n t or j u s t i f i c a t i o n of m o r a l i t y i s i n "human 
f l o u r i s h i n g " so t h a t , i f anything "needs what makes i t 
f l o u r i s h , so a man needs, or ought t o perform, only 
v i r t u o u s a c t i o n s . . . " - ( p . 209). 
^Toot, "Moral Arguments," p» 17o 
Warnock, op. c i t o , p. 66=7. The precis e r e l a t i o n 
between needs and wants or desires i s not c l e a r l y defined 
by the d e s c r i p t i v i s t s , as Hare has argued i n h i s defense 
of p r e s c r i p t i v i s m . He attempts t o show t h a t l o g i c alone 
cannot place l i m i t s upon what one desires and, i f the 
necessary c o n d i t i o n f o r the s a t i s f a c t i o n of a desire i s 
something which i s needed, then there are no l o g i c a l 
l i m i t s on t h i s e i t h e r (op. c i t . , p. 250=7)° Warnock 
claims, however, t h a t he merely wants t o l i m i t the 
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The case f o r the l i m i t a t i o n of those t h i n g s which 
are r e l e v a n t t o moral e v a l u a t i o n i s c a r r i e d f u r t h e r by-
Foot and Ufarnock i n t h e i r d iscussion of the c r i t e r i a f o r 
the use o f the word "good." They bot h argue t h a t choosing 
cannot be e i t h e r a necessary or a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n 
f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of the word "good" t o some obje c t or 
a c t i o n and t h a t , u l t i m a t e l y , e v a l u a t i o n does not r e s t upon 
choice at a l l . I n d e s c r i b i n g the n o n - n a t u r a l i s t p o s i t i o n 
of Hare, Warnock claims t h a t 
0 . o he i s saying, not only t h a t i t i s f o r us t o 
decide what our moral opinions are, but also t h a t 
i t i s f o r us t o decide what t o take as grounds 
f o r or against any moral o p i n i o n . We are not 
only, as i t were, f r e e to decide on the evidence, 
but also f r e e t o decide what evidence i s . I do 
no t , i t seems, decide t h a t f l o g g i n g i s wrong 
because I am against c r u e l t y j r a t h e r , I decide 
t h a t f l o g g i n g i s wrong because I decide t o be 
against c r u e l t y . And what, i f I d i d make t h a t 
d e c i s i o n , would be my ground f o r making i t ? That 
1 am opposed t o the d e l i b e r a t e i n f l i c t i o n of pain? 
N o c — r a t h e r t h a t I decide t o be opposed t o i t . And 
so on.l 
To take t h i s p o s i t i o n i s t o hold t h a t good and other value 
words are only c o n t i n g e n t l y r e l a t e d t o t h e i r objects and 
to hold t h a t whatever one chooses t o be a reason f o r the 
e v a l u a t i o n of some ob j e c t or a c t i o n i s adequate j u s t i f i c a -
t i o n (or l e g i t i m a s a t i o n , t o use Foot's term) f o r t h a t 
evaluation,, Foot and Warnock contend, however, t h a t " i f a 
man who c a l l s an A a good A has reason, other things being 
r e l e v a n t considerations f o r something said t o be good and 
i n t h i s sense agrees w i t h the n a t u r a l i s t s ' p o s i t i o n . " I f 
t o be a ' n a t u r a l i s t ' i s to mai n t a i n t h a t c e r t a i n kinds of 
f a c t s or f e a t u r e s are n e c e s s a r i l y r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i a o f 
moral e v a l u a t i o n , then I would surmise t h a t 'naturalism' 
i s t r u e " (p. 68). 
^ I b i d . , p c 1+7 o 
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equal, t o p r e f e r i t t o other A's, t h i s i s because of the 
k i n d of t h i n g t h a t an A i s , and i t s connection w i t h h i s 
wants and needs." 1 That "the k i n d of t h i n g t h a t an A i s " 
can give a s u f f i c i e n t and a necessary reason f o r choosing 
A or f o r e v a l u a t i n g i t i n a p a r t i c u l a r way can be shown 
by several examples, argues Foot, One class of objects 
f o r which t h i s i s so i s t h a t group cha r a c t e r i s e d by 
having a f u n c t i o n . Objects such as knives, pens, and so 
f o r t h can be described i n f u n c t i o n a l terms and i n t h i s 
d e s c r i p t i o n the c r i t e r i a f o r the goodness of these 
o b j e c t s i s determined. Thus, 
the primary c r i t e r i o n of goodness i n a k n i f e i s 
i t s a b i l i t y t o cut w e l l . I f a man goes i n t o a 
shop and asks f o r a k n i f e , saying t h a t he wants 
a good k n i f e , he can be understood as wanting 
one t h a t cuts w e l l , and since " k n i f e " i s a 
f u n c t i o n a l word i n the str o n g sense "good knives 
cut w e l l " must be held t o be some kind o f 
a n a l y t i c p r o p o s i t i o n . 2 
Indeed the same holds t r u e of n o n - f u n c t i o n a l words such 
as " f a t h e r , " "farmer," " r i d e r , " " l i a r , " and so f o r t h i n 
which again the c r i t e r i a f o r the goodness of these r o l e s 
i s determined by and l i m i t e d t o the d e f i n i t i o n of these 
r o l e s i n a p a r t i c u l a r community. 
What i s good farming w i l l n a t u r a l l y vary some-
what from place to place . . . But w i t h i n such 
l i m i t s the standards by which farming i s judged 
depend on the meaning of the word, since what 
counts i n farming i s only something which has a 
p a r t i c u l a r point. 3 
Foot, "Goodness and Choice," The A r i s t o t e l i a n 
Society, Supplementary Volume XXXV (19bl), r e p r i n t e d i n 
Eudson, op. c i t . , p c 22?. 
2 I b i d a , p„ 216. 3 I b i d . , p 0 218. 
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The c r i t e r i a f o r the goodness of thi n g s and the reasons 
which would count as evidence f o r one's e v a l u a t i o n are 
thus n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l e d by the d e s c r i p t i o n e i t h e r of 
the f u n c t i o n of some t h i n g or of i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
To c a l l something "good" i s thus the r e s u l t not of one's 
having chosen i t but of one's r e c o g n i t i o n of the d e s c r i p -
t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i t j i n t h i s way value i s d e t e r ~ 
mined by f a c t s . The other f a c t o r which i s determinative 
of one's e v a l u a t i o n of something i s the connection between 
t h a t o b j e c t or a c t i o n and "human needs or wants." 
Warnock claims t h a t t o evaluate i s t o i n d i c a t e one's 
preference f o r something and t h i s preference i s the 
r e s u l t o f a need or want. He argues, as we have seen, 
t h a t there i s a l i m i t t o the thi n g s a human being can 
understandably be said t o want or need and t h e r e f o r e t h i s 
also i s not the r e s u l t of choice. Thus, "we do not choose 
to want t h i s or t h a t , to p r e f e r one t h i n g to another J when 
we have choices t o make, we do not i n t u r n choose what are 
t o be reasons f o r choosing. To take t h a t l i n e , as we sug-
gested e a r l i e r t h a t p r e s c r i p t i v i s m does, i s t o imply t h a t 
i n the end there are no reasons at a l l . " ' ' ' Thus w i t h 
regard t o both reasons which can be given f o r c a l l i n g 
something good, namely the d e s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of the t h i n g as w e l l as i t s connection w i t h needing or 
wanting, the d e s c r i p t i v i s t s can claim " t h a t c r i t e r i a f o r 
Warnock, op. c i t . , p. 67» 
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the goodness of each and every k i n d of t h i n g . . . are 
always determined, and not a matter f o r d e c i s i o n . 
I t i s important a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t we r a i s e two 
c r i t i c i s m s which have been made against the d e s c r i p t i -
v i s t s so t h a t the nature o f t h e " d e s c r i p t i v e and evalua= 
t i v e meaning of i n d i c a t i v e statements becomes more c l e a r . 
I n r e p l y i n g t o the d e s c r i p t i v i s t s ' challenge, Hare 
suggests t h a t the basic f a l l a c y of t h i s account i s t o 
suppose "that some utterance i s d e s c r i p t i v e when i t i s 
n o t " and t h e r e f o r e t o equivocate on what i s meant by 
p 
d e s c r i p t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n . I n h i s essay on descrip= 
t i v i s m , Hare maintains t h a t there are two ways i n which 
d e s c r i p t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n may be interdependent and 
t h a t these two ways are c o n f l a t e d i n the d e s c r i p t i v i s t s ' 
account. The f i r s t way i n which they may be r e l a t e d i s 
t h a t the d e s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f an o b j e c t or 
a c t i o n f u r n i s h the reasons f o r an e v a l u a t i v e judgement 
and the person who makes such a judgement must be able 
to know and give those reasons. I f a person claims 
"That behaviour i s rude," he must support t h i s e v a l u a t i o n 
w i t h reasons which w i l l be i n the form of i n d i c a t i v e 
sentences d e s c r i b i n g the f a c t u a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 
behaviour. Hare o f f e r s the f o l l o w i n g as an example of 
the r e l a t i o n between reasons and choices. 
"''Foot, "Goodness and Choice," p. 216. 
2 
Hare, op. c i t . , p„ 2i|0. See above, p„ U9-»^ 0« 
I f I ' am choosing between an ordi n a r y mushroom 
and a poisonous t o a d s t o o l t o put i n the d i s h 
t h a t I am making f o r myself, I n a t u r a l l y choose, 
and p r e f e r , and t h i n k i t best t o choose and t h a t 
I ought t o choose, the mushroom and not the toad-
s t o o l i and I t h i n k t h i s because the l a t t e r i s 
poisonous ( i . e . such as t o cause death i f eat e n ) . 
That the t o a d s t o o l i s poisonous i s my reason f o r 
r e j e c t i n g i t . l 
The d e s c r i p t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the ob j e c t or a c t i o n 
are indeed h i g h l y r e l e v a n t t h e r e f o r e t o the choices which 
one makes but t h i s does not i n any way prove t h a t choices 
can be reduced t o reasons nor t h a t choices are super-
f l u o u s once the reasons are explained. To maintain t h a t 
t h i s i s so would be to m a i n tain t h a t d e s c r i b i n g and 
e v a l u a t i n g are i n e f f e c t the same t h i n g . Indeed t h i s 
seems t o be what Foot i n p a r t i c u l a r i s arguing i n her 
dis c u s s i o n of the e v a l u a t i v e words l i k e "courageous" or 
"rude" and i t i s here t h a t , Hare claims, she c o n f l a t e s 
the second r e l a t i o n between e v a l u a t i o n and d e s c r i p t i o n 
w i t h the f i r s t . The second way i n which these two may 
be r e l a t e d i s t h a t an e v a l u a t i o n may become l o g i c a l l y 
t i e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r d e s c r i p t i o n w i t h i n c e r t a i n words. 
Thus " i f I say t h a t a man has acted courageously, i t 
w i l l be odd f o r me t o add t h a t he did not do the r i g h t 
t h i n g . " However, whereas Hare would agree w i t h the 
f i r s t way i n which d e s c r i p t i o n s and eval u a t i o n s are 
r e l a t e d , he i s not w i l l i n g t o accept the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
1 I b i d . , p. 2$7o 
2 
Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, p. 297. 
of t h i s second way which i s o f f e r e d by the d e s c r i p t i v i s t s . 
Foot, i n p a r t i c u l a r , claims t h a t the d e s c r i p t i v e charac-
t e r i s t i c s of a c e r t a i n type of o f f e n s i v e behaviour e n t a i l 
the e v a l u a t i v e conclusion t h a t t h i s behaviour i s rude arid 
thus t h a t one cannot refuse t o accept the conclusion once 
the d e s c r i p t i o n has been proved,"*" What she seems t o be 
arguing, Hare claims, i s t h a t one cannot say t h a t the 
o f f e n s i v e behaviour i s the reason f o r one's choosing t o 
c a l l i t rude unless one i s prepared t o argue t h a t the 
o f f e n s i v e behaviour e n t a i l s t h i s p a r t i c u l a r evaluation,, 
What i s wrong w i t h such an argument i s t h a t ; 
t h i s i s t o confuse l o g i c a l entailment . . . w i t h 
the r e l a t i o n between choice and reasons f o r 
choice o . . The r e l a t i o n between choice and 
reasons f o r choice i s not a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n , , 
There i s no l o g i c a l compulsion on me, or even 
any weaker l o g i c a l c o n s t r a i n t , t o r e f r a i n from 
e a t i n g what I know w i l l k i l l me. I r e f r a i n 
from e a t i n g i t because I know i t w i l l k i l l mej 
but i f I did the opposite, and ate i t because 
I knew i t would k i l l me, I should n o t be 
off e n d i n g against any l o g i c a l r u l e r e g u l a t i n g 
the uses of words „ „ „ .2 
Hare argues t h a t t h i s confusion places n o n - n a t u r a l i s t s i n 
a f a l s e dilemma and t h a t only when the two issues are 
separated can any progress i n understanding be made. 
Foot, "Moral Arguments," p. 1^-16. 
Hare, op. c i t . , p. 25)7=8. Warnock concedes t h a t 
t h i s p o i n t i s v a l i d . " ^ I f the a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t then main-
t a i n s t h a t there are no c r i t e r i a of e v a l u a t i o n which any-
one i s l o g i c a l l y o b l iged t o accept, then I b e l i e v e t h a t 
' a n t i - n a t u r a l i s m ' i s also t r u e . " I n t h i s sense he claims 
t h a t the n a t u r a l i s t and a n t i - n a t u r a l i s t p o s i t i o n s are not 
incompatible w i t h each other. Op. c i t . , p. 68=9„ 
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Now i f anybody t h i n k s t h a t one can never say 
"q because p" unless there i s a l o g i c a l con-
n e c t i o n between "p" and "q," he i s l i k e l y t o 
attempt t o place opponents o f d e s c r i p t i v i s m 
i n the f o l l o w i n g ' dilemma. E i t h e r we have t o 
admit t h a t there i s a l o g i c a l connection 
between statements of f a c t , taken by them-
selves, and e v a l u a t i v e conclusions . . . j 
or else we must hold t h a t e v a l u a t i v e judge-
ments are never made because of anything--
i . e . t h a t they are q u i t e i r r a t i o n a l . 1 
To be placed i n such a dilemma only can be the r e s u l t of 
accepting t h i s confusion of the boundaries between evalua-
t i v e and d e s c r i p t i v e meaning. 
The second argument t o be made against d e s c r i p -
t i v i s m i s one which b r i n g s out a t once both the best and 
the worst i n t h i s account of moral reasoning. I t i s t o 
the c r e d i t of the d e s c r i p t i v i s t s t h a t they have c a l l e d 
a t t e n t i o n t o the great number of words i n our language 
which are used w i t h both e v a l u a t i v e and d e s c r i p t i v e 
meanings and t h a t they have urged a much more c a r e f u l 
examination i n t o the nature of the r e l a t i o n between these 
meanings. Foot has attempted t o do t h i s , however, by 
c l a i m i n g t h a t what she c a l l s "non-evaluative" or 
" d e s c r i p t i v e " premises can e n t a i l e v a l u a t i v e conclusions, 
I b i d . , p. 25>8. This same k i n d of dilemma i s 
described by R. W. Beardsmore, Moral Reasoning (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London, 1969). He argues against Foot's 
n o t i o n t h a t an e v a l u a t i v e and p a r t i c u l a r l y a moral judge-
ment cannot be considered important unless i t can be shown 
t o be l o g i c a l l y ( i . e . i n t e r n a l l y ) r e l a t e d t o some " p o i n t . " 
This i s t o confuse the reasons f o r one's e v a l u a t i o n , which 
i m p l i c i t l y show the importance--as opposed t o the 
t r i v i a l i t y = - o f the e v a l u a t i o n w i t h the meaning of t h a t 
e v a l u a t i o n , which Foot claims t o be important only i f i t s 
l o g i c a l connection w i t h human good or harm can be shown. 
This confusion presents the o p p o s i t i o n again w i t h a f a l s e 
dilemma o f e i t h e r a d m i t t i n g t h a t reasons f o r a moral judge-
ment are t r i v i a l or accepting t h a t moral reasons are 
l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of human good or harm 8 
t h a t the meaning of the one i s bound up w i t h the meaning 
of the other. However, as P h i l l i p s and Mounce have 
argued, such an inference can only make sense or be 
considered v a l i d given a c e r t a i n context of s o c i a l 
p r a c t i c e s and behaviour and i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s back-
ground which w i l l r e v e a l the hidden e v a l u a t i v e premise 
necessary f o r the deductive inference,, With the s t a t e -
ment "That behaviour i s rude" f o r example, i t i s not 
simply a matter of the f a c t s whether such a statement i s 
j u s t i f i e d or n o t . 
A person who wishes to say t h a t the offence i s 
a "pure f a c t " from which a moral conclusion can 
be deduced i s simply confused. What are the 
"pure f a c t s " r e l a t i n g to the pushing and the 
i n j u r y i t i s supposed, t o cause? A p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
account of the pushing (which might be regarded 
as pure enough) would not enable one t o say what 
was going on, any more than a p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
account of the i n j u r y would t e l l us anything 
about what moral a c t i o n ( i f any) i s c a l l e d f o r 
as a r e s u l t . 1 
What Foot has f a i l e d t o recognize i s t h a t her account of 
such an infer e n c e depends upon the e v a l u a t i v e meaning of 
the word "offence" which she claims to be p a r t of her 
"non-evaluative" premises and such e v a l u a t i v e meaning i s 
dependent upon the r u l e s f o r behaviour which are agreed 
2 
upon by any p a r t i c u l a r community of people. Thus, "the 
D. Z. P h i l l i p s and H. 0. Mounce, Moral Pract i c e s 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969), p. 50. 
p 
The example used by P h i l l i p s and Mounce t o argue 
t h i s p o i n t i s from Malcolm's memoirs of W i t t g e n s t e i n . 
Malcolm describes an i n c i d e n t i n which G. E. Moore and 
Wi t t g e n s t e i n agreed as t o the f a c t s of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s 
behaviour but disagreed as t o i t s e v a l u a t i o n , Moore 
t h i n k i n g h i s behaviour rude and W i t t g e n s t e i n t h i n k i n g i t 
appropriate and not at a l l rude. See Norman Malcolm, 
Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n ; A Memoir (Oxford, 1968), py 33» 
and P h i l l i p s and Mounce, op. c i t . , p. 5>0=1. -
9h 
n o t i o n of 'offence' i s p a r a s i t i c on the n o t i o n of a 
standard or norm, although these nee.d not be fo r m u l a t e d " j 
the d e s c r i p t i o n of the word "offence" has, t h e r e f o r e , 
"moral i m p o r t . " 1 This p a r t i c u l a r a t t a c k on Hume's 
ve r s i o n of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y f a i l s t h e r e f o r e 
because the premises from which, i t i s claimed, an 
ev a l u a t i v e conclusion can be deduced are not p u r e l y 
d e s c r i p t i v e ones; t h i s v e r s i o n of the f a l l a c y has not 
t h e r e f o r e been r e f u t e d i n Foot's account. 
The importance of t h i s attempt i s , however, t h a t 
Hume's account of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y i s shown t o 
be i n need o f some f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n and several 
possible ways of deducing e v a l u a t i v e conclusions from 
non-evaluative premises have been suggested. I n p a r t i -
c u l a r new attempts have been made to close the gap between 
sentences c o n t a i n i n g " i s " and those c o n t a i n i n g "ought" 
and t o show t h a t i m p e r a t i v e s , both s i n g u l a r and more 
general ones, can be deduced from i n d i c a t i v e s . An 
a l t e r n a t i v e i s thereby o f f e r e d t o Hare's n o t i o n of moral 
reasoning i n which the p r a c t i c a l s y l l o g i s m i s the primary 
form of the l o g i c of moral d e c i s i o n . Two a r t i c l e s 
published i n 1958 by G. E. M„ Anscombe give us one of the 
e a r l i e s t clues as t o the character of t h i s r e v i s i o n of 
Hume and i n d i c a t e t h a t an important f a c t o r i n a new account 
of moral reasoning w i l l i n v o l v e a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the 
nature o f " f a c t s " and thus also of i n d i c a t i v e sentences 
1 I b i d o 
which s t a t e f a c t s . To show the inadequacy both of 
Hume's understanding o f f a c t and o f h i s n o t i o n o f the 
t r u t h r e l a t i o n s which h o l d between sentences, Anscombe 
appeals t o the n o t i o n o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s and argues 
f o r the v a l i d i t y o f the t r a n s i t i o n from " i s " t o "owes." 
Fol l o w i n g Hume I might say t o my grocers "Truth 
c o n s i s t s i n agreement e i t h e r t o r e l a t i o n s o f 
ideas, as t h a t twenty s h i l l i n g s make a pound, or 
t o matters of f a c t , as t h a t you have d e l i v e r e d 
me a q u a r t e r o f potatoes; from t h i s you can see 
t h a t the term does not apply t o such a p r o p o s i -
t i o n as t h a t I owe you so much f o r the potatoes. 
You r e a l l y must not jump from an •is'-'-as, t h a t 
i t r e a l l y i s the case t h a t I asked f o r the 
potatoes and t h a t you d e l i v e r e d them and sent 
me a b i l l = = t o an 'owes.'"2 
Given the context of our i n s t i t u t i o n s regarding the buying 
of goods from a grocer, Anscombe argues t h a t her owing the 
grocer f o r the potatoes "consists i n " the f a c t s t h a t she 
ordered them and he d e l i v e r e d them. Indeed, the conclu-
s i o n " I owe the grocer f o r these potatoes" i s the descrip= 
t i o n o f a c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n between the grocer and the 
shopper which holds t r u e given the i n s t i t u t i o n o f buying 
and s e l l i n g and these p a r t i c u l a r circumstances. 
The f i r s t important suggestion which i s made by 
Anscombe's discu s s i o n i s t h a t an imperative such as " I 
ought t o pay the grocer f o r the potatoes he d e l i v e r e d " 
Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy," and "On 
Brute Facts," Analysis, V o l . 18 (1958), both r e p r i n t e d 
i n Thomson and Dworkin, op. c i t . , p. 186-210 and 71=5 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . References t o these a r t i c l e s w i l l be taken 
from Thomson and Dworkin. 
Anscombe, "On Brute F a c t s , " p. 71. Cf. "Modern 
Moral Philosophy," p. 189. 
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does not add some n o n - f a c t u a l element t o the statement 
of the f a c t s which are r e l e v a n t t o the t r a n s a c t i o n 
I n t h i s sense, 
o o . there i s no need t o appeal t o anything 
beyond the f a c t s when considering what i s 
morally i m p o r t a n t . No appeals t o a mysterious 
realm of e v a l u a t i v e meaning are necessary. I f 
a customer orders potatoes, and the grocer 
d e l i v e r s them t o him, the grocer i s j u s t i f i e d 
i n saying t h a t the customer owes him f o r the 
potatoes. There i s l i t t l e p o i n t i n the 
philosophers' p r o t e s t t h a t we cannot derive an 
"ought"--that he owes the grocer f o r the 
potatoes=-from an " i s " - = t h a t he ordered the 
potatoes and t h a t the grocer d e l i v e r e d them--
since the example i l l u s t r a t e s the a r t i f i c i a l i t y 
of the t h e s i s 0 2 
The meaning o f the imperative i s bound up not only w i t h 
the i n s t i t u t i o n of buying and s e l l i n g which f u r n i s h e s i t s 
context or background but also w i t h the t r u t h of c e r t a i n 
f a c t s which are r e l e v a n t t o i t . Prom the d e s c r i p t i o n o f 
the t r a n s a c t i o n between the shopper and the grocer and 
given the i n s t i t u t i o n o f buying and s e l l i n g the impera-
t i v e conclusion i s " i n normal circumstances" v a l i d . 3 
Secondly, the issue o f what c o n s t i t u t e s a "brute f a c t " 
i s r a i s e d by Anscombe who claims t h a t the f a c t s r e l e v a n t 
t o the imperative conclusion above are "brute r e l a t i v e t o " 
t h i s conclusion. Thus, the f a c t t h a t the grocer c a r t e d 
the potatoes t o the buyer's house and l e f t them there i s 
a b r u t e f a c t r e l a t i v e t o the i n d i c a t i v e statement t h a t 
I b i d . a p. 72. 
p 
P h i l l i p s and Mounce, op. c i t . , p. 119. 
-^Anscombe, "On Brute Pacts," p. 7k° Cf. "Modern 
Moral Philosophy," p. l89-90„ 
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the grocer "supplied" the buyer w i t h potatoes; however, 
t h i s statement i t s e l f becomes a b r u t e f a c t r e l a t i v e t o 
the f a c t t h a t the buyer owes the grocer f o r the potatoes. 
I n r e l a t i o n to many d e s c r i p t i o n s of events o r 
states of a f f a i r s which are asserted to h o l d , 
we can ask what the "brute f a c t s " were; and 
t h i s w i l l mean the f a c t s which h e l d , and i n 
v i r t u e o f which, i n a proper context, such-and-
such a d e s c r i p t i o n i s t r u e or f a l s e , and which 
are more "b r u t e " than the al l e g e d f a c t answer-
i n g t o t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n . ^ 
The challenge thus r a i s e d i s t o reconsider the e v a l u a t i v e 
and d e s c r i p t i v e meaning of both i n d i c a t i v e and imperative 
sentences and i n t h i s way t o consider the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
deducing imperatives from i n d i c a t i v e s . 
The n o t i o n of the r e l a t i v e bruteness of f a c t s has 
become the s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r several attempts t o show how 
"ought" can be derived from " i s " and i t i s important t h a t 
we examine several of these f o r the i n s i g h t they can o f f e r 
regarding the l o g i c of moral d e c i s i o n . Max Black i s one 
w r i t e r who has challenged the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t s ' i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of Hume's famous passage and of the autonomous 
character of moral judgements. I n l i g h t o f the tremendous 
i n f l u e n c e of Hume's remarks, Black proposes "to assign t o 
the p r i n c i p l e t h a t only f a c t u a l statements can f o l l o w from 
e x c l u s i v e l y f a c t u a l statements the t i t l e 'Hume's 
G u i l l o t i n e . ' " I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Hume's g u i l l o t i n e and 
- L I b i d . , p. 73-U. 
2 B l a c k , "The Gap Between ' I s ' and 'Should,'" 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, V o l . L X X I I I (196U), r e p r i n t e d i n 
Hudson, The Is/Ought Question, p. 100. 
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i n p a r t i c u l a r Hare's use o f i t as the foundat i o n f o r the 
autonomy of "ought" r e s t s , i n Black's view, on the 
pre s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t "no term may occur i n the conclusion 
of a v a l i d argument unless i t occurs, or can be made t o 
occur by s u i t a b l e d e f i n i t i o n s , somewhere i n the premises. "^ 
Now as a r u l e governing the l o g i c of s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning, 
t h i s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i s q u i t e c o r r e c t ; however, what i s 
mistaken i s t h a t t h i s r u l e governs a l l forms of v a l i d 
argument and f u r t h e r t h a t a l l moral reasoning i s s y l l o -
g i s t i c . One example which Black o f f e r s o f such non= 
s y l l o g i s t i c reasoning i s the f o l l o w i n g s 
V i v i s e c t i o n causes g r a t u i t o u s s u f f e r i n g t o 
animals. Therefore, i f n o t h i n g t h a t causes 
g r a t u i t o u s s u f f e r i n g ought to be done, v i v i = 
s e c t i o n ought not t o be done.^ 
This form of argument i s based on the r u l e t h a t " I f A 
then B" e n t a i l s " I f B ought not to be done, A ought not 
to be done," i n which c l e a r l y the conclusion does not 
occur i n the premises. However, the type o f moral 
reasoning which Black considers a r e a l challenge t o the 
n o t i o n o f "an unbridgeable l o g i c a l gap between 'ought' 
and ' i s ' " i s t h a t i n which moral advice i s derived from 
c e r t a i n f a c t s being t r u e . The f o l l o w i n g i s an examples 
1 I b i d . , p. 1 0 0 - 1 . 
2 I b i d . , p. 1 0 1 . 
-^Another example of t h i s n o n - s y l l o g i s t i c reason= 
i n g i s o f f e r e d by A. N. P r i o r . Prom the r u l e o f deduction 
"P; t h e r e f o r e e i t h e r P or Q" the f o l l o w i n g t r a n s i t i o n from 
n o n - e t h i c a l premises t o an e t h i c a l conclusion i s v a l i d % 
"Tea-drinking i s common i n England; t h e r e f o r e e i t h e r 
t e a - d r i n k i n g i s common i n England or a l l New Zealanders 
ought t o be shot." "The Autonomy of E t h i c s , " A u s t r a l a s i a n 
Journal of Philosophy, V o l . 3 8 ( I 9 6 O ) , p. 2 0 1 . 
Fischer wants t o mate Botwinniko 
The one and o n l y way t o mate Botwinnik i s f o r 
Fischer t o move the Queen. 
Therefore, Fischer should move the Queen. 
An observer of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r chess game between Fischer 
and Botwinnik who knows the p o i n t and the r u l e s of the 
game and who wishes t o give Fischer some p r a c t i c a l advice 
derives t h a t advice, here i n the form of a weak impera-
t i v e , from the f a c t s of the case stated i n the two 
premises. 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the premises and the 
conclusion i s n o t , however, one of s t r i c t e ntailment f o r 
the conclusion t h a t Fischer should move the Queen does 
not f o l l o w by " l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y " from the given f a c t u a l 
premises. Black claims? 
. . . I am r e l u c t a n t t o say t h a t the p r a c t i c a l 
"should"-conclusion i s e n t a i l e d by i t s f a c t u a l 
premises? the important c o n t r a s t w i t h s t r a i g h t -
forward cases o f entailment might indeed be 
marked by using some such l a b e l as " l a t e n t 
n e c e s s i t y " or " v i r t u a l n e c e s s i t y . " 2 
Since " g i v i n g advice i s performing a v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n " 
one may l e g i t i m a t e l y r e f r a i n from g i v i n g t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
advice or any advice at a l l on the basis of c e r t a i n other 
f a c t s which one knows t o be t r u e . ^ However, once a person 
Black, op. c i t . , p. 1 0 2 . 
^ b i d . , p„ 1 1 1 . 
3 
-'One might not give t h i s p a r t i c u l a r advice t o 
F i s c h e r knowing t h a t Botwinnik has a weak h e a r t and 
would collapse from the shock of such a move or one might 
not give advice a t a l l knowing t h a t Fischer has not asked 
f o r nor does he need any help i n choosing h i s next move. 
I b i d . , p. 108. For a d i s c u s s i o n of the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f 
such a l t e r n a t i v e s , see P h i l l i p s , "The P o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
Moral Advice," A n a l y s i s , Volo 25 (1961;), r e p r i n t e d i n 
Hudson, op. c i t . , p. lllj,°19<. 
chooses t o give Fischer advice about h i s game the advice 
which he gives i s r e s t r i c t e d t o the above conclusion i f 
the f a c t u a l premises are t r u e * "Given t h a t you want t o 
achieve E and t h a t doing M i s the one and only way of 
achieving E," t h a t you should do M i s the only l e g i t i m a t e 
and r a t i o n a l advice which can be g i v e n . 1 
I f a moral conclusion i s ever r e l a t e d to non-
moral premises i n the f a s h i o n I have imagined, 
then, given t h a t a moral conclusion i s t o be 
drawn, we have no choice as t o which conclusion 
i t s h a l l be . . . given t h a t the speaker i s 
committed t o o f f e r i n g some advice or other, the 
only advice t h a t he can r a t i o n a l l y o f f e r i s "Y"ou 
should do M."2 
There i s t h e r e f o r e some gap between the premises and the 
conclusion which cannot be closed by c l a i m i n g t h a t the 
conclusion i s l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l e d by the f a c t u a l premises, 
as Foot seems t o argue. Rather, i n Black's views 
between the f a c t u a l premises and the p r a c t i c a l 
conclusion there i s a s o r t o f gap, bridge a b l e 
only by an agent's w i l l i n g n e s s to engage i n the 
re l e v a n t a c t i v i t y or p r a c t i c e . The t r u t h o f 
the premises r e s t r i c t s the performance, whether 
t h a t of " a d v i s i n g " or something e l s e , t o a 
si n g l e p o s s i b i l i t y , but there w i l l be no per-
formance at a l l unless the agent chooses t o 
f o l l o w the path.3 
The same holds t r u e , Black claims, f o r l e s s t r i v i a l 
examples of moral reasoning such" as: 
Doing A w i l l produce p a i n . 
Apart from producing the pain r e s u l t i n g from A, 
doing A w i l l have the same consequence t h a t 
not doing A would have had. 
Therefore, A ought not to be done s4 
^ I b i d . , p. 109. 3 I b i 3 . 
2 I b i d . . p. 111. * * I b i d . , p„ 113. 
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Here again one who i s w i l l i n g t o give moral advice and 
who knows the f a c t u a l premises t o be t r u e must by 
" v i r t u a l n e c e s s i t y " draw the above c o n c l u s i o n j i t i s the 
only p o s s i b l e moral conclusion which can r a t i o n a l l y be 
drawn from these p a r t i c u l a r premises<> 
who claims t h a t given the existence of an i n s t i t u t i o n or 
a game and given the r u l e s which c o n s t i t u t e these, moral 
conclusions can be derived from f a c t u a l premises. As an 
example, Searle o f f e r s the f o l l o w i n g argument; 
(1) Jones u t t e r e d the words " I hereby promise 
t o pay you, Smith, f i v e dollars„" 
(2) Jones promised t o pay Smith f i v e dollars„ 
(3) Jones placed h i m s e l f under (undertook) an 
o b l i g a t i o n t o pay Smith f i v e d o l l a r s . 
(k) Jones i s under ah o b l i g a t i o n to pay Smith 
f i v e d o l l a r s o 1 (5) Jones ought t o pay Smith f i v e d o l l a r s * 
Searle argues thats 
o o o the r e l a t i o n between any statement and 
i t s successor, w h i l e not i n every case one o f 
"entail m e n t , " i s none the l e s s not j u s t a con~ 
• t i n g e n t relation°, and the a d d i t i o n a l statements 
necessary t o make the r e l a t i o n s h i p one o f entail-» 
ment do not need to i n v o l v e any e v a l u a t i v e 
statements, moral p r i n c i p l e s , or anything o f 
the sort„2 
What i s needed t o understand the v a l i d i t y o f t h i s moral 
argument i s a c l e a r n o t i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e between types 
of d e s c r i p t i v e statements and i t i s t o c a l l a t t e n t i o n t o 
at l e a s t two such types t h a t Searle introduces the moral 
argument <> 
J o R 8 Searle, "How t o Derive 'Ought' from ' I s , ' " 
P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, V o l e L X X I I I (1961+), r e p r i n t e d i n 
Hudson, op. c i t e , p c 121» 
A s i m i l a r argument i s presented by J„ R. Searle, 
2 I b i d D 
As paradigms of these two types Searle suggests 
the f o i l o w i n g s 
Type I s "My car goes e i g h t y miles an hour." 
"Jones i s s i x f e e t t a i l , , " 
"Smith has brown h a i r . " 
Type 2 s "Jones got married»" 
"Smith made a promisee" 
"Jackson has f i v e d o l l a r s . " 
"Brown h i t a home r u n . " l 
A l l of these statements, Searle claims, s t a t e o b j e c t i v e 
f a c t s which can be judged e m p i r i c a l l y to be t r u e or f a l s e 
and thus they a l l f i t the c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f d e s c r i p t i v e 
language which n o n - n a t u r a l i s t s presuppose. Howevers 
Though both kinds o f statements s t a t e matters 
of o b j e c t i v e f a c t , the statements c o n t a i n i n g 
words such as "married," "promise," "home r u n , " 
and " f i v e d o l l a r s " s t a t e f a c t s whose existence 
presupposes c e r t a i n i n s t i t u t i o n s ; a man has 
f i v e d o l l a r s given the i n s t i t u t i o n of money » . <, 
We might c h a r a c t e r i s e such f a c t s as i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
f a c t s , and co n t r a s t them w i t h n o n = i n s t i t u t i o n a l , 
or b r u t e , f a c t s : t h a t a man has a b i t of paper 
w i t h green i n k on i t i s a b r u t e f a c t , t h a t he 
has f i v e d o l l a r s i s an i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t . 3 
The i n d i c a t i v e sentences belonging t o Type 2 are there° 
f o r e ones which s t a t e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s , though they 
may become "brute r e l a t i v e t o " other statements.^ The 
important f e a t u r e o f the i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t s above which 
x I b i d . , p. 130. 
2 
I b i d . , p. 129o Searle c i t e s Hare and Nowell° 
Smith as examples o f contemporary moral philosophers who, 
on the basis of t h i s understanding o f d e s c r i p t i v e 
language, consider e v a l u a t i v e language t o be unique<> 
• ^ I b i d . , p. 130. Here Searle acknowledges h i s 
indebtedness t o Anscombe's suggestions i n the a r t i c l e s 
discussed e a r l i e r , , 
^Thus "Smith made a promise" s t a t e s a f a c t which 
i s b r u t e r e l a t i v e t o "Smith undertook an o b l i g a t i o n . " 
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i s c r u c i a l t o Searle's d e r i v a t i o n o f "ought" from " i s " i s 
t h a t they presuppose i n s t i t u t i o n s which are "systems of 
c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s o " 1 These i n s t i t u t i o n s , i . e . marriage, 
promising, money, and b a s e b a l l , are c o n s t i t u t e d by r u l e s 
which make up these various forms of a c t i v i t y and which 
also r e g u l a t e the conduct o f one who p a r t i c i p a t e s i n 
them„ I t i s t h e r e f o r e by appealing t o the c o n s t i t u t i v e 
r u l e of "the promising game," as Hare has l a b e l l e d i t , 
t h a t Searle i s able to der i v e an "ought" from an " i s 0 " 
I t i s o f t e n a matter o f f a c t t h a t one has cer° 
t a i n o b l i g a t i o n s , commitments, r i g h t s , and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , but i t i s a matter of i n s t i = 
t u t i o n a l , not b r u t e , f a c t o I t i s one such 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d form of o b l i g a t i o n , promising 
which I invoked above t o derive an "ought" from 
an " i s , " I s t a r t e d w i t h a b r u t e f a c t , t h a t a 
man u t t e r e d c e r t a i n words, and then invoked the 
i n s t i t u t i o n i n such a way as t o generate insti° 
t u t i o n a l f a c t s by which we a r r i v e d a t the 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t t h a t the man ought t o pay 
another man f i v e d o l l a r s . The whole p r o o f 
r e s t s on an appeal t o the c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e 
t h a t to make a promise i s t o undertake an 
o b l i g a t i o n o ^ 
W i t h i n t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n i t t h e r e f o r e becomes a t a u t o l o g y 
t h a t "one ought to keep one's promises. " This i s not an 
e v a l u a t i v e major premise g i v i n g a p r i n c i p l e by which one 
has f r e e l y chosen t o r e g u l a t e one's behaviour, as Hare 
would argue i n order t o ma i n t a i n the v a l i d i t y o f the 
p r a c t i c a l s y l l o g i s m I t i s p r e c i s e l y because the 
Searle, op. c i t . , p. 131= 
I b i d . , p. 131o 
Hare, "The Promising Game," Revue I n t e r n a t i o n a l e 
de P h ilosophic, No. 70 (1961).), r e p r i n t e d i n Hudson, og7 
c i t . Indeed here one p o i n t of co n t e n t i o n between 
argument from an " i s " t o an "ought" works i n Searle's 
view w i t h o u t the i n t r o d u c t i o n of e v a l u a t i v e premises 
t h a t he claims we need t o reconsider the e n t i r e d i s t i n c ~ 
t i o n between d e s c r i p t i v e and e v a l u a t i v e meaning upon 
which "Hume's g u i l l @ t i n e " r e s t s * 1 For what he claims 
t o have shown i s t h a t there are some f a c t s which can be 
described i n i n d i c a t i v e sentences which are c l e a r l y also 
e v a l u a t i v e , and o f t e n moral, as wello " i f you l i k e , then, 
we have shown t h a t 'promise' i s an e v a l u a t i v e word, but 
since i t i s also p u r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e , we have r e a l l y shown 
t h a t the whole d i s t i n c t i o n needs to be re-examined" 
(underlines mine). 
A r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h i s matter i s also 
encouraged by D„ Emmet i n her discussion of the nature 
o f " s o c i a l f a c t S o " A f t e r s t a t i n g her fundamental agree-
ment w i t h the l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e t h a t no statements about 
what ought t o be done can be derived from p u r e l y f a c t u a l 
p r e s c r i p t i v i s t s and d e s c r i p t i v i s t s i s s t a t e d most c l e a r l y e 
Hare claims t h a t "the c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s o f an institu° 
t i o n may c o n t a i n some t a u t o l o g i e s , but they cannot a l l be 
t a u t o l o g i e s , i f they are going t o p r e s c r i b e t h a t people 
act i n c e r t a i n ways and not i n o t h e r s " (underlines minef 
p, 11+7). The dispute between them r e s t s upon whether or 
not the c o n s t i t u t i v e r u l e s o f i n s t i t u t i o n s are t a u t o l o -
gous—-as Searia claims==or non°tautologous and p r e s c r i p t i v e 
— a s Hare claimso 
"H/hether or not these a d d i t i o n a l statements are 
e v a l u a t i v e i s the issue discussed by Hare, op. c i t . , 
McClellan and Komisar, "On D e r i v i n g 'Ought' from ' I s , ' " 
and Thomson and Thomson, "How not t o Derive 'Ought' from 
' I s , ' " b oth r e p r i n t e d i n Hudson, op. c i t e , p. 157=67. 
Searle, op. c i t . , p. 133 
statements. Emmet goes on t o challenge whether such a 
d i s t i n c t i o n between p u r e l y f a c t u a l statements and 
statements which are " v a l u a t i o n a l l y loaded" can prac» 
t i c a l l y be made.''" Her d e s c r i p t i o n of the two types of 
statements o f f a c t i s t h a t Type 1 statements are "propo^ 
s i t i o n s g i v i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of what i s or was the case 
and Type 2 statements are those which describe s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s or s i t u a t i o n s . Statements of the second ty p e , 
are " u s u a l l y adduced as reasons supporting moral judg° 
ments or d e c i s i o n s , " since "they are statements about 
people occupying v a r i o u s r o l e s vis=a=vis one another. 
The f o l l o w i n g could thus be o f f e r e d as a v a l i d non-
s y l l o g i s t i c argument i n which an "ought" i s derived 
from an " i s 0 " 
"You ought t o help her because, a f t e r a l l , 
she i s your mother."3 
I n t h i s argument, "the o b l i g a t i o n t o help i s said t o 
f o l l o w from the f a c t of parenthood. But the f a c t i s 
not a mere f a c t s i t i s a f a c t o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , "^ 
^Emrnet, Facts and O b l i g a t i o n s (Dr. W i l l i a m s ' 
L i b r a r y , London, 195& ) 3 p» b". 
2 I b l d . 
3 
Emmet, Rules, Roles, and Relations (Macmillan, 
London, 1966), p. 37• Cf. Facts and O b l i g a t i o n s , p. 11= 
12, i n which two other examples are o f f e r e d ! "X i s your 
son, t h e r e f o r e you ought n o t t o t r e a t him l i k e t h a t p " 
and "Since you are a doctor, you ought t o respect the 
confidences of your p a t i e n t s . " 
^ I b i d o 
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The v a l i d i t y of the argument from the statement o f some 
s o c i a l f a c t t o an e v a l u a t i v e or moral conclusion i s 
based on the f a c t t h a t the n o t i o n o f r o l e i s both 
e v a l u a t i v e and descriptive» Emmet defines a r o l e as 
"a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a recognized k i n d w i t h i n a given 
s o c i e t y , w i t h some n o t i o n of the k i n d o f conduct appro= 
p r i a t e t o i t b u i l t i n t o i t s description,, A f u l l 
d e f i n i t i o n of the r o l e of "mother" t h e r e f o r e includes 
not only a f a c t u a l , p h y s i c a l or b i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n 
of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p but also an i n d i c a t i o n of the 
behaviour which can w i t h i n a s o c i e t y be reasonably 
expected o f one who f i l l s t h a t r o l e . 
The n o t i o n o f r o l e , t h e r e f o r e , I suggest pro-
vides a l i n k between f a c t u a l d e s c r i p t i o n s o f 
s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s and moral pronouncements 
about what ought t o be done i n them„ I t has, 
so t o speak, a f o o t i n both camps, t h a t o f 
f a c t and of val u e ; i t r e f e r s t o a r e l a t i o n - * 
ship w i t h a f a c t u a l b a s i s , and i t has a norm 
of behaviour b u i l t i n t o i t which i s being 
e x p l i c i t l y or t a c i t l y accepted i f the r o l e 
i s c i t e d as a reason.^ 
This i s t r u e , Emmet argues, both i n the case of r o l e s 
which are "purposively undertaken" and those which are 
"ascribed." As examples of the former k i n d , she mentions 
both the r o l e of "statesman" and t h a t of "doctor," i n 
which the e v a l u a t i v e and d e s c r i p t i v e meanings o f these 
r o l e s are c l o s e l y i n t e r r e l a t e d , , 
•'•Emmet, Facts and O b l i g a t i o n s , p. 8„ Cf 0 Rules, 
Roles, and R e l a t i o n s , p. U0o *~ 
2 
Emmet, Rules, Roles, and R e l a t i o n s , p 0 lj.l„ Cf. Facts and O b l i g a t i o n s , p 0 10 o 
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Role a c t i v i t i e s p u r p o s i v e l y undertaken are 
l i k e l y t o have e v a l u a t i v e meaning not only i n 
t h a t some modicum of e f f i c i e n c y i n the r o l e 
i s presupposed when according the name, but 
also t h a t „ . 0 the name may be w i t h h e l d i f 
c e r t a i n g e n e r a l l y acknowledged o b l i g a t i o n s 
of the r o l e are not observed,! 
Therefore, the f a c t t h a t someone i_s a doctor or statesman 
not only gives s u f f i c i e n t grounds, i n some circumstances, 
f o r the d e r i v a t i o n of imperatives regarding what one 
ought to do as a doctor or statesman; t h i s f a c t also can 
be changed or even denied should one f a i l t o perform a t 
l e a s t m i n i m a l l y the a c t i o n s appropriate t o i t . I t i s 
t h e r e f o r e a s o c i a l f a c t which r e q u i r e s the f u l f i l l m e n t o f 
some o b l i g a t i o n s comprising p a r t of the d e f i n i t i o n of the 
r o l e i n order t o remain true<> 
The more d i f f i c u l t cases i n v o l v e the d e r i v a t i o n 
of imperatives from s o c i a l f a c t s which s t a t e one's 
ascribed r o l e s , such as those o f f a t h e r or mother which 
are based on n a t u r a l k i n s h i p r e l a t i o n s . Here the i n t e r -
r e l a t i o n of d e s c r i p t i v e and e v a l u a t i v e meaning i s f u r t h e r 
confused by the p o s s i b i l i t y of b o t h n a t u r a l and s o c i a l 
d e f i n i t i o n s of t h i s r o l e . Whereas according t o a n a t u r a l 
d e f i n i t i o n of fatherhood, one's f a t h e r w i l l always be 
one's f a t h e r regardless of h i s f u l f i l l m e n t or neglect o f 
the appropriate d u t i e s or o b l i g a t i o n s , according t o a 
s o c i a l d e f i n i t i o n t h i s r o l e takes on d i s t i n c t i v e l y evalua-
t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s $ , and a complete understanding of t h i s 
Emmet, Facts and O b l i g a t i o n s , p. llj.=15><, 
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r o l e r e q u i r e s a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the i n s t i t u t i o n of 
fatherhood w i t h i n a given society,"*" . The conclusion t o 
be drawn from t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n -
ships i s tha t ? 
. o , i n cases where d e s c r i p t i o n s of f a c t s are 
d e s c r i p t i v e of s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s i n which the 
r e l a t i o n s are r o l e r e l a t i o n s , a r i g i d d i s t i n c -
t i o n between d e s c r i p t i v e and p r e s c r i p t i v e 
language cannot be maintained. When reasons 
f o r moral decisions are given by c i t i n g the 
f a c t s of a s i t u a t i o n , the s i t u a t i o n may already 
be seen i n terms of c e r t a i n expectations as t o 
appr o p r i a t e conduct i n i t , i f the s i t u a t i o n 
c o nsists of people i n c e r t a i n r o l e s vis°a°vis 
each ot h e r , such as f a t h e r and c h i l d , or debtor 
and c r e d i t o r . So an agent i n deciding what he 
ought t o do, when he considers the f a c t s , must 
associate or d i s s o c i a t e h i m s e l f from these 
general expectations as t o app r o p r i a t e 
behaviour.2 
Although Emmets i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s not prepared t o c l a i m 
w i t h Foot t h a t an imperative conclusion i s e n t a i l e d by a 
pu r e l y f a c t u a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f s o c i a l r o l e s , she does 
argue t h a t such a d e s c r i p t i o n may not be p o s s i b l e or 
p r a c t i c a l . D e s c r i p t i o n s of r o l e s have, i n her view, a 
dual l o g i c a l f o r c e and can t h e r e f o r e e n t a i l e v a l u a t i v e 
and imperative conclusions. Such an an a l y s i s provides 
some i n s i g h t i n t o the nature of r e l i g i o u s e t h i c a l d e c i -
s i o n as w e l l since the p a r t played by " r o l e " i s q u i t e 
The c o m p l e x i t i e s o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n have been 
discussed by Emmet i n b o t h works c i t e d above and by 
A. I . Melden, Rights and Right Conduct ( B l a c k w e l l , London's 
1 9 5 9 ) , and D.- Z. P h i l l i p s , "God and Ought," C h r i s t i a n 
E t h i c s and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. I . T. Ramsey 
(SCM Press, London, 1 9 6 6 ) , p. 1 3 3 - 9 o 
Emmet, Facts and O b l i g a t i o n s , p. 16. 
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i m p o r t a n t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n understanding the r e l a t i o n -
ship of God and man0 
The p o s s i b i l i t y 6f deducing imperatives from 
i n d i c a t i v e statements of r o l e i s also considered by 
A. N o P r i o r who o f f e r s the f o l l o w i n g example of such 
an arguments 
o o o since the two premisses " A l l church 
o f f i c e r s ought t o be r e v e r e n t " and "Under-
takers are Church o f f i c e r s " j o i n t l y imply 
t h a t undertakers ought t o be r e v e r e n t , the 
s i n g l e e t h i c a l premiss " A l l Church o f f i c e r s 
ought t o be r e v e r e n t " i m p l i e s t h a t i f under-
takers are Church o f f i c e r s they ought t o be 
re v e r e n t , and the s i n g l e n o n - e t h i c a l premiss 
"Undertakers are Church o f f i c e r s " i m p l i e s 
t h a t I f a l l Church o f f i c e r s ought to be 
reverent undertakers ought t o be« I n f a c t 
t h i s n o n - e t h i c a l premiss "Undertakers are 
Church o f f i c e r s " i m p l i e s t h a t whatever a l l 
Church o f f i c e r s ought t o do, undertakers 
ought t o cloo^ " 
What P r i o r attempts t o show i n t h i s example i s t h a t we 
need not arrange t h i s argument i n s y l l o g i s t i c form t o 
understand i t s l o g i c The d u t i e s of undertakers, since 
they are " p a r a s i t i c d u t i e s " based upon the duties o f 
Church o f f i c e r s i n general, can be deduced from a s t a t e -
ment of these more fundamental d u t i e s . I n t h i s sense, 
he appeals t o p r o p o s i t i o n a l (or c l a s s ) c a l c u l u s and 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n theory t o cla i m t h a t what holds of a l l 
Church o f f i c e r s w i l l also h o l d " o f undertakers„ P r i o r 
concludes 
t h a t one simply can derive conclusions which 
are " e t h i c a l " i n a q u i t e serious sense from 
premisses none of which have t h i s character,, 
The undertaker, f o r example, who learns t h a t 
P r i o r , op. c i t . 9 p c 203o 
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he i s a Church o f f i c e r , can l e a r n as a l o g i c a l 
consequence of t h i s something about h i s duty 
t h a t he d i d not know bef o r e . This something 
w i l l indeed r e q u i r e supplementation by other 
t h i n g s - = I mean other t h i n g s of an e t h i c a l 
sort==before the undertaker i s i n possession 
of a precise recipe f o r a c t i o n or a b s t e n t i o n 
from a c t i o n at place P and time Tj but i n 
t h i s i t resembles much e l s e " t h a t nevertheless 
c o n s t i t u t e s , as f a r as i t goes, s i g n i f i c a n t 
i n f o r m a t i o n about what one ought t o do.-'-
The l o g i c of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r example and others l i k e i t , 
w h i l e not the l o g i c of Hare's p r a c t i c a l s y l l o g i s m , i s 
nevertheless the v a l i d deduction of an e v a l u a t i v e or 
imperative conclusion from a d e s c r i p t i v e premise and 
o f f e r s t h e r e f o r e a reasonable guide f o r the behaviour 
of undertakers. 
I n g i v i n g t h e i r account of moral reasoning, the 
d e s c r i p t i v i s t s have challenged several of the major 
presuppositions o f p r e s c r i p t i v i s m by i n s i s t i n g t h a t the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p both of d e s c r i p t i v e and e v a l u a t i v e meaning 
and o f i n d i c a t i v e and imperative i s r e a l l y f a r more 
complex than the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t account would a l l o w . 
This i s so not only because i n d i c a t i v e sentences are 
r a r e l y i n o r d i n a r y discourse j u s t pure statements of 
b r u t e f a c t but r a t h e r are sentences which are i m p l i c i t l y 
connected w i t h the speaker's wants, needs, or purposes 
or which are d e s c r i p t i o n s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d or s o c i a l 
r o l e s and r e l a t i o n s j i t i s so also because from such 
i n d i c a t i v e s w i t h dual l o g i c a l f o r c e i t i s p o s s i b l e t o 
derive imperatives which p r e s c r i b e a course of a c t i o n 
or value°judgements as t o the nature o f the o b j e c t or 
1 I b l d o , p. 2 0 6 o 
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a c t i o n described, A s t r i c t d e s c r i p t i v i s t would argue 
t h a t such a deduction i s based on the f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n 
d e s c r i p t i o n s o f f a c t s e n t a i l an appropriate e v a l u a t i o n 
of those f a c t s ; a m i l d d e s c r i p t i v i s t would argue t h a t 
the deduction i s " v i r t u a l l y necessary" since many 
d e s c r i p t i o n s of f a c t are " v a l u a t i o n a l l y loaded" and 
t h e r e f o r e have the f o r c e of b o t h d e s c r i p t i o n and evalua= 
t i o n . I n e i t h e r case, the challenge t o "Hume's g u i l l o -
t i n e " has been given and a more i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n o f f a c t 
and value has been explained. I n Emmet's words, "we 
should be chary of e l e v a t i n g the n o n = d e d u c i b i l i t y o f 
'ought* p r o p o s i t i o n s from ' i s ' p r o p o s i t i o n s t o the s t a t u s 
o f a 'law of l o g i c ' and s t i l l more, of b a p t i z i n g i t i n t o 
t h i s s t a t u s as 'Hume's law.'" 1 Furthermore, the p r e c i s e 
character of the independence of matters o f f a c t from 
matters of value has been re-examined since both Moore's 
and Hare's f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h i s autonomy are considered 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . This challenge t o both versions of the 
n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y can t h e r e f o r e f u r n i s h the background 
f o r a discussion of another account of moral reasoning 
and d e c i s i o n i n which some of the weaknesses o f both 
p r e s c r i p t i v i s m and d e s c r i p t i v i s m may be resolved. 
Emmet, Rules, Roles, and R e l a t i o n s , p. . 
CHAPTER IV 
ONLOOKS AND DECISION 
I n t h e i r concern t o o f f e r an account of m o r a l i t y 
which avoids both the t r a d i t i o n a l dichotomy between f a c t 
and value and a d i s s o l u t i o n of matters o f value i n t o 
those o f f a c t , both Beardsmore i n h i s Moral Reasoning 
and P h i l l i p s and Mounce i n t h e i r Moral P r a c t i c e s provide 
some i n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c i s m s o f p r e s c r i p t i v i s m and 
d e s c r i p t i v i s m and p o i n t the way toward a more adequate 
understanding of the nature of moral decision-making. 1 
As Beardsmore has s t a t e d the problem, both of the 
accounts of moral reasoning which we have j u s t examined 
are attempts "to show how i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r f a c t u a l 
reasons t o provide a fo u n d a t i o n f o r moral ( o r , more 
g e n e r a l l y , e v a l u a t i v e ) conclusions 0 . . and b o t h 
these attempts r e s t on the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t the l i n k 
between f a c t u a l reasons and e v a l u a t i v e conclusions can 
on l y be provided by some e x t r a , e l u s i v e element,, I n 
Hare's a n a l y s i s , t h i s e x t r a element i s t h a t o f commenda-
t i o n or e v a l u a t i o n which i s not derived from b u t added onto 
the d e s c r i p t i v e meaning o f statements i n order t o give 
1 
R o Wo Beardsmore, op. c i t . j D» Z D P h i l l i p s and H o 0 o Mounce, op. c i t . 
^Beardsmore, op. c i t . , p. 68. 
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them p r e s c r i p t i v e f o r c e . What allows the conclusion of 
ev a l u a t i v e or imperative sentences from f a c t u a l premises 
i s the presence of t h i s commendatory element expressed 
i n the n e u s t i c of the e v a l u a t i v e sentences. The 
d e s c r i p t i v i s t account r e l i e s i n a s i m i l a r way upon the 
n o t i o n of "human good" to f a c i l i t a t e moral reasoning. 
Thus an e v a l u a t i v e conclusion i s v a l i d l y drawn from 
f a c t u a l premises i f the e x t r a element i s assumed t o be • 
present, namely t h a t the f a c t s s t a t e d are i n some way 
conducive t o t h a t good, 1 i n the d e s c r i p t i o n of moral 
reasoning which i s o f f e r e d by Beardsmore, P h i l l i p s and 
Mounce t h i s e x t r a element i s no longer necessary t o 
understand the l o g i c of the t r a n s i t i o n from " i s " t o 
"ought." Rather what i s needed i s a c l e a r understanding 
of the context o f moral p r a c t i c e s which f u r n i s h the back-
ground f o r any p a r t i c u l a r instance o f moral reasoning 0 
As Beardsmore suggests; 
I do not t h i n k t h a t moral argument can be 
explained as a process of l i n k i n g reason 
and conclusion by some e l u s i v e e x t r a e l e -
ment. Nor do I see why such an e x p l a n a t i o n 
should be thought t o be necessary, why i t 
should be thought to be the task of moral 
philosophy t o i n t e r p r e t moral arguments as 
disguised syllogisms or as disguised means-
end arguments.^ 
I t i s to provide t h i s other k i n d o f e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t 
the n o t i o n of moral p r a c t i c e s i s i n t r o d u c e d . 
* I b i d . , p. 70-1. Cf. Foot's i n t r o d u c t i o n t o 
Theories of E t h i c s (Oxford I f a i v e r s i t y Press, Oxford, 
1967), p. 13-15. 
2 I b i d . , p. 71-2 0 
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P h i l l i p s and Mounce f i n d the p r i n c i p l e weak-
ness o f the previous two accounts t o be e i t h e r the over-
statement or the understatement of the r o l e of d e c i s i o n 
i n moral reasoning. According t o the p r e s c r i p t i v i s t , i t 
i s always p o s s i b l e to d i s t i n g u i s h between the d e s c r i p t i v e 
and e v a l u a t i v e elements i n statements and i t i s t h i s 
e v a l u a t i v e element alone which i s the r e s u l t of d e c i s i o n . 
For example, i t i s possible according t o t h i s view t o 
separate the d e s c r i p t i v e from the e v a l u a t i v e elements i n 
the statement, "You t o l d a l i e . " Whether or not one uses 
t h i s statement t o express any s o r t of moral condemnation 
against the l i a r depends upon the speaker's d e c i s i o n t o 
adopt as a p r i n c i p l e the b e l i e f t h a t t e l l i n g l i e s i s 
wrong; otherwise the statement simply describes someone's 
a c t i o n and contains by i t s e l f no i n d i c a t i o n of p r a i s e or 
condemnation.^" A person may choose whether or not t o 
evaluate another's a c t i o n i n t e l l i n g a l i e and may only 
j u s t i f y the p a r t i c u l a r e v a l u a t i o n chosen w i t h reference 
to another p r i n c i p l e which also i s the f u n c t i o n o f 
i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n . Thus, "a p a r t i c u l a r p r e s c r i p t i v e 
judgement can be j u s t i f i e d by reference t o a ' p r i n c i p l e ' 
t h a t i s i t s e l f a piece o f advocacy, something one has 
Hare t r i e d t o account f o r t h i s i n h i s discu s s i o n 
of words i n which the d e s c r i p t i v e and e v a l u a t i v e meanings, 
have become h a b i t u a l l y l i n k e d so t h a t i t may be r h e t o r i c a l 
t o ask, a f t e r l e a r n i n g t h a t someone t o l d a l i e , 'Yes, but 
did he do something wrong?" Hare i s s t i l l bound, however, 
t o the b e l i e f t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n are 
l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e and t h a t a c l e a r understanding 
of the nature of m o r a l i t y r e q u i r e s t h a t such a d i s t i n c t i o n 
be upheld. Language of Morals, Chapter 7« 
decided f o r oneself." This overemphasis on the element 
of d e c i s i o n i n morals represents moral reasoning as 
having no u l t i m a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n other than the p a r t i c u l a r 
judgement o f the moral person and t h e r e f o r e as l a c k i n g ah 
adequate ground on which t o base moral p r i n c i p l e s . 
d e c i s i o n i s seen e s p e c i a l l y i n Hare's discussion of the 
"way of l i f e " of the moral agent. Hare claims t h a t basic 
p r i n c i p l e s can i n the end only be j u s t i f i e d w i t h r e f e r -
ence t o each other, a whole m a t r i x of these p r a c t i c a l 
p r i n c i p l e s being a "way of l i f e . " There i s t h e r e f o r e no 
answer t o the dilemma of a moral person who wants t o know 
why a p a r t i c u l a r set of p r i n c i p l e s ought t o be chosen 
over another. 
We can only ask him t o make up h i s own mind 
which way he ought, t o l i v e s f o r i n the end 
ev e r y t h i n g r e s t s upon such a d e c i s i o n o f 
p r i n c i p l e . He has t o decide whether t o 
accept t h a t way o f l i f e or n o t ; i f he accepts 
i t , then we can proceed t o j u s t i f y the decisions 
• t h a t are.based upon i t ; i f he does not accept 
i t , then l e t him accept some other, and t r y t o 
l i v e by i t . 2 
Two important c r i t i c i s m s have been suggested by N. H. G. 
Robinson against Hare's a s s e r t i o n regarding the l i m i t s 
of r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n morals. Hare has maintained 
t h a t w i t h i n a way of l i f e , p a r t i c u l a r moral decisions are 
j u s t i f i e d by reference t o general p r i n c i p l e s chosen t o 
guide one's behaviour. The only p o s s i b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
The l a c k of an adequate grounding f o r moral 
P h i l l i p s and Mounce, op. c i t . , p. 6. 
2. Hare, cit.„ p. 69. 
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f o r these p r i n c i p l e s could be i n the form of a complete 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the way of l i f e t o which one i s coro° 
m i t t e d and yet i t i s j u s t such a t o t a l d e s c r i p t i o n 
which Hare also claims i s impossible i n practice» He 
claims t h a t " i f pressed t o j u s t i f y a d e c i s i o n completely,, 
we have t o give a complete s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the way of 
l i f e of which i t i s a p a r t " ; y e t " t h i s complete s p e c i -
f i c a t i o n , i t i s impossible i n p r a c t i c e t o give « « » 
Such an "impossible p o s s i b i l i t y " i s , as Robinson suggests, 
d i f f i c u l t to understando For i f one cannot s p e c i f y 
completely the way of l i f e which u l t i m a t e l y j u s t i f i e s 
one's p r i n c i p l e s and a c t i o n s , then what p o s s i b l e r o l e 
can such a n o t i o n as "way o f l i f e " p l a y i n d e c i s i o n -
making? I f , on the other hand, the way of l i f e i s 
"involved i n " matters of p r a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n , then has 
not a s u f f i c i e n t s p e c i f i c a t i o n been offered? 
I n s h o r t , anything and ev e r y t h i n g practic° 
able i s p r e s c r i p t i b l e i n theory, or else 
• no t h i n g i s p r e s c r i p t i b l e i n theory u n t i l i t 
i s p rescribed i n p r a c t i c e . What the p r e -
s c r i p t i v e theory needs at t h i s p o i n t i s a 
genuine element of o b j e c t i v i t y which might 
overflow a l l our f o r m u l a t i o n s of i t , but 
t h a t i s p r e c i s e l y what i t seeks t o avoid; 
and i f there i s n o t h i n g but our f o r m u l a t i o n s 
there i s n o t h i n g t o overflow them which might 
be the basis of a p o s s i b i l i t y i n theory which 
i s n o t a p o s s i b i l i t y i n p r a c t i c e 
When i t comes t o the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a way of l i f e , the 
moral person can only remain s i l e n t ; no f u r t h e r 
x I b i d 0 
'TJo H o G„ Robinson, The Groundwork of C h r i s t i a n 
E t h i c s (Eerdman's, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1972), p. 6 l { . 0 
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p r e s c r i p t i o n i s p o s s i b l e and the way of l i f e r e s t s 
fundamentally on the d e c i s i o n of the moral agent t o 
adopt it„ 
This i s to suggest an even more r a d i c a l c r l t i ~ ' 
cism of the p r e s c r i p t i v e theory of morals, however, and 
t h a t i s i t s r e l i a n c e upon an " u l t i m a t e and all° 
comprehending a r b i t r a r i n e s s 0 R o b i n s o n argues t h a t 
the ambiguity which i s f a t a l t o Hare's account i s con° 
t a i n e d i n h i s demand t h a t the de c i s i o n w i t h regard to a 
way of l i f e be a moral one and at the same time a d e c i s i o n 
"upon which e v e r y t h i n g moral w i l l r e s t , " What i s l a c k i n g 
i s any explanation of the grounds upon which such a 
d e c i s i o n i t s e l f might r e s t , since what would count as a 
good reason or as " j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a moral o b l i g a t i o n 
can only be defined w i t h i n a way of life» 
I f we can gather a l l p r e s c r i p t i o n s together 
i n t o a complete s p e c i f i c a t i o n of a t o t a l way 
of l i f e and s t i l l ask s i g n i f i c a n t l y "Ought I 
to decide f o r t h i s way of l i f e or not?°nthen 
m o r a l i t y overflows the sum-total of p r e s c r i p -
t i o n s and cannot p r o p e r l y be explained by 
reference t o them alone a3 
The choice then becomes clears e i t h e r t h i s d e c i s i o n 
between two ways of l i f e i s an a r b i t r a r y one, perhaps 
based only upon which way I want t o l i v e , since no moral 
reasons can be o f f e r e d f o r the choice, or Hare's account 
of what m o r a l i t y c o n s i s t s i n needs r e v i s i o n i n order t o 
make the l o g i c of t h i s d e c i s i o n clear*, P h i l l i p s and 
1 I b i d 9 . p„ 6 6 o 3 I b i d , , p 0 6 £ c 
2 I b i d L , p . 61^,, 
Mounco would suggest t h a t "a moral d e c i s i o n or judgement 
i s i n t e l l i g i b l e only where there are c e r t a i n t h i n gs t h a t 
are not open t o judgement or d e c i s i o n " and t h a t the l a c k 
of such a n o n ~ p r e s c r i p t i v e foundation f o r d e c i s i o n i n 
Hare's discussion accounts f o r our i n a b i l i t y t o fathom 
what such a choice between ways o f l i f e might be l i k e 0 ^ 
The understatement of the r o l e o f de c i s i o n i n 
moral reasoning which i s t o be found i n the d e s c r i p t i v i s t 
understanding of m o r a l i t y presents d i f f i c u l t i e s which are 
eq u a l l y problematic given the presuppositions o f t h i s 
account. Two of these e s p e c i a l l y are r e l e v a n t t o our 
considerations here* The f i r s t argument presented by 
both Beardsmore and P h i l l i p s i s against the view t h a t 
a given set o f f a c t s w i l l y i e l d a u t o m a t i c a l l y an "ought" 
or "should" p r o p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t the d e c i s i o n of the moral 
agent being r e q u i r e d at a l l t o e x p l a i n the t r a n s i t i o n 
from " i s " t o "ought„" What t h i s a n a l y s i s cannot account 
f o r i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of "varied moral r e a c t i o n s " t o the 
same set of f a c t s about which those who disagree m o r a l l y 
are i n agreement„ To complicate the example o f the 
grocer who d e l i v e r s potatoes t o h i s customer, suggested 
by Anscombe, P h i l l i p s introduces a new f a c t , namely t h a t 
P h i l l i p s and Mounce, op. c i t 0 , p„ 12. That 
such a d e c i s i o n could not be the r e s u l t of a p r a c t i c a l 
s y l l o g i s m i s shown by Beardsmore, op 0 c i t . He says 
t h a t on Hare's account the only connection which there 
can be between f a c t s and decisions i s a s y l l o g i s t i c one D 
And any s y l l o g i s m would r e q u i r e a major premise which, 
since a way of l i f e i s the u l t i m a t e major premise, cannot 
be supplied here,, Such a d e c i s i o n would t h e r e f o r e be a 
l i t e r a l l y senseless a c t o " (See p« 33°U°) 
the customer i s unemployed, and argues t h a t a move from 
t h i s f a c t u a l premise to the imperative conclusion t h a t 
the customer ought to pay the grocer f o r the potatoes 
i s not a matter any longer of simply knowing what the 
f a c t s a r e 0 ^ Indeed the grocer may w e l l know the f a c t s , 
i n c l u d i n g the f a c t t h a t the i n s t i t u t i o n of buying and 
s e l l i n g provides a set of s o c i a l f a c t s by which obiiga= 
t i o n s can be judged, and s t i l l say t o h i s customer, 
"Forget what you owe me." The s t a t i o n e r , however, may 
not be so generous i n h i s judgement and may s t i l l r e q u i r e 
the customer t o pay the b i l l a t h i s shop though he i s i n 
possession of the same f a c t s as the grocer,, A f u r t h e r 
example i s suggested by Beardsmore and i s drawn from 
Graham Greene's n o v e l , The Heart of the Matter., Two 
characters i n t h i s novel commit s u i c i d e , one a non° 
Ca t h o l i c named Pemberton and the other a C a t h o l i c p o l i c e 
commissioner named Scobie. Presuming t h a t we could 
reach an agreement on the f a c t s of each case and could 
be c l e a r about what a c t u a l l y happened, i s there any 
reason t o suppose t h a t we would also agree about the 
m o r a l i t y of such an action? Indeed i t may be the case 
t h a t f o r Catholics the a c t i o n of s u i c i d e i s considered 
t o be wrong but t h a t f o r non=Catholics the same a c t i o n 
might be considered courageous or good 0 Such d i f f e r e n c e s 
are s i g n i f i c a n t moral disagreements, but i t would appear 
1 I b i d o , p , 123o 
p 
Beardsmore, op. c i t . , p 0 72f e 
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t h a t they cannot simply be resolved by an appeal t o the 
f a c t s o f the easel indeed they might prove to be 
i r r e d u c i b l e t o any set of f a c t s upon which the two 
p a r t i e s might agree."^ 
The problem which i s r a i s e d by the p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f moral disagreement given the same set of f a c t s cuts 
even more deeply i n t o the d e s c r i p t i v i s t account of moral 
reasoning, however, since, as Beardsmore and P h i l l i p s 
i n t e r p r e t i t , moral reasoning i s not j u s t a matter o f 
knowing or not knowing the f a c t s but r a t h e r a matter o f 
i n t e r p r e t i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e or relevance of those f a c t s . 
This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t i n the analogy o f f e r e d by 
Black, namely t h a t we can understand the l o g i c of d e c i s i o n 
i n m o r a l i t y by considering the decisions made w i t h i n a 
game such as chess. Once a person chooses t o be i n v o l v e d 
i n the game, i t i s then not only p o s s i b l e f o r him t o 
derive, imperative conclusions from f a c t u a l premises 
regarding the o b j e c t i v e s or r u l e s of the game| i t i s also 
the case t h a t what moral conclusions one draws are only 
a f u n c t i o n of c e r t a i n f a c t s being true.. 
Just as i n chess anyone accepting the f a c t s of 
the case i s committed t o drawing a c e r t a i n con= 
e l u s i o n , so i n m o r a l i t y anyone accepting the 
f a c t s of the case i s committed t o a p a r t i c u l a r 
moral judgement. On t h i s view, moral disagree** 
ment can stem only from ignorance of f a c t or 
l a c k of understanding.2 
What i s obscured by t h i s analogy i s the r o l e which moral 
b e l i e f s or moral p r a c t i c e s p l a y i n determining which f a c t s 
2 I b i d . , p. 75» 
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are important t o the drawing of a moral conclusion» I f 
the example t h a t Black o f f e r s of reasoning w i t h i n the 
context of a game ( i . e . , Fischer wants t o mate Botwinniko 
The one and only way t o mate Botwinnik i s t o move the 
Queen. Therefore, move the Queen) i s f u r t h e r complicated 
by the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a new f a c t (such as the f a c t t h a t 
Botwinnik i s i n poor h e a l t h and might s u f f e r a severe 
shock i f he i s mated by F i s c h e r ) , n o t only are the possi° 
b i l i t i e s of v a l i d moral advice increased but the moral 
advice which one does o f f e r w i l l depend upon a judgement 
about the importance of the f a c t s which one knows 0 
The confusions i n the above argument [ i o e 0 
Black's] are due i n p a r t t o a mistaken view 
of " f a c t s o " True, w i t h i n a given moral viewpoint„ 
the f a c t s w i l l bind those who share i t t o s i m i l a r 
moral conclusions„ But, f o r them, the f a c t s 
already have moral i m p o r t . I t i s not a case of 
moral conclusions being deduced from non° 
ev a l u a t i v e f a c t u a l premisses. Black t h i n k s 
t h a t the f a c t s bind one t o moral advice which 
he regards as "the s i n g l e p o s s i b i l i t y " i n the 
s i t u a t i o n o But . . . the moral advice one 
th i n k s one ought to give w i l l be determined 
• by one's moral b e l i e f s ! i t i s such b e l i e f s 
which give the f a c t s t h e i r relevance and 
s i g n i f i c a n c e 0 1 
The r o l e of moral b e l i e f s i s eq u a l l y important i n the 
case regarding s u i c i d e already mentioned 0 Whether or n o t 
one regards the f a c t t h a t Scobie caused h i s own death by 
t a k i n g an overdose of drugs as s u f f i c i e n t grounds f o r 
condemning h i s a c t i o n and whether one claims t h a t t h i s 
f a c t e n t a i l s the e v a l u a t i v e conclusion t h a t Scobie d i d 
something wrong i s a f u n c t i o n of the moral import of 
P h i l l i p s and Mounce, o c i t p. 129=30. Cfo 
Beardsmore, op. c i t . , p 0 7U» 
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t h i s f a c t which i s i n t u r n a f u n c t i o n of the d i f f e r i n g 
moral b e l i e f s of the witnesses to t h i s evento 
Foot would most l i k e l y argue t h a t i t must be 
t r u e f o r the person who condemns the s u i c i d e as wrong 
t h a t t h i s condemnation bear an " i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n " t o 
the a c t i o n i t s e l f . I t i s not the a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n of 
a C a t h o l i c t o condemn s u i c i d e but r a t h e r t h i s condemna= 
t i o n i s i n t i m a t e l y bound up w i t h the very d e s c r i p t i o n of 
the deaths of Scobie and Pemberton. As an appeal f o r the 
r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of moral b e l i e f s on the basis of 
common evidence, and f o r the grounding of those b e l i e f s 
i n matters o f f a c t , t h i s n o t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
f a c t and value might be acceptable. What Foot wants t o 
argue, however, and what the d e s c r i p t i v i s t account i n 
general tends t o suggest, i s t h a t no one could refuse 
the v e r d i c t given by Scobie's w i f e and t h e i r p r i e s t , 
Father Rank, by c l a i m i n g t h a t he does not see the f a c t s 
t h a t way.-*- Provided t h a t the connection can be shown 
between the b e l i e f t h a t committing s u i c i d e i s wrong and 
some n o t i o n of what i s d e t r i m e n t a l t o the goal o f human 
f l o u r i s h i n g , i t should be p o s s i b l e , on the d e s c r i p t i v i s t s 
a n a l y s i s , f o r a l l of us t o agree on the condemnation o f 
s u i c i d e . However, as Beardsmore and P h i l l i p s have argued 
t h i 3 i s t o beg the ques t i o n . For what i s at stake here i 
p r e c i s e l y what Ca t h o l i c s and non=Catholics consider t o be 
See e s p e c i a l l y Foot, "Moral B e l i e f s , " p. &k-
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the value of human l i f e and t h i s i s a matter about which 
they may never reach agreement,, 
The conversation at Fellowes' dinner p a r t y 
shows this<> Several guests are discussing 
Pemberton's death. Both Scobie and h i s host 
accept j u s t the same f a c t s as evidence f o r the 
claim t h a t Pemberton committed s u i c i d e (he 
str a n g l e d h i m s e l f w i t h a l e n g t h of cord 
attached t o a picture°hanger); nevertheless 
they judge h i s a c t i o n d i f f e r e n t l y . For 
Fellowes i t i s c l e a r t h a t "a chap's got the 
r i g h t t o take h i s own l i f e , " For Scobie 
s u i c i d e i s "the u n f o r g i v a b l e s i n . " But t h i s 
i s not because they disagree over the f a c t s , 
but because the f a c t s have a d i f f e r e n t s i g n i f i ~ 
cance f o r them.-*-
What w i l l determine t h i s s i g n i f i c a n c e i s the b e l i e f which 
i s held by the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n the dispute regarding the 
nature of human l i f e and the r e s u l t i n g o b l i g a t i o n s which 
are bound up w i t h t h a t l i f e . To claim t h a t the case can 
be decided merely by knowing the f a c t s i s not t o o f f e r a 
completely s a t i s f a c t o r y account of the l o g i c of moral 
d e c i s i o n i n cases such as t h i s one. 
' That an a n a l y s i s of the r o l e of b e l i e f s or a t t i -
tudes i n moral d e c i s i o n m a k i n g i s c r u c i a l should by now 
be f a i r l y c l e a r , f o r the c e n t r a l i t y of these i n some 
moral decisions must su r e l y suggest t o us t h a t an examina= 
t i o n of t h e i r l o g i c i s necessary 0 John Lemmon suggested 
such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n h i s essay on moral dilemmas, f o r 
he claimed t h a t the arguments which resolve some dilemmas 
f a c i n g the moral person cannot be accounted f o r by the 
2 
t r a d i t i o n a l l o g i c a l approach,, Perhaps an example w i l l 
Beardsmore, op. c i t . , p„ 9U<> 
John Lemmon, "Moral Dilemmas," C h r i s t i a n E t h i c s 
and Contemporary Philosophy, ed„ by I c T„ Ramsey (SCM 
12U 
serve t o i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t ; i t i s a well°known and 
oft°quoted one from the w r i t i n g s of S a r t r e o 
o o o I w i l l r e f e r t o the case of a p u p i l of 
mine, who sought me out i n the f o l l o w i n g 
circumstanceso His f a t h e r was q u a r r e l l i n g 
w i t h h i s mother and was also i n c l i n e d t o be 
a " c o l l a b o r a t o r " ; h i s e l d e r - b r o t h e r had been 
k i l l e d i n the German o f f e n s i v e of 191+0 and 
t h i s young man, w i t h a sentiment somewhat 
p r i m i t i v e but generous, burned t o avenge him,, 
His mother was l i v i n g alone w i t h him, deeply 
a f f l i c t e d by the semi=treason of h i s f a t h e r 
and by the death of her o l d e s t son, and her 
one c o n s o l a t i o n was i n t h i s young man„ But 
he, at t h i s moment, had the choice between 
going t o England to j o i n the Free French Forces 
or of s t a y i n g near h i s mother and h e l p i n g her 
to live» He f u l l y r e a l i z e d t h a t t h i s woman 
l i v e d only f o r him and t h a t h i s disappearance 
==or perhaps h i s death-=would plunge her i n t o 
despair,, He also r e a l i z e d t h a t , c o n c r e t e l y 
and i n f a c t , every a c t i o n he performed on h i s 
mother's beh a l f would be sure of e f f e c t i n the 
sense of a i d i n g her t o l i v e , whereas anything 
he d i d i n order t o go and f i g h t would be an 
ambiguous a c t i o n which might vanish l i k e water 
i n t o sand and serve no purpose,, For i n s t a n c e p 
t o set out f o r England he would have t o w a i t 
i n d e f i n i t e l y i n a Spanish camp on the way 
through Spain; or, on a r r i v i n g i n England or 
i n A l g i e r s he might be put i n t o an o f f i c e t o 
f i l l up forms. Consequently, he found h i m s e l f 
confronted by two very d i f f e r e n t modes of 
a c t i o n ; the one concrete, immediate, but 
d i r e c t e d towards only one i n d i v i d u a l ; the 
other an a c t i o n addressed t o an end i n f i n i t e l y 
g r e a t e r , a n a t i o n a l c o l l e c t i v i t y , but f o r t h a t 
reason ambiguous=~and i t might be f r u s t r a t e d 
on the way„ At the same time, he was hesi= 
t a t i n g between two kinds of m o r a l i t y ; on the 
one s i d e , the m o r a l i t y of sympathy, of personal 
devotion, and, on the other s i d e , a m o r a l i t y of 
wider scope but of more debatable v a l i d i t y , , He 
had t o choose between these two op-
press, London, 1966), p 0 279„ By a " t r a d i t i o n a l l o g i c a l 
approach" Lemmon suggests "the l o g i c of i m p e r a t i v e s , 
deontic l o g i c , and what not„" 
"'"J. P. S a r t r e , E x i s t e n t i a l i s m and Humanism, t r a n s l o 
by P 0 M a i r e t (Methuen, London, 19Ub") 9 P. 35°6„ ~ 
125 
The problem which ch a r a c t e r i s e s t h i s dilemma and which 
makes i t i n t e r e s t i n g f o r an a n a l y s i s of a t t i t u d e s i s the 
f a c t t h a t "the arguments which t r y t o e s t a b l i s h e x a c t l y 
what one's moral s i t u a t i o n is_ are not d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e 
from those which attempt to resolve the dilemma i t s e l f 0"^ 
Indeed, as Lemmon f u r t h e r suggests, "the dilemma i s so 
grave a one, p e r s o n a l l y speaking, t h a t e i t h e r d e c i s i o n 
i n e f f e c t marks the adoption on the p a r t of the agent o f 
a changed moral outlook. ' An even more extreme case o f 
t h i s type of dilemma i s suggested by the example of Cham«= 
b e r l a i n ' s n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h H i t l e r i n 1938. I n t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n a moral person i s c a l l e d upon t o make a d e c i s i o n 
"of a recognizably moral character though he i s completely 
unprepared f o r t h e " s i t u a t i o n by h i s present moral o u t l o o k . " ^ 
The dilemma requires f o r i t s s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s o l u t i o n some 
kin d of c r e a t i v e extension of the boundaries, or even a 
complete r e f o r m u l a t i o n , of one's moral outlook.-
I n b o t h the dilemmas which Lemmon describes i t 
would seem t h a t the models o f d e c i s i o n we have so f a r 
discussed are inadequate f o r p r o v i d i n g a framework w i t h i n 
which t o understand the r e s o l u t i o n s r e q u i r e d . On the one 
hand, decisions of p r i n c i p l e do not seem t o be r e q u i r e d 
not simply because a c o n f l i c t of p r i n c i p l e s may be i n v o l v e d , 
b u t more e s p e c i a l l y because "part of the very dilemma i s 
j u s t one's u n c e r t a i n t y as t o one's a c t u a l moral s i t u a t i o n , 
Lemmon, op. c i t . , p. 2 7 6 . Underlines mine. 
2 I b i d 0 3 l b i d . , p. 2 7 7 . 
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one's s i t u a t i o n w i t h respect to d u t i e s , o b l i g a t i o n s , and 
p r i n c i p l e S o " 1 I t w i l l not do t o say t h a t Sartre's p u p i l 
could resolve h i s dilemma by choosing a u n i v e r s a l i s a b l e 
p r i n c i p l e such as "Always act out of personal d e v o t i o n 0 " ^ 
Not only i s i t p o s s i b l e t h a t t h i s i s a p r i n c i p l e which 
the young man w i l l not choose t o l i v e by i n f u t u r e 
dilemmas of t h i s k i n d , t h a t i s , one which he may formu-= 
l a t e simply to deal w i t h t h i s s i t u a t i o n and no o t h e r j but 
furthermore, as Sar t r e says, the man i s " h e s i t a t i n g between 
two kinds o f m o r a l i t y , " and i t i s j u s t a t the p o i n t of such 
a d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g one's way of l i f e t h a t the p r i n c i p l e ^ 
model i s unable t o shed l i g h t on matters. On the other 
hand, the f a c t s upon which a r e s o l u t i o n o f these dilemmas 
might be based are n o t a l t o g e t h e r clear-cut„ What i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g about the s i t u a t i o n s mentioned i s n o t j u s t 
whether one or any moral conclusion w i l l be e n t a i l e d by 
the d e s c r i p t i o n of the case f a c i n g the moral person but 
p r e c i s e l y how t h i s person can and w i l l come to some 
understanding of and de c i s i o n about the character o f h i s 
dilemma. Sartre's p u p i l i s faced w i t h two sets of f a c t s 9 
those regarding h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s mother and those 
regarding the Free French Forces and t h e i r s t r u g g l e against 
an aggressor. What i s r e q u i r e d on h i s p a r t i s some s o r t o f 
1 I b i d . , p. 27l±0 
2 
Sartre i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r essay does seem h i m s e l f 
t o f a l l v i c t i m t o the same search f o r a u n i v e r s a l i s a b l e 
moral p r i n c i p l e and i t could j u s t i f i a b l y be argued t h a t 
the one he wants t o suggest i s i n the end q u i t e inadequate 
i t s e l f t o deal w i t h t h i s dilemma. Op. c i t . , p 0 50°3« 
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choice as t o which f a c t s have the most s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r 
him and i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h a t choice w i l l be a 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d deduction from any new, a l l - i n c l u s i v e 
set o f f a c t s which might be proposed. Chamberlain's 
s i t u a t i o n i s even more d i f f i c u l t since p r e c i s e l y what 
was needed on h i s p a r t was a judgement as t o the k i n d 
of person he was d e a l i n g w i t h and the very r e a l p o s s i -
b i l i t y of deception as t o H i t l e r ' s character as w e l l as-
the urgency r e q u i r e d make t h i s not simply a matter o f 
knowing or not knowing a l l the f a c t s . What the f a c t s 
are, has t o some ext e n t t o be decided i n t h i s dilemma and, 
though there may be a reasonable l i m i t t o the number and 
types of d e s c r i p t i o n s which could be o f f e r e d of the 
problems f a c i n g Chamberlain i n 1938» y e t i t w i l l n ot be 
h e l p f u l t o o v e r s i m p l i f y the ease w i t h which one might 
come t o understand these f a c t s and thereby know the 
o b l i g a t i o n which f o l l o w s from them,, 
A c a r e f u l a n a l y s i s of the l o g i c of a t t i t u d e s and 
of t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o moral d e c i s i o n m a k i n g has been 
o f f e r e d by Donald Evans i n . h i s book The Logic of Self° 
I n v o l v e m e n t H i s work, which i s an attempt t o provide 
a framework w i t h i n which r e l i g i o u s language might be 
understood and appraised, suggests also a way i n which 
statements o f f a c t and moral imperatives are r e l a t e d i n 
the f o r m a t i o n o f a t t i t u d e s . Evans' a n a l y s i s owes a great 
SCM Press, London, 1963 0 
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deal t o the work of J o L„ A u s t i n and i t i s w i t h t h i s 
new understanding o f language i n general proposed by 
Au s t i n t h a t we should begin t h i s d i s c u s s i o n of atti° 
tudeso The importance of Austin's work i s both h i s 
que s t i o n i n g of the t r a d i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s of language 
accepted by grammarians and l o g i c i a n s preceding him 
and h i s e x p l o r a t i o n o f the nature and i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
the i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e of language,, As he i n t e r p r e t s 
i t , the i m p l i c a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l grammar and l o g i c i s 
t h a t only those sentences a c t u a l l y make sense which 
s t a t e f a c t s , r e f e r t o f a c t s , or describe some objects,. 
Meaning and t r u t h are thus t o be determined by reference 
t o the r e l e v a n t f a c t s being s t a t e d or described,, Only 
statements o f f a c t , or i n d i c a t i v e sentences, are capable 
on t h i s account of being considered t r u e or f a l s e , and 
other statements, having no r e f e r e n t , can have no t r u t h -
value or claim t o meaning and are t h e r e f o r e considered 
"nonsenseo" I t was j u s t t h i s "nonsense" which f a s c i n a t e d 
o 
A u s t i n and which he intended t o i n v e s t i g a t e and clarify„ 
One o f the claims he made which i s important f o r 
our an a l y s i s here i s t h a t n ot a l l i n d i c a t i v e sentences 
are d e s c r i p t i o n s or statements of f a c t * The examples 
which i n t e r e s t e d him were those which bear every outward 
resemblance t o statements of f a c t , namely those sentences 
which have "as i t happens, humdrum verbs i n the f i r s t 
* J 0 L„ A u s t i n , How t o Do Things w i t h Words (Oxford 
U n i v e r s i t y Press, London, 1962), p„ 1=1^ ~~ 
I b i d , , p„ l+o 
person s i n g u l a r present i n d i c a t i v e a c t i v e . " Yet these 
utterances "do not 'describe' or ' r e p o r t 9 or constate 
anything at a l l , are not 'true or f a l s e 1 J and the 
u t t e r i n g of the sentence i s , or i s a p a r t o f , the doing 
o f an a c t i o n , which again would not normally be 
described as saying something,," 2 These sentences A u s t i n 
l a b e l l e d "performatives" and he hoped t h a t by co n s i d e r i n g 
the l o g i c of performatives he would be able to undermine 
the assumptions t h a t t o say something i s always t o s t a t e 
t h a t something i s so and t h a t doing and saying are two 
e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t a c t s . The examples w i t h which A u s t i n 
began h i s e x p l o r a t i o n were? 
" I do 0" (spoken i n a marriage ceremony) 
" I bet you sixpence i t w i l l r a i n tomorrow." 
" I name t h i s ship the Queen Eliza b e t h . " 3 
I n each of these cases the standard of judgement as t o 
t r u t h or f a l s i t y by reference t o the f a c t s simply does 
not apply, f o r t o u t t e r these sentences i s n o t t o 
describe or r e f e r t o anything, but t o do it„ 
The meaning of t h i s type of u t t e r a n c e , A u s t i n 
suggested, should be ascertained by reference t o the 
" i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e " of the language and i t i s t h i s 
which c o n s t i t u t e s h i s second important c o n t r i b u t i o n t o 
our study of a t t i t u d e s . He makes e x p l i c i t f o r the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l study of language the need f o r and p o s s i ~ 
b i l i t y o f o u t l i n i n g a type o f meaning which does n o t 
•'•Ibid., p 0 5o 3 I b i d . 
2 
I b i d . 
130 
i n v o l v e merely the t r a d i t i o n a l n o t i o n s of "sense and 
r e f e r e n c e . " 1 The meaning and v a l i d i t y of per f o r m a t i v e 
utterances i s a f u n c t i o n not simply of t h e i r content 
but of two other major f a c t o r s which provide them w i t h 
i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces the circumstances i n which the 
utte r a n c e i s made and the conduct, motives and purposes 
of the speakers. I n the f i r s t example, the utterance 
" I do" req u i r e s the proper i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g f o r i t 
t o make sense and i t w i l l be subject t o " i n f e l i c i t i e s " 
i f the circumstances under which i t i s spoken are n o t 
r i g h t . One of the necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r "the smooth 
or 'happy' f u n c t i o n i n g of a pe r f o r m a t i v e " i s thus t h a t ; 
A o l There mu3t e x i s t an accepted conventional 
procedure having a c e r t a i n conventional 
e f f e c t , t h a t procedure t o inc l u d e the 
u t t e r i n g of c e r t a i n words by c e r t a i n per-
sons i n c e r t a i n circumstances, and f u r t h e r , 
the 
A.2 p a r t i c u l a r persons and circumstances i n a 
given case must be appropriate f o r the 
i n v o c a t i o n of the p a r t i c u l a r procedure 
invoked.2 
Secondly, the pe r f o r m a t i v e r e q u i r e s t h a t c e r t a i n conduct 
and f e e l i n g s or thoughts accompany i t s utterance and the 
absence of these could also cause i t t o be i n f e l i c i t o u s , , 
Thus? 
- L I b i d . f p. 100. A u s t i n intended t o d i s t i n g u i s h 
the i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f language from i t s meaning but 
as Evans p o i n t s out i t i s more h e l p f u l i n understanding 
s e l f - i n v o l v i n g language t o say t h a t i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e 
i s Part of meaning. Op. c i t o s > p. 71, n. 1. Hare's debt 
t o A u s t i n 1 s work can s u r e l y also not be overlooked since 
i n many ways Hare i s making the same kinds of appeals 
w i t h regard t o the commendatory or e v a l u a t i v e f o r c e of 
language 0 
2 I b i d 0 , p. lU°l£o 
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The procedures must be executed by a l l particl° 
pants both c o r r e c t l y and completely,, 
Where, as o f t e n , the procedure i s designed 
f o r use by persons having c e r t a i n thoughts or 
f e e l i n g s , or f o r the i n a u g u r a t i o n of c e r t a i n 
consequential conduct on the p a r t of any 
p a r t i c i p a n t , then a person p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n 
and so i n v o k i n g the procedure must i n f a c t 
have those thoughts or f e e l i n g s , and the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s must i n t e n d so t o conduct them^ 
selves, and f u r t h e r must a c t u a l l y so conduct 
themselves s u b s e q u e n t l y ^ 
I t was Evan3' i n t e n t i o n i n h i s work to e x p l a i n 
more f u l l y the i m p l i c a t i o n s and commitments of performa~ 
t i v e language and i n p a r t i c u l a r t o show the way i n which 
one's a t t i t u d e s , f e e l i n g s , and p r a c t i c a l commitments are 
r e l a t e d t o the t h i n g s one says. For t h i s reason, h i s 
f i r s t task was to c l a s s i f y the various types of performa-
t i v e utterances which there are and then t o i n d i c a t e which 
of these are s p e c i f i c a l l y s e l f - i n v o l v i n g , , What we have 
seen i n the d e s c r i p t i v i s t account of moral reasoning i s 
an attempt to p o i n t out the e s s e n t i a l relatedness of f a c t 
and value such t h a t t h e i r a r b i t r a r y attachment t o each 
other by the d e c i s i o n of a moral agent i s precluded„ The 
p r e s c r i p t i v i s t n o t i o n t h a t any such move from f a c t t o 
va l u e , or from i n d i c a t i v e t o i m p e r a t i v e , conceals a 
hidden e v a l u a t i v e premise, and thus also a d e c i s i o n of 
the agent t o commend the f a c t s , needs also t o be taken 
i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The attempt t o explore the possi= 
b i l i t i e s of a non°propositional l o g i c may help not only -
t o c l a r i f y the nature o f t h i s controversy but also t o 
i n d i c a t e the r o l e o f r e l i g i o u s f a i t h i n moral d e c i s i o n ^ 
1 I M d J L , p„ l£ e 
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Only then can such issues as the autonomy of value or 
the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y be judged w i t h p r e c i s i o n and 
f a i r n e s s o 
Evans ' c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of perf o r m a t i v e utterances 
depends upon the type of a c t i o n which i s done by the 
speaker i n speaking. Constatives are those utterances 
which use verbs l i k e estimate, guess, warn, r e p o r t or 
argue and by which the speaker r e f e r s us t o some other • 
s t a t e of a f f a i r s . Examples would bes 
I guess t h a t there are 391+ steps t o the top 
of the Cathedral tower. 
I warn you t h a t i t w i l l r a i n t h i s a f t e r n o o n . 
Constatives have an a b s t r a c t a b l e f a c t u a l content which 
can i t s e l f be judged f o r i t s t r u t h , accuracy, or c o r r e c t ^ 
ness independently o f the speaker's i n t e n t i o n s or f e e l = 
ingSo They d i f f e r from mere statements o f f a c t i n t h a t 
the speaker has a c t u a l l y performed an a c t i o n by saying 
themj t h a t i s , he has issued a warning or made a guess. 
A f u l l account of t h e i r meaning must t h e r e f o r e include a 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n not only of t h e i r content but also of the 
speaker's a c t i o n i n u t t e r i n g therm Commissives are 
another type o f perf o r m a t i v e i n which the speaker commits 
h i m s e l f t o some a c t i o n and i s thereby i n v o l v e d i n t h a t 
which he says. Examples might bes 
I promise t o pay you the money I owe. 
I i n t e n d t o f i n i s h t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . 
Here the content of the utterances cannot be judged i n the 
same way as co n s t a t i v e s f o r the s t a t e of a f f a i r s which i s 
suggested by the sentences has n o t y e t come about. The 
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f a c t s , t h a t the money owed i s paid and t h a t the d i s s e r -
t a t i o n i s f i n i s h e d , can only be judged as f u l f i l l e d or 
u n f u l f i l l e d , and t h i s judgement, along w i t h an under-
standing of the speaker's i n t e n t i o n s and conduct i n v o l v e d 
i n the u t t e r a n c e , would i n d i c a t e the meaning of commis-
sive performatives„ A t h i r d type of performative i s the 
e x e r c i t i v e by which the speaker exercises h i s a u t h o r i t y 
i n such a way t h a t he b r i n g s about a new s t a t e of 
affairs„ Thuss 
I order you t o stop smoking„ 
I auth o r i s e you t o act on my behalf» 
These performatives do not n e c e s s a r i l y have an a b s t r a c t -
able f a c t u a l content at a l l j thus your a c t i n g on the 
speaker's behalf i s not judged as t r u e or f a l s e but as 
obedience or conformity t o the speaker's authority» I t 
i s only a f t e r such actions have been c a r r i e d out t h a t we 
can s t a t e them as co n s t a t i v e s which can be judged t r u e or 
f a l s e o Behabitives are a f o u r t h type o f perf o r m a t i v e 
which o f t e n do n o t have a subordinate clause a t a l i o 
Examples would bes 
Thank you. 
I apologise f o r my behaviour,. 
We p r a i s e thee, 0 Lord. 
These utterances do have f a c t u a l presuppositions r e g a r d i n g 
the s i t u a t i o n out of which the speaker i s thanking, prais° 
i n g or a p o l o g i s i n g and they do o f t e n have f a c t u a l content a 
The a c t i o n performed here by the speaker i s t w o f o l d % 
1 ) these utterances e s t a b l i s h a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
hearer and thus place the speaker i n t o a context of s o c i a l 
behaviour and 2) they imply the speaker's a t t i t u d e toward 
or i n t e n t i o n w i t h regard t o the person addressed and are 
thus s e l f " i n v o l v i n g . The f i n a l class o f p e r f o r m a t i v e s , 
v e r d i c t i v e s , includes utterances i n which the speaker 
says what :Ls so on the basis of o p i n i o n , judgement, or 
appraisal« Thus: 
I f i n d you g u i l t y of manslaughter. 
I n my o p i n i o n , she i s very beautiful„ 
The content of the v e r d i c t i v e i s not s t r i c t l y f a c t u a l as 
i n the case o f the c o n s t a t i v e b u t a d e s c r i p t i o n of the 
o b j e c t , person, or event i n question i s indeed c r u c i a l t o 
the judgement which i s made. Opinions and judgements are 
no t simply p r i v a t e matters but can be assessed as reason-
abl e , t r u e ~ t o ^ r e a l i t y , or adequate ."^  
This rough sketch o f the types o f pe r f o r m a t i v e 
utterance has allowed us t o i s o l a t e the s e l f " i n v o l v i n g 
p e rformative language i n which a t t i t u d e s are i m p l i e d , 
namely b e h a b i t i v e s , and i t i s t o an an a l y s i s of a t t i t u d e s 
s p e c i f i c a l l y which we now t u r n . By a t t i t u d e s we mean the 
d i s p o s i t i o n or posture o f a person which i s expressed or 
i m p l i e d i n the statements a person makes and by which 
others know t h a t the speaker i s f o r or against something 
and whether i t i s important or unimportant t o him. We 
cannot be said t o know what someone's a t t i t u d e i s unless 
we can roughly c l a s s i f y h i s r e l a t i o n t o t h a t about which -
he speaks i n t o one of f o u r c a t e g o r i e s ; a g a i n s t / i m p o r t a n t , 
against/unimportant, f o r / i m p o r t a n t , f o r / u n i m p o r t a n t 
1 Evans, op. cit„ p. 30-1+0° 2 I b i d _ L , p. 122=3. 
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A t t i t u d e s are i m p l i e d , as we have s a i d , i n be h a b i t i v e s 
and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n e x p l i c i t behabit-ives they are most 
e a s i l y recognised,. E x p l i c i t b e h a b i t i v e s would be s 
I am s o r r y f o r o f f e n d i n g you« 
I welcome t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y o f speaking t o you 0 
I commend Smith f o r being so p o l i t e on t h a t 
d i f f i c u l t occasion* 
I n these u t t e r a n c e s , the speaker i s t a k i n g up a d e f i n i t e 
posture towards some person, event, or o b j e c t and i t i s 
the f o r c e of the b e h a b i t i v e t o r e l a t e the speaker t o h i s 
subject i n whatever way he chooses„ The act of t a k i n g up 
a posture towards something i s thus performed by the 
be h a b i t i v e through speech,, The utterance also provides a 
framework f o r a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the s u b j e c t , a r e l a t i o n -
ship which i s now t o be determined by the type of posture 
the speaker considered a p p r o p r i a t e and adopted 0 Behabi-
t i v e s have f a c t u a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , t h a t the speaker has 
indeed offended someone or t h a t he has i n f a c t been asked 
to speak, and also f a c t u a l content, t h a t Smith has on 
some occasion been polite„ These provide the s e t t i n g f o r 
the utterance and are the c o n d i t i o n s to which the speaker 
i s responding by the adoption of an a t t i t u d e . I n the 
case of e x p l i c i t b e h a b i t i v e s , the i m p l i c a t i o n of an 
a t t i t u d e i s strong and d e f i n i t e so t h a t i t would render 
the utterance meaningless i f the speaker were t o deny 
a c t u a l l y h o l d i n g the attitude„ E x p l i c i t b e h a b i t i v e s thus-
have an i n d e f e a s i b l e i m p l i c a t i o n of a t t i t u d e s and are 
s e l f = s t u l t i f y i n g i f the speaker were t o d i s c l a i m what 
i s implied,, 1 
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Other statements i n which a t t i t u d e s are i m p l i e d 
are n o n = e x p l i c i t b e h a b i t i v e s though i n these the i m p l i = 
c a t i o n i s not so s t r o n g or d e f i n i t e 0 Consider, f o r 
example, the many utterances made which c o n t a i n words 
w i t h dual l o g i c a l f o r c e , words which b o t h describe and 
evaluateo^" I t i s Evans' suggestion t h a t the a n a l y s i s of 
such words concentrate on the e x p l i c i t p erformatives f o r 
which these words are a s o r t of shorthand. A t t i t u d e s are 
contained i n utterances making use of these words e i t h e r 
by prima f a c i e or by co n t e x t u a l i m p l i c a t i o n . The second 
example of an e x p l i c i t b e h a b i t i v e given above, " I wel° 
come t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y of speaking t o you," would also 
imply an a t t i t u d e i f the speaker were t o say, "This i s 
a t r u l y wonderful occasion at which I speako" Here the 
i m p l i c a t i o n i s prima f a c i e , since i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r the 
speaker t o deny having the a t t i t u d e o f g r a t e f u l n e s s but 
he must e x p l i c i t l y d i s c l a i m i t i f he i s not grateful„ 
This can be a weak prima f a c i e i m p l i c a t i o n , i n which the 
speaker can deny t h a t he even i m p l i e s an a t t i t u d e a t a l l 
and i n f a c t must do so i f he i s t o be understood, or a 
str o n g one, i n which he can deny having the a t t i t u d e but 
cannot deny t h a t he i m p l i e d i t i n what was sa i d - A t t i = 
tudes might also be i m p l i e d i n utterances f o r which the 
context provides the i m p l i c a t i o n , , Our speaker might say, 
"This i s a d i s t i n g u i s h e d and eminent group which I am 
about t o addresso" As the opening remark o f an important 
I b i d , , p 0 58» n„ 1 . Evans here suggests a pre' 
l i m i n a r y l i s t of such words found under "ca" i n the 
Shorter Oxford E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y 0 
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address, t h i s utterance i m p l i e s the speaker's g r a t i t u d e 
by v i r t u e of the context i n which i t i s s a i d , and indeed 
the speaker can r e l y on the b e l i e f i n the appropriateness 
of t h i s a t t i t u d e w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l group t o give 
h i s words the perf o r m a t i v e f o r c e of a behabitiveo I t 
might be the speaker's i n t e n t i o n , however, t o use t h i s 
sentence only i n a d e s c r i p t i v e way so t h a t a f t e r char° 
a c t e r i s i n g the group t o whom he i s speaking he might 
w e l l deny t h a t t h i s was an appropriate occasion on which 
t o f e e l g r a t e f u l o 1 
Prom an examination of many types of utterance i n 
which a t t i t u d e s are i m p l i e d or expressed, Evans was able 
t o s p e c i f y f o u r d i s t i n c t elements i n v o l v e d i n a t t i t u d e s ? 
f e e l i n g s , o p i n i o n , behaviour, and i n t e n t i o n , , A person 
could g i v e an i n d i c a t i o n of the a t t i t u d e s he holds by 
expressing any one of these f o u r elements, thereby making 
e x p l i c i t the posture he has taken w i t h regard t o some 
s u b j e c t o I n the a t t i t u d e , sorrow, a person's f e e l i n g s 
are the important element and one might express t h i s 
a t t i t u d e by saying, " I f e e l s o r r y f o r having offended y o u 0 " 
The f e e l i n g s which are most r e l e v a n t t o a t t i t u d e s are 
those which are associated w i t h or a r i s e out of our r e l a = 
t i o n s h i p s w i t h others or w i t h the w o r l d , r a t h e r than those 
such as pain or i l l n e s s which are associated w i t h p r i v a t e 
experienceo An a t t i t u d e i n which f e e l i n g s are not 
prominent i s one i n which one's o p i n i o n about something 
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i s crucial„ I n saying, " I commend Smith f o r being so 
p o l i t e on t h a t d i f f i c u l t occasion," what i s important 
i s not the way the speaker f e e l s about Smith or about 
h i s being p o l i t e , but r a t h e r h i s assessment of the 
s i t u a t i o n i n which Smith acted and t h a t a c t i o n i t s e l f 0 
As an o p i n i o n i m p l i e s a judgement made w i t h regard t o 
something, whether s u c h an op i n i o n receives the 
support of one's f e e l i n g s or not may be i r r e l e v a n t 0 
A statement about one's past, present, or f u t u r e 
behaviour can also be i n d i c a t i v e of one's a t t i t u d e and, 
l i k e w i s e , there are a t t i t u d e s i n which t h i s behaviour i s 
the most c r i t i c a l element. The utterance " I always 
respect my supervisor's d i r e c t i o n s " i n d i c a t e s t h a t the 
speaker's non-verbal behaviour as w e l l as h i s statements 
t o other manifest h i s a t t i t u d e toward another person, 
and, i n t h i s case, t h a t behaviour i n r e l a t i o n t o h i s 
supervisor i s c r u c i a l t o the h o l d i n g of the a t t i t u d e , 
respect* F i n a l l y , a statement r e g a r d i n g one's i n t e n t i o n , 
reveals a t t i t u d e s as w e l l . Thus, " I plan t o be a hard~ 
working s t u d e n t " not only describes a f u t u r e course of 
a c t i o n upon which the speaker intends t o embark but als o 
i m p l i e s h i s commitment t o b r i n g t o f u l f i l l m e n t some a t t i -
tude he now has toward hard work and the r o l e of a students 
As a commissive utterance t h i s statement i s s e l f - i n v o l v i n g 
f o r the speaker's a t t i t u d e i s i n t r i n s i c t o the behaviour 
he intends to perform„ Evans claims t h a t although any one 
of these elements alone i s n e i t h e r necessary nor s u f f i c i e n t 
f o r the presence o f an a t t i t u d e p y e t they are each important 
•' ••' < 
1 3 9 
t o a g r e a t e r or l e s s e r degree i n the d i f f e r e n t kinds of 
a t t i t u d e s one can take up,,^ " 
I n h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of a t t i t u d e s , Evans draws a 
c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between f e e l i n g s and a t t i t u d e s and 
between expressions of each,, I n t h i s respect h i s account 
of the meaning of a t t i t u d e expressions w i l l d i f f e r from 
t h a t of Stevenson who considered both types of expression 
t o be instances o f emotive meaning 0 For Evans, an expres-
sion of f e e l i n g i s the means by which the speaker gives 
another person access t o h i s p r i v a t e , i n t e r n a l mood or 
a f f e c t a t any given time,, I t i s s i m i l a r t o a r e p o r t and 
i s t h e r e f o r e dependent upon a given s t a t e o f a f f a i r s f o r 
i t s accuracy,. I t i s important when one expresses one's 
f e e l i n g s t o e x h i b i t some k i n d of " f e e l i n g = r e v e a l i n g 
behaviour" such t h a t the expression can be v e r i f i e d , f o r 
one i s i m p l y i n g by such expressions t h a t a corresponding 
mental, p h y s i c a l or emotional s t a t e i s present a t the 
time of the utterance„ The content of an expression of 
f e e l i n g i s not a matter of choice and i n t h i s way these 
expressions are l i k e d e s c r i p t i v e sentences„ The sin<= 
c e r i t y of an expression i s a f u n c t i o n b o t h of the speaker 
"meaning what he says" and also o f h i s having the f e e l i n g 
which he claims t o have»^ I n h i s a n a l y s i s of moral 
language, Stevenson does n o t appear t o subscribe t o the 
same understanding of the d e s c r i p t i v e nature of expres° 
sive language„ 
1 I b i d , „ p„ l l 6 ~ 1 2 3 o 3 I b i d o n p e 82,, 
2 I b i d 0 8 p„ 8 8 0 
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Broadly speaking, there are two d i f f e r e n t 
purposes which lead U3 t o use language. On 
tEe one hand we use words (as i n . s c i e n c e ) t o 
record, c l a r i f y , and communicate b e l i e f s . 
On the other hand we use words t o give vent 
t o our f e e l i n g s ( i n t e r j e c t i o n s ) , or t o create 
moods ( p o e t r y ) , or t o i n c i t e people t o acti o n s 
or a t t i t u d e s ( o r a t o r y ) . 
The f i r s t use of words I s h a l l c a l l 
" d e s c r i p t i v e , " the second, "dynamic"! 
His account does not attempt t o analyse the content of 
expressions but i s concerned w i t h p l a c i n g i n t o two broad 
categories the uses t o which a l l language can be p u t . 
He has t h e r e f o r e thrown together some very d i f f e r e n t kinds 
of expressions i n t o the category "dynamic" or "emotive." 
The emotive meaning of a word or phrase i s a 
strong and p e r s i s t e n t tendency „ . . t o give 
d i r e c t expression ( q u a s i ~ i n t e r j e c t i o n a l l y ) t o 
c e r t a i n of the speaker's f e e l i n g s or emotions 
or a t t i t u d e s ; and i t i s also a tendency t o 
evoke ( q u a s i - i m p e r a t i v e l y ) corresponding 
f e e l i n g s , emotions, or a t t i t u d e s i n those t o 
whom the speaker's remarks are addressed.^ 
An a t t i t u d e according t o Stevenson includes such t h i n g s 
as "purposes, a s p i r a t i o n s , wants, preferences, desires 
9 o ." and i t i s c l e a r t h a t no attempt t o d i s t i n g u i s h 
between these w i l l be made.^ 
A t t i t u d e s , as d i s t i n c t from f e e l i n g s , have other 
elements i n v o l v e d i n them, namely o p i n i o n s , i n t e n t i o n s , 
and behaviour, and i t i s the presence of these elements 
which gives expressions o f a t t i t u d e t h e i r p e r f o r m a t i v e 
f o r c e . A t t i t u d e expressions must t h e r e f o r e be judged on 
Stevenson, Facts and Values, p. 18=19. 
I b i d . , p. 2 1 ° 2 . 
Stevenson, E t h i c s and Language, p. 3 « 
the basis of what the speaker does i n u t t e r i n g them? he 
does not merely give vent t o something i n s i d e but r a t h e r 
appraises, i n t e n d s , or a c t s 0 I n t h i s respect, the con-
t e n t of these expressions cannot be said t o be t r u e or 
f a l s e f o r no claim i s being made regarding an i n n e r 
s t a t e o f a f f a i r s ] what i s c r u c i a l i n the u t t e r a n c e i s 
the a c t i o n of the speaker i n saying i t . Two of the 
elements i n a t t i t u d e s may be expressed i n s i m i l a r ways • 
t o f e e l i n g s j thus we can express our i n t e n t i o n s or our 
opinions or we can say t h a t we have each of these„ Yet, 
opinions and i n t e n t i o n s are matters of d e c i s i o n and imply 
t h a t the speaker has "created" them f o r himselfo One 
creates the i n t e n t i o n " I p l a n t o be a hard-working 
s t u d e n t , " by saying t h i s i n c e r t a i n a p p r o p r i a t e circum= 
stances ( i . e . , the speaker must i n f a c t be a student) and 
by meaning i t . 1 The s i n c e r i t y o f the expression cannot 
be judged i n the same way as f e e l i n g - e x p r e s s i o n s since 
the d e s c r i p t i v e element has become i r r e l e v a n t . To express 
i n t e n t i o n or opinions i s t o use language i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e 
way and i n so f a r as these.elements are c r u c i a l i n expres-
sions of a t t i t u d e s , t h a t language i s also performative,, 
D i r e c t expressions of a t t i t u d e are given i n 
utterances which Evans terms "onlooks," a word which he 
coined "as a substantive f o r what i t i s t o 'look on x as 
y«'" I f one i s asked one's a t t i t u d e towards somethings 
•LEvans, op. c i t o , p. 8 3 o 
2 I b i d . , p 0 1 2 5 * 
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the s t r u c t u r e of one's r e p l y would be " I l o o k on x as y 0 " 
Examples of onlooks would be the f o l l o w i n g ? 
I look on t h i s task as a waste of timeo 
I consider Jim t o be a close f r i e n d * 
My l i f e i s a p i l g r i m a g e toward heaven,, 
I l o o k on Henry as a brother„ 
I n each of these expressions, there are two act i o n s which 
are i m p l i e d and which give the expressions p e r f o r m a t i v e 
forceo One i s a judgement as to the n a t u r e , character, 
f u n c t i o n , or importance o f the subject and the other i s 
a commitment t o t r e a t i n g or a c t i n g toward the subject i n 
a c e r t a i n way„ An onlook i s t h e r e f o r e "a f u s i o n o f a 
d e c i s i o n - t h a t x i s l i k e y w i t h a decision°to t r e a t x 
l i k e y/ 1^ Onlooks are thus composed o f two p e r f o r m a t i v e s , 
v e r d i c t i v e s and commissives„ 
The v e r d i c t i v e element i n onlooks i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
the speaker has valued, r a t e d , judged, evaluated, or 
formed an op i n i o n about the subject and the onlook 
expresses what he considers t o be the case w i t h regard 
t o t h a t subject,, The onlook cannot be judged as a con-
s t a t i v e by checking the d e s c r i p t i v e content of the u t t e r -
ahce w i t h some corresponding s t a t e o f a f f a i r s , f o r the 
utterance represents a d e c i s i o n made by the speaker* 
The onlook i s the r e s u l t o f h i s having reached a v e r d i c t 
w i t h regard t o some subject and v e r d i c t s are judged by 
t h e i r appropriateness , reasonableness, or adequacy 0 Two-
elements are fundamental i n t h i s verdict,, On the one 
hand, t o make a judgement about something one must 
consider the r e l e v a n t f a c t s , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , q u a l i t i e s , 
or nature o f the s u b j e c t . An adequate v e r d i c t i s one 
which i s well=formed, one which i s the r e s u l t of a care-
f u l d e l i b e r a t i o n and a reasonable study of the subject 
so t h a t the r e s u l t i n g o p i n i o n i s j u s t i f i a b l e and f a i r . 
To a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , a v e r d i c t can t h e r e f o r e be descrip° 
t i v e o f the s u b j e c t and can convey a c e r t a i n amount of 
i n f o r m a t i o n regarding the matter i n q u e s t i o n . What i s 
d i s t i n c t i v e about onlooks, as opposed t o statements o f 
f a c t or even expressions of f e e l i n g , i s t h a t t h i 3 v e r -
d i c t i v e element i s the r e s u l t of a d e c i s i o n about the 
f a c t s , a d e c i s i o n which i s not a l t o g e t h e r determined by 
the f a c t s but which i s n o t independent of them e i t h e r . 
L o g i c a l l y , the speaker i s f r e e i n h i s a p p r a i s a l of the 
subject and i t i s t h i s choice which gives h i s onlook i t s 
p e r f o r m a t i v e f o r c e . On the other hand, the v e r d i c t i v e 
element i m p l i e s a scheme or s t r u c t u r e i n t o which the 
speaker places the s u b j e c t . The sub j e c t i s ascribed 
some status or assigned some r o l e t o play w i t h i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r s t r u c t u r e ; i n doing t h i s the speaker i s g i v i n g 
"a s o r t o f p r i v a t e , u n o f f i c i a l E x e r c i t i v e . 1 , 1 Again t h i s 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s the v e r d i c t i v e from a c o n s t a t i v e i n which 
such a scheme of t h i n g s i s not implied„ 
The commissive element i n onlooks i s the per~ 
f o r m a t i v e by which the speaker chooses t o t r e a t x l i k e y, 
and i t i s a t t h i s p o i n t t h a t we begin t o see the close 
m 
r e l a t i o n s h i p which e x i s t s between v e r d i c t i v e s and corn-
missives i n onlooks<, For t h i s commitment means f i r s t 
of a l l an i n i t i a l w i l l i n g n e s s to lo o k on x as y i n order 
t o reach a d e c i s i o n about x j indeed the v e r d i c t could 
not be reached w i t h o u t t h i s openness t o seeing x as y 
so t h a t i t can be c a r e f u l l y considered 0 The v e r d i c t i n 
an important sense cannot be rendered unless one a c t u a l l y 
takes up a p o s i t i o n w i t h regard t o the subject and, again, 
t h i s t a k i n g of a p o s i t i o n i s not e s s e n t i a l t o statements 
of f a c t i n which one's purpose i s j u s t t o describee The 
commissive element i s of g r e a t e r consequence than t h i s , 
however, f o r the f u t u r e behaviour of the speaker toward 
the subject i s implied„ The onlook w i l l have behavioural 
consequences i n the c o n t i n u i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p of the 
speaker and the su b j e c t and f o r t h i s reason there i s a 
seriousness associated w i t h the d e l i b e r a t i o n , , ^ An onlook 
t h e r e f o r e s t r o n g l y i m p l i e s t h a t the speaker i s committing 
h i m s e l f t o some p o l i c y o f behaviour toward x, behaviour 
which i s also appropriate t o y and t o which the speaker 
may already be committed i n r e l a t i o n t o y 0 I n many 
onlooks the behaviour i m p l i e d i s non-verbal and i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t what the speaker has undertaken i s a whole set o f 
actio n s i n r e l a t i o n t o the subject by which h i s i n t e n t i o n 
w i l l be f u l f i l l e d 0 The onlook thus declares t h a t i n t e n t i o n 
and i m p l i e s t h a t c e r t a i n actions are t o f o l l o w as a r e s u l t 0 
Indeed the imperatives which the speaker w i l l give h i m s e l f 
"*"An onlook i s thus not a matter of saying, "Let"a 
pretend t h a t x i s l i k e y 0 " 
i n the f u t u r e w i t h regard t o h i s a c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o 
the s u b j e c t w i l l be derived from t h i s onlook and w i l l 
be i n d i c a t i v e o f the f u l f i l l m e n t of the speaker's 
i n t e n t i o n i m p l i e d i n the onlook 0 The onlook thus 
declares an i n t e n t i o n which w i l l d i r e c t the course of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between speaker and subject i n the 
f u t u r e o 
The i n t e r a c t i o n of these two elements, v e r d i c - • 
t i v e and commissive, can best be i l l u s t r a t e d by an 
examination of the d i f f e r e n t types of onlook which there 
are.o The examples which we have given are of two kinds? 
l i t e r a l and n o n - l i t e r a l , , I n a l i t e r a l onlook, such as 
" I l o ok upon t h i s task as a waste of t i m e , " or " I con=> 
s i d e r Jim t o be a close f r i e n d , " the comparison which 
the speaker has made between x and y i s f a i r l y obvious 
and the reasons f o r t h i s judgement can be made e x p l i c i t Q ' 
I t i s p o s s i b l e i n each case f o r the speaker t o j u s t i f y 
h i s v e r d i c t by g i v i n g the q u a l i t i e s or c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of x which have l e d him t o form the opi n i o n t h a t i t i s 
l i k e y 0 The basis f o r the.comparison can be shown by 
the speaker d e s c r i b i n g e x a c t l y those c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f 
the task he i s now performing which have l e d him t o the 
conclusion t h a t i t i s indeed a waste o f time* Not only 
i s the v e r d i c t f a i r l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , b ut the i n t e n t i o n 
of the speaker i s as w e l l e C e r t a i n a c t i o n s are appro-
p r i a t e l y expected of one who considers another person t o 
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be a close f r i e n d and those ac t i o n s w i l l f u l f i l l the 
commitment made by the speaker<, The content o f l i t e r a l 
onlooks i s thus v e r i f i a b l e both by examining the 
reasoning by which the speaker reached h i s judgement and 
by observing h i s behaviour i n r e l a t i o n t o the subject„ 
N o n - l i t e r a l onlooks, however, are not able t o be 
checked i n q u i t e the same way. The basis f o r the com° 
par i s o n between x and y i n a non°literal onlook cannot • 
be shown w i t h o u t r e f e r r i n g t o the a t t i t u d e of the speaker 
and thus t h i s type o f onlook may not be understood by 
someone who does n o t share a c e r t a i n r a p p o r t w i t h t he 
speaker's p o i n t of view* What i s expressed i n the onlook 
i s the b e l i e f t h a t the way of behaving towards x i s the 
same as the way of behaving towards y Q 
When we use the formula "look on x as y, 1 1 we 
assume t h a t there i s an appropriate way of 
t h i n k i n g and behaving i n r e l a t i o n t o y, so 
t h a t we are committing ourselves t o a s i m i l a r 
way of behaving and t h i n k i n g i n r e l a t i o n t o x.,1 
An a n a l o g i c a l onlook, such as "My l i f e i s a p i l g r i m a g e 
toward heaven," i s a type o f non°literal onlook i n which 
the speaker claims t o f i n d s i m i l a r i t i e s between x and y 
wi t h o u t a c t u a l l y saying t h a t x i s l i t e r a l l y y„ There i s 
an "independent s i m i l a r i t y " which the speaker's l i f e and 
a p i l g r i m a g e toward heaven bear toward one another so 
t h a t i t would be odd f o r the speaker t o add a f t e r s t a t i n g 
t h i s onlook, "but i t r e a l l y i s n o t 0 " 2 I n a p a r a b o l i c 
onlook, of which many r e l i g i o u s onlooks are examples, 
1 I b l d e o p 0 1 3 1 o 2 I b i d O 0 p 0 1 3 2 0 
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the basis f o r the comparison may not be obvious at a l l 
since there i s no a b s t r a c t a b l e content by which the 
s i m i l a r i t y of x and y could be judged. Thus i n " I l o o k 
on Henry as a b r o t h e r , " Henry may bear no resemblance 
e i t h e r i n character or behaviour t o the speaker's b r o t h e r 
or t o any kind of a b r o t h e r a t a l l j . y e t the speaker makes 
the comparison i n a p a r a b o l i c way by reference t o h i s 
a t t i t u d e . I n a p a r a b o l i c onlook, the only s i m i l a r i t y 
which the speaker i s suggesting i s t h a t the f e e l i n g s and 
behaviour appropriate i n r e l a t i o n t o y are i n some way 
l i k e those appropriate i n r e l a t i o n t o x.^" The most t h a t 
i s s a i d by way of comparing x and y i s , "x i s such t h a t 
the a t t i t u d e a p p r o p r i a t e t o y i s s i m i l a r t o the a t t i t u d e 
a ppropriate t o x." 2 The speaker i n d i c a t e s h i s judgement 
t h a t Henry i_s a b r o t h e r to him but the only way i n which 
he can e x p l a i n what he means by t h i s i s t o make reference 
t o h i s a t t i t u d e s , t h a t i s , t o say t h a t the a t t i t u d e and 
behaviour one would have toward a r e a l brother i s the same 
as t h a t which the speaker has toward Henry. 
Evans i n d i c a t e s two ways i n which the n o t i o n of 
onlook can be u s e f u l f o r analysing the l o g i c of moral 
d e c i s i o n . There i s a tendency i n e x p l a i n i n g d e c i s i o n t o 
claim t h a t the judgement as t o the character of the sub° 
j e c t , x, can be conducted o b j e c t i v e l y and t h a t as a r e s u l t 
of t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n one can commit oneself t o a c e r t a i n 
behaviour toward x. This would represent d e c i s i o n as a 
1Ibid.„ p. 1 3 1 ° 2 o 2Ibid.„ p. 1 3 3 o 
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matter of d e s c r i b i n g x and then, as a r e s u l t of the 
d e s c r i p t i o n , choosing t o t r e a t i t a c e r t a i n way.. Thus 
a moral d e c i s i o n would l o o k l i k e t h i s i 
x and y are s i m i l a r i n having f e a t u r e s a, b, 
and c 0 I am f o r ( a g a i n s t ) whatever has 
f e a t u r e s , a, b, and c. Hence I am f o r 
( a g a i n s t ) x . 1 
Since the comparison of x and y i s , on t h i s model, taken 
as a p u r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e e n t e r p r i s e , so t h a t the state° 
ment "x i s l i k e y" i s a statement of f a c t , the v a l u e -
judgement bears no r e l a t i o n t o the comparison at a l l * 
Here, value appears as a f u n c t i o n of l i k e s or preferences 
and i n t h i s way i t s autonomy i s maintained. However, as 
Evans claims, 
This i s a d i s t o r t e d account, because the f i r s t 
premise i s o v e r l y - s i m p l i f i e d . x has f e a t u r e s 
s i m i l a r t o the f e a t u r e s a, b and c which y 
possesses; but the d e c i s i o n t h a t f e a t u r e s a, 
b and c are r e l e v a n t and t h a t there i s s u f f i -
c i e n t s i m i l a r i t y f o r me to "look on x as y" i s 
not e n t i r e l y independent of the d e c i s i o n t o 
"look on x as y." That i s , such judgements 
concerning relevance and s i m i l a r i t y depend i n 
p a r t on a Commissive or i n t e n t i o n a l element.2 
On the other hand, moral d e c i s i o n might be represented 
as having no v e r d i c t i v e element so t h a t one's i n t e n t i o n s 
bear no r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h one's judgements. A d e c i s i o n 
would be l i k e t h i s % 
I am f o r ( a g a i n s t ) x. 
I am also f o r ( a g a i n s t ) y even more d e f i n i t e l y 
and c l e a r l y . 
So I a l l e g e t h a t there are some s i m i l a r i t i e s 
between x and y . 3 
I b i d . , p. 1 3 6 . 
2 I b i c U , p. 1 3 7 , 
I b i d . 
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On t h i s account, the judgements of the moral agent are 
taken as a f u n c t i o n of h i s commitments and are thus 
"epiphenomenal," f o r what i s r e a l l y important i s only 
t h a t the judgement as to the s i m i l a r i t y of x and y lend 
support t o the commitments which the person already has. 
This account does n o t take s e r i o u s l y the speaker's attempt 
t o a r r i v e a t a f a i r and reasonable a p p r a i s a l of the 
subject and t h e r e f o r e does not consider t h a t the speaker 
i s i n f a c t c l a i m i n g something about the r e a l i t y of x and 
y. i t t h e r e f o r e also represents a d i s t o r t e d model of 
decision-making„ 
What i s c l e a r i n expressions of onlook i s t h a t 
n e i t h e r the v e r d i c t i v e nor the commissive element can 
be reduced one t o the other, f o r an onlook i s "a f u s i o n 
of a d e c i s i o n ^ t h a t « 0 <, w i t h a decision°to 0 0 „ „ For, 
i f I do d e l i b e r a t e concerning the f o r m u l a t i o n 
or acceptance of a t y p i c a l onlook, i t i s mis-
l e a d i n g t o d e p i c t the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of t h i s 
d e l i b e r a t i o n e i t h e r i n terms of a d e c i s i o n - t h a t 
and a decision°to which are completely indepen-
dent, or i n terms of a d e c i s i o n - t h a t which i s 
t o t a l l y dependent on a d e c i s i o n - t o T ^ 
The n o t i o n of p e r f o r m a t i v e ' f o r c e can thus help t o c l a r i f y 
the l o g i c of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of f a c t and value i n moral 
decision-making since the way i n which value i s autonomous 
can now be explained as f o l l o w s : 
The p a r t i c u l a r non-entailment which i s empha-
sized by the "autonomy of v a l u e " i s an instance 
of a more general f e a t u r e o f language s I f an 
utterance does not have pe r f o r m a t i v e f o r c e p i , 
2 I b i d , 
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I t does not e n t a i l an utterance which does 
have performative f o r c e P^0 Since a f l a t 
C o n s t ative, by d e f i n i t i o n , does not have 
Behabitive or Commissive f o r c e , i t cannot 
e n t a i l an utterance which does. That i s , 
i n o ther terminology, "No statement e n t a i l s 
a value~judgement„" The non^entailment which 
i s stressed by the "autonomy of value" depends 
on a d i f f e r e n c e i n performative f o r c e between 
two utterances p i 
Moral reasoning makes use of onlooks which do have per° 
fo r m a t i v e force« Therefore from i n d i c a t i v e sentences 
expressive of t h i s onlook, imperatives are l e g i t i m a t e l y 
derived f o r the f u t u r e behaviour o f the speaker since 
h i s i n t e n t i o n s and commitments are bound up i n the 
c l o s e s t way w i t h h i s b e l i e f s and judgements 0 
I r i s Murdoch has perhaps s t a t e d t h i s most c l e a r l y 
i n her essay on "Vis i o n and Choice i n M o r a l i t y , , " 2 The 
d o c t r i n e of the s t r i c t s eparation of f a c t and value has 
le d us to assume t h a t moral concepts are "commendations 
of n e u t r a l a r e a s 0 " What we should consider i s "the way 
i n which a moral ou t l o o k i s shown i n r a m i f i c a t i o n s of 
more s p e c i a l i z e d concepts which themselves determine a 
v i s i o n of the w o r l d 0 W A moral argument may proceed from 
s t a t i n g f a c t s t o re n d e r i n g value judgements? however, 
"such arguments take place w i t h i n a moral a t t i t u d e where, 
some sovereign concept decides the relevance of the f a c t s 
and may, indeed, render them observable." Thusj, 
1 I b i d 0 , p 0 59-60o 
There would, indeed, scarcely be an o b j e c t i o n 
t o saying t h a t there were "moral f a c t s i n the 
sense of moral i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of s i t u a t i o n s 
where the moral concept i n question determines 
what the s i t u a t i o n i s , and i f the concept i s 
withdrawn we are not l e f t w i t h the same s i t u a -
t i o n or the same f a c t s . I n s h o r t , i f moral 
concepts are regarded as deep moral configura= 
t i o n s of the wor l d , r a t h e r than as l i n e s drawn 
round separable f a c t u a l areas, then t h e r e w i l l 
be no f a c t s "behind them 1 1 f o r them t o be erron° 
eously defined i n terms o f . l 
I f a moral onlook represents the speaker's commitments 
and h i s judgement as t o the character of the w o r l d , then 
f a c t and value are n o t s t r i c t l y separable w i t h i n t h a t 
onlooko The freedom of the moral person i s thus not h i s 
"being able t o l i f t the concept off. the otherwise 
u n a l t e r e d f a c t s and l a y i t down elsewhere, but i n being 
able t o 'deepen' or 'reorganize' the concept or change i t 
f o r another o n e 0 1 , 2 This a n a l y s i s by no means cuts the 
moral agent o f f from the world of "brute f a c t s " nor does 
i t make him p e c u l i a r l y immune from "the way t h i n g s r e a l l y 
are." We cannot l e g i t i m a t e l y conclude from the statements, 
"No f l a t Constative e n t a i l s a value=judgement," t h a t 
t h e r e f o r e "No e x t e r n a l s t a t e o f a f f a i r s a f f e c t s a man's 
freedom i n malting a ( t r u l y ) moral d e c i s i o n . " Nor can we 
claim t h a t "A man ought n o t t o allow any e x t e r n a l s t a t e 
of a f f a i r s t o a f f e c t h i s freedom i n making a moral 
decisions"-^ What t h i s view does a l l o w f o r i s an i n t i m a t e 
I b i d „, p. 211 0^ The preceding quotes are a l l t o 
be found on t h i s page Q. 
2 I b i d e , p„ 2l£ 0 
^Evans, op. citOB p 0 Cf„ Murdoch's a n a l y s i s 
of the l o g i c a l and moral arguments i n v o l v e d i n the n o t i o n 
of the autonomy of value,, 0p o c i t f l , p„ 212°15<> 
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r e l a t i o n between a person's judgement as t o what i s the 
case and h i s commitment t o moral a c t i o n , a r e l a t i o n i n 
which a transcendent'may play a c r i t i c a l p a r t , and which 
the exposure of the " n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y " cannot 
destroyed 
Murdoch, op„ c i t O 0 p D 21$„ Cf 0 Evans, op 0 cit„ 
p o 6£°6 o 
CHAPTER V 
ONTOLOGICAL ETHICS 
Paul T i l l i c h i s a t h e o l o g i a n who has analysed 
m o r a l i t y both from w i t h i n and w i t h o u t the context o f the 
C h r i s t i a n f a i t h . As a C h r i s t i a n e t h i c i s t , he sets out 
the nature of m o r a l i t y w i t h i n a d o c t r i n a l system and 
attempts to show the dependence o f C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l 
demands upon systematic t h e o l o g i c a l c l a i m s A s one who 
i s concerned w i t h the nature o f m o r a l i t y i n ge n e r a l , 
T i l l i c h describes i n an o n t o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s the l o g i c 
o f e t h i c a l decisions as they derive from metaphysical 
statements regarding the nature of man's being and o f 
being°itselfo These d e s c r i p t i o n s are i n t e r e s t i n g f o r 
two reasons; f i r s t , because the r e l a t i o n s h i p which 
T i l l i c h devises between r e l i g i o u s a ssertions and onto= 
l o g i c a l statements i s i n d i c a t i v e of h i s unique contribu= 
t i o n t o the philosophy o f r e l i g i o n , and second, because 
the p h i l o s o p h i c a l e t h i c which he does develop i n d i c a t e s 
a d e f i n i t e r e l i a n c e upon r e l i g i o u s affirmations„ Our 
study o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p of i n d i c a t i v e and imp e r a t i v e 
i n T i l l i c h ' s thought w i l l centre around three primary 
^ T i l l i c h , Systematic Theology (the combined 
volume e d i t i o n o f James Nisbet & Co., Welwyn, Herts.,, 
1968), Vol- I , p„ 35fc» h e r e a f t e r abbreviated ST9 I , I I , 
or I I I o ~ ~ 
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areas o f concern. We w i l l need to describe i n the f i r s t 
place the confusion between r e l i g i o u s and o n t o l o g i c a l 
i n d i c a t i v e s which makes a study o f h i s e t h i c so d i f f i ~ 
c u l t . Secondly, we w i l l analyse the l o g i c of de c i s i o n 
both i n T i l l i c h ' s general understanding o f e t h i c s and 
i n h i s s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e o l o g i c a l e x p o s i t i o n . F i n a l l y we 
w i l l examine the transformism of T i l l i c h ' s e t h i c by which 
i t w i l l become c l e a r t h a t r e l i g i o u s a f f i r m a t i o n s which 
are not made e x p l i c i t i n h i s a n a l y s i s o f moral d e c i s i o n 
have i n f a c t been presupposed throughout and thus have a 
transforming e f f e c t upon the nature of the moral i n d i c a -
t i v e as T i l l i c h i n t e r p r e t s i t . 
The nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between ontology 
and the r e l i g i o n of the B i b l e i s the su b j e c t of T i l l i c h ' s 
l i t t l e book, B i b l i c a l R e l i g i o n and the Search f o r U l t i m a t e 
R e a l i t y , ^ and i t i s w i t h i n t h i s e x p o s i t i o n t h a t h i s 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l method f o r analysing r e l i g i o n and the 
r e l i g i o u s e t h i c becomes p l a i n . The p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f 
t h i s work i s t h a t b i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n and the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
study o f ontology do confront one another on the same 
l e v e l and are t h e r e f o r e i n danger o f c o n f l i c t i n g or even 
of becoming incompatible w i t h one another. I t i s 
^ B i b l i c a l R e l i g i o n and The Search f o r Ultimate 
R e a l i t y ( U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago, Chicago, 1955)» h e r e a f t e r 
abbreviated BRSUR. 
This must be balanced w i t h T i l l i c h ' s statement 
i n ST I , p, 30, t h a t a c o n f l i c t between theology and 
philosophy i s not necessary, "nor i s a synthesis between 
them p o s s i b l e . A c o n f l i c t presupposes a common basis on 
which t o f i g h t . But there i s no common basis between 
theology and philosophy." T i l l i c h seems t o mean by t h i s 
remark t h a t any c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f theology and philosophy 
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t h e r e f o r e h i s i n t e n t i o n to show t h a t "they have an u l t i -
mate u n i t y and a profound interdependence»Religion as 
both " d i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n and human r e c e p t i o n " and p h i l o s o -
phy as " t h a t c o g n i t i v e endeavour i n which the question o f 
being i s asked"^ face one another on the b a t t l e - f i e l d o f 
t r u t h but i t i s T i l l i c h ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t b o t h are r e a l l y 
f i g h t i n g on the same side f o r the same g o a l . ^ I n order 
to show t h i s T i l l i c h analyses t h a t aspect of human e x i s t -
ence which both i n s p i r e s p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y and a t the 
same time i n d i c a t e s a readiness f o r the r e c e p t i o n of 
r e l i g i o u s r e v e l a t i o n , namely "the search f o r u l t i m a t e 
r e a l i t y . " • 
T i l l i c h defines t h i s as the search f o r the " r e a l l y 
r e a l . " ~ 
The search f o r u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y beyond every-
t h i n g t h a t seems to be r e a l i s the search f o r 
b e i n g - i t s e l f , f o r the power o f being i n every-
t h i n g t h a t i s . I t i s the o n t o l o g i c a l question, 
the r o o t question of every p h i l o s o p h y 0 5 
I t i s t h i s quest f o r t h a t which l i e s beyond our f i n i t u d e 
and a l l o t h e r aspects o f the human predicament which 
f u r n i s h e s the e x i s t e n t i a l motive f o r the p u r s u i t of 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h . This motive i s a l o n g i n g " f o r a 
takes place w i t h i n one d i s c i p l i n e or the other, f o r there 
are no problems common to both about which each could have 
a c o n f l i c t i n g view, without e n t e r i n g the other's t e r r i -
t o r y . See comments by J. Heywood Thomas, Paul T i l l i c h s -
An Appraisal (SCM Press, London, 1963), p. I4J4.—5» 
• " • T i l l i c h , BRSUR, p 0 L 
2 I b i d . , p. 21, frlbld., p.10. Cf, ST I , p. 21* 
3 I b i d . , p„ 5 0 ^ I b i d . , p. 13-
form o f being t h a t p r e v a i l s against non-being i n our-
selves and i n our w o r l d " and thus i t i s most deeply a 
lo n g i n g f o r the power o f b e i n g . 1 This lo n g i n g T i l l i c h 
f i n d s t o be the u n d e r l y i n g theme o f many d i f f e r e n t 
types of philosophy. I n each T i l l i c h describes the 
involvement o f the philosopher's personal existence i n 
h i s task, an involvement i n which the philosopher commits 
h i m s e l f to the p r o j e c t of d i s c o v e r i n g the nature o f 
u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y and i n which he must always m a i n t a i n a 
c r i t i c a l and s c e p t i c a l a t t i t u d e toward the f i n d i n g s o f 
h i s search. i t i s t h i s s u b j e c t i v e aspect o f the p h i l o -
s o p h i c a l task which T i l l i c h c o r r e l a t e s w i t h the subjec-
t i v e meaning o f b i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n , a c o n f r o n t a t i o n which 
he claims " w i l l b r i n g us t o the p o i n t where the p o s i t i v e 
r e l a t i o n between b i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n and ontology comes t o 
l i g h t f o r the f i r s t time."3 p 0 r "the s i t u a t i o n o f man i n 
the s t a t e of asking f o r u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y " corresponds t o 
"the s i t u a t i o n of man i n the s t a t e of f a i t h " j they are 
r e l a t e d on the model o f question and answer.^ I t i s at 
t h i s p o i n t t h a t one already has the impression t h a t the 
p r o j e c t i s c o n t r i v e d by T i l l i c h , f o r the questions about 
u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y a r i s e from the human s i t u a t i o n i n which 
the l o n g i n g f o r the power o f being i s profoundly exper-
ienced, so t h a t the form of the answer i s predetermined 
1 I b i d j L , p. 1U. 
2 I b i d . , p. 19-20. k 
• I b i d . , p. i+3-
I b i d . 
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by t h i s search. 1 T i l l i c h ' s argument i s t h a t r e l i g i o u s 
r e v e l a t i o n can and indeed does provide the answer t o the 
problem o f man's existence so h i s a n a l y s i s of b i b l i c a l 
r e l i g i o n w i l l work towards a d e f i n i t i o n o f f a i t h which 
w i l l show t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n i n i t s simplest form. " F a i t h 
i s the s t a t e o f being grasped by an u l t i m a t e concern," 
a grasping which has the consequence o f a l l o w i n g man not 
only t o make the u l t i m a t e e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n w i t h regard t o 
h i s l i f e , namely t o determine h i s own d e s t i n y , but also 
to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a community i n which h i s s o c i a l nature 
w i l l be f u l f i l l e d . 2 Thus d e f i n e d , f a i t h i s shown as the 
f u l f i l l m e n t o f and the answer to the quest f o r u l t i m a t e 
r e a l i t y which characterises human existence» 
T i l l i c h concludes as a r e s u l t o f t h i s a n a l y s i s 
t h a t there i s a " s t r u c t u r a l i d e n t i t y " o f ontology and 
b i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n by which the elements of the p h i l o -
sopher's quest f o r u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y can be shown to be 
analogous to the elements of r e l i g i o u s f a i t h . Both are " 
d r i v e n by u l t i m a t e concern. Both r e q u i r e courage i n the 
face of non-being. Both i n v o l v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the 
concrete a c t u a l i s a t i o n of the power of being over non-being» 
Both depend upon t r u s t i n t h i s power of being.^ On the basis 
C f o Heywood Thomas, op. c i t . , i n which he 
expresses t h i s as a f e e l i n g " t h a t the argument moves 
in e x o r a b l y towards i t s predetermined concl u s i o n " (p. 30)„ 
2 T i l l i c h , BRSUR, p. $1* Cf. p. 1^-8» 
3 
Ibid.„ p„ 63-
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o f t h i 3 , T i l l i c h claims t h a t 
the u l t i m a t e concern about t r u t h which d r i v e s 
toward the search f o r u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y i s 
a p a r t of the u l t i m a t e concern about one's 
existence as a person, as a being who i s able 
to ask the question of h i s being and o f univer= 
s a l being. 
As a r e s u l t o f t h i s s u p e r f i c i a l i d e n t i t y T i l l i c h goes on 
t o say t h a t the o n t o l o g i c a l meaning of the b i b l i c a l f a i t h 
reveals i t to be the answer to the search f o r u l t i m a t e 
r e a l i t y , and, i n a l l three p o s s i b l e areas of c o n f l i c t 
between the s u b j e c t i v e side o f b i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n and 
ontology, f a i t h can be shown to encompass and p e r f e c t 
the passionate quest c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of each, u n i t i n g them 
i n t o one movement of the soul from the f i n i t e towards the 
i n f i n i t e . Ontology presupposes the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a 
r e v e l a t o r y experience i n which the eyes of the philosopher 
w i l l be opened; i t i s j u s t t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y which r e l i g i o u s 
conversion, experienced as "being grasped," encompasses 
and f u l f i l l s . Likewise the p h i l o s o p h i c a l e t h i c which i s 
chara c t e r i s e d by the p o l a r i t i e s o f freedom and d e s t i n y , 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n and obedience, e s s e n t i a l and e x i s t e n t i a l 
being, f i n d s these c o n f l i c t s resolved and transcended by 
the b i b l i c a l e t h i c o f grace and l o v e . ^ F i n a l l y the s o l i -
tude o f the philosopher d r i v e n by "eros" towards the t r u e 
and the good i s not denied but f u l f i l l e d by the r e l i g i o u s 
I b i d . , p. 6I4. (underlines mine)*, 
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experience o f agape i n which the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
" p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i t h u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y , or reunion w i t h 
b e i n g - i t s e l f " i s c r e a t e d . 1 i t i s at t h i s p o i n t already 
obvious t h a t there i s a great imbalance i n T i l l i c h ' s 
argument caused by.the hidden p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t the 
d i v i n e i s impinging upon the human i n b i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n 
i n a way which i t does not do i n philosophy, and i t i s 
t h i s which makes the c o r r e l a t i o n o f b i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n and 
ontology so d i f f i c u l t t o understand. I f T i l l i c h ' s p o i n t 
i s simply t h a t r e l i g i o u s a ssertions do contai n o n t o l o g i c a l 
ones, and t h a t one cannot discuss or resolve issues i n 
b i b l i c a l r e l i g i o n w i t h o u t t a k i n g ontology s e r i o u s l y , then 
the p o i n t i s w e l l taken. .What i s here being claimed, 
however, i s t h a t the two are able t o be c o r r e l a t e d , being 
resolved by simple equations. O n t o l o g i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n the ground o f being, p h i l o s o p h i c a l conversion i n which 
one i s "able t o see t r u e r e a l i t y , " and the l o n g i n g f o r 
t r u t h are a l l transformed i n the l i g h t of t h e i r r e l i g i o u s 
counterpart i n t o grace, f a i t h , and love (agape), a t r a n s -
f o r m a t i o n which i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because the r e a l d i f f e r -
ences between the two are made t o seem i n s i g n i f i c a n t and 
s u p e r f i c i a l . 
This correspondence of ontology and b i b l i c a l 
r e l i g i o n i s c a r r i e d f u r t h e r by T i l l i c h ' s d i scussion o f 
the o b j e c t of t h i s u l t i m a t e concern. The d e s c r i p t i o n 
of the o b j e c t i s again p r e f i g u r e d i n T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n 
o f the nature of the quest? i t i s obvious t h e r e f o r e t h a t 
I b i d . , p„ ?l=2o 
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the o b j e c t o f man's u n c o n d i t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i s u l t i m a t e 
r e a l i t y . The word " u l t i m a t e " i s w e l l chosen here f o r 
i t i s d e s c r i p t i v e both o f the s t r e n g t h of man's lo n g i n g 
f o r the power o f being or the ext e n t of h i s concern f o r 
h i s own existence as w e l l as o f the ob j e c t of man's 
searchp t h a t which w i l l s a t i s f y the l o n g i n g and resolve 
the problems of existence. Only t h a t which i s u l t i m a t e 
can be the su b j e c t o f our i n f i n i t e i n t e r e s t ? "only t h a t ' 
which i s the ground of our being and meaning should con-
cern us u l t i m a t e l y . " 1 The use of the word "should" here 
i l l u s t r a t e s one o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s pervading T i l l i c h ' s 
e t h i c ; f o r w h i l e i t appears t o have imperative f o r c e and 
T i l l i c h h i m s e l f wants t o give i t moral meaning, i t r e a l l y 
has meaning only as p a r t of the d e f i n i t i o n o f u l t i m a t e 
concern as t h a t which d r i v e s the quest f o r t h i s r e a l i t y 0 
What could be an imperative f o r r e l i g i o u s f a i t h derived 
from G.od's h o l i n e s s i s made here t o be p a r t of the 
d e f i n i t i o n of some aspect of human existence and thereby 
takes on the f o r c e of necessity,, T i l l i c h thus claims t o 
have moved from an understanding o f human existence, the 
most s i g n i f i c a n t aspect of which i s man's concern f o r 
u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y manifested i n b o t h r e l i g i o u s f a i t h and 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y , t o statements regarding the nature 
o f t h i s r e a l i t y which i s being sought 0 
This e x i s t e n t i a l grounding o f r e l i g i o u s claims, 
by which r e l i g i o u s i n d i c a t i v e s are shown t o be c o r r e l a t e d 
I b i d . , p, 51o 
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to i n d i c a t i v e s regarding human existence by d e f i n i t i o n , 
i s d r i v e n f u r t h e r by an anal y s i s o f the o n t o l o g i c a l 
meaning i m p l i c i t i n r e l i g i o u s claims, What b i b l i c a l 
r e l i g i o n r e a l l y says about God and what the various 
d o c t r i n e s of t h a t r e l i g i o n are intended t o symbolise i s 
t h a t God i s t h i s u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y , the ground o f our 
being and meaning, 1 Ontology, as "the word of being, the 
word which grasps being, makes i t s nature manifest, d r i v e s 
i t out of i t s hiddenness i n t o the l i g h t of knowledge," 2 
i s e s s e n t i a l t o these a f f i r m a t i o n s not only because i t i s 
presupposed by them but also because r e l i g i o u s symbols 
"demand" an o n t o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 3 then becomes 
T i l l i c h ' s t ask b o t h i n h i s e x p l i c a t i o n o f C h r i s t i a n 
d o c t r i n e s and i n h i s a n a l y s i s of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l impera° 
t i v e s t o b r i n g t h i s o n t o l o g i c a l meaning t o l i g h t 0 The 
c i r c l e i s thus completedj what begins from human experience 
as a passionate and s e l f - i n v o l v i n g quest f o r u l t i m a t e 
r e a l i t y now f i n d s i t s e l f resolved i n an o b j e c t whose nature 
and meaning i s p e r f e c t l y c o r r e l a t e d t o the presuppositions 
out o f which the quest arose„ Prom t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y 
a n a l y s i s o f T i l l i c h ' s methodology and presuppositions 
regarding the nature of r e l i g i o u s and o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t e -
ments, i t i s po s s i b l e t o foresee the two p a r a l l e l l i n e s 
o f thought which he w i l l take w i t h regard t o the charac= 
t e r i s a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y . On the one hand, he w i l l be 
1 
T i l l i c h , ST I , p, 2l*o 
2 T i l l i c h , BRSUR. p. 6 e 
I b i d . , p. 73„ 
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concerned t o a r t i c u l a t e the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f moral a c t i o n 
w i t h regard to human l i f e i n general and i n t h i s respect 
h i s a n a l y s i s can be seen as a new v e r s i o n of a n a t u r a l 
law e t h i c . . On the other hand, he w i l l argue f o r the 
i n c l u s i o n of C h r i s t i a n morals i n a whole scheme of 
d o c t r i n a l assertions which are not superfluous t o the 
nature o f t h a t m o r a l i t y and i n t h i s respect he develops 
an understanding of theonomous e t h i c s . Both these l i n e s 
of thought r e q u i r e c a r e f u l examinations 
T i l l i c h , as Midgley has argued, bases h i s e t h i c 
upon a r a t i o n a l understanding of the e s s e n t i a l nature of 
man's being which i s also considered the t e l o s o f man or 
the law of human n a t u r e . 1 i t i s the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f 
j u s t such a p o s s i b l e grounding f o r e t h i c s t h a t i n d i c a t e s 
T i l l i c h ' s r e j e c t i o n o f the tenets o f p o s i t i v i s t e t h i c s , 
c u l m i n a t i n g i n the e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i s m of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
p h i l o s o p h i e s . I n the f i r s t p l ace, T i l l i c h r e j e c t s the 
m i s t r u s t of metaphysics which stems from a fundamental 
scepticism regarding the a b i l i t y o f man t o transcend 
h i m s e l f and t o know the nature of any r e a l i t y other than 
the f i n i t e , e m p i r i c a l one o f which he i s a p a r t . T i l l i c h ' s 
e t h i c i s dependent i n i t s methodology and i t s conclusions 
upon the a b i l i t y o f man's reason t o know the character o f 
h i s own e s s e n t i a l nature and the s t r u c t u r e of r e a l i t y as 
a whole. This can be seen i n T i l l i c h ' s argument t h a t 
1 L . C, Midgley, Beyond Human Nature; The Contem-
porary Debate over Moral N a t u r a l Law (Brigham Young Uni-
v e r s x t y Press, Provo, Utah, 1968), p. 22. 
ontology i s inescapable f o r e t h i c s , t h a t the norms upon 
which e t h i c s i s founded must have o n t o l o g i c a l standing,, 
Whenever the o n t o l o g i c a l foundation of j u s t i c e 
was removed, and a p o s i t i v i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
o f law was t r i e d , no c r i t e r i a against a r b i t r a r y 
tyranny or u t i l i t a r i a n r e l a t i v i s m were l e f t . ^ 
A l l forms o f m o r a l i t y , according to T i l l i c h , must be 
dependent upon or presuppose an ontology! a p i c t u r e o f 
man and h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the world and w i t h h i s 
e s s e n t i a l being i s the basis upon which e t h i c a l impera~ 
t i v e s are founded, t o which they conform, and which they 
b r i n g t o f u l f i l l m e n t or r e a l i s a t i o n . The proper way t o 
begin the development of an e t h i c a l theory i s thus t o 
ask the primary q u e s t i o n ; "Where must we l o o k w i t h i n 
encountered r e a l i t y t o discover the source o f the 
ought°to°be i n being?" The answer t o t h i s q uestion can 
only be r e a l i s e d i n an ontology o f values by which T i l l i c h 
hopes t o prove t h a t man's e s s e n t i a l nature i s the only 
s u i t a b l e foundation f o r m o r a l i t y and i n which h i s meta° 
p h y s i c a l realism w i l l be demonstrated.-^ 
I n the second p l a c e , T i l l i c h does not see any 
v a l i d i t y i n the claim t h a t i t i s not pos s i b l e t o derive 
an "ought" from an " i s , " t h a t is., an e t h i c a l imperative 
•> 
• ' • T i l l i c h , Love, Power and J u s t i c e (Oxford Univer= 
s i t y Press, New York, 1960), p. 55=6. Hereafter abbre° 
v i a t e d LPJ. 
2 I b i d . , p. 72=7» See also T i l l i c h , M o r a l i t y and 
Beyond (Pontana L i b r a r y , London, 1969), Chapter 1 (her©= 
a f t e r abbreviated M&B), and T i l l i c h , " I s a Science o f 
Human Values Possible?", New Knowledge i n Human Values, 
A. H o Maslow (ed.) (Harper, New York, 1959). 
^Midgley, op. c l t . 8 p» 25f„ 
16U 
from a statement o f the nature o f r e a l i t y or of the 
essence of man. He takes h i s stand f i r m l y on the side 
of e t h i c a l n a t u r a l i s m by a s s e r t i n g t h a t an ana l y s i s of 
the e s s e n t i a l nature of man n e c e s s a r i l y e n t a i l s an 
understanding o f t h a t which i s demanded o f man, namely 
the fundamental e t h i c a l imperative.- Indeed the g r e a t e s t 
danger of the p o s i t i v i s m he was r e j e c t i n g was the 
r e s u l t a n t r e l a t i v i s m or even n i h i l i s m w i t h regard t o 
m o r a l i t y . 1 As opposed t o the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t a s s e r t i o n 
t h a t values are created and given v a l i d i t y by human choice, 
T i l l i c h intends t o show t h a t there are p r e - e x i s t i n g values 
and t h a t only these values can do j u s t i c e t o the c o n t i n -
gencies and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i m p l i c i t i n human existence. 
T i l l i c h i n s i s t s upon a basis i n ontology f o r the formu= 
l a t i o n of e t h i c a l norms and f o r the making o f moral 
decisions. Three questions are t h e r e f o r e primary i n h i s 
study and i l l u s t r a t e h i s r e j e c t i o n of p o s i t i v i s m and 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s m w i t h regard to the nature o f values "Are 
there any a b s o l u t e l y v a l i d values? How are they r e l a t e d 
t o r e a l i t y ? What i s t h e i r o n t o l o g i c a l standing?" I t i s 
here t h a t T i l l i c h ' s a n alysis o f human existence plays a 
c r u c i a l r o l e , f o r t h i s a n a l y s i s has convinced him t h a t no 
v a l i d e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s can be derived from existence i n 
i t s d i s t o r t e d and estranged state» He seems here t o be 
r e t a i n i n g the negative i n s i g h t s of e x i s t e n t i a l i s m regarding 
See Hans Jonas, "Gnostici sm and Modern N i h i l i s m 0 
S o c i a l Research, Vo l . 19, No. I4. (1952), p. U30-U52. 
it 
T i l l i c h , M&B, p 0 l8„ Cf. Midgley, op. c i t . , p 11 o 
the dehumanisation of l i f e , the a l i e n a t i o n and estrange-
ment of man from man and from the essence of human l i f e , 
i n order t o prove not only the n e c e s s i t y f o r but also the 
t r u t h of values founded i n o n t o l o g y . 1 The v e r i f i c a t i o n 
he would o f f e r f o r such an understanding o f m o r a l i t y 
would be.to say, as Midgley suggests, " i f l i f e i s mean= 
i n g f u l on the basis o f an understanding o f o n t o l o g i c a l 
concepts, then those concepts are true,," 
T i l l i c h develops t h i s o n t o l o g i c a l ground o f 
values i n h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of e x i s t e n t i a l and e s s e n t i a l 
being and i t i s here t h a t we begin t o see the i d e n t i t y 
of "ought" and " i s " i n h i s ethic„ One o f the concerns 
of T i l l i c h ' s Systematic Theology i s to analyse the nature 
of existence as man a c t u a l l y l i v e s i t and t o provide the 
s o l u t i o n t o the quest which c h a r a c t e r i s e s t h i s existence.) 
As existence i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by f i n i t u d e , s e l f = 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n , and ambiguity, so essence w i l l be 
described as t h a t which overcomes f i n i t u d e , resolves 
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n , and ascribes meaning, T i l l i c h o f f e r s 
as a p r e l i m i n a r y d e f i n i t i o n of essence, "the nature o f a 
t h i n g , " or "the q u a l i t y i n which a t h i n g p a r t i c i p a t e s , " 
or "a u n i v e r s a l , " but what i s more important t o h i s 
understanding o f m o r a l i t y i s t h a t essence i s " t h a t from 
which a being has ' f a l l e n , 1 the t r u e and u n d i s t o r t e d 
nature o f t h i n g s . "^ p 0 r by t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , what i j i 
"'"Midgley, op. cit„, p. 13. 
2 
I b i d » 9 p. 31• 
3 T i l l i c h , ST I , p. 22$. 
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e s s e n t i a l l y i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h what ought to be existen= 
t i a l l y o 
Man as he e x i s t s i s not what he e s s e n t i a l l y 
i s and ought t o be. He i s estranged from h i s 
t r u e being. The p r o f u n d i t y of the terra 
"estrangement" l i e s i n the i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t 
one belongs e s s e n t i a l l y t o t h a t from which 
one i s estranged.! 
Corresponding t o the. nature o f estranged, existence i s the 
t h r e e f o l d c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of man's essence. F i r s t l y , i t 
i s t h a t t o which man r e a l l y belongsj i t c o n s t i t u t e s the 
s t r u c t u r e o f h i s being and i s thus the innermost law o f 
hi s being. I n t h i s sense i t judges man and, though man 
i s a l i e n a t e d from h i s essence, he cannot escape t h i s 
judgement which stays w i t h him as the commanding law over 
against him. Secondly, essence i s t h a t which empowers 
man's existence, g i v i n g i t the power which comes w i t h 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n being. While existence i s chara c t e r i s e d 
by i t s powerlessness t o overcome separation and s e l f ~ 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n , essence i s p o t e n t i a l being which i s rooted 
i n the power o f b e i n g = i t s e l f , God. T h i r d l y , man's essence 
i s t h a t which would f u l f i l l h i s e x i s t e n t i a l s t r i v i n g f o r 
unambiguous l i f e and which would allow the a c t u a l i z a t i o n 
of h i s e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I n t h i s sense, essence 
i s the t e l o s o f human existence. 
M o r a l i t y thus a r i s e s out o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
man w i t h h i s essence and i t i s t h i s essence which defines -
the norms man i s t o obey and creates the co n d i t i o n s f o r 
the f u l f i l l m e n t o f them. 
1ST I I , p. 51=2. 
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This means t h a t f o r T i l l i c h there i s an objec° 
t i v e and absolute moral standard; b u t , as a 
f u r t h e r p o i n t , i t does not mean t h a t there i s 
an o b j e c t i v e set or system or moral laws, known 
to man, which man has the unchanging duty t o 
observe and apply.1 
I t i s f o r t h i s reason, namely t h a t the content of such 
systems i s " h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n d i t i o n e d , " t h a t T i l l i c h "seta 
aside the t r a d i t i o n a l conception of n a t u r a l law" i n 
favour of one which i s more person-centred. M o r a l i t y , 
f o r T i l l i c h , i s a matter of becoming a centred s e l f , t h a t 
i s , becoming a person. 
I n man complete centredness i s e s s e n t i a l l y g i v e n , 
but i t i s not a c t u a l l y given u n t i l man a c t u a l i z e s 
i t i n freedom and through d e s t i n y . The act i n 
which man a c t u a l i z e s h i s e s s e n t i a l centredness 
i s the moral a c t . M o r a l i t y i s the f u n c t i o n o f 
l i f e by which the realm of the s p i r i t comes i n t o 
being . . . A moral a c t , t h e r e f o r e , i s not an 
act i n which some d i v i n e or human law i s obeyed 
but an act i n which l i f e i n t e g r a t e s i t s e l f i n 
the dimension o f s p i r i t , and t h i s means as per=> 
s o n a l i t y w i t h i n a community. M o r a l i t y i s the 
f u n c t i o n of l i f e which the centred s e l f c o n s t i -
t u t e s i t s e l f as a person; i t i s the t o t a l i t y o f 
those acts i n which a p o t e n t i a l l y personal l i f e 
process becomes an a c t u a l person,2 
To be moral i s thus not simply t o obey an imperative but 
to be t r u e t o oneself; t o be immoral i s t o be i n v o l v e d i n 
falsehood and s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n . M o r a l i t y i s thus the 
l i n k between the t r u t h o f human essence experienced as 
the demand f o r s e l f - c o n s i s t e n c y and the power o f t h a t 
e s s e n t i a l being experienced as the demand f o r the s e l f t o 
be a c t u a l i s e d as a person. The knowledge o f t h i s 
N. H o G o Robinson, op. c i t , , p. 28£. Cf 0 
T i l l i c h , ST I I I , p. 49-50. 
2 T i l l i c h , ST I I I , p. 1+0. Cf. M&B, p. 12. 
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e s s e n t i a l being through ontology thus becomes the basis 
f o r the d e r i v a t i o n o f e t h i c a l imperatives which neces-
s a r i l y f o l l o w from these i n d i c a t i v e s o f man's own beingo 
With the basis o f m o r a l i t y thus i d e n t i f i e d w i t h 
man's essence, b o t h the autonomy and the u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y 
of morals can be maintained„ I n speaking of autonomy, 
T i l l i c h shares the concern o f Kant t h a t the c a t e g o r i c a l 
imperative be self-imposed and t h i s , f o r him, means not 
only t h a t the moral law i s known by reason but also t h a t 
i t i s the law o f man's own b e i n g T h e law of one's 
essence i s not experienced or known as an imperative 
placed upon man by an a l i e n or f o r e i g n power demanding 
h i s obedience! r a t h e r i t comes from w i t h i n man and belongs 
t o himo The same holds t r u e o f the u n c o n d i t i o n a l nature 
of the moral demand„ No e x i s t i n g t h i n g , no o b j e c t or f a c t 
which i s a l t o g e t h e r bedingt ( c o n d i t i o n e d ) , n o t h i n g belong-
i n g t o existence, could place an u l t i m a t e demand upon us, 
but only we ourselves commanding ourselves. I n t h i s way 
m o r a l i t y i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l i n the sense o f being of u l t i -
mate seriousness because i t i s the means o f s e l f - r e a l i s a -
t i o n ! " i t puts our e s s e n t i a l being as a demand against 
u S o ' ° Thus n o t h i n g other than man's e s s e n t i a l being could 
1 T i l l i c h , " I s a Science of Human Values Possible?" 
p. 195- This i s not t o speak of l o g i c a l autonomy, a sub--
j e c t t o be discussed later,, 
2 T i l l i c h , Theology of C u l t u r e , R„ Co K i m b a l l , ed 0 
(Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, New York, 196i|), p« 136» Here-
a f t e r abbreviated as TC„ 
I b i d , 
place a demand upon him which r e q u i r e s h i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l 
obedience and n o t h i n g else could be of u l t i m a t e s i g n i f i -
cance t o man's existence., 
The law i s not strange t o man. I t i s n a t u r a l 
law. I t represents h i s t r u e nature from which 
he i s estranged. Every v a l i d e t h i c a l command-
ment i s an expression o f man's e s s e n t i a l rela° 
t i o n t o h i m s e l f , to others and t o the univ e r s e . 
This alone makes i t o b l i g a t o r y and i t s d e n i a l 
s e l f " d e s t r u c t i v e . This alone accounts f o r the 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l form of the moral imperative . . „ 
Yet t h i s understanding of the u n c o n d i t i o n a l demand has a 
h i n t of i n e v i t a b i l i t y about i t , and thus i t i s robbed of 
i t s p a r t i c u l a r l y moral character. T i l l i c h asserts t h a t 
man's a b i l i t y t o act resp o n s i b l y i n h i s existence also 
"enables him t o act against the moral demand. He can 
surrender t o the d i s i n t e g r a t i n g forces which tend t o 
c o n t r o l the personal centre and t o destroy i t s u n i t y . 
However, one wonders whether such s e l f ^ c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s 
r e a l l y p o s s i b l e given the d e f i n i t i o n o f the uncondition= 
a l i t y o f t h i s demand, f o r "the s i l e n t voice o f our own 
being . . . denies us the r i g h t t o s e l f " d e s t r u c t i o n . 
T i l l i c h s t a t e s h i s v e r s i o n of a n a t u r a l law e t h i c 
i n such a way t h a t m o r a l i t y appears t o be completely 
independent o f r e l i g i o u s claims. The fundamental moral 
"ought" arises from the nature of man's essence as t h a t 
to which he belongs, from which he i s estranged, and 
which empowers h i s existence i n the w o r l d . Thus, " i t i s 
1LPJ, p. 76=7. Ibid.„ p. 17. 
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because the law i s o f one's essence t h a t i t i s impera-
t i v e , and o o . i t i s i n i t s imperativeness t h a t i t s 
e s s e n t i a l i t y i s experienced„1,1 Such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
of the moral "ought" w i t h i t s o n t o l o g i c a l ground makes 
i t d i f f i c u l t t o understand how r e l i g i o u s i n d i c a t i v e s 
could be r e l a t e d t o moral imperatives at a l l except i n 
a s u p e r f i c i a l way. However, T i l l i c h does not leave the 
matter here; he i s concerned to develop an understanding 
of the theonomous character o f m o r a l i t y i n which the 
fundamental relatedness of r e l i g i o u s i n d i c a t i v e s and 
moral imperatives can be demonstrated„ His method f o r 
doing so i s , as we a n t i c i p a t e d e a r l i e r , t o make the 
o n t o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of the moral imperative synonymous 
w i t h the o n t o l o g i c a l meaning of r e l i g i o u s claimso Thus 
God's r e v e l a t i o n o f h i m s e l f throughout the B i b l e and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n C h r i s t as the New Being can be expressed 
i n r e l i g i o u s i n d i c a t i v e s , the r e a l meaning of which i s t o 
say- something about man's existence i n the w o r l d , h i s 
estrangement from h i s essence, and h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
B e i n g - i t s e l f o This r e d u c t i o n o f the meaning of r e l i g i o u s 
claims, w h i l e i t supports T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r e s t i n main-
t a i n i n g the autonomy of a m o r a l i t y derived from r e l i g i o n 
i n the Kantian sense, nevertheless becomes problematic 
since T i l l i c h does not r e a l l y come to terms w i t h the f u l l 
meaning of the claims which are most necessary t o support 
George A. Lindbeck, "Natural Law i n the Thought 
of Paul T i l l i c h , " N a t u r a l Law Forum, Vol . 7 (1962), p e 86 s 
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h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y . These two problems, the 
nature o f a theonomous m o r a l i t y and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
r e l i g i o u s i n d i c a t i v e s , need t o be examined c a r e f u l l y 
before we can evaluate T i l l i c h ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f the l o g i c 
of d e c i s i o n i n r e l i g i o u s m o r a l i t y . 
T i l l i c h ' s . f o r m u l a t i o n of theonomous m o r a l i t y i s 
an attempt t o avoid the dangers and inadequacies which he 
sees i m p l i c i t i n autonomous and heteronomous m o r a l i t y and 
to resolve the d i f f i c u l t i e s accompanying these a l t e r n a ~ 
t i v e accounts. For T i l l i c h , autonomy could mean three 
d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s , only one of which need be maintained i n 
a theonoraous account of m o r a l i t y . F i r s t l y , T i l l i c h claims 
t h a t the p o s i t i v i s t and e x i s t e n t i a l i s t understandings o f 
m o r a l i t y r e s t upon a n o t i o n of the autonomy of values and 
the freedom o f each i n d i v i d u a l w i t h regard t o such values 
which T i l l i c h r e j e c t s as having dangerous and unavoidable 
consequences. Any attempt t o "make e t h i c s independent of 
ontology" leads t o t o t a l e t h i c a l r e l a t i v i s m i n which the 
v a l i d i t y o f moral values becomes a problem f o r which there 
i s no adequate s o l u t i o n . The attempt to claim t h a t there 
i s no moral law standing over against man's existence 
which b o t h compels and empowers h i s obedience t o i t i s 
untenable| i t represents our r e f u s a l t o recognise the 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l demand which alone can resolve and b r i n g 
t o f u l f i l l m e n t the dilemmas and ambiguities described by 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s . This appears t o be f o r the most p a r t a 
moral r a t h e r than a l o g i c a l argument against t h i s v e r s i o n 
of the autonomy of m o r a l i t y . The second n o t i o n o f 
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autonomy which i s not t o be r e j e c t e d by but r a t h e r sub~ 
3umed under a theonomous m o r a l i t y i s what T i l l i c h c a l l s 
the "autonomy o f e t h i c a l research,," 1 This seems t o be 
the attempt t o conduct an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the nature 
of values which i s f r e e from any dependence upon a 
p a r t i c u l a r t r a d i t i o n or any s p e c i f i c c u l t u r a l and h i s t o r -
i c a l content given t o m o r a l i t y . However, as T i l l i c h 
argues, 
„ o o t h i s argument disregards the f a c t t h a t 
even the seemingly autonomous research i n 
philosophy i n general and e t h i c s i n p a r t i c u l a r 
i s dependent on a t r a d i t i o n which expresses an 
u l t i m a t e concern, a t l e a s t i n d i r e c t l y and 
unconsciously. Autonomous e t h i c s can be autono° 
tnous only w i t h respect t o s c h o l a r l y method, not 
w i t h respect t o i t s r e l i g i o u s substance,^ 
T i l l i c h seems here t o argue t h a t the p h i l o s o p h i c a l method, 
which he appears t o assume i s an o b j e c t i v e , impersonal 
d e s c r i p t i o n not u n l i k e a s c i e n t i f i c method, cannot f i n d 
the r e s o l u t i o n to the u l t i m a t e concern which motivates i t s 
search i n such a d i s i n t e r e s t e d d e s c r i p t i o n of m o r a l i t y . 
This claim would o f course o n l y hold t r u e given t h a t 
T i l l i c h ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of the p r o j e c t of philosophy i s 
t r u e and t h a t indeed every such p h i l o s o p h i c a l attempt has 
a r e l i g i o u s substance i m p l i c i t w i t h i n i t , ^ The t h i r d 
sense o f autonomy which T i l l i c h uses as the ba s i s f o r 
^ • T i l l i c h , ST I I I , p, 285„ 
2 
I b i d , ; u n derlines mine D 
I t appears, however, i n t h i s case, as i n o t h e r s , 
t h a t t h i s i s an u n f a l s i f i a b l e claim,, 
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theonomous e t h i c s derives from the d e f i n i t i o n of the 
word, autos nomos, the inner law.'*" 
T i l l i c h ' s argument against heteronomous e t h i c s 
i s t h a t i t makes moral decisions subject t o the laws or 
norms or w i l l of a power a l i e n t o man* Not only i s 
heteronomy u n s a t i s f a c t o r y because the fundamental moral 
law must be self-imposed, i t i s also incapable of pro° 
v i d i n g an adequate reason or m o t i v a t i o n f o r obedience t o 
i t o I f m o t i v a t i o n f o r the making o f moral decisions i s 
a f u n c t i o n e i t h e r o f an u l t i m a t e concern or o f the p r o j e c t 
of the person t o become a centred s e l f , then only some° 
t h i n g l i k e "the i n n e r law of one's being" can f u l f i l l t h a t 
m o t i v a t i o n or be i t s adequate o b j e c t . Any attempt t h e r e -
f o r e t o formulate a r e l i g i o u s e t h i c i n which a person i s 
made su b j e c t t o the w i l l of God e x t e r n a l t o h i s own human 
nature i s an instance of such i m p o s i t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of heteronomous e t h i c s . Presumably t h i s i s als o the 
reason f o r T i l l i c h ' s polemic against " t h e o l o g i c a l e t h i c s " 
as a d i s c i p l i n e which i s attem p t i n g t o determine the 
nature o f m o r a l i t y from w i t h o u t o r p r e j u d i c e a reasoned 
i n q u i r y i n t o the moral law on the basis o f a p a r t i c u l a r , 
h i s t o r i c a l content given t o t h a t law.^ The p r e s u p p o s i t i o n 
of t h i s a t t a c k on a r e l i g i o u s , heteronomous e t h i c reveals 
again the way i n which T i l l i c h t r e a t s the meaning o f 
r e l i g i o u s i n d i c a t i v e s . Not a l l those who cla i m t h a t 
"""See above, p.l68-9o 3ST I I I , p. 281^ =5. 
2TC, p. 136. 
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m o r a l i t y i s a matter of obedience t o the w i l l o f God 
would claim t h a t God i s a stranger t o human existence 
nor t h a t h i s w i l l i s a l i e n . On the other hand, one 
need n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have t o say t h a t God i s n o t a 
stranger nor h i s w i l l a l i e n because t h i s w i l l i s 
i d e n t i f i a b l e w i t h the law o f our own e s s e n t i a l b e i n g . 1 
For T i l l i c h , however, t h i s choice i s clears e i t h e r one 
accepts t h a t the w i l l of God i^s the law o f our e s s e n t i a l 
being or one adopts the view t h a t God's law i s f o r e i g n 
to us and t h e r e f o r e cannot i n a meaningful way command 
our obedience.^ 
T i l l i c h considers the inadequacies o f autonomy 
and heteronomy great enough t o develop a new under° 
standing o f m o r a l i t y as theonomous and i t i s t h i s which 
he attempts t o describe i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l terms i n 
M o r a l i t y and Beyond. Here he demonstrates what he c a l l s 
the r e l i g i o u s dimension, source, and element i n m o r a l i t y . 
R e l i g i o n i s defined as "the self-transcendence of the 
s p i r i t toward what i s u l t i m a t e and unconditioned i n 
being and meaning," and m o r a l i t y , which i s obedience t o 
the u n c o n d i t i o n a l moral i m p e r a t i v e , "gives u l t i m a t e 
seriousness . . . t o r e l i g i o n . " 3 As a c o r r e l a t e t o the 
seriousness which m o r a l i t y gives t o the r e l i g i o u s quest, 
T i l l i c h defines the r e l i g i o u s dimension o f m o r a l i t y as 
1 
Cf. Paul Ramsey, Nine Modern M o r a l i s t s ( P r e n t i c e -
H a l l , Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey, 1962), p. 18I4.0 
2LPJ, p„ 760 
3M&B . p. 9~10„ 
p r e c i s e l y " i t s u n c o n d i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r . " Since uncon-
d i t i o n a l l y i s "the awareness of our belonging t o a 
dimension t h a t transcends our own f i n i t e freedom," both 
r e l i g i o n and m o r a l i t y are c o n s t i t u t e d by the same aspect 
of human existence, namely the transcendence o f a person 
toward t h a t which i s u l t i m a t e . M o r a l i t y i s thus r e l i g i o u s 
i n so f a r as i t i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by t h i s quest f o r an 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l demand beyond f i n i t e e xistence. R e l i g i o n -
i s not only present i n the nature o f the p r o j e c t of 
m o r a l i t y , i t i s also present i n i t s s o l u t i o n . The 
appropriate u n c o n d i t i o n a l demand f o r an autonomous 
m o r a l i t y i s , as we have already seen, " t h a t man become 
a c t u a l l y what he i s e s s e n t i a l l y , a person w i t h i n a com-
munity of persons.-" 3 Thus formulated, t h i s demand can 
only a r i s e from a r e l i g i o u s source, a source which i s 
i t s e l f transcendent or u l t i m a t e , which i s absolute or 
unconditioned and which a l s o empowers a person's obed-
ience t o i t . This r e l i g i o u s source, T i l l i c h claims i s 
agape. I t i s agape which "transcends the f i n i t e p o s s i -
b i l i t i e s o f man" and which includes w i t h i n i t s e l f the 
demands o f j u s t i c e t h a t each person be acknowledged as 
a person.^ Thus i t i s agjip_e_ alone which can provide the 
content i n terms o f s p e c i f i c moral imperatives by which 
the u n c o n d i t i o n a l moral demand can be f u l f i l l e d . The 
r e l i g i o u s element i n m o r a l i t y i s also c o n s t i t u t e d by the 
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r e l i g i o u s source, a£ap_e_, f o r i t can provide the motiva-
t i o n needed f o r moral obedience by c r e a t i n g the condi<= 
t i o n s f o r i t s own f u l f i l l m e n t . Since the u n c o n d i t i o n a l 
demand t o become a c t u a l l y what we are e s s e n t i a l l y 
"presupposes the c o n t r a s t between our e s s e n t i a l and our 
a c t u a l b e i n g , " i t alone does not have the power which 
can move us t o be obedient t o i t , namely grace. 1 Grace 
i s c o n s t i t u t e d both by an o b j e c t i v e aspect, since i t 
creates "a s t a t e of reunion i n which the cleavage between 
our t r u e and our a c t u a l being i s f r a g m e n t a r i l y overcome, 
and the r u l e o f the commanding law i s broken," and a 
s u b j e c t i v e aspect which i s our "acceptance o f the message 
t h a t we are accepted." The r e l i g i o u s element i n m o r a l i t y 
thus " f u l f i l l s what the moral imperative demands" and 
f u r t h e r motivates the a c t u a l i s a t i o n of our t r u e selves 
i n e x i stence. 
One cannot f a i l t o be impressed again by the ease 
w i t h which T i l l i c h c o r r e l a t e s r e l i g i o n and m o r a l i t y on 
the basis of d e f i n i t i o n s . Our d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i s , however, 
not only w i t h the c i r c u l a r i t y of the argument but w i t h the 
r e a l ambiguity which i s introduced by t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of 
theonomous m o r a l i t y . F i r s t l y one wonders whether there i s 
any d i f f e r e n c e i n content between theonomous and autonomous 
m o r a l i t y . I s autonomous m o r a l i t y as obedience t o the i n n e r 
law o f one's essence i m p l i c i t l y theonomous or does the 
theonomous character of m o r a l i t y make a s i g n i f i c a n t 
I b i d . , p. kk~5° 2 I b i d . , p. 58, 49o 
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d i f f e r e n c e t o i t ? The p r e c i s e d i s t i n c t i o n between 
theonotny and autonomy may be more apparent than r e a l . 
On the other hand, however, T i l l i c h has so defi n e d 
autonomous m o r a l i t y t h a t i t simply cannot be r e a l i s e d 
w i t h o u t a r e l i g i o u s source and motivation,, The r e l i g i o u s 
n o t i o n of agapj^ i s by d e f i n i t i o n t h a t which compensates 
f o r the inadequacies of autonomous m o r a l i t y and i t i s 
t h i s maneouvre which seems t o make theonomous m o r a l i t y 
p o s s i b l e at a l l . I s m o r a l i t y thus dependent by d e f i n i t i o n 
upon r e l i g i o n and unable t o be "united w i t h i t s own depth" 
w i t h o u t agape? 1 I f t h i s i s the case, then i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t we need a f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n of the basis upon 
which such a claim f o r agape and f o r theonomous m o r a l i t y 
i s being made. T i l l i c h claims; 
I n a theonomous s i t u a t i o n reason a c t u a l i z e s 
i t s e l f i n obedience t o i t s s t r u c t u r a l law and 
i n the power of i t s own i n e x h a u s t i b l e ground„ 
Since God (theos) i s the law (nomos) f o r b o t h 
the s t r u c t u r e and the ground of reason, they 
are u n i t e d i n him, and t h e i r u n i t y i s manifest 
i n a theonomous s i t u a t i o n . 2 
Theonomy t h e r e f o r e represents the h i g h e s t u n i t y t o be 
achieved i n the e s s e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f being, thus 
r e q u i r i n g t h a t both autonomy and heteronomy be resolved 
i n the a c t u a l i s a t i o n o f theonomy. 
1ST I , p„ 9U< 
3 
That t h i s process i s somewhat s i m i l a r t o a 
d i a l e c t i c has been suggested by Midgley, "Paul T i l l i c h 8 s 
New Science of Values," Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 
V o l . 15, No. 2 (1962), p. 250. 
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I n the Systematic Theology, T i l l i c h claims t h a t 
" a c t u a l theonomy i s autonomous e t h i c s under the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence." 1 I t i s by the d e s c r i p t i o n of such a "presence" 
t h a t T i l l i c h hopes t o show the relevance of s p e c i f i c a l l y 
C h r i s t i a n claims f o r m o r a l i t y and to strengthen h i s argu-
ment f o r the grounding of moral imperatives i n the 
s t r u c t u r e of e s s e n t i a l being. The s p i r i t , T i l l i c h c l a ims, 
i s a dimension of l i f e i n which man experiences "the u n i t y 
of power and meaning i n h i m s e l f " and by which he i s able 
t o understand the D i v i n e S p i r i t which appropriates and 
p 
transcends h i s own. Likewise, man's s p i r i t i s i t s e l f a 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the Divine S p i r i t experienced by man as 
a dimension of l i f e which i s u l t i m a t e . 3 The character of 
t h i s S p i r i t u a l Presence i s i t s e c s t a t i c q u a l i t y exper-
ienced as a "meaning-bearing power" i n which man p a r t i c i -
pates and which he can a c t u a l i s e i n h i s own c r e a t i v i t y . ^ 
The two " c r e a t i v e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s " of t h i s Presence are 
f a i t h and l o v e , both of which derive from the "transcendent 
u n i o n " experienced by man as a reunion o f h i s e x i s t e n t i a l 
and e s s e n t i a l being. I n h i s d e f i n i t i o n s of f a i t h and l o v e , 
T i l l i c h succumbs t o the c i r c u l a r i t y we f i r s t examined i n 
B i b l i c a l R e l i g i o n and the Search f o r U l t i m a t e R e a l i t y , 
and here again the outcome i s e q u a l l y u n s a t i s f y i n g . 
F a i t h i s known and experienced by man before the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence as the s t r i v i n g f o r a l i f e beyond the ambiguities 
3 I b l d . , p. 120-21. 
* * I b i d . , p. 122, 121+, 127a 
ST I I I , p. 285. 
2 I b i d . , p. 118. 
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o f t h i s existence and can thus also be c a l l e d " u l t i m a t e 
concern." However, since t h i s s t r i v i n g i s a f u n c t i o n o f 
man's s p i r i t and since h i s s p i r i t i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of 
the D i v i n e S p i r i t , f a i t h cannot f i n d f u l f i l l m e n t except " 
as man i s grasped or opened up by the S p i r i t u a l Presence, 
F a i t h thus i s "the s t a t e of being grasped by the tran° 
scendent u n i t y o f unambiguous l i f e " which then invades the 
c o n f l i c t s , c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , and ambiguities o f existence 
a l l o w i n g man t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h a t which i s unambiguous.^ 
Likewise love can be found " i n a l l the f u n c t i o n s of the 
mind" and has "roots i n the innermost core o f l i f e i t s e l f . 
As such, love i s bot h a d r i v e o f l i f e i t s e l f manifested 
as the human s t r i v i n g f o r r e u n i t i n g t h a t which i s separ-
ated and "an i m p o s s i b i l i t y f o r the human s p i r i t by i t s e l f . 
I t i s f a i t h which "embodies love as the s t a t e of being 
taken i n t o t h a t transcendent u n i t y " and thus the S p i r i t u a l 
Presence br i n g s about the u n i t y of being which f u l f i l l s 
the s t r i v i n g s o f human'emotion, w i l l and i n t e l l e c t . At -
t h i s p o i n t T i l l i c h claims 
i n r e l a t i o n t o God the d i s t i n c t i o n between f a i t h 
and love disappears. Being grasped by God i n 
f a i t h and adhering t o him i n love i s one and the 
same s t a t e of c r e a t u r e l y l i f e . I t i s participa° 
t i o n i n the transcendent u n i t y o f unambiguous 
l i f e . 2 
The question which must now be considered i s whether the 
content o f a l l r e l i g i o u s claims w i l l i n the same way be 
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o statements about man h i m s e l f and whether 
1 I b i d . , p. 137, 1U2. 2 I b i d . , p. 11*7. 
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such a t r a n s l a t i o n can do j u s t i c e e i t h e r t o the o b j e c t i v e 
content o f these claims or t o t h e i r moral implications,, 
I n The Courage t o Be, T i l l i c h attempts t o describe 
the character of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and man i n 
terms o f man's experience o f courage. 1 Courage i 3 defined 
as an a t t i t u d e of s e l f - a f f i r m a t i o n i n s p i t e of the t h r e a t 
of non-being and, since i t i s being alone which can and 
does overcome non-being, courage re q u i r e s by d e f i n i t i o n . 
an o n t o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n . I t i s t h i s very f o u n d a t i o n , 
however, which deprives the n o t i o n o f any e t h i c a l conno-
t a t i o n i t might have f o r courage becomes the m a n i f e s t a t i o n 
i n man of the overcoming of non-being on the l e v e l o f 
e s s e n t i a l being. Courage i s thus a necessary p a r t o f 
human existence i n so f a r as t h a t existence i s already 
i n d i c a t i v e o f the overcoming of non-being. However, 
T i l l i c h wants t o make courage more than t h i s i n t h a t i t 
i s also defined as an a t t i t u d e which overcomes a l l forms 
of a n x i e t y and despair. These forms o f non-being are the 
ones which t h r e a t e n the very h e a r t and depth o f man's 
exist e n c e , the most d i f f i c u l t being the a n x i e t y o f meaning 
lessness and emptiness t h r e a t e n i n g man's s p i r i t u a l s e l f = 
a f f i r m a t i o n . - * I t i s the experience o f t h i s a n x i e t y which 
^Pontana L i b r a r y o f Theology and Philosophy 
( C o l l i n s , London, 19&9)I h e r e a f t e r abbreviated CTB. 
2 
How p r e c i s e l y the c r e a t i o n of man can serve 
b o t h as an overcoming of non-being and as the a c t u a l i -
s a t i o n of f u r t h e r s e p a r a t i o n , since there are now many 
e x i s t i n g beings, i s a very d i f f i c u l t issue t o understand 
i n T i l l i c h ' s thought. 
3 T i l l i c h , CTB, p e l69-173<> 
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T i l l i c h describes as the boundary of the human s i t u a t i o n 
and i t i s j u s t here that man can experience or be grasped 
by absolute f a i t h , , 1 At t h i s point the courage to be 
becomes "an expression of f a i t h and what ' f a i t h 1 means 
must be understood through the courage to be,. 
Yet T i l l i c h also claims that t h i s f a i t h and 
courage are revelatory and give us some in s i g h t i n t o the 
character of God. "The courage to be i n i t s r a d i c a l form 
i s a key to an idea of God which transcends both mysticism 
arid the person~to=person encounter."3 However, i t i s 
curious that here where we might expect to f i n d some clue 
i n t o the nature of God, we are not t o l d anything other 
than what we already know, namely that courage "shows us 
the nature of being, i t shows that the s e l f ~ a f f i r m a t i o n 
of being i s an a f f i r m a t i o n that overcomes negation,, n^ 
Through deeper penetration i n t o the many symbols used to 
speak about God, T i l l i c h removes them one by one as 
obstacles to the true God who i s "God above God," and i n 
experiencing absolute f a i t h we discover th a t no r e l i g i o u s 
affirmations about God can be made at alio Absolute 
f a i t h i s "the accepting of the acceptance without somebody 
"'"Ibid., p. l 8 3 o 
2 I b i d o , p, 1 6 7 o Cf. p. 1 6 6 , 1 8 2 , i n which f a i t h -
and courage are synonymous w i t h one another, and p„ 1 7 1 * 1 7 6 , i n which f a i t h i s considered to be the cause of 
courageo 
3 I b i d 0 , p„ 1 7 3 o 
^ I b i d * 
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or something that accepts,"*'* and thus i t requires the 
"God above God" to provide i t w i t h the necessary power 
of being to overcome the radical doubt which i t must 
face. As T i l l i c h describes i t ; 
I t i s simply f a i t h , undirected, absolute. I t 
i s undefinable, since everything defined i s 
dissolved by doubt and meaninglessness. Never° 
theless, even absolute f a i t h i s not an eruption 
of subjective emotions or a mood without objec~ 
t i v e foundations.^ 
I t s o b j e c t i v i t y i s provided by the power of being by 
which a person i s grasped, which he can d i r e c t l y exper° 
ience, and which he can then only symbolise a f t e r i t s 
apprehension. 
T i l l i c h does claim to be concerned about the 
charge that r e l i g i o u s symbols or assertions are merely 
an " i l l u s i o n a r y support of or a destructive interference 
w i t h autonomous morals."3 Yet i t i s precisely because 
he continuously attempts to go behind r e l i g i o u s assertions 
to f i n d t h e i r ontological meaning or ground that he seems 
to beg t h i s question altogether,. Religious claims are 
made to f i t a pre-existing scheme i n which assertions 
regarding the actions of God and those regarding man's 
condition or atti t u d e s are defined i n terms of each other <> 
Any s i g n i f i c a n t difference that the one set of assertions 
•^Ibid., p e 1 7 9 . Cf. J. Heywood Thomas, op., c i t . 9 p. 6 6 ° 7 » where he analyses the nature of T i l l i c h ' s d i s -
cussion of God i n CTB and shows the emptiness of T i l l i c h ' s 
claims regarding t h i s "God above God„" 
2 I b i d . , p„ 1 7 1 e 
3ST I I I , p 0 l 6 9 o 
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might make to the other i s thus excluded a p r i o r i . This 
can be i l l u s t r a t e d by reference to those assertions 
which the Christian would claim are the most s i g n i f i c a n t 
i n terms of the moral l i f e he i s to lead, namely claims" 
about the Incarnation. I n the h i s t o r i c a l existence of 
the man, Jesus, T i l l i c h finds'the presence of the New 
Being. I t i s t h i s which man i n his estranged and power-* 
less existence has been seeking i n order to f u l f i l l the 
demand placed upon him that he f u l f i l l what he i s i n 
essence. The incarnation i s thus the necessary, though 
paradoxical, c o r r e l a t i v e to man's search f o r the power 
of being. 
I f there were no personal l i f e i n which exis-
t e n t i a l estrangement had been overcome, the 
New Being would have remained a quest and an 
expectation and would not be a r e a l i t y i n time 
and space. Only i f the existence i s conquered 
i n one point°=a personal l i f e , representing 
existence as a whole--is i t conquered i n prin= 
c i p l e , which means " i n beginning and i n power."1 
I t i s therefore the r e s u l t of the incarnation that an 
i n d i v i d u a l i s able to overcome the estrangement i n hia 
own l i f e and his relationships w i t h others. 
T i l l i c h claims that there i s an objective and a 
subjective side to t h i s salvation available i n Christ; 
i t i s both a divine action and a human response. The 
action of God means that a new state of being has been 
created which i s to be found i n the person of Christ and -
which i s universal i n so f a r as i t i s a p o s s i b i l i t y i n 
ST I I , p. 1 1 3 = 1 1 * . 
0 
1 8 U 
which any person can p a r t i c i p a t e . The New Being means 
the presence of power to man, a "healing" power which i s 
able to overcome estrangement i n man's existence.. I n 
the description of the objective action of God i n the 
bringing of salvation and the atoning a c t i v i t y , however, 
T i l l i c h understands these actions both i n terms of t h e i r 
ontological meaning and i n terms of the eff e c t s which 
they have upon human existence<, With regard to salvation 
T i l l i c h claims, 
I t corresponds to the state of estrangement as 
the main ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of existence. I n t h i s 
sense, healing means r e u n i t i n g that which i s 
estranged, giving a centre to what i s s p l i t , 
overcoming the s p l i t between God and man, man 
and h i s world, man and himself. 1 
Likewise w i t h reference to the atonement, T i l l i c h relates 
language about God's action to language about man's 
existence by claiming that the former can be understood as 
the cause of some change of a f f a i r s i n the l a t t e r . Thus! 
The doctrine of atonement i s the description 
of the e f f e c t of the New Being i n Jesus as"the 
Christ on those who are grasped by i t i n t h e i r 
state of estrangement. This d e f i n i t i o n points 
to the two sides of the process of atonement, 
to that i n the manifestation of the New Being 
which has an atoning e f f e c t and to that which 
happens to man under the atoning effect„2 . 
I t i s j u s t such a t r a n s l a t i o n of the objective element i n 
the atonement as the creation of an e f f e c t which ia 
actualised or made e f f e c t i v e "only i f man reacts and 
1 I b i d . , p„ 1 9 2 c 
2 
I b i d . , p. 1 9 7 J underlines mine 0 
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accepts the removal of g u i l t , " which i s suspicious,, As 
Heywood Thomas suggests, 
. o c i t must be emphasised that the doctrine 
of Atonement i s not capable of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
as a description of cer t a i n psychological pro~ 
cesses . , . however the f i r s t statement i s to 
be interpreted i t must always be a statement 
about God and so i s not a description of a 
state of a f f a i r s capable of exhaustive empirical 
v e r i f i c a t i o n . I n so f a r as the doctrine of 
Atonement makes reference to God at a l l i t i s a 
description of transcendent actions and so 
incapable of reduction to any set of statements 
which contain merely empirical language.1 
The r e s u l t of t h i s t r a n s l a t i o n i s , however, that 
T i l l i c h can now move w i t h apparent ease between r e l i g i o u s 
assertions and t h e i r e t h i c a l implications. What i s neces= 
sary f o r the Chris t i a n moral l i f e i s that union w i t h God 
be re-established by p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h i s New Being and 
i t i s t h i s power from which e t h i c a l actions w i l l f l o w 0 
"Only a New Being can produce a new action," T i l l i c h 
claims, and i t i s because the r i g h t conditions are now 
produced i n man's existence that man can perform e f f e c t i v e 
moral action w i t h i n the world and i n r e l a t i o n to his 
fe l l o w men. The i n s i g h t Christians have gained which 
goes beyond autonomous morality i s that we are not to seek 
our own salvation f o r t h i s leads to "hard t o i l and t r a g i c 
f a i l u r e . " 2 Thus the only r e l i g i o u s i n d i c a t i v e which i s of 
J. Heywood Thomas, op. c i t . , p. 109. Cf. C. B o 
Martin, T i l l i c h ' s Doctrine of Man (Nisbet, Welwyn, Herts„s 1966), p. l7t5-9." Martin raises a si m i l a r issue w i t h 
regard to the proclamation "Jesus i s the Chr i s t . " Do we 
say t h i s because Jesus has transforming power over us as 
we come to know him and i s the meaning of our proclamation 
that he effec t s such a change i n our existence? 
2ST I I , p„ 9 2 . 
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any consequence to morality i s that the New Being which 
overcomes the e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement a l l people face 
but cannot conquer alone i s now available i n Christ 
through our p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the S p i r i t u a l Presence . 
This i n i t s e l f does not y i e l d any moral imperatives f o r 
man's action but presupposes an appraisal of human 
existence i n which value judgements have already been 
made. What ought to be happening i n human l i f e i s known 
by an in v e s t i g a t i o n of man's nature; e x i s t e n t i a l 
estrangement ought to be overcome; man should be reunited 
v/ith that from which he i s separatedj man should become 
what i n essence he r e a l l y i s . Martin has claimed that 
f o r t h i s reason the r e l i g i o u s i n d i c a t i v e becomes funda= 
mentally unnecessary. 
Those uncommitted to the Christian r e v e l a t i o n 
as T i l l i c h defines i t might f i n d equal saving 
power i n the contemplation of the l i f e and 
death of a Socrates, a Rabbi Akiba, or a 
Mahatma Gandhi=~to mention only a few. 1 
Would T i l l i c h be w i l l i n g t o say that the power to f u l f i l l 
the moral law can be found i n other great h i s t o r i c a l 
figures and that wherever i t i s found i t has equal 
v a l i d i t y w i t h that found i n Christ? 
I t would seem that he intends to maintain the 
uniqueness of Christ and that t h i s i s done by f i n d i n g 
the ontological meaning of Jesus' words, deeds, and 
s u f f e r i n g , a meaning which i s not to be found i n other 
persons who have spoken, acted, or suffered. T i l l i c h 
^Martin, op. c i t . , p. 179. 
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finds three expressions of the New Being i n Jesus and 
off e r s his understanding of the e t h i c a l significance of 
each expression. The f i r s t expression i s to be found i n 
the words of Jesus, his preaching and teaching. Some 
might claim that the significance of Jesus f o r e t h i c a l 
action i s that his teachings can be interpreted as 
"doctrinal and e t h i c a l laws" to which the Christian 
affirms his obedience. T i l l i c h claims, however, that 
t h i s i s a l e g a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Jesus, the r e s u l t 
of which w i l l be a form of s e l f - s a l v a t i o n i n which the 
Christian i s bound to do exactly what Jesus t o l d people 
to do. We must, however, look not to the content of 
Jesus' words but rather to t h e i r power, a power which 
they have because "he i s himself the Word or "the f i n a l 
self-manifestation of God to humanity." 1 The reasoning 
behind such a claim on T i l l i c h ' s part i s apparently t h a t , 
since .Jesus i s himself "more than a l l the words he has 
spoken,' any attempt to consider him as simply a r e l i g -
ious and moral teacher i s to make him i n t o another person.. 
However, i t i s surely not the case that a l l those who 
would take the teachings of Jesus as a source f o r moral 
imperatives intend to or actually do separate what he 
said from who he was, f o r i t i s precisely because of his 
unique person that h is words are taken seriously. I t i s 
therefore not clear that T i l l i c h ' s a l t e r n a t i v e i s the 
•"•ST I I , p. 139-11*0. 
2 
I b i d . , p. II4O1 underlines mine. I s t h i s not an 
empty assertion? 
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only available one to legalism. According to T i l l i c h , 
Jesus' words "have the power to create the New Being"j 
Christians are obedient to those words as they allow 
themselves to be grasped by t h i s power. I n t h i s way 
Jesus' words are "transformed i n t o r e a l i t y . " ^ 
Another view of e t h i c a l action i n response to 
Jesus might emphasize the second expression of the New 
Being, namely Jesus' deeds, and would claim that 
Christians are called to fo l l o w Jesus' example. This 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Christian ethics would centre on the 
demand to imitate Christ or to make one's l i f e " i nto a 
copy of the l i f e of Jesus." 2 Again, T i l l i c h makes his 
point by placing his opponent i n a f a l s e l y extreme posi-
t i o n and he has bought his v i c t o r y at the price of i n s i g -
nificance. I m i t a t i o C h r i s t ! must not contradict the 
"meaning" of Jesus' t r a i t s which i s precisely to show 
that he i s the New Being J the only adequate understanding 
of i m i t a t i o n i s , f o r T i l l i c h , "that we, i n our -concrete-
ness, are asked to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the New Being and to be 
transformed by i t , not beyond, but w i t h i n , the contin-
gencies of our l i f e . " 3 Any form of i m i t a t i o n therefore 
which becomes "a new law" i s l i k e w i s e inappropriate to 
Christian e t h i c a l action. F i n a l l y , the t h i r d expression 
of the New Being, namely Jesus' s u f f e r i n g , also has an 
•""Ibid. 3 I b i d . 
2 
I b i d . , p. 1I+1. 
189 
ontological meaning. Suffering i s necessary i f separa= 
t i o n i s to be overcome and man must p a r t i c i p a t e i n the 
power brought by t h i s suffering i n order to be reunited 
w i t h his essence. 
Only by taking suf f e r i n g and death upon him-
s e l f could Jesus be the Christ, because only 
i n t h i s way could he p a r t i c i p a t e completely 
i n existence and conquer every force of 
estrangement which t r i e d to dissolve h is 
u n i t y w i t h God.l 
Here T i l l i c h i s concerned to argue w i t h those who would 
separate Jesus' s a c r i f i c i a l death as "the opus superero-
gatorium which makes i t possible f o r God to overcome the 
c o n f l i c t between his love and his wrath." This view does 
not emphasize what f o r T i l l i c h i s the fundamental s i g n i f i -
cance of Jesus' person of which the necessary consequence 
i s his s u f f e r i n g and death, namely that he i s "the 
appearance of the eternal God°Manhood under the conditions 
of existence" and as such causes the New Being to be 
present i n power to men. 
T i l l i c h ' s attempt to maintain the uniqueness of 
Christ and to claim that i n his person as the New Being 
alone i s the source of power f o r the moral l i f e has 
resulted i n making clear precisely those r e l i g i o u s con-
v i c t i o n s which do have a transforming e f f e c t upon the 
whole of his e t h i c , including i t s foundation upon 
I b i d . 
2 I b i d . , p a l l j . 2 . T i l l i c h i s here discussing 
Anseltm 
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ontological assertions, and i t xd.ll be best to close 
w i t h an analysis of t h i s transformism p a r t i c u l a r l y as 
i t i s seen i n his work, Love, Power and Justice. As 
Paul Ramsey suggests i n his essay on T i l l i c h , the whole 
of T i l l i c h ' s ontological analysis i s carried out "within 
a parenthesis f i r s t drawn by Christology." i f t h i s i s 
so then there must be at the heart of T i l l i c h ' s under-
standing of ethics an i n d i c a t i v e which cannot be and i s 
not translated i n t o statements which are by d e f i n i t i o n 
true of our existence nor which can be reduced to sta t e -
ments about man himself. Ramsey i s not unaware of the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n undertaking such a search f o r "the 
Christian concepts he [ T i l l i c h ] employs have i n f a c t 
themselves already suffered transformation by the general 
philosophical insights of a p a r t i c u l a r school. The 
monism which T i l l i c h attempts to develop creates serious 
problems f o r the Christian understanding of the God and 
man relationship since, i n T i l l i c h ' s explanation of love 
as the estranged seeking reunion, one can see " i n the 
shadows the i d e a l i s t i c Absolute going through the 
undulations of separation or estrangement from i t s e l f 
and then r e j o i n i n g i t s e l f . " ^ Yet Ramsey maintains that 
i n at least two respects T i l l i c h ' s p r i o r understanding 
of the nature of the divine-human rel a t i o n s h i p derives 
1 Ramsey, op. c i t . a p. 183. 
2 I b i d . o p. iQk" 
3 I b i d . 
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from tho b i b l i c a l understanding and these presuppositions 
transform his ontological speculations.. 
The f i r s t area i n which t h i s can be seen i s 
T i l l i c h ' s notion of agape which "'cuts i n t o ' the other -
q u a l i t i e s of love to p u r i f y and elevate them."1 The 
descriptions of j u s t i c e and power which T i l l i c h o ffers 
both point and indeed drive forward towards agapeg each 
description i s thus affected by T i l l i c h ' s conviction that 
j u s t i c e and power must, i n the end, r e l y upon the trans-
forming power of love to be f u l f i l l e d as j u s t i c e and power. 
Ramsey does not wish to claim a f t e r t h i s observation that 
T i l l i c h attempts to deduce e t h i c a l imperatives from a 
general p r i n c i p l e of love which i s known or believed 
beforehand. Indeed T i l l i c h himself rej e c t s "the theory 
that love adds some s p e c i f i c contents to natural j u s t i c e " 
or even that love transcends j u s t i c e "by i t s a d d i t i o n a l 
information about the contents of the moral l i f e . " 3 
Rather, the transformation which Ramsey has i n mind i s 
that i n which 
love "gives another dimension" to p r a c t i c a l 
reason or to natural j u s t i c e , and i t i s from 
the determinate meaning and q u a l i t y of t h i s 
other 'dimension" that there flows the trans-
forming power of love upon j u s t i c e which 
produces creative j u s t i c e , and the ra d i c a l 
conversion even of the most dynamic propor-
t i o n a l j u s t i c e and i t s r e d i r e c t i o n as an act 
of self-surrender changing the proportions.U 
When we look closely at the analysis of creative j u s t i c e 
1 I b i d . , p. 186. 3 l b i d 0 
2 o k 
I b i d . , p. l 8 ? o I b i d . , p. 191e 
which T i l l i c h proposes, f o r example, i t i s possible to 
see that love has affected the nature of that j u s t i c e . 
I t i s love that "recognizes what j u s t i c e demands", namely 
l i s t e n i n g , giving and f o r g i v i n g . 1 I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
the q u a l i t i e s of gi v i n g and f o r g i v i n g that love has 
created a new dimension to j u s t i c e which i s not i n t r i n s i c 
to j u s t i c e i t s e l f , yet i s c r u c i a l to the f u l f i l l m e n t of 
that j u s t i c e . Again w i t h regard to proportional j u s t i c e , 
love demands a type of self-surrender not i n t r i n s i c to 
that j u s t i c e but which love alone r e q u i r e s . 2 Indeed 
T i l l i c h ' s description of the d i f f e r e n t forms of love i s 
also founded upon his conviction that love converts love, 
"transforming and r e d i r e c t i n g i t " tovjards agape or 
"covenant love. " 3 - Ajjapjs " p u r i f i e s " or "elevates" the 
other types of love (eros, p h i l i a , l i b i d o ) so that i t i s 
possible f o r a l l of them to e x i s t i n u n i t y together.,^ 
Yet, as Ramsey argues, t h i s agapei simply cannot be assimi 
l a t e d again "to the general notion of love as an inherent 
nisus of the soul toward reunion of the separated," f o r 
the claim that each i n d i v i d u a l should become reunited 
w i t h the u n i t y to which he belongs i s already a claim 
based upon f o r g i v i n g love expressed by T i l l i c h as the 
acceptance of the unacceptable. This demand f o r reunion 
1LPJ, p. 8 l | - 6 o 
^ I b i d . , p. 8 3 . 
3 
Ramsey, op. c i t . , p e 1 0 0 o 
^LPJ, p. 1 1 6 = 1 1 9 . 
Ramsey, op. c i t . , , p e 1 9 3 * 
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i s thus not a "natural" claim upon man but a demand of 
love-transformed-justice. I t i s love alone which can 
require "that t h i s claim be accepted and that he be 
accepted who i s unacceptable i n terms of proportional 
j u s t i c e o " 1 • 
A s i m i l a r transformation occurs i n T i l l i c h ' s 
discussion of morality as a function of the s p i r i t . The 
moral imperative, T i l l i c h claims, i s f i r s t known or 
experienced i n "the person-to-person encounter" and i t i s 
i n t h i s encounter that the unconditional v a l i d i t y of t h i s 
imperative i s recognised. 2 I s t h i s not again a b i b l i c a l 
notion of love as personal r e l a t i o n establishing i t s e l f 
r i g h t at the heart of morality i t s e l f ? What before was 
an unconditionally v a l i d moral imperative experienced as 
"our essential being over against our state of e x i s t e n t i a l 
estrangement" now turns out to be i n f a c t the claim of 
another person "to be a person and to be dealt with as a 
person.' 0 Indeed, that a whole community of persons 
should be involved i n the reunion of the s e l f w i t h i t s 
essence i s surely the claim made by ajgape and not the 
discovery of an ontological analysis. I t i s w i t h the 
understanding of love as agape that T i l l i c h can then 
claim that " l i f e has love i n i t s e l f as one of i t s 
1LPJ, p. 86. 
2 
ST i n , p. ij.3, hl° 
3 
I b i d . , p. 43. Cf. our discussion e a r l i e r of 
the moral imperative as described i n M&B. 
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c o n s t i t u t i v e elements." Prom t h i 3 conviction alone can 
T i l l i c h "lay down as the basic formula of love something 
which, so f a r from commanding instant assent, requires 
his whole philosophy of being f o r the a r t i c u l a t i o n of 
i t s very meaning, namely, 'Being taking Non=Being i n t o 
i t s e l f . ' " As love i s at the beginning of our awareness 
of the moral imperative, so i t also creates the f u l f i l l -
ment of these demands i n the end, f o r i t i s the S p i r i t 
which "elevates the person i n t o the transcendent u n i t y 
of the divine l i f e and i n so doing i t reunites the 
estranged existence of the person w i t h his essence." 3 
There i s another r e l i g i o u s conviction with which 
T i l l i c h analyses the nature of love, power, and j u s t i c e , 
however, and t h i s has to do w i t h his eschatological 
v i s i o n of the Kingdom of God. T i l l i c h ' s understanding of 
t h i s divine u n i t y i n which God and man w i l l be reunited 
and which w i l l be achieved i n the future kingdom has 
also transformed his analysis of human existence i t s e l f . -
For he affirms that not only are love, power and j u s t i c e 
one i n the divine ground, "they s h a l l become one i n human 
existence."** What has transformed T i l l i c h ' s understanding 
of these q u a l i t i e s and atti t u d e s i n human existence i s his 
1LPJ, p. 26. 
o 
Robinson, op. c i t . , p. 289. The i n t e r n a l quote 
i s from LPJ, p. l;9. 
3ST I I I , p. 290. 
k 
LPJ, p. 1 0 8 . 
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understanding of t h e i r divine nature which w i l l be made 
manifest i n the holy community.'1' Indeed, the transfor= 
mation i s so complete, Ramsey suggests, that he i s moved 
to wonder "whether what we have here i s not actually a 
phenomenology of the kingdom of God and of his C h r i s t . " 2 
The future i s viewed by T i l l i c h as a time of universal 
f u l f i l l m e n t i n which God's redemptive power w i l l overcome 
f u l l y the power of non-being. I t i s f u l f i l l m e n t w i t h i n 
t h i s divine and universal f u l f i l l m e n t which constitutes 
the ultimate claim of j u s t i c e , a claim which i t i s the 
duty of love-transformed-justice (that i s , creative 
j u s t i c e ) to bring about. 3 i n f a c t , God himself i s one 
who deals i n creative j u s t i c e and does not bind himself 
to proportional j u s t i c e f o r the sake of bringing to 
f u l f i l l m e n t the l i v e s of those who might be excluded 
according to natural j u s t i c e . ^ A neutral description 
of human existence, or even of the structure of r e a l i t y 
as a whole, cannot of i t s e l f bear t h i s conclusion 
regarding the future because the natural tendency of the 
creation, indicated by the notion of natu r a l j u s t i c e , i 3 
f r e e l y altered by God himself and by others who exercise 
t h i s love-transformed-justice. This a l t e r a t i o n or trans-
formation, T i l l i c h affirms i n hope, w i l l lead to the 
1 I b i d L , p. 110, 111, 116. 
Ramsey, op. c i t . , p. 186, 
3LPJ, p. 61|=£0 
^IMd., p. 66. 
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f u l f i l l m e n t of human existence, a f u l f i l l m e n t which can 
now only be "a fragmentary a n t i c i p a t i o n " of the f u t u r e , 
but which i s e f f e c t i v e now i n the loving actions of the 
s p i r i t u a l community.1 T i l l i c h ' s r e v i s i o n of natural law 
ethics, which we suggested before, i s thus that he 
i d e n t i f i e s "the telos of love, the overcoming of separa-
t i o n , with the telos of the fundamental dynamism of 
being." I t i s then possible to claim that " A l l natural" 
laws can then be subsumed under the law of love." As 
Robinson has argued, "rigorism, a new naturalism, and 
something l i k e possession by the divine S p i r i t a l l hang 
together w i t h i n the texture of T i l l i c h ' s thought" and 
form the basis of his ethic of agape, expressed i n 
imperatives to reunite that which i s separated.3 
I b i d . , p. 121;. 
Lindbeck, op. c i t . , p. 89• 
Robinson, op. c i t . , p. 289. 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPERATIVE ETHICS 
I t w i l l be i n s t r u c t i v e at t h i s p o i n t t o con-
sid e r the work of Etnil Brunner as another example of 
t h e o r e t i c a l C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s . Brunner's approach i s 
i n t e r e s t i n g i n c o n t r a s t to t h a t o f T i l l i c h , not the 
l e a s t because he gives a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t account o f 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y w i t h n a t u r a l or 
autonomous m o r a l i t y . His c r i t i c i s m s o f moral philosophy 
and i n p a r t i c u l a r h i s a t t a c k against Kant have r a i s e d a 
good deal of discu s s i o n regarding both the relevance o f 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems and the nature 
o f r e l i g i o u s epistemology. I t w i l l be u s e f u l f o r us t o 
begin .therefore w i t h Brunner's dis c u s s i o n of moral 
philosophy since i t f u r n i s h e s the background f o r h i s 
own development of the nature of C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y . 
These problems are faced again i n the development o f 
h i s a c t u a l p o s i t i o n on the nature o f C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , 
f o r i n the e x p o s i t i o n of h i s "theology o f c r i s i s " 
Brunner makes as s e r t i o n s which are themselves problematic 
f o r the philosopher and which make the anal y s i s of 
e t h i c s i n the C h r i s t i a n context even more problematic. 
As f a r as poss i b l e i n analysing Brunner's e x p o s i t i o n , 
we w i l l t r y t o view i t from the i n s i d e and w i l l use the 
n o t i o n of s e l f - i n v o l v i n g language bo t h t o come t o terms 
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w i t h h i s e t h i c on i t s own ground and t o i n d i c a t e i t s 
possible relevance f o r the p h i l o s o p h i c a l study of e t h i c s . 
F i n a l l y , a c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n of the l o g i c of d e c i s i o n 
i n Brunner's thought, p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h reference t o the 
challenge of the n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y , w i l l be appro° 
p r i a t e and w i l l make use of some p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c i s m s 
of h i s p o s i t i o n . 
Imperative by attempting t o show the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and 
l i m i t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n e s t a b l i s h i n g an autonomous and 
completely r a t i o n a l system of ethics."'" The fundamental 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n what Brunner c a l l s " r a t i o n a l e t h i c s " i s 
t o be found i n the two d i f f e r e n t views of the r e l a t i o n 
between " i s " and "ought" represented by two major types 
of e t h i c a l t h e o r y , n a t u r a l i s m and i d e a l i s m . Naturalism, 
Brunner claims, "consists o f the more or less l o g i c a l 
attempt t o e x p l a i n the moral l i f e from n a t u r a l f a c t s , or 
t o base ' m o r a l i t y ' t h a t i s , the ' r i g h t ' life-=mpon such 
f a c t s . " Because t h i s e t h i c i s based upon a concept of 
the good l i f e , a d e s c r i p t i o n of the value t o be found i n 
3 
l i f e i t s e l f , Brunner also c a l l e d i t eudaimonism. 
Idealism on the o t h e r hand i s founded upon a moral law 
"'"Transl. Olive Wyon ( L u t t e r w o r t h , London, 191+2) i 
h e r e a f t e r abbreviated D. I . 
Brunner begins h i s analysis of The Divine 
I b i d . , p. 3b» 
Brunner, God and Man; Four Essays on the Nature 
t r a n s l . D. Cairns (SGM Press, London o f P e r s o n a l i t r y , 
1936), p. 72=6; h e r e a f t e r abbreviated G&M. 
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which i s independent of t h i s world or l i f e i t s e l f and 
which appears t o man as a " c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e " 
demanding h i s obedience. The l o g i c a l danger of i d e n t i -
f y i n g the "ought" of m o r a l i t y w i t h the " i s " o f n a t u r a l 
l i f e or value i s thereby avoided by the i d e a l i s t emphasis 
on "duty f o r duty's sake" and by the m a i n t a i n i n g o f the 
autonomy of the moral i m p e r a t i v e . However, Brunner f i n d s 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n both systems o f e t h i c s . N aturalism, he 
claims, "does not give any fou n d a t i o n f o r a genuine 
o b l i g a t i o n " and id e a l i s m cannot " b r i n g i t s e t h i c a l law 
of reason i n t o touch w i t h the m a t e r i a l r e a l i t i e s of the 
world of a c t i o n . " ^ The former system i d e n t i f i e s what i s 
w i t h what ought t o be w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t the sense of 
o b l i g a t i o n i s l o s t ; the l a t t e r separates the two so 
r a d i c a l l y t h a t any r e l a t i o n s h i p between them becomes 
problematic. Brunner suggests t h a t t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
can also be considered as the a n t i t h e s i s o f the immanence 
or transcendence o f "ought," an a n t i t h e s i s which again .. 
leads r a t i o n a l e t h i c s i n t o unavoidable c o n f l i c t s and 
which, f o r Brunner, can only be'surpassed by the C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c . I f the "ought" i s made completely immanent then 
e s s e n t i a l l y no "ought" i s l e f t ; i f i t i s made transcendent 
then e i t h e r man cannot know i t or h i s reason i s capable o f 
f o r m u l a t i n g t h i s "ought" i n which case i t s transcendence 
i s l o s t . 
1 I b i d . , p. 73. Cf. D. I . , p. 3U-52S 
2 
D. I . , p. 45=7o 
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Since Brunner judged i d e a l i s m t o be the most 
hopeful p h i l o s o p h i c a l attempt to create a r e a l a l t e r n a -
t i v e t o n a t u r a l i s m , though Kant d i d go too f a r i n h i s 
separation of " i s " and "ought," and since, i n some 
respects, Brunner sees h i s own e x p o s i t i o n of the Chris= 
t i a n e t h i c as motivated by some o f the same concerns, we 
should examine c r i t i c a l l y h i s a n a l y s i s o f the Kantian 
system."'" The importance of Kant's f o r m u l a t i o n of e t h i c s , 
according t o Brunner, i s t h a t he u n i t e s two of the 
notions by which the moral good can be determined, 
namely "the i d e a " and "law. Kant does attempt t o do 
j u s t i c e both t o the autonomy of the moral good and t o 
man's consciousness of a "thou s h a l t " d i r e c t e d t o h i s 
existence,, Brunner c a l l s t h i s i d e a l i s m since the cate = 
g o r i c a l imperative t o which man owes obedience i s 
"ex a c t l y the same as the Idea of the Good" and i n t h i s 
way both i t s autonomy and i t s r e l a t i o n to man are 
3 
expressed. However, as Brunner w i l l attempt t o argue, -
the c o n t r a d i c t i o n between " i s " and "ought," and thereby 
also the a n t i t h e s i s between an immanent or a transcendent 
"ought," i s deepened to such an extent i n Kantian e t h i c s 
^"In choosing Kant as h i s r e a l opponent i n the 
d e s c r i p t i o n of e t h i c s , Brunner "shows t r u e discernment„ " 
H. D o Lewis, Morals and the New Theology ( V i c t o r Gol-
lancz, L t d . , London, 19lt7), p., 32. 
2 
Brunner f i n d s three such concepts i n moral 
philosophy upon which i t s f o r m u l a t i o n of m o r a l i t y i s 
foundeds value, the idea, and law. Revelation and 
Reason, t r a n s l . O live Wyon (SCM Press, London, 19V?), 
p. 324J h e r e a f t e r abbreviated as R&R0 
JT>o I . , p„ 39o 
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t h a t no r e s o l u t i o n of the d i f f i c u l t y i s pos s i b l e on 
Kant's own terms. Brunner suggests two major reasons 
f o r t h i s . I n the f i r s t place, Brunner i n t e r p r e t s Kant 
as a d u a l i s t i n h i s view of the world and of the s e l f 
and t h i s i s a dualism which i s e s s e n t i a l t o Kant's 
understanding of autonomy i n morals. I n the second 
place, Brunner b e l i e v e s Kant's e t h i c t o be a p u r e l y 
formal one i n which no content can be given t o the 
c a t e g o r i c a l imperative which bears a s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n ^ 
ship t o the form of the law. I n both cases, Brunner f i n d s 
the. s e paration of " i s " and "ought" so r a d i c a l t h a t another 
f o r m u l a t i o n of e t h i c s a l t o g e t h e r i s necessary; i t i s t h i s 
which Brunner w i l l o f f e r i n h i s account o f C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c s . 
Brunner claims t o f i n d dualism i n the Kantian 
e t h i c , p a r t i c u l a r l y as a r e s u l t o f Kant's arguments f o r 
the autonomy of m o r a l i t y , and he i s concerned t o i n d i c a t e 
h i s disagreement w i t h the fundamental presuppositions 
under which t h i s autonomy i s developed. H. D. Lewis has 
suggested three such arguments f o r autonomy i n Kant. The 
f i r s t argument i s Kant's attempt t o e s t a b l i s h the autonomy 
of the moral law i t s e l f . 
[ i t ] i s not to be derived i n any way from a 
n a t u r a l impulse or tendency . . . Nor i s the 
content o f o b l i g a t i o n t o be derived from an 
ana l y s i s o f any p a r t i c u l a r r e a c t i o n of our 
own.J-
Lewis, op. c i t . , p. 33« This i s a claim of Kant's 
which Lewis agrees w i t h , f i n d i n g t h a t i t "can be i d e n t i f i e d ^ 
i n e s s e n t i a l s , w i t h the claim we have made f o r e t h i c a l 
o b j e c t i v i t y . " 
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Brunner recognises t h i s as a l e g i t i m a t e attempt to base 
m o r a l i t y i n t h a t which transcends the n a t u r a l and i s 
t h e r e f o r e independent o f man's i n c l i n a t i o n s or wishes, 
but what i s necessary i n order t o support such a n o t i o n 
of autonomy i s the development o f the autonomy of man's 
p r a c t i c a l reason as w e l l . I t i s t h i s reason which can 
discover the a p r i o r i moral law to which one i s then 
o b l i g a t e d and from which imperatives are de r i v e d . W ith 
accepting a transcendent source of the moral i m p e r a t i v e , 
Brunner i s i n e s s e n t i a l agreement; however, he could not 
accept t h a t man hims e l f was capable of discove r i n g i t by 
the use o f h i s own r a t i o n a l f a c u l t i e s . To claim t h i s 
would, according t o Brunner's d e f i n i t i o n of the a n t i t h e s i s 
common t o r a t i o n a l e t h i c s , be t o hol d t h a t the moral law 
i s indeed immanent i n r e l a t i o n t o man and i t i s j u s t here 
t h a t Brunner claims not t o be able t o understand Kant's 
i n t e n t i o n . For, i n attempting t o transcend n a t u r a l i s m , 
Kant has y e t presupposed "a p o i n t of i d e n t i t y between 
d i v i n e and human knowledge i n reason, w i t h o u t which tran = 
scendentalism breaks down, and w i t h which f a i t h i n God and 
i n R e v e l a t i o n cannot be combined. 
Secondly, Kant argues t h a t m o r a l i t y must be 
autonomous w i t h regard t o m o t i v a t i o n f o r i t i s a matter 
of doing one's "duty f o r duty's sake." Thus, as Lewis 
suggests, Kant holds " t h a t duty must be f r e e l y f u l f i l l e d , 
i t must be accepted because o f i t s o b l i g a t o r y character 
and, t h e r e f o r e , independently o f any n a t u r a l urge t o act 
^D. I . , po U6„ 
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as i t r e q u i r e s , " 1 I n h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f the i d e a l i s t 
p o s i t i o n , Brunner o f f e r s h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e o 
An act i s not good i f I do i t because I l i k e 
doing i t , but only i f I do i t because I ought 
to do i t , because I "may" not do otherwise. 
Thus the p r i n c i p l e o f the Good can never be 
sought i n my own impulses but only i n the law 
which confronts me.2 
I t i s at t h i s p o i n t Brunner claims the d u a l i s t i c view of 
the s e l f emerges since the "fundamental a n t i t h e s i s . . . 
between t h a t which i s and t h a t which ought t o be" i s 
i n t e r n a l i s e d and man i s s p l i t i n t o two selves. 
The i n t e l l i g i b l e S e l f i s then the L e g i s l a t o r 
of the Good . . . the e m p i r i c a l S e l f becomes 
a sense-bound c r e a t u r e , w i t h o u t freedom, the 
i n t e l l i g i b l e S e l f becomes a God.3 
Brunner r e j e c t s such dualism on the grounds t h a t man's 
" i n t e l l i g i b l e S e l f " i s not i n f a c t capable of being a 
"Lawgiver" to man, f o r indeed "the S e l f which i s con-
scious o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and can have a 'sense o f g u i l t 1 
does not e x i s t . T h e - s e l f which d i r e c t s one towards the 
moral law i s the s e l f which i s ch a r a c t e r i s e d by freedom 
and which alone can be aware of and impose a duty upon the 
moral agent. This i s the t h i r d sense i n which Kant 
Lewis, op. c i t . , p. 3U« 
. I . , p. 38 • 
^ I b i d . , p. lj.6. Cf. Lewis, op. c i t . , p. 3U° "The 
pure s e l f i s conceived i n such a way t h a t i t i n v a r i a b l y 
d i r e c t s i t s e l f t o what i s o b l i g a t o r y , and the e m p i r i c a l 
s e l f f o l l o w s the course o f n a t u r a l d e s i r e s . " 
I b i d . 
x -\ •' 
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supported the autonomy of morals f o r "an agent cannot • 
have a duty w i t h o u t being aware of t h a t d u t y . " Thus 
I cannot be under any o b l i g a t i o n t o do what 
I do not perceive t o be my duty i f the a b i l i t y 
t o discharge a duty i s e s s e n t i a l t o i t s being 
a duty. Duty must t h e r e f o r e be "self-imposed" 
i n the sense t h a t I accept or recognize i t . l 
Since Brunner has r e j e c t e d already the n o t i o n of a l e g i = 
s l a t i v e s e l f , i t i s c l e a r t h a t he could not accept t h i s 
n o t i o n of the s e l f - i m p o s i t i o n o f m o r a l i t y , nor does he 
accept the p r i n c i p l e upon which i t i s based, namely " I 
ought, t h e r e f o r e I can." I t i s c l e a r t h a t Brunner i s 
prepared to draw the most r a d i c a l consequences from 
Kant's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f autonomy f o r he f i n d s t h i s 
dualism dangerous and unavoidable. He claims, 
i f we take the p r i n c i p l e o f autonomy, and the 
i d e n t i t y of the Law-giver and the S e l f 
s e r i o u s l y , then the inmost p a r t o f the w i l l 
i s indeed not only i n harmony w i t h , but i s 
i d e n t i c a l w i t h the Divine W i l l , thus e v i l can 
only be due t o the n o n - i n t e l l i g i b l e , e m p i r i c a l , 
and causally-determined S e l f ; thus i t i s not 
r e a l l y an e v i l w i l l but merely a hindrance.2 
One senses here t h a t the r e a l crux of Brunner's disagree-
ment w i t h r a t i o n a l e t h i c s i s beginning t o show i t s e l f i n 
t h i s h i n t t h a t idealism i s "incapable of knowing e v i l i n 
i t s depths."3 i t i s o n l y when the gap between " i s " and 
"ought" i s no longer i n t e r n a l i s e d i n man h i m s e l f , as 
Lewis, op. c i t . , p. 3f?» 
2 
D. I . , p. U7. 
R&R, p. 327-30. 
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Brunner w i l l argue i n h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s , 
t h a t the r e a l seriousness of e v i l can be confronted and 
overcomeo 
Brunner's second major c r i t i c i s m of Kant has to " 
do w i t h the formalism of the moral law since i t does not 
support any r e l a t i o n between i t s o b l i g a t o r i n e s s and the 
nature of things i n themselves. Since m o r a l i t y must be 
fre e d from the i n t e r f e r e n c e of any p a r t i c u l a r set of 
n a t u r a l desires or i n c l i n a t i o n s , the r e s u l t i s t h a t what 
matters i n m o r a l i t y i s not what the moral agent does b u t 
only how he does i t . The goodness of one's actions i s 
recognised not only by the content o f the actions them~ 
selves but by whether or not they conform t o the law one 
has placed upon oneself. I n Brunner's eyes t h i s becomes 
le g a l i s m , f o r 
I t i s not the content of the w i l l which makes 
i t good or bad--the same a c t i o n can at one 
time be good and at another time be bad°-but 
the "form" of the w i l l , t h a t i s , i t s harmony 
w i t h the l a w 0 l : 
For Brunner the value of formalism i n a l l o w i n g the moral 
law to be transcendent and even t o be u n i v e r s a l l y appli° 
cable cannot outweigh the problem of d e f i n i n g the contents 
of t h i s moral law which s u r e l y must be given w i t h some 
reference t o statements about the nature o f God, man or 
the world. Brunner claims t h a t Kant would be u n w i l l i n g 
t o do this,. 
D. I . , p. 39o 
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The d i f f i c u l t y i s due t o the f a c t t h a t the 
Kantian philosophy o f f e r s no l i n k between 
the world of exi3tence--and, indeed, the 
concrete w o r l d , as i t now is==and t h a t which 
ought to be. The imperative "Thou s h a l t " i s 
a stranger i n t h i s w o r l d , i t has no t h i n g t o 
do w i t h t h i n g s as they a c t u a l l y are.^ 
Indeed since Brunner i n t e r p r e t s Kant as both a d u a l i s t 
and a f o r m a l i s t , he can see only two ways i n which Kant 
might give the moral law content, b o t h o f which would 
be unacceptable t o Kant and to h i m s e l f . One p o s s i b i l i t y 
would be f o r Kant t o determine the content o f moral 
imperatives according t o t h a t which denies or subdues 
one's i n c l i n a t i o n s and i n t h i s way the moral law would 
be r e l e v a n t t o man's a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n . This, however, 
would reduce the Kantian e t h i c t o "an a s c e t i c e t h i c o f 
absolute r e n u n c i a t i o n of the w o r l d " and i t i s not c l e a r 
at a l l t h a t Kant could agree to such an e t h i c . Another 
p o s s i b i l i t y would be t o determine the content o f impera-
t i v e s .by reference t o an e t h i c o f c u l t u r e or an e t h i c o f 
values i n which case Kant would have to r e l i n q u i s h the 
autonomy of m o r a l i t y i n favour o f a f r e e l y chosen heter= 
onomy. E i t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e would bo t h weaken the separa= 
t i o n of " i s " and "ought" and c o r r u p t the n o t i o n o f "duty 
f o r duty's sake" both o f which Brunner wishes t o r e t a i n 
f o r the development of h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c . 3 
^ " I b i d . s p. 1^ 8, 
2 I b i d . 
3 
Brunner claims i n a d d i t i o n t h a t when Kant d i d 
come t o terms w i t h the m a t e r i a l content o f h i s e t h i c . 
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I n h i s book, The Categorical I m p e r a t i v e , H. J o 
Paton discusses the nature of autonomy and of formalism 
i n the Kantian e t h i c and comes t o very d i f f e r e n t con= 
elusions regarding these notions than Brunner.^ The 
f i r s t two meanings of autonomy f o r which Brunner c r i t i = 
cises Kant, f o r example, are discussed by Paton i n a 
s e c t i o n e n t i t l e d "Misunderstandings," and i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t he intends t o argue how f a r removed the i m p l i c a t i o n s 
which Brunner draws are from Kant's own understanding. 
Paton i n t e r p r e t s Kant as saying t h a t n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n 
i s not by i t s e l f a s u f f i c i e n t motive of moral a c t i o n , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i f t h a t a c t i o n i s t o be considered good. 
He d i d not mean by t h i s t h a t i n c l i n a t i o n could not m o t i ~ 
vate a good a c t i o n at a l l , but merely t h a t the motive o f 
duty provided by p r a c t i c a l reason must be present at the 
same time. According t o Paton, Kant avoids n a t u r a l i s m 
not because he h e l d t h a t i n c l i n a t i o n could not motivate 
or determine a moral a c t i o n , but because t h a t i n c l i n a t i o n 
could not by i t s e l f determine what one's duty was.^ Thus 
what i s i s not the source of what ought t o be. One's 
h i s n o t i o n o f duty was p e r v e r t e d and became "desire or 
i n c l i n a t i o n somewhat g l o r i f i e d . " I n attempting t o g i v e 
concrete imperatives to t h e ' f o r m a l maxim, Kant r i s k s 
n a t u r a l i s m and thereby weakens the is=ought a n t i t h e s i s . 
I b i d . , p. 1+9o 
i n Kant's Moral Philosophy (Hutchinson's U n i v e r s i t y 
L i b r a r y , London, 19i|6). 
H. J.„ Paton, The C a t e g o r i c a l I m p e r a t i v e ; A Stud 
l b i d . , p. 1*8-9. 
3 I b i d . , p a 1|9» 
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i n c l i n a t i o n i s indeed an i r r e l e v a n t ground f o r deciding 
both what one's duty, i s and t h a t i t ought t o be obeyed, 
but t h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y imply t h a t a moral judge-
ment i s being rendered against i n c l i n a t i o n s as such. For, 
as Paton goes on t o demonstrate, "moral a c t i o n i s com-
p a t i b l e w i t h the presence o f i n c l i n a t i o n " since maxims 
themselves a r i s e as a r e s u l t o f "the cooperation o f 
reason and i n c l i n a t i o n . " 1 I t i s one of the f u n c t i o n s o f 
the p r a c t i c a l reason t o transform an i n c l i n a t i o n or an 
i n t e r e s t i n t o an a c t i o n by the c r e a t i o n o f a maxim which 
w i l l guide t h i s a c t i o n . 2 Thus, not only are actions o f t e n 
suggested t o us by our i n c l i n a t i o n s , our i n c l i n a t i o n s 
themselves could not r e s u l t i n ac t i o n s w i t h o u t the use 
of the p r a c t i c a l reason. J To say t h e r e f o r e t h a t a c t i o n s 
r e s u l t i n g from reason are good, wh i l e those r e s u l t i n g 
from i n c l i n a t i o n are bad i s to make the matter d e c e p t i v e l y 
simple and a good deal l e s s complex than Kant's own 
w r i t i n g s j u s t i f y . 
Paton t h e r e f o r e also opposes the conclusion which 
Brunner accepts as a l o g i c a l consequence of h i s i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of autonomy, namely the charge of dualism. 
Paton argues t h a t freedom i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the q u a l i t y 
belonging t o one of man's selves, the r a t i o n a l one which 
i s capable of moral a c t i o n , and t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n by 
n a t u r a l n e c e s s i t y does not belong e x c l u s i v e l y t o man's 
1 l b i d . , p. 56. 3 l b i d . , p. 83, I4 . 9 . 
2 I b i d . , p. 83. 
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l e s s e r s e l f . The view t h a t "moral a c t i o n i s wholly f r e e 
and a l l other a c t i o n w h o l l y determined" i s simply 
"absurd" and cannot be j u s t l y a t t r i b u t e d t o Kant. 1 Lewis 
i n t e r p r e t s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the "pure" and the " 
" e m p i r i c a l " s e l f as Kant's attempt "to f i t i n t o h i s 
system . . . the c o n v i c t i o n which ha considered, and I 
t h i n k very r i g h t l y considered, t o be axiomatic i n moral 
t h i n k i n g — n a m e l y , t h a t the idea of o b l i g a t i o n involves 
the freedom of choice." What does need t o be maintained 
from Kant's argument f o r the autonomous p r a c t i c a l reason 
i s t h a t man i s faced w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of choosing 
e i t h e r i n c l i n a t i o n or duty and o f being obedient to e i t h e r , 
though one does not need t o emphasise q u i t e so r a d i c a l l y 
the c o n f l i c t between i n c l i n a t i o n and d u t y . 3 Indeed, t o 
read Kant as a r a d i c a l d u a l i s t seems t o exclude the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t there could be a s i g n i f i c a n t c o n f l i c t 
between the two selves a t a l l , a c o n f l i c t which i s at l e a s t 
p a r t i a l l y necessary f o r the n o t i o n o f duty t o be meaningful 
at a l l . ^ I f there i s such a gap between the selves, i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o see how desires could e i t h e r h i nder or help 
moral a c t i o n , or indeed how one's reason could a f f e c t or 
c o n t r o l one's i n c l i n a t i o n s . ^ The r e a l issue t h e r e f o r e i s 
x I b i d . , p. 215. 
Lewis, op. c i t . , p. 35•> 
3 I b i d . , p. 3U» 
k I b i d . 
Paton, c i t . , p. 25Uo 
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whether the laws of freedom, manifest i n the exercise of 
man's p r a c t i c a l reason, and the laws o f n e c e s s i t y , mani° 
f e s t i n man's n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n s , can be meaningfully 
combined i n man h i m s e l f , and i t i s f o r j u s t such an 
issue t h a t a s o l u t i o n can be found w i t h i n Kant. Each o f 
these notions regarding freedom and n e c e s s i t y represents 
a p o i n t of view w i t h regard t o manj t h a t i s , man can be 
regarded as "a t h i n g as i t i s i n i t s e l f " i n which case he 
considers h i m s e l f to be "independent of the laws t o which 
the same t h i n g i s subject as an appearance or as belonging 
to the sensible world."- 1- Freedom and n e c e s s i t y become 
t h e r e f o r e two ways of viewing the whole man and are not 
q u a l i t i e s which adhere to one aspect o f man or another, 
and when considered from the p o i n t of view of freedom, 
the whole person i s subject t o and can act r e s p o n s i b l y 
under the demands of the moral law. With t h i s n o t i o n , 
t h e r e f o r e , "the supposed c o n t r a d i c t i o n disappears." 
Likewise the charge of formalism against Kant, .. 
Paton argues, does not r e a l l y touch on a s i g n i f i c a n t 
issue i n h i s f o r m u l a t i o n of e t h i c s f o r i t was p r e c i s e l y 
Kant's i n t e n t i o n t o e x p l a i n the form o f m o r a l i t y and n o t 
t o "moralize."^ N a t u r a l d e s i r e s , human goals, or personal 
^ • I b i d . t p 0 266-7. That Kant i n v o l v e s h i m s e l f i n 
f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s by attempting t o formulate a meta^ 
physic i n which t h i s "double s t a n d p o i n t " plays an essen<= 
t i a l r o l e need not concern us here, f o r , as Paton says, 
"Kant's e t h i c s . <> . i s not based on h i s metaphysics 1 
i t would be t r u e r t o say t h a t h i s metaphysics „ « o i s 
based p r i m a r i l y on h i s e t h i c s . " I b i d . , p 0 2f?5„ 
2 3 I b i d . . p 0 267o I b i d . , p c 7k°5o 
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values are not i r r e l e v a n t i n the making o f a c t u a l moral 
decisions though they may be i r r e l e v a n t i n the-formula-
t i o n o f our duty and thus g i v i n g content t o the cate-
g o r i c a l i m perative i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o b l e m a t i c As 
Paton e x p l a i n s ; 
A man who i s guided by the formal maxim of 
m o r a l i t y must not be conceived as a c t i n g i n 
a vacuum. I n the l i g h t of t h i s maxim he 
s e l e c t s and c o n t r o l s h i s o r d i n a r y maxims o f 
s e l f - l o v e and i n c l i n a t i o n . ^ 
Kant i s t h e r e f o r e , on t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , not one who 
has f o r g o t t e n t h a t "moral a c t i o n has a matter as w e l l as 
a form, an e m p i r i c a l as w e l l as an a p r i o r i element, and 
an o b j e c t as w e l l as a supreme p r i n c i p l e , " but r a t h e r one 
who "does not f o r g e t . He expects h i s readers t o remember."' 
Kant does not suppose t h a t our p r a c t i c a l moral problems 
can be solved by c o n s u l t i n g the c a t e g o r i c a l imperative 
alone, f o r t h i s i n i t s e l f y i e l d s no s p e c i f i c demands. 
Kant at once makes i t c l e a r t h a t there i s no 
question-=as i s sometimes supposed--of deducing 
p a r t i c u l a r d u t i e s merely from the empty form of 
u n i v e r s a l law. On the c o n t r a r y , we have to 
consider the matter which has to be f i t t e d 
i n t o t h i s empty form. The matter c o n s i s t s o f 
our o r d i n a r y m a t e r i a l maxims based on i n c l i n a -
t i o n f o r d e f i n i t e o b j e c t s ; and what we have to 
do i s t o accept or r e j e c t these maxims by the 
p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l i t y . 3 
I t i s j u s t t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n - of the supreme p r i n c i p l e which 
Kant demonstrates i n h i s Metaphysic of Morals f o r the form 
of t h i s p r i n c i p l e alone cannot e n t a i l p a r t i c u l a r impera° -
t i v e s o f a c t i o n . To accuse Kant, as Brunner does, of being 
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able t o f i l l t h i s formal p r i n c i p l e o n l y w i t h a s c e t i c 
requirements or the demands of an a l i e n source .-i3 thus 
not a l t o g e t h e r j u s t i f i e d , , 1 
Another important c r i t i c i s m o f Brunner ?s argument 
against r a t i o n a l e t h i c s or n a t u r a l m o r a l i t y has been 
brought f o r t h by N, H„ GG Robinson who claims t h a t 
Brunner's e n t i r e argument must be viewed i n the l i g h t o f 
h i s b e l i e f i n the inherent s i n f u l n e s s o f n a t u r a l man. 
I t i s t h i s c o n v i c t i o n on Brunner's p a r t which colours the 
whole o f h i s argument w i t h n a t u r a l i s m and id e a l i s m and 
turns i t l o g i c a l l y i n t o an argument ad hominem. As 
Brunner h i m s e l f suggests p h i l o s o p h i c a l e t h i c s "aims t o 
complete the process of n a t u r a l moral c l a r i f i c a t i o n " and 
i s i n t h i s sense a f u n c t i o n of man's, p r i d e . Thus, 
i t i s the attempt t o base m o r a l i t y upon the 
human reason i t s e l f , w i t h o u t the a d d i t i o n a l 
ai d of i r r a t i o n a l - r e l i g i o u s and i r r a t i o n a l -
c onventional sanctions. P h i l o s o p h i c a l e t h i c s 
. . o i s at the same time a r a t i o n a l e t h i c , 
the e r e c t i o n o f a standard f o r the w i l l and 
f o r conduct which can be e s t a b l i s h e d i n ^ 
accordance w i t h reason . . . A p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
e t h i c i s not n e c e s s a r i l y an i r r e l i g i o u s e t h i c ; 
but i t s d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e i s the f a c t 
t h a t i t always c a t e g o r i c a l l y r e j e c t s the basis 
of a transcendent r e v e l a t i o n ; i n t h i s sense i t 
i s always "an immanental idea."3 
Cf. D. M. MacKinnon, A Study i n E t h i c a l Theory 
(A. & C. Black, London, 1957), p. 115-16. Sure f o r Kant 
"the n o t i o n o f goodness takes precedence over t h a t o f 
duty; i f moral goodness i s the fundamental form of good° . 
ness, t h a t very language bears witness t o the precedence 
of the n o t i o n s of goodness and value over those of duty 
and o b l i g a t i o n . " Thus i n the charge t h a t Kant's e t h i c 
i s "negative" there i s le s s t r u t h or i n s i g h t than 
i n v e c t i v e o 
2 N . H o G o Robinson, The Groundwork of C h r i s t i a n 
E t h i c s , p. 460 
P. L a p« 35o 
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I t would seem t h e r e f o r e t h a t the very a n t i t h e s e s which 
Brunner claims to be so problematic i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
e t h i c s are themselves the r e s u l t of man's attempt t o 
impose a moral standard upon h i m s e l f w i t h o u t any appeal 
t o a transcendent source of the-moral law. R a t i o n a l 
e t h i c s "has a r i s e n out o f the need to give g r e a t e r 
s e c u r i t y t o e t h i c a l thought than i t possesses i n i t s 
popular form," but since i t r e l i e s on reason alone, i t 
cannot resolve i t s i n h e r e n t contradictions."^" Thus, 
i n r e a l i t y the e t h i c a l i n q u i r y i s sustained by 
a deep=seated and hidden motive which seeks 
f o r self-dependent and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t reason, 
m o r a l i t y , man, a gre a t e r s e c u r i t y than others-
wise they possess 02 
The r e s u l t i s , i n terms of Brunner's thought, t h a t even 
though he i s prepared t o admit t h a t ' t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f 
e t h i c s i s the "simple experience o f moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y " 
common t o a l l men, an experience which gives r i s e t o 
questions concerning the Good, nevertheless what i s 
e s s e n t i a l t o m o r a l i t y i s the n o t i o n of "commandf. "^ Any ' 
r a t i o n a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y f a i l s t o come t o terms 
w i t h t h i s n o t i o n , and i t i s a f a i l u r e to admit a transcen-
dent beyond man's reason, and thus i s incapable of d e f i n i n g 
^ I b i d . , p. kk-
2 
Robinson, op. c i t . , p 0 i j . 6 . • 
^D. lot p. hSi 5 2 0 Cfo h i s a n a l y s i s o f the 'moral r a t i o n a l p e r c e p t i o n " o f man i n R&R, p« 3 2 1 f c 
2 l J | 
a "pure" m o r a l i t y which "assumes the form o f a commando 
A theonomous e t h i c alone can resolve the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s 
o f r a t i o n a l autonomous e t h i c s and indeed t h i s l a t t e r 
e n t e r p r i s e must be abandoned a l t o g e t h e r i n so f a r as i t " 
seeks t o e s t a b l i s h man's a u t h o r i t y over against God's. 
The r a t i o n a l i s m of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l e t h i c 
can never be combined w i t h the r e c o g n i t i o n 
of a d i v i n e s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n . . . Autonomy 
and theonomy cannot be combined,2 
I t i s i n coming t o terms w i t h the r e v e l a t i o n o f God t h a t 
m o r a l i t y can come to understand i t s e l f and i t i s when 
m o r a l i t y i s founded upon God's commands t h a t i t becomes 
"pure" and the separation of the " i s " and the "ought" i s 
maintained„ 
God's r e v e l a t i o n Of Himself and o f His w i l l t o 
man i s f o r Brunner the only f o u n d a t i o n upon which a moral 
ought can be based and the only source of moral impera-
t i v e s which w i l l i n s p i r e e t h i c a l obedience. I t i s t h i s 
r e v e l a t i o n which provides 
an answer i n which the c o n f l i c t between the 
empty but pure form of the command and i t s 
concrete but impure e t h i c a l content i s ended; 
an answer i n which good and e v i l are c l e a r l y 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d from one another, w i t h o u t 
merging again i n t o one at an innermost p o i n t ; 
i n which the o p p o s i t i o n between good and e v i l 
comes out as c l e a r l y as p o s s i b l e , y e t w i t h o u t 
rending humanity i n t o two separate metaphysical 
halves . . . 3 
The C h r i s t i a n e t h i c based upon such a r e v e l a t i o n can o f f e r 
a transcendent source of good which i s r e l e v a n t t o human 
R&R, p. 32ko -^Ibido, p„ 5 1 o 
» 
D. I . , p. U 6 o 
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l i f e and which does not f o r c e the a n t i t h e s i s o f " i s " 
and "ought" i n t o man h i m s e l f , nor set i t between nature 
and man's reason. What becomes c l e a r i n Brunner's 
thought i s t h a t f o r him the more fundamental a n t i t h e s i s 
i n m o r a l i t y i s t h a t between ho l i n e s s and sins i t i s s i n 
which ch a r a c t e r i s e s the whole of c r e a t i o n and which i s 
the r o o t of the inadequacy o f r a t i o n a l e t h i c s to o f f e r 
a non=natural, and t h a t means a non°sinful, f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f the good. The good can only be known t o us by the 
r e v e l a t i o n of God i n which the transcendent and h o l y 
"ought" i s shown t o be God's w i l l i t s e l f . 
What God does and w i l l s i s goods a l l t h a t 
opposes the w i l l of God i s bad. The Good 
has i t s basis and i t s existence s o l e l y i n 
the w i l l of God , . . God i s not merely the 
guardian of the Moral Law and of the moral 
ordinances, but t h e i r Creator.! 
Since "the Good i s based s o l e l y on God's transcendent 
r e v e l a t i o n , " i t i s not p o s s i b l e , Brunner claims, f o r man 
t o discover i t w i t h i n the n a t u r a l world or from h i s own 
sense o f o b l i g a t i o n . God reveals h i m s e l f as the r e a l i t y 
o f the highe s t value whose w i l l i s good and man judges 
goodness i n the world by t h i s norm. 
Correspondingly, the content o f C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s 
i s formulated by God's commands and moral a c t i o n i s 
cha r a c t e r i s e d by obedience t o God's w i l l . Here the 
essence o f "pure" m o r a l i t y i s r e a l i s e d , t h a t i s when 
human goodness i s seen as a f u n c t i o n of Good i t s e l f s 
namely the w i l l o f God. Thus, "there i s no Good save 
I b i d . , p„ 5 3 o 
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obedient behaviour, save the obedient w i l l . . . The 
Good consists i n always doing what God w i l l s a t any 
p a r t i c u l a r moment."1 Brunner suggests t h a t as a r e s u l t 
of the c e n t r a l i t y of obedience i n the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c , 
t h i s e t h i c i s b a s i c a l l y s i t u a t i o n a l God's w i l l cannot 
be formulated i n advance o f a s i t u a t i o n of d e c i s i o n and 
can never be s t a t e d i n terms of general moral p r i n c i p l e s 
to guide one's choices and actions,, This again c o n s t i = 
t u t e s one of the d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s of the C h r i s t i a n 
m o r a l i t y as opposed t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l e t h i c s , since "the 
C h r i s t i a n conception of the Good d i f f e r s from every other 
conception of the Good at t h i s very p o i n t ; t h a t i t cannot 
be defined i n terms o f p r i n c i p l e at a l l . " E t h i c a l a c t i o n 
i s thus conceived as no longer a matter o f deducing impera-
t i v e s from general p r i n c i p l e s of a c t i o n but r a t h e r of being 
open t o and ready t o act upon the w i l l of God i n every 
moment. 
The s c i e n t i f i c p r e s e n t a t i o n of the C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c can c e r t a i n l y never represent the Good 
as a general t r u t h , easy t o be perceived, and 
based on a u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e . . „ i t s task 
i s t o work out s c i e n t i f i c a l l y the ch a r a c t e r " 
i s t i c element i n the C h r i s t i a n knowledge o f 
the Good, namely t h a t the Good, as f a i t h knows 
i t , can never be l e g a l i s t i c , or a matter of 
ab s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e . . . 3 
The transcendence o f God's w i l l i s thus p r o t e c t e d due t o 
the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of f o r m u l a t i n g any r a t i o n a l l y acceptable 
1 I b i d . , p. 8 3 . 3 I b i d . , p. 8 9 . 
2 I b i d . , p. 8 2 . 
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or u n i v e r s a l i s a b l e p r i n c i p l e s , even a p r i n c i p l e o f agape. 
This s i t u a t i o n a l i s m of Brunner's understanding o f e t h i c a l 
d e c i s i o n i s also expressed i n h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of 
C h r i s t i a n a c t i o n as determined by the a c t i o n o f God, as 
being performed w i t h i n the a c t i v i t y of God. 
The Good i s t h a t which God doesj the goodness 
of man can be no other than l e t t i n g h i m s e l f be 
placed w i t h i n the a c t i v i t y of God. This i s 
what " b e l i e v i n g " means i n the New Testament. 
And t h i s f a i t h i s the p r i n c i p l e of e t h i c s . 2 
C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y i s not only set i n the sphere o f God's 
a c t i o n but i s also dependent upon God's a c t i v e presence 
f o r i t s power and e f f i c a c y . Thus, "Human conduct can 
only be considered 'good' when, and i n so f a r as, God 
Himself acts i n i t , through the Holy S p i r i t . " ^ 
Two issues seem here to be c r u c i a l t o Brunner's 
understanding of e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n and a c l o s e r examination 
±"The Good i s simply what God w i l l s t h a t we 
should do, not t h a t which we would do on the basis o f a 
p r i n c i p l e of l o v e . " I b i d . , p. 1 1 7 . This type df a n a l y s i s 
i n which C h r i s t i a n d e c i s i o n i s i n t e r p r e t e d as a matter o f 
obedience to the p r i n c i p l e o f love i s given i n Joseph 
F l e t c h e r ' s S i t u a t i o n E t h i c s . Although he too i s concerned 
to avoid l e g a l i s m as a s l a v i s h obedience t o laws and t o 
a f f i r m the nature o f C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s as s i t u a t i o n a l , one 
cannot escape the i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m i n h i s understanding o f 
t h i s l o v e . Indeed F l e t c h e r concedes the r a t i o n a l i t y o f 
h i s a n a l y s i s of e t h i c s by g i v i n g us a formula or c a l c u l u s 
f o r determining our a c t i o n s - according t o an i d e a l of love 
i n s p i r e d by God's r e v e l a t i o n of h i m s e l f i n Jesus (see 
p a r t i c u l a r l y pages 9 5 - 9 9 ) . This seems t o be p r e c i s e l y 
the k i n d of r a t i o n a l confinement o f God's w i l l which 
Brunner would consider undermining t o the essence o f 
C h r i s t i a n d e c i s i o n as pure openness t o whatever God 
w i l l s o (Westminster Press, P h i l a d e l p h i a , 1 9 6 6 ) . 
T b i d . , p. 55<> 
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of them w i l l serve t o c l a r i f y the nature of d e c i s i o n -
making. The f i r s t problem which a r i s e s has t o do w i t h 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between statements about the nature of 
God known by h i s r e v e l a t i o n of h i m s e l f and those about 
human moral agents. What i s the l o g i c of t h i s r e l a t i o n -
ship i n Brunner's thought? Secondly, a problem r e l a t e d 
t o t h i s f i r s t one has t o do w i t h the nature of one's 
acceptance of r e l i g i o u s claims such t h a t e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n 
and a c t i o n are bound up w i t h them. What i s the nature of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two aspects of the C h r i s t i a n 
l i f e as Brunner i n t e r p r e t s i t s b e l i e f and action? Since 
Brunner i s u n w i l l i n g to def i n e the w i l l of God i n any 
terms which man could discover independently of r e v e l a t i o n 
and since the content of t h a t w i l l cannot, by d e f i n i t i o n , 
be i d e n t i c a l w i t h the demands of man's e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e , 
i t remains t o be seen what r e l a t i o n s h i p t h i s w i l l of God 
can have t o human l i f e and d e c i s i o n . 
Of c e n t r a l importance t o Brunner's e x p o s i t i o n o f 
the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c i s h i s understanding of the nature 
of f a i t h which alone can recognise the demands made by 
God upon human l i f e and can complete the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f 
f e l l o w s h i p w i t h God which i s the ground of the C h r i s t i a n 
moral l i f e . F a i t h f o r Brunner i s an outl o o k adopted by 
one who bel i e v e s and i s c o n s t i t u t e d by a judgement regard" 
ing God's r e v e l a t i o n of h i m s e l f i n C h r i s t and a commitment 
to give oneself i n obedience t o the way of l i f e so o f f e r e d 
by t h a t a c t i o n . F a i t h i s " o b e d i e n c e - i n - t r u s t " and 
expresses most f u l l y "the dependence of the human act 
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upon a fo r e g o i n g d i v i n e a c t . " i t i s t h i s f a i t h which 
ch a r a c t e r i s e s the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l l i f e as c o n t i n u a l 
openness to the w i l l ' o f God i n every d e c i s i o n and 
which i s 
the personal answer o f s e l f - g i v i n g t o the 
Word o f God. I n t h i s response of s e l f = 
g i v i n g the d i v i n e self-communication f i r s t 
reaches i t s g o a l , and a c t u a l f e l l o w s h i p 
between God and man o r i g i n a t e s . 2 
Thus Brunner can speak of f a i t h as both "assent" and 
"re s o l v e " f o r , 
I n p i s t i s i s contained the personal acknowl= 
edgement of the Lord as Lord, obedience, and 
the personal acceptance of the d i v i n e s e l f = 
g i v i n g love i n g r a t e f u l , responding l o v e . 3 
As assent, f a i t h i n v o l v e s the r e c o g n i t i o n both o f God's 
r e v e l a t i o n i n the person and a c t i o n o f Jesus C h r i s t and o f 
the character o f the encounter between God and man which 
was enacted i n him. As r e s o l v e , f a i t h means the commit-
ment of one's behaviour and i n t e n t i o n s t o ac t i o n s which 
are appropriate t o t h a t encounter and which f u l f i l l the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p God o f f e r s t o nan. 
t i a n l i f e i s t o be found i n the r e v e l a t o r y and recon= 
o i l i n g a c t i o n of God i n C h r i s t . Since "we know God's 
since "Jesus C h r i s t Himself i s the Word,"-5 i t i s t h a t 
Brunner, The Divine°Human Encounter, t r a n s l . 
Amandus W. Loos (SCM Press, London, 19i|i|)j P» k91 here-
a f t e r abbreviated as D-HE. 
For Brunner, t h e r e f o r e , the centre of the C h r i s -
w i l l only through His r e v e l a t i o n , i n His own Word 
it 
and 
2 I b i d . D . l o o P ° l l i j . 0 
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event which becomes the foundation of the new morality,, 
I n the l i f e of C h r i s t , Brunner claims, God was perform-
i n g an a c t i o n of r e c o n c i l i n g man t o h i m s e l f b o t h by 
d i s c l o s i n g h i s nature and h i s i n t e n t i o n to man and by 
g i v i n g of h i m s e l f i n a deeply personal encounter w i t h 
h i s c r e a t u r e s . C h r i s t ' s l i f e i s an event 
i n which God confronts the human " I " as "Thou," 
i n which man does not dispose of the d i v i n e 
t r u t h , but receives i t i n an act of s e l f -
communication on the p a r t of God and i n which 
t h i s act of communication i s not the same as 
the deepest act of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n but an 
event, i n which from beyond human p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
God Himself d i s c l o s e s Himself t o man.^ 
Brunner's i n t e n t i o n i n The Divine-Human Encounter was t o 
argue t h a t the r e v e l a t i o n cannot be contained i n the form 
of d o c t r i n e s , h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h s , or t r u t h s o f reason 
p r e c i s e l y because he considered i t t o be a deeply per«= 
sonal a c t i o n on the p a r t of God h i m s e l f . Any d o c t r i n a l 
or h i s t o r i c a l statements are derived from or express the 
fundamental r e v e l a t i o n which i s the opening up^of a new 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and man. 
The s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n of God i s no o b j e c t , but 
wholly the doing and s e l f - g i v i n g of a subject 
=~or, b e t t e r expressed, a Person. A Person 
who i s r e v e a l i n g Himself, a Person who demands 
and o f f e r s Lordship and f e l l o w s h i p w i t h Him-
s e l f , i s the most r a d i c a l a n t i t h e s i s t o every-
t h i n g t h a t could be c a l l e d o b j e c t or o b j e c t i v e ^ 
Because of t h i s personal character o f r e v e l a t i o n , i t does 
not come i n the form o f pronouncements which man i s t o 
accept or r e j e c t . P i t t e n g e r has taken t h i s view i n h i s 
P . I . , P o ^0 a ^"HE, P a 5 3 . 
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c r i t i c i s m of Brunner's c h r i s t o l o g y . He i n t e r p r e t s the 
Christ-event i n Brunner as an act i n which God speaks 
only of h i m s e l f and C h r i s t i a n f a i t h as a "one-sided 
conversation p i e c e " i n which God announces h i s sa l v a t i o n ' 
i n a great " e i t h e r = o r " and commands a d e c i s i o n t o be made, 
e i t h e r acceptance or r e j e c t i o n o f what God says. 1 Such 
an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Brunner emphasises the character of 
f a i t h as assent but cannot do j u s t i c e t o the resolve by 
which a b e l i e v e r commits him s e l f t o a new r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h Godo 
This resolve i s a f u n c t i o n of one's w i l l i n g n e s s 
t o see i n the Christ-event an act of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n 
which God h i m s e l f i s i n v o l v e d i n h i s Word. 
That God i n His Word does not speak "something" 
but Himself also changes the way of "speaking." 
God Himself speaks t o myself t t h a t i s t o say, 
His speaking i s address. P r e v i o u s l y we 
expressed i t i n t h i s way; God d e l i v e r s t o us 
no course of l e c t u r e s i n dogmatic theology; He 
submits and explains t o us no confession o f 
f a i t h . He does say t o me, " I am the Lord thy 
God." His Word i s claim and promise, g i f t and 
demand. Likewise "knowing" also acquires a new 
meaning. No longer i s i t a question o f the 
i n s e r t i o n of something i n t o the knowledge I 
possess, the expansion of the i n t e l l e c t u a l 
r i c h e s at my d i s p o s a l | but i t i s answering 
Norman P i t t e n g e r , The Word In c a r n a t e ; A Study 
of the D o c t r i n e o f the Person of C h r i s t (Nisbet & Co., 
London, 1 9 5 9 p . 1 3 6 . Lewis understands t h i s aspect 
of Brunner's thought f o r he p o i n t s out t h a t the work of 
C h r i s t i s "the c u l m i n a t i o n of God's self-communication 
i n 'saving h i s t o r y ' - - n o t to be confused w i t h a mere 
progressive i n i t i a t i o n ' i n t o c o r r e c t ideas about God, f o r 
the p r o p h e t i c 'word' i s at the same time an 'act,' . 0 o 
God, i n His r e v e l a t i o n gives us, not 'a word from God" 
but 'God h i m s e l f , * the 'Person who speaks' and the !con= 
t e n t of h i s teaching' being one." Lewis, Morals and 
Revelation,, The Muirhead L i b r a r y o f Philosophy ( A l l e n 
and Unwin, London, 1951)» p. 37» 
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p e r s o n a l l y when p e r s o n a l l y addressed, and hence 
obedient, t h a n k f u l confession and prayer. 
This communication between God and man i n the form of 
God's address i s God's drawing near t o man i n love and i t 
i n v o l v e s b o t h God and h i s creatures i n a r e l a t i o n o f 
"personal correspondence" i n which a l o v i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p 
can be f u l f i l l e d . Thus Brunner i n t e r p r e t s the r e v e l a t i o n 
not merely as the g a i n i n g of new knowledge about God. He 
does claim t h a t "God reveals His own Nature" and "God 
reveals His w i l l " but t h i s i s not meant i n the sense of 
content alone. God reveals Himself "where He gives 
Himself." I t i s as a response t o t h i s s e l f ~ g i v i n g t h a t 
God demands obedience t o h i s w i l l f o r human l i f e ! i t i s 
f a i t h which responds by inward assent t o God's a c t i o n 
and by resolve t o be r e c o n c i l e d t o Godo 
Prom the perspective of God's drawing near t o man 
i n C h r i s t , Brunner considers two b i b l i c a l a c t i o n = p i c t u r e s 
of primary importance i n d e s c r i b i n g the d i v i n e and human 
r e l a t i o n s h i p and i n i n d i c a t i n g the moral r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
of the C h r i s t i a n . The f i r s t i s the a c t i o n of c r e a t i o n i n 
which God makes h i m s e l f known as Lord, appoints man as 
the c reature responsible t o him,, judges h i s c r e a t i o n t o 
be good, and promises c o n t i n u i n g providence and care f o r 
i t o This e n t i r e c r e a t i v e a c t i o n i s taken as a s e l f =-
•^Brunner, D°HE, p. 62. This i s also the meaning 
of Brunner's claim t h a t " F a i t h does not depend on 'some= 
t h i n g true'--even though t h i s t r u t h were something spoken 
by God==but has t o do w i t h God Himself, how He reveals 
Himself to us i n His Word, i s present w i t h us, addresses 
us, and f u r t h e r s i n us the response of obedience°in= 
t r u s t . " I b i d . , p 0 ?6 0 
2 
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d i s c l o s u r e of God's claim t o be acknowledged as Lord, a 
clai m which i s t o be recognised i n the various actions 
of r e v e a l i n g , a p p o i n t i n g , j u d g i n g , promising, and e v a l u -
a t i n g . I t i s the r e l i g i o u s claim "This world i s God's 
c r e a t i o n " which considers the n a t u r a l world t o be e v i -
dence of God's Lordship and an expression of h i s omnipo-
tence and supremacy,. 
As Creator God i s our absolute Lord and the 
Lord o f a l l existence. I n Him alone the 
existence of the w o r l d , and the manner i n 
which i t e x i s t s , i s based. This w o r l d , as 
i t i s = ~ i n s p i t e of e v e r y t h i n g — i s God's 
wor l d . I t i s t h i s world which He w i l l s , 
. His c r e a t i o n . ^ 
For Brunner, t h i s claim means t h a t "God's w i l l c o n t r o l s 
a b s o l u t e l y e v e r y t h i n g " and the world not only belongs t o 
but i s t o t a l l y dependent upon God h i m s e l f . This under-
standing of the created world i s c o n s t i t u t e d by a judge-
ment as t o the character of c r e a t i o n and a commitment t o 
a way .of l i v i n g i n which t h a t character i s a c t u a l i s e d . 
The C h r i s t i a n can be described t h e r e f o r e as one who 
"looks on Creation as an a c t i o n which has various per-
f o r m a t i v e f o r c e s and which i s c o r r e l a t e d w i t h various 
performative r e p l i e s . " - * One p o l a r i t y o f C h r i s t i a n 
decision-making thus centres on the a c t i o n and response 
p a t t e r n of the c r e a t i o n . 
1 I b i d . , p. 1 2 3 . 
2 I b i d . , p. 1 1 9 . 
3 
Evans, The Logic of Self-Involvement, p. 1 6 0 . 
r 
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God's claim t o Lordship involves f i r s t of a l l 
h i s r i g h t to a l l t h a t he has made and h i s c a l l i n g o f 
man i n p a r t i c u l a r to p l a y a s p e c i a l r o l e w i t h i n t h a t 
handiwork. Creation has thus an e x e r c i t i v e element 
f o r i n the a c t i o n of making man,God q u a l i f i e s man's 
existence by i t s dependence upon him and by h i s claim 
to man as a personal correspondent. Thus Brunner can 
say t h a t "man i s only man i n v i r t u e o f the claim made 
on him by God."^ Man's c r e a t i o n i s an act o f appoints 
ment i n which h i s existence and i t s meaning are u n i t e d . 
Man alone has an " I " , or, r a t h e r , i s a S e l f , 
but t h i s S e l f i s not i t s e l f u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y ! 
i t i s not based upon i t s e l f , i t does n o t 
possess a s e i t y , but I am " I " only because, and 
i n so f a r as, God addresses me as "thou"| 
t h e r e f o r e the d i s t i n c t i v e q u a l i t y o f my 
existence, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , only .consists i n 
the f a c t t h a t I am addressed by God.^ 
God's i n t e n t i o n w i t h regard t o human l i f e i s thus made 
c l e a r by h i s exercise of a u t h o r i t y and power i n causing 
t h a t l i f e t o e x i s t . This c r e a t i o n i s also evaluated by 
God as being good and i s cha r a c t e r i s e d by t h i s v e r d i c t i v e 
element as w e l l . Value i s given t o what God has made, 
value which can be recognised by man, not independently 
o f God, but only as h i s Lordship i s acknowledged. The 
goodness of c r e a t i o n i s thus a f u n c t i o n o f God's having 
judged i t t o be so and t h i s means t h a t i t s goodness w i l l 
n o t be seen unless God also i s seen. God also acts i n 
"^ "Do I . 9 p. 66. 
2 
I b i d . , p. 1 5 3 . Cf. D-HE, p. 3 7 « 
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the c r e a t i o n by promising h i s guidance and care f o r 
what he has made and, i n so doing, he reveals h i s i n t e n -
t i o n f o r the f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s h i p between h i m s e l f and 
the w o r l d . God as Creator i s thus one who "guarantees 
to m a i n t a i n and preserve what He c r e a t e s , " and i t i s 
t h i s task which i s performed by the "orders" o f 
c r e a t i o n . 1 The orders are the means by which God holds 
back "the i r r u p t i o n of the forces of chaos" and p r o t e c t s 
the world from d e s t r u c t i o n . 
P r i m a r i l y these orders are only of any p r a c t i -
c a l use when they r e a l l y do create and main-
t a i n order, however p r i m i t i v e or u n j u s t t h i s 
o r d e r i n g may be. Human l i f e cannot e x i s t 
w i t h o u t such orders. Therefore, even though 
only i n an i n d i r e c t fragmentary way. they are 
the W i l l of God, they are His g i f t . 2 
These orders are then t o be understood as a sign o f the 
promise o f God and as the means by which he f u l f i l l s h i s 
i n t e n t i o n t o ensure the p r e s e r v a t i o n of c r e a t i o n . 
Moral a c t i o n at t h i s p o l a r i t y of the C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c i s a matter of responding t o the a c t i o n of God, 
hi s exercise of a u t h o r i t y , h i s e v a l u a t i o n , and h i s commitment. 
The f i r s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the C h r i s t i a n i s t o recognise 
i n the c r e a t i o n t h i s t h r e e - f o l d a c t i o n of God and t o 
resolve t h a t the only way of l i f e worthy of one's commit-
ment i s one which appropriates these a c t i o n s i n t o moral 
decisions and a c t i o n s . Recognising God's claim on human 
l i f e means i n the f i r s t place l o o k i n g upon t h a t l i f e as 
1 I b i d . , p. 2 2 U o 2 I b i d . , p. 2 2 1 . 
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one o f c r e a t u r e l y dependence and renouncing any inde-
pendence from the Giver of l i f e . This a t t i t u d e t o l i f e 
i s the one which w i l l allow man t o f i n d h i s t r u e s e l f 
i n response t o God's address and i n which he becomes 
t h a t f o r which God has created Mm^ 
S i m i l a r l y men are also considered as those 
who are not something i n and f o r themselves, 
but only as those who from the f i r s t are 
placed i n a s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n to God and 
then also place themselves i n such a r e l a -
t i o n : e i t h e r p o s i t i v e or negative, obedient 
or disobedient, t r u e or f a l s e , comformable 
to God or impious. They too are always consid= 
ered as those who a c t : and the a c t i o n , whether 
expressing s i n or f a i t h , i s always understood 
as a c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o God.2 
To recognise God's claim on l i f e i s t o see t h a t one's 
whole l i f e ought t o be l i v e d i n r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h God 
and t h a t whatever a person does ought to be done i n the 
context of such a r e l a t i o n s h i p . Brunner i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s 
t o be a l i f e of obedience and o f service i n response t o 
the c a l l of God so t h a t the C h r i s t i a n commits h i m s e l f i n 
f a i t h "to do t h a t which honours God and makes His w i l l 
e f f e c t i v e . " 3 Continual openness t o God's commands and 
w i l l i n g n e s s t o serve h i s i n t e n t i o n t h e r e f o r e c h a r a c t e r i s e 
C h r i s t i a n d e c i s i o n i n response t o the claim o f the 
Creator. 
Moral a c t i o n must also be chara c t e r i s e d by the 
acceptance o f God's v e r d i c t upon the c r e a t i o n and by 
1 I b i d . , p. 7 8 . 
2D°KE, p. 3 2 . 
'D. I . , p. 1 8 8c 
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sharing the i n t e n t i o n of God i n pre s e r v i n g the c r e a t i o n 
means recognising "the e x i s t i n g r e a l i t y as the sphere 
i n which the Good i s t o be r e a l i z e d ; t h a t i s , t h i s 
a c t u a l r e a l i t y defines f o r us our course o f action."^ -
t o play i n C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n both because they 
are the necessary sphere of moral a c t i o n and because 
they are God's means of working w i t h i n the c r e a t i o n . 
Not only does he use them t o prevent the d e s t r u c t i o n o f 
h i s work; they are also the "means by which the d i v i n e 
wisdom compels men t o l i v e i n community." I n t h i s sense, 
the orders do d e f i n e to a c e r t a i n extent what the C h r i s t i a n 
i s . t o do f o r , no matter how imperfect they are, obedience 
to God's w i l l i m p l i e s obedience t o these orders. The 
d i f f i c u l t y i n Brunner's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n here i s i n determ-
i n i n g t o what extent such obedience t o the orders r e a l l y 
i s a matter of doing the w i l l of God and t o what extent .. 
i t i s obedience f o r the sake of these orders themselves. 
On the one hand; Brunner. does claim t h a t the w i l l o f God 
can be obeyed by f u l f i l l i n g the requirements of one's 
s t a t i o n and r o l e i n s o c i e t y , t h a t , indeed, the f i r s t duty 
of the C h r i s t i a n i s a conservative one, namely "to recog-
n i z e and adjust ourselves t o the orders He has created."-* 
Thus the n a t u r a l order f u r n i s h e s the bare minimum 
through the n a t u r a l " o r d e r s . Accepting t h i s v e r d i c t 
The Schopfungsordnung t h e r e f o r e have a p o s i t i v e r o l e 
1 I b i d p. 2 9 1 . 3 I b i d . , p. 208 . 
I b i d . , p. 210 . 
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requirements of C h r i s t i a n l i f e and only thus f a r i s i t 
i n d i c a t i v e of the w i l l o f God.-*-
Reverence f o r the' Creator, whose work, i n 
s p i t e of a l l human p e r v e r s i o n , i s the one 
e x i s t i n g r e a l i t y , demands as our f i r s t 
r e a c t i o n obedience t o the e x i s t i n g order, 
and g r a t e f u l acceptance of the goodness o f 
the Creator i n the orders, through which 
alone He makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r us t o serve 
our neighbour, and indeed, t o l i v e at a l l . 
The orders t h e r e f o r e are a means f o r obeying the w i l l o f 
God f o r f e l l o w s h i p among men, f e l l o w s h i p which would be 
destroyed, as would l i f e i t s e l f , by the loss o f these 
orders. The purpose of God's c r e a t i v e work i s thus ful=> 
f i l l e d by doing what these orders r e q u i r e and can f u r n i s h 
us w i t h u s e f u l knowledge as t o the content o f God's w i l l 
f o r human l i f e . 
Robinson argues t h a t t h i s emphasis on the created 
orders reveals a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f l a w i n Brunner's e t h i c , 
f o r 
[ h i s ] e t h i c a l thought was pervaded by the 
n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y , the e r r o r o f d e r i v i n g 
"ought" from " i s , " the moral from the n a t u r a l , 
the mistake o f s u b o r d i n a t i n g the former t o 
the l a t t e r instead o f a f f i r m i n g i t s supremacy 
as the t r u e supernatural. 3 
± R e i n h o l d Niebuhr, "The Concept o f 'Order o f 
Crea t i o n ' i n Emil Brunner's.Social E t h i c , " i n The Theology 
of Emil Brunner, ed. Chas. W. Kegley, The L i b r a r y o f 
L i v i n g Theology, V o l . 3 (Macmillan, New York, 1 9 6 2 ) , p. 
2 6 6 - 7 . 
. I ., p. 2 1 i i . 
Robinson, op. c i t . , p. 2 3 U « 
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He c i t e s as an example of t h i s f a l l a c y Brunner's attempt 
to derive an " i d e a l of marriage as a l i f e l o n g r e l a t i o n ^ 
ship between one man and one woman from the bare n a t u r a l 
f a c t s t h a t every c h i l d i s the o f f s p r i n g of one man and 
one woman." Brunner's i n t e r e s t i n such an order as 
marriage stems, Robinson argues, not from i t s moral 
character nor from i t s being commanded by God, but from 
the f a c t t h a t i t i s n a t u r a l t o human l i f e . ' ' " I t seems 
t h a t f o r Brunner, however, t h i s n a t u r a l f a c t takes on 
moral s i g n i f i c a n c e as a person comes to see i n the 
n a t u r a l world the a c t i o n and involvement of God so t h a t 
"marriage i s not a n a t u r a l occurrence, but a moral act 
based upon the fo u n d a t i o n of a n a t u r a l occurrence." 
To see i n t h i s n a t u r a l f a c t an a c t i o n of deeper s i g n i f i -
cance i s t o adopt an onlook which appropriates God's 
judgement upon and promise t o h i s c r e a t i o n and by which 
one t h e r e f o r e can make decisions t h a t w i l l f u l f i l l the 
int-ention of God h i m s e i f . 
The second a c t i o n - p i c t u r e which c o n s t i t u t e s the 
other p o l a r i t y of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n and a c t i o n 
"^The p o i n t Robinson intends t o make by the use 
of t h i s example w i l l be brought out more c l e a r l y i n our 
c r i t i q u e o f Brunner's e t h i c . Robinson does claim t h a t 
f o r Brunner the guidance provided by the orders "does 
not contain any e t h i c a l sentiment but has r a t h e r 'a more 
t e c h n i c a l f u n c t i o n : t h a t of g i v i n g the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . ' . 
Time and again Brunner described the orders as p r o v i d i n g 
no more than a framework f o r the C h r i s t i a n l i f e and as 
'based upon a standard of law which i s t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t 
from t h a t which i s known by f a i t h o 1 " These references 
show Brunner at h i s most d u a l i s t i c . I b i d . , p. 196=7. 
See D. I . , p. 150, 335« 
^Brunner, D. I . , p. 357. Cf. Niebuhr, op 0 c i t o j 
p. 266. 
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i s t h a t of God's redemptive a c t i v i t y , "As Creator He 
i s the beginning and the ground o f a l l e x i s t e n c e , the 
source of a l l l i f e ; as Redeemer He i s the End, the Goal, 
towards which a l l existence t e n d s „ T h e end towards 
which God w i l l b r i n g h i s c r e a t i o n i s chara c t e r i s e d by 
the f u l f i l l m e n t of the r e l a t i o n s h i p ' which God o r i g i n a l l y 
intended and Brunner claims t h a t i t i s God alone who can 
f u l f i l l h i s own w i l l . Although " i t i s His w i l l t h a t God 
w i l l s t o accomplish i n the w o r l d " and although "He i s not 
the servant of some purpose outside Himself," yet " i n His 
love o . o He sets up an End outside Himself w i t h o u t 
ceasing t o be His own End." 2 Brunner describes t h i s 
end as 
the communion "of the creature w i t h Himself, 
the Creator. This Divine w i l l f o r "community" 
i s God's Sovereign W i l l . Therefore s a l v a t i o n , 
b e a t i t u d e , the f u l f i l l m e n t o f the purpose of 
l i f e , b o t h f o r humanity as a whole, and f o r 
the i n d i v i d u a l , i s included i n God's r o y a l 
purpose.3 
For Brunner, t h i s d e sire of God t o f u l f i l l a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h man i n which both God and man can be t r u e t o them° 
selves i s an expression of God's love f o r h i s c r e a t i o n , 
a love which can overcome the resi s t a n c e of man's s e l f -
w i l l expressed i n s i n and which w i l l l a s t when even f a i t h 
and hope have vanished.** The redemptive a c t i o n o f God i s 
thus h i s sel f - i n v o l v e m e n t i n the h i s t o r y o f the n a t u r a l 
world t o b r i n g h i s c r e a t i o n towards the goal f o r which -
^"Ibid ., p. 1 2 2 o 
2 
I b i d . , p. 1 1 9 o 
3 I b i d . 
I b i d . , p. l6ljo 
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i t was created, namely the establishment o f a l o v i n g 
community under h i s k i n g s h i p . 
The orders of c r e a t i o n can then be seen i n the 
context of the purpose f o r which God i s preserving t h i s 
world from destruction,. 
For He w i l l s t o lead the Creation out beyond 
i t s e l f , i n t o the p e r f e c t i n g of a l l t h i n g s . God 
does not preserve the world simply i n order to 
preserve i t , but i n order t h a t He may p e r f e c t 
i t . Therefore His a f f i r m a t i o n of the e x i s t i n g 
order i s only conditional~-namely, i t i s con-
d i t i o n e d by t h i s aim, i t i s the a f f i r m a t i o n of 
a t r a n s i t i o n a l s t a t e . 1 
The orders do not represent any form of t r a d i t i o n a l 
n a t u r a l law p r e c i s e l y because they are transformed by 
God's purpose f o r them and are allowed to e x i s t only 
i n so f a r as they compel man t o l i v e i n community. The 
goal f o r which they were created i s thus i m p l i c i t i n 
t h e i r existence and they are t o be obeyed f o r t h i s reason 
only. The orders, seen from the perspective of God's 
redeeming a c t i v i t y , do not r e q u i r e acts of love which 
Brunner understands according t o the model of personal 
I-Thou r e l a t i o n s h i p , and thus do not r e q u i r e decisions 
which f o l l o w the l o g i c o f love or o f f a i t h . ^ They a l l o w 
I b i d . , p. 21U. 
p 
Cf. Ramsey, Nine Modern M o r a l i s t s , p. 202. 
These "orders" are described i n a somewhat d i f f e r e n t way -
i n Brunner's J u s t i c e and the Soci a l Order, t r a n s l . Mary 
H o t t i n g e r (Harper and Brothers, London, 19U5), which i s 
more d u a l i s t i c i n 'Its c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c s and Ramsey claims i t i s not a l t o g e t h e r t y p i c a l o f 
Brunner's w r i t i n g since i t more c l o s e l y resembles a 
Cat h o l i c n a t u r a l law theory. See Ramsey, op. c i t . , p. 201„ 
Brunner, D. I . , p. 223« 
s i n f u l men t o e s t a b l i s h some order of j u s t i c e i n s o c i e t y 
by which human r e l a t i o n s h i p s are p o s s i b l e , so t h a t 
j u s t i c e becomes i n f a c t the strange work of love by not 
a l l o w i n g human community t o be a l t o g e t h e r destroyed. 
The second task o f the C h r i s t i a n corresponding 
t o the f i r s t conservative one i s thus t o transform the 
s o c i a l and n a t u r a l order by r e d i r e c t i n g i t towards the 
coming kingdom o f God. I n t h i s sense the C h r i s t i a n i s 
to do the works of l o v e , a love which "cannot exhaust 
i t s e l f i n s a t i s f y i n g the n a t u r a l demands o f l i f e " but 
which must become ser v i c e t o one's f e l l o w men i n the 
l i g h t of God's chosen d e s t i n y f o r mankind."1" E t h i c a l 
a c t i o n at t h i s p o l a r i t y becomes r e v o l u t i o n a r y and the 
C h r i s t i a n i s c a l l e d t o maintain a "very c r i t i c a l and 
ch a l l e n g i n g a t t i t u d e towards the world i n i t s present 
s t a t e . " Responding t o the purpose o f God t o redeem 
t h i s world from s i n requires the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t "the 
w i l l of God does not merely t e l l us to adapt ourselves, 
t o accept, but also t o r e s i s t , t o p r o t e s t , not t o be 
'conformed t o t h i s w o r l d . 1 i n f a i t h , the C h r i s t i a n 
accepts God's v e r d i c t upon t h i s s i n f u l world and b e l i e v e s 
i n hope God's promise t o f u l f i l l - h i s i n t e n t i o n f o r crea= 
t i o n , an i n t e n t i o n which alone i s t o serve as the basis 
f o r the e t h i c a l decisions which a C h r i s t i a n must make i n 
t h i s w o rld. This i s the e t h i c a l meaning o f conversion 
1 I b i d . , p. 2 l £ o 
2 
I b i d . , p. 127. 
I b i d . , p. 217, 
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and redemption f o r the C h r i s t i a n , t h a t he i s to ignore 
the e x i s t i n g orders and inaugurate a completely new 
l i n e o f a c t i o n stemming from and moving towards the 
coming Kingdom of God. 1 E t h i c a l a c t i o n i s transformed 
by the c e r t a i n t y of God's d e c i s i v e a c t i o n i n the f u t u r e , 
a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n which Ramsey describes as a " t e l e o -
l o g i c a l l y dynamic connection°°running backward, so t o 
speak, between redemption, p r e s e r v a t i o n and c r e a t i o n . " 2 -
I t i s because o f t h i s hope, which i s the acceptance o f 
God's promise w i t h c e r t a i n t y , t h a t the task o f the 
C h r i s t i a n i n the world appears p a r a d o x i c a l . 
The e x i s t i n g orders, behind which stands the 
Divine order, c o n s t i t u t e s the framework w i t h i n 
which our service of our neighbour i s to be 
performed; they form the vessel which we are 
to f i l l w i t h the content of l o v e . We have 
j u s t said t h a t the f i r s t t h i n g necessary i s 
not to a l t e r t h i s vessel but t o f i l l i t w i t h 
the new content. But there are vessels which 
are c o n t r a r y t o t h i s content of l o v e , and i t 
i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t such vessels ought t o 
be smashed. Where the e x i s t i n g order i s no 
longer u s e f u l but harmful, i t i s r i p e f o r 
d e s t r u c t i o n . 3 
Although emphasis on the c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y of God shows 
the n a t u r a l order t o be i n d i c a t i v e o f God's promise t o 
h i s c r e a t i o n , the redemptive a c t i v i t y causes a " f r u i t f u l 
t e n s i o n " between these orders and the command of God t h a t 
l i f e w i l l be f u l f i l l e d o n l y i n acts o f love.** Therefore, 
Ramsey, op. c i t . , p. 20!;. 
2 I b i d . , p. 205. 
^Brunner, D. I . , p. 2l8. 
^Ramsey, op. c i t . , p. 202. 
because of s i n , the love which i s possible i n personal 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s o f t e n " r e f r a c t e d " and one acts i n a 
way which love alone does not require? yet one i s 
o b l i g a t e d t o act and does so i n the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t 
God w i l l f u l f i l l h i s own i n t e n t i o n f o r t h i s w o r l d . 1 
These two a c t i o n - p i c t u r e s have i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
f o r Brunner the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c i s r a d i c a l l y t h e o c e n t r i c . 
The C h r i s t i a n e t h i c i s ch a r a c t e r i s e d by the f a c t t h a t "a 
man cannot begin t o l i v e by i t except through a r a d i c a l 
r e o r i e n t a t i o n of w i l l whereby the man's p r a c t i c a l o u t l o o k 
i s centred i n God r a t h e r than i n h i m s e l f or i n humanity 0" 
This r e o r i e n t a t i o n by which f a i t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d r e q u i r e s 
t h a t "Every e t h i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n [be] connected w i t h the 
whole Idea o f God, " t h a t the moral decisions o f the 
C h r i s t i a n f l o w from the actions of God i n which h i s 
3 
i n t e n t i o n i s revealed. Indeed, Brunner goes so f a r as 
to claim t h a t " C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s i s the science o f human 
conduct as i t i s determined by D i v i n e conduct" and i t i s 
j u s t the nature of t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n which causes so 
many d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i q u e o f h i s 
e t h i c . ^ Brunner's an a l y s i s of p h i l o s o p h i c a l e t h i c s l e d 
hira t o ass e r t t h a t the major a n t i t h e s i s which could not 
be resolved by n a t u r a l morality=~namely, the gap between 
" i s " and "o u g h t , " — c o u l d be overcome by a m o r a l i t y based 
1 I b i d o 
^Robinson, op. c i t . , p. 180. 
^Brunner, D. I„, p„ Q$„ 
* * I b i d . , p 0 860 
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upon the r e v e a l i n g a c t i v i t y of God. 
I t i s He who u n i t e s what i s w i t h what ought 
t o be, He, the Creator of Nature and of the 
s p i r i t , of a l l t h a t e x i s t s and of ideas? His 
w i l l i s the source of t h a t which i s and the 
basis of t h a t which ought t o b e . l 
What ought t o be i s known by understanding the a c t i o n 
of God and moral a c t i o n must be God a c t i n g through human 
beings„ 
The Good i s t h a t which God does; the goodness 
of man can be no other than l e t t i n g h i m s e l f 
be placed w i t h i n the a c t i v i t y of God. This 
i s what " b e l i e v i n g " means i n the New Testa~ 
merit. And t h i s f a i t h i s the p r i n c i p l e o f 
"ethics."2 
Robinson i n t e r p r e t s such an emphasis i n Brunner's thought 
as heteronomous f o r i n t h i s " e t h i c of redemption" Brunner 
only "gave a one=sided v e r s i o n of the t r u t h D He repre-= 
sented f a i t h as i f i t were e n t i r e l y a matter of st a n d i n g , 
or r a t h e r of being placed, i n the sun . „ „ "3 Indeed 
t h i s dependence o f m o r a l i t y upon the a c t i o n of God i s the 
only a l t e r n a t i v e f o r one who has so r a d i c a l l y conceived 
the s i n f u l n e s s and e v i l which pervades the whole n a t u r a l 
and human realm. Lewis has claimed t h a t t h i s i s "a most 
important f e a t u r e o f recent t h e o l o g i c a l controversy, 
namely the assumption t h a t there, i s no a l t e r n a t i v e t o the 
theory of s p e c i a l r e v e l a t i o n other than t h a t of making 
^ I b i d . , p, l l i j . B 
2 
I b i d . , p 0 55° 
3 
Robinson, op. c i t . , p„ 175o 
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e t h i c a l ideas dependent on the nature of man h i m s e l f . 
This heteronomy can be^ seen t o have two consequences f o r 
Brunner's e x p l i c a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n m o r a l i t y and they are 
ones which c o n s t i t u t e serious o b j e c t i o n s t o h i s analysis". 
On the one hand, Brunner claims t h a t s i n and e v i l 
pervade a l l areas o f human r e a l i t y except those which are 
touched by God or transformed by obedience t o him 0 Sin= 
fulness i s cha r a c t e r i s e d by bondage i n which one's knowl° 
edge and experience are l i m i t e d t o the n a t u r a l world and 
i n which one cannot s a t i s f a c t o r i l y f u l f i l l the moral 
demands f e l t by " n a t u r a l man." This means t h a t f o r 
Brunner man cannot discover what he ought t o do by 
reason, but only by f a i t h i n which the f r u s t r a t i o n s o f 
reason's quest f o r the good are overcome. Indeed 
the nearer anything l i e s t o t h a t centre of 
existence where we are concerned w i t h the 
whole, t h a t i s , w i t h man's r e l a t i o n t o God 
and the being of the person, the gre a t e r i s 
the disturbance of r a t i o n a l knowledge by s i n . 2 
F a i t h i s able t o give d i r e c t i o n t o one's actions pre= 
c i s e l y because " i t i s i t s e l f c o n t r o l l e d from w i t h o u t " 
and because f a i t h "can only achieve self-knowledge 
because i t i s known by God."3 This l a c k of the knowledge 
of God due t o s i n i s experienced by the moral agent aa a 
"sense o f ought" and m o r a l i t y which flows from such a 
"^"Lewis, Morals and Re v e l a t i o n , p. l l + ^ l ^ . 
p 
Brunner, R&R, 'p„ 383„ 
3 D o I . , p. l 6 l 0 
source i s a by-product of s i n as w e l l . 
Obedience due t o a 3ense of u n w i l l i n g con° 
s t r a i n t i s bondage, and indeed the bondage o f 
s i n . I f I f e e l I ought t o do r i g h t , i t i s a 
sign t h a t I cannot do i t . I f I could r e a l l y 
do i t , there would be no question of "ought" 
about i t at a l l . The sense of "ought" shows 
me the Good at an i n f i n i t e , impassable dis° 
tance from my w i l l . 1 
What i s considered by some forms of n a t u r a l m o r a l i t y t o 
be an e s s e n t i a l c o n s t i t u e n t of m o r a l i t y i s considered by 
Brunner as evidence of the g r e a t e s t s i n , namely man's 
p r i d e over against God, and i t i s t h i s r e j e c t i o n of the 
moral which makes C h r i s t i a n f a i t h as a source o f m o r a l i t y 
so d i f f i c u l t t o understand i n Brunner's thought. 
Brunner can only speak of f a i t h i n p a r a d o x i c a l 
terms f o r i t i s b o t h a "passive y i e l d i n g t o God," a 
" s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n which springs from the d e l i b e r a t e 
acceptance of one's l i f e from the Hand o f God," and i t 
i s God's g i f t and a c t i o n upon man by the c r e a t i o n i n him 
of "the new man."2 "God demands the obedience of f a i t h . 
God gives the earnest determination t o do something. 
Yet p r e c i s e l y who i s the agent who acts here i n " p u l l i n g 
oneself t o g e t h e r " and what i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the o l d man l i v i n g under s i n and the new man created and 
given by God? Robinson suggests t h a t Brunner here p o s i t s 
^ I b i d . , p. Jl\.„ Here as Robinson suggests B runner 0 
uses "ought" i n i t s p s y c h o l o g i c a l r a t h e r than i t s l o g i c a l 
meaning. Op. c i t . , p. 235» 
p 
I b i d . , p. 161. 
3 I b i d a , p„ 81. 
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whether* w i t t i n g l y or n o t , what I have c a l l e d 
a sphere, a l i f e , an existence, a n a t u r e , a 
heart which i s on every side and i n the most 
absolute sense the g i f t of God. Even f o r the 
C h r i s t i a n , however, there i s alongside t h i s 
g i f t another r e a l i t y , an a l t e r ego, the s i n f u l 
ingrown s e l f ; and between these two there i s , 
one can only suspect, an u n r e m i t t i n g warfare. 
I f t h i s account i s t r u e , then Brunner has h i m s e l f adopted 
an understanding o f the s e l f f o r which he accused Kant of 
being g u i l t y , and, unless Brunner i s prepared to admit 
t h a t f o r the C h r i s t i a n as f o r the n a t u r a l m o r a l i s t e t h i c s 
i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by the a n t i t h e s i s of " i s " and "ought" 
w i t h i n man's own being, then must he not say t h a t the 
"new man" does not e x i s t at a l l ? I t would seem t h a t 
Brunner must say t h i s new man e x i s t s only i n the act o f 
obedience by which God's s p i r i t u a l power i s appropriated 
and i s t h e r e f o r e never a possession o f man or a substance 
however "g h o s t l y " w i t h i n man* 
has to' do w i t h what sense i t makes t o apeak of a Chris -
t i a n " m o r a l i t y " at a l l . Brunner h i m s e l f claims t h a t 
c e r t a i n l y any o l d or untransformed n o t i o n of m o r a l i t y i s 
not s u i t a b l e f o r understanding the C h r i s t i a n l i f e a t a l l . 
This i s the new s t a t e o f l i f e , t h a t man's 
l i f e i s no more centred i n the "ought," but 
i n the " i s " - = i n the " i s " which God has g i v e n . 
The word of grace i s not an imperative l i k e 
t h a t o f the law, but an i n d i c a t i v e . Not 
"Man must be" but "You are w i t h God," through 
God's a c t a 2 
Robinson, op. c i t . , p. 23f><> 
The deeper question which t h i s r a i s e s , however, 
Rather, 
runner, G&M, p c 8 l ° 2 0 
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Indeed the whole o f the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c would be charac= 
t e r i s e d by i n d i c a t i v e s o n l y were i t not f o r the f a c t 
t h a t s i n s t i l l pervades man's n a t u r a l life„ Since 
"round [man's] neck there s t i l l hangs the o l d Adam . « 0 
the i n d i c a t i v e o f the D i v i n e promise becomes the impera~ 
t i v e of the Divine command.""*" Robinson argues t h e r e f o r e 
t h a t Brunner's understanding of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s depends 
upon the d e r i v a t i o n of an "ought" from an " i s " even 
though t h i s " i s " i s s u p e r n a t u r a l l y conceived, i n terms 
of D i v i n e a c t i v i t y . Thus 
he d i d not j u s t derive the moral from the 
n a t u r a l but allowed the l a t t e r t o swallow i t 
up and a c t u a l l y s u b s t i t u t e d the n a t u r a l , even 
i f i t was the supernatural n a t u r a l l y conceived, 
f o r the normative»2 
This i s "the instance par excellence of the n a t u r a l i s t i c 
f a l l a c y i n Brunner."3 Lewis also suggests the loss o f 
the d i s t i n c t i v e l y moral character of "ought" when i t i s 
made t o be dependent upon a r e l i g i o u s source. . Since our 
e n t i r e knowledge of the Good i s a r e s u l t of God's revela° 
t i o n of h i s person and w i l l , there can be no autonomous 
or o b j e c t i v e i n q u i r y i n t o the nature o f Good by which man's 
o b l i g a t i o n t o do i t could be known. I n Brunner's attempt 
to preserve the o b j e c t i v i t y of the Good, he has i n f a c t 
made i t a d e r i v a t i v e n o t i o n which r e q u i r e s the support o f 
•^ D. I . , p„ 80 o 
P 
Robinson, op. c i t , , p. 235° 
3 I b i d . , p„ 23U» 
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God's w i l l f o r i t s character t o be known and f u l f i l l e d . " ' " 
The r e s u l t o f t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of God's w i l l and the 
Good would mean t h a t i n Brunner's analysis o f C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n there i s a great "either°or„" 
I n i t s e l f the o u t r i g h t r e j e c t i o n of n a t u r a l 
m o r a l i t y , l o c k , stock and b a r r e l , i s bound t o 
issue i n the dilemma, e i t h e r law w i t h o u t con-
t e n t or else l i f e w i t h o u t law, e i t h e r formalism 
or n a t u r a l i s m . Moreover, i n t u r n , t h i s dilemma 
i n e v i t a b l y leads t o another, t o the unhappy 
choice between a sheerly heteronomous a u t h o r i t y 
on the one s i d e , which w i l l a r b i t r a r i l y supply 
the missing content, and a completely autonomous 
way of l i f e on the ot h e r , w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y , 
norm or p r i n c i p l e . 2 
This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c l e a r l y hinges upon what Brunner meant 
by the claim t h a t "What God does and w i l l s i s goodj a l l 
t h a t opposes the w i l l o f God i s bad e The Good has i t s 
basis and i t s existence s o l e l y i n the w i l l of Godo" 
What i s suggested by the analysis of Brunner u s i n g 
the model of s e l f ^ i n v o l v i n g language i s t h a t from w i t h i n 
the perspective o f f a i t h there can be no s t r i c t s eparation 
of e t h i c s and epistemology«^ What the C h r i s t i a n claims i s 
t h a t God reveals h i m s e l f t o man as the r e a l i t y o f the 
hi g h e s t Good, a r e a l i t y which can be recognised only by 
man's w i l l i n g n e s s t o examine and t o l i v e h i s own l i f e i n 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o i t . The a t t i t u d e of f a i t h which charac° 
t e r i s e s the C h r i s t i a n way of l i f e i s f o r Brunner a judge-
ment t h a t the whole o f l i f e i s t o be seen i n i t s t r u e 
1 L e w i s , Morals and the New Theology, p. 2$£o 
Robinson, op. c i t . , p. 19k« 
•j 
^Cf 0 Lewis, Morals and Revelation, p„ 31s,3<. 
nature by accepting the v e r d i c t which God has made upon 
i t and t h i s means t o know r e a l i t y i n i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o 
a h o l y God„ F a i t h i s , secondly, a commitment t o l i v i n g 
as one determined by the i n t e n t i o n s and a c t i o n s of God 
and the adoption of a way o f l i f e i n which a l o v i n g 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h God and one's fellowmen can be 
r e a l i s e d o I t i s the claim of f a i t h t h a t goodness i s 
only known as one i s prepared t o take up a stance w i t h . 
regard t o God and i t i s a stance which, Brunner claims, 
cannot be j u s t i f i e d by reference to any n a t u r a l m o r a l i t y 
or any arguments of reason, but which i s the r e s u l t of 
God's w i l l i n g and g i v i n g it» 
CHAPTER V I I 
DIALECTICAL ETHICS 
The work of Reinhold Niebuhr a f f o r d s us another 
unique i n s i g h t i n t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p of i n d i c a t i v e and 
imperative i n C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . I n h i s 
i n t e l l e c t u a l autobiography Niebuhr s a i d , 
I cannot and do not claim t o be a t h e o l o g i a n . 
I have taught C h r i s t i a n S o c i a l E t h i c s f o r a 
quar t e r of a century and have also d e a l t i n 
the a n c i l l a r y f i e l d o f " a p o l o g e t i c s . " My 
avocational i n t e r e s t as a k i n d of c i r c u i t 
r i d e r i n the colleges and u n i v e r s i t i e s has 
prompted an i n t e r e s t i n the defense and j u s t i = 
f i c a t i o n o f the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h i n a secular 
age, p a r t i c u l a r l y among what Schleiermacher 
c a l l e d C h r i s t i a n i t y ' s " i n t e l l e c t u a l despisers<>" 
I have never been very competent i n the n i c e 
p o i n t s of pure theology; and I must confess 
t h a t I have not been s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t e r e s t e d 
h e r e t o f o r e t o acquire the competence. 
Niebuhr d i d not claim t o be a t h e o l o g i a n i n the systematic 
sense o f t h i s task and h i s work does not resemble any k i n d 
of dogmatic account of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of God and man o f 
the k i n d we see i n e i t h e r T i l l i c h or Brunner. Indeed i t 
i s p r e c i s e l y because o f h i s a b i l i t y as a p r o p h e t i c voice 
i n the contemporary world t h a t Uiebuhr's understanding o f 
the m o r a l i t y i m p l i c i t i n the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h i s o f such 
consequence. As Brunner has commented, "With him theology 
Reinhold Niebuhr, " I n t e l l e c t u a l Autobiography," 
i n Reinhold Niebuhr: His R e l i g i o u s , S o c i a l , and P o l i t i c a l 
Thought, e d i t e d by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. B r e t a l l , 
The L i b r a r y of L i v i n g Theology, V o l . 2 (The Macmillan 
Company, New York, 1956), p. 3. 
2U2 
2 J | 3 
broke i n t o the w o r l d j theology was no longer quarantined, 
and men o f l e t t e r s , p h ilosophers, s o c i o l o g i s t s , h i s -
t o r i a n s , even statesmen, began t o l i s t e n . Once more 
theology was becoming a s p i r i t u a l f o r c e t o be reckoned -
w i t h . " 1 Niebuhr's was a voice t h a t penetrated c r i t i c a l l y 
i n t o the dominant i n s t i t u t i o n s and .modes of thought 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f western c i v i l i s a t i o n w i t h b o t h n e g a t i v e , 
harsh judgements and p o s i t i v e moral imperatives d i r e c t e d 
towards the a c t u a l i s a t i o n o f love i n human h i s t o r y . 
Niebuhr's c r i t i q u e of c u l t u r e and h i s i n s i s t e n c e 
upon the n e c e s s i t y f o r responsible moral decisions do not 
begin from an examination o f the nature and content o f 
God's w i l l , as i n Brunner, but r a t h e r from h i s per c e p t i v e 
i n s i g h t i n t o the nature of man and o f h i s t o r i c a l e x i s t e n c e . 
Our analysis o f h i s e t h i c w i l l begin t h e r e f o r e w i t h 
Niebuhr's understanding o f man's nature and d e s t i n y from 
which he both c r i t i c i s e s t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l and 
r e l i g i o u s thought and Reconstructs h i s own v e r s i o n of 
n a t u r a l law. Prom t h i s perspective we w i l l then be able 
t o show the relevance o f love as b o t h the ground and the 
goal o f e t h i c a l a c t i o n . Niebuhr's dis c u s s i o n o f love as 
the "law o f l i f e " and as the "impossible p o s s i b i l i t y " i s 
important not only f o r the i n s i g h t i t o f f e r s regarding 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f f a i t h and reason but also f o r the type 
of decision-making which i t i m p l i e s and r e q u i r e s . An 
anal y s i s o f the l o g i c o f d e c i s i o n i n Niebuhr's thought 
"'•Emil Brunner, "Some Remarks on Reinhold Niebuhr's 
Work as a C h r i s t i a n Thinker," i n Kegley and B r e t a l l , 
op. c i t . , p. 2 9 o 
w i l l conclude our study and w i l l i n d i c a t e the dynamic 
and self-renewing q u a l i t y o f Niebuhr's e t h i c i n which the 
c r e a t i v e t e n s i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of human l i f e i s con= 
t r o l l e d and f u l f i l l e d i n man's encounter w i t h the love 
of God. 
Like Brunner, Niebuhr begins h i s major anthro-
p o l o g i c a l work, as w e l l as h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Chris= 
t i a n e t h i c s , w i t h c r i t i c i s m s o f previous n o t i o n s o f man • 
and of the moral imperative t o which he owes obedience, 
and i t i s i n the context of these negative i n s i g h t s t h a t 
his. own c o n s t r u c t i v e understanding o f these issues can 
best be i n t e r p r e t e d . Niebuhr claims i n p a r t i c u l a r t h a t 
two major p o s i t i o n s have ch a r a c t e r i s e d r e l i g i o u s and 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g about t h i s subject and t h a t these 
are inadequate both f o r t h e i r f a i l u r e t o take the whole 
nature o f man i n t o account and f o r t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o 
y i e l d .an e t h i c i n which human l i f e may be f u l f i l l e d . 
The p r e s u p p o s i t i o n which gives r i s e to such c r i t i c i s m 
i s thus Niebuhr's b e l i e f t h a t both r a t i o n a l i s t and 
i r r a t i o n a l i s t accounts of human existence cannot do 
j u s t i c e t o the dual nature of man. Thus an e t h i c which 
w i l l be adequate t o man as he is" w i l l r e q u i r e a f i r m e r 
f o u n d a t i o n than has been so f a r provided. 
How d i f f i c u l t i t i s t o do j u s t i c e to b o t h the 
uniqueness o f man and h i s a f f i n i t i e s w i t h the 
world o f nature below him i s proved by the 
almost unvarying tendency o f those p h i l o s o p h i e s , 
which describe and emphasize the r a t i o n a l 
f a c u l t i e s o f man or h i s c a p a c i t y f o r s e l f = 
transcendence t o f o r g e t h i s r e l a t i o n t o nature 
and to i d e n t i f y him, prematurely and unquali= 
f i e d l y , w i t h the d i v i n e and the e t e r n a l | and 
o f n a t u r a l i s t i c philosophies to obscure the 
uniqueness of man.^ 
Niebuhr's i n t e r e s t i n the h i s t o r i c a l existence o f man 
and h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t the r e a l i t i e s o f experience must 
be the t e s t o f any anthropology or e t h i c s i s i n d i c a t i v e 
of h i s use o f the e m p i r i c a l method i n theology and sup-
ports the view o f one o f h i s admirers t h a t 
to a mind l i k e t h a t of Niebuhr the e m p i r i c a l 
method, when conceived i n a p r o p e r l y broad 
way, has the great advantage over the r a t i o n -
a l i s t i c , t h a t i t recognizes the l i m i t a t i o n s 
of man's f i n i t e reason and i s less l i k e l y t o 
f o s t e r i n t e l l e c t u a l pretensions. 2 
This method w i l l become c l e a r by examining the nature of 
Niebuhr's argument and w i l l show also the way i n which 
Niebuhr i s able t o weave together i n s i g h t s from b i b l i c a l 
f a i t h and from experience i n a very d i f f e r e n t way from 
T i l l i c h . 
I n o p p o s i t i o n t o T i l l i c h , Niebuhr's i n s i g h t i n t o 
the nature o f man and h i s appeal t o the t r u t h o f the 
C h r i s t i a n f a i t h do not- i n d i c a t e a w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept 
s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y the dominant trends o f thought o f h i s era. 
Thus, as Richardson has suggested, Niebuhr i s more 
"prophet" than "apologist,," 
He i s f a r too c r i t i c a l of the presuppositions 
of our age t o be a conventional a p o l o g i s t „ . . 
I n an important sense a prophet's f u n c t i o n i s 
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (Charles 
Scribner's Sons, New York, 19^1)» Vol„ I , p. i | j h e r e a f t e r 
c i t e d as NDM, I or I I . 
George P. Thomas, "Niebuhr on Reason and Meta° 
ph y s i c s j Reinhold Niebuhr: A Symposium," i n Union Semi° 
nary Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . X I , No. k (1956), p. 21; h e r e a f t e r 
c i t e d as "Symposium." 
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e x a c t l y the opposite o f an a p o l o g i s t ' s : 
instead of makings sympathetic contact w i t h 
the thought o f h i s age the prophet i s com-
p e l l e d by an inner n e c e s s i t y to c r i t i c i z e 
and r e j e c t i t . l 
Niebuhr defined h i s opponents i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l world 
as the r a t i o n a l i s t s or i d e a l i s t s and the i r r a t i o n a l i s t s 
or n a t u r a l i s t s each of whom i n various ways attempts t o 
o f f e r an e x p l a n a t i o n of man and h i s moral l i f e which i s 
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u l t i m a t e l y one-sided and t h e r e f o r e d i s t o r t e d . On the 
one hand, r a t i o n a l i t y places the g r e a t e s t emphasis on 
man's a b i l i t y to transcend h i s p h y s i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l 
existence t o enquire i n t o the character of t h a t existence 
or t o e x p l a i n the essence of human na t u r e . Man's unique-
ness, r a t i o n a l i t y claims, i s a f u n c t i o n of h i s r a t i o n a l 
f a c u l t i e s , the a b i l i t y o f h i s nous t o t h i n k , r e f l e c t , 
enquire, argue, c a l c u l a t e , reason, and i t i s t h i s capa-
c i t y which i s allowed t o subdue and transform the aspects 
of man's existence i n t o some k i n d of u n i t a r y or coherent 
system of thought. I t was p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the c l a s s i c a l 
r a t i o n a l i s m o f Plato and A r i s t o t l e t h a t Niebuhr found the 
most o b j e c t i o n a b l e tendencies and ones which are s t i l l 
present i n modern versions of r a t i o n a l i s m . On the one 
-^Alan Richardson, "Reinhold Niebuhr as A p o l o g i s t , 
i n Kegley and B r e t a l l , op. c i t . , p. 216. 
^ I n choosing these two views Niebuhr shows h i s 
a f f i n i t y w i t h Brunner who also argued against the moral 
philosophy of i d e a l i s m and n a t u r a l i s m . See above, pages 
198 -99 . Cf. Brunner, "Some Remarks . . .," i n which he 
n o t i c e s the i n f l u e n c e o f h i s thought e s p e c i a l l y i n 
Niebuhr's NDM, p. 32-3, and Niebuhr's "Reply t o I n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n and C r i t i c i s m , " i n Kegley and B r e t a l l , op. c i t . 
i n which he acknowledges t h i s debt to Brunner ( p . 431-2).. 
Hereafter c i t e d as "Reply." 
\ 
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hand, 
r a t i o n a l i s m p r a c t i c a l l y i d e n t i f i e s r a t i o n a l 
man (who i s e s s e n t i a l man) w i t h the divines 
f o r reason i s , as the c r e a t i v e p r i n c i p l e , 
i d e n t i c a l w i t h God.l 
On the other hand, t h i s spark of the d i v i n e i n man 
r e s u l t s i n the d u a l i s t i c tendency o f r a t i o n a l i s m . 
The dualism has the consequence f o r the 
d o c t r i n e of man of i d e n t i f y i n g the body 
w i t h e v i l and of assuming the e s s e n t i a l 
goodness of mind or s p i r i t . ^ 
Niebuhr i s thus opposed to the p i c t u r e o f man which i s 
o f f e r e d by those who would use reason only t o account 
f o r the uniqueness of man. 
Yet Niebuhr's c r i t i c i s m s o f r a t i o n a l i t y go much , 
deeper than t h i s , f o r he i s also concerned w i t h the meta~ 
p h y s i c a l or o n t o l o g i c a l systems which are created by 
reason as explanations o f man's existence and h i s t o r y and 
as the source f o r moral imperatives by which man i s t o be 
guided. I t i s t h i s which i d e a l i s m , i n b o t h i t s s u b j e c t i v e 
and o b j e c t i v e forms, attempts t o do and Niebuhr o f f e r e d 
several reasons f o r i t s inadequacy as an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
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of man. Ra t i o n a l i s m searches f o r a u n i t a r y theory i n 
which the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s and i n c o n g r u i t i e s o f l i f e , 
h i s t o r y , and even nature can be resolved and, since t h i s 
1NDM I , p. ?. 
p 
I b i d . ; c f . p. 112. 
-'Sometimes Niebuhr speaks as though i d e a l i s m were 
on l y one form o f r a t i o n a l i s m , c f . i b i d . , p. 20, 33* and 
other times as though r a t i o n a l i t y i s by d e f i n i t i o n 
i d e a l i s t i c since i t both emphasises the mind o f man and 
seeks u n i t a r y meaning w i t h i n a changing r e a l i t y . 
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i s of primary concern t o the r a t i o n a l i s t , the a c t u a l 
f a c t s may be m i s i n t e r p r e t e d to f i t the systematic 
e x p l a n a t i o n . 
Things and events may be too unique t o f i t 
i n t o any system o f meaning; and t h e i r unique-
ness i s destroyed by a premature c o o r d i n a t i o n 
to a system of meaning, p a r t i c u l a r l y a system 
which i d e n t i f i e s meaning w i t h r a t i o n a l i t y 
This d i s t o r t i o n of the uniqueness and the p a r t i c u l a r i t y 
b o t h of the h i s t o r i c a l moment and of man's concrete s e l f 
means, f o r Niebuhr, t h a t "the whole realm of genuine 
selfhood „ o . i s beyond the comprehension o f various 
systems o f philosophy. Neither A r i s t o t l e nor Kant suc-
ceeds i n accounting f o r the concrete human s e l f as f r e e 
T?2 
agent." Furthermore r a t i o n a l i s m i n i t s concern f o r 
ontology i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a "passion f o r i d e n t i f y i n g 
'being' w i t h a f i x e d s t r u c t u r e , so t h a t temporal events 
are cast i n t o the category of 'appearance' . . . " and 
t h i s , Niebuhr claims, i s a "permanent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f 
the metaphysical mind."^ Evidence f o r t h i s can-be found, 
both i n the attempt of r a t i o n a l i s m t o resolve prematurely 
"realms of coherence and meaning [which] may stand i n 
r a t i o n a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o each other " ; and i n i t s r e f u s a l 
Niebuhr, C h r i s t i a n Realism and P o l i t i c a l 
Problems (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1953)> P° 
176; h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as CRPP.  
^ I b i d . , p. 178, 
Niebuhr, The S e l f and the Dramas o f H i s t o r y 
(Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1955)* P« 122; here-
a f t e r c i t e d as SDH. 
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t o recognise t h a t "there are c o n f i g u r a t i o n s and s t r u c t u r e s 
which stand athwart every rationally•conceived'system of 
meaning and cannot be appreciated i n terms o f the a l t e r n a -
t i v e e f f o r t s t o b r i n g the s t r u c t u r e completely i n t o one 
system or the o t h e r . " 1 Thus Niebuhr argues t h a t 
since ontology i s the "science o f being," i t 
has i t s l i m i t a t i o n s i n d e s c r i b i n g any being 
or being per se which contains mysteries and 
meanings which are not w i t h i n the l i m i t s of 
reason.2 
Among these mysteries are the h i s t o r i c a l existence o f man 
which becomes nonsensical when i n t e r p r e t e d by those who 
seek "to comprehend the p a t t e r n s of h i s t o r i c a l d e s t i n y 
w i t h i n a framework of ontology" and human freedom which 
i n the end "does not f i n d i t s norm i n the s t r u c t u r e s 
e i t h e r o f nature or o f reason."^ 
1CRPP, p. 1 7 7 o 
2"Reply, " p. 1 * 3 2 o : 
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^ I b i d . , p. i + 3 3 » This r e p l y i s d i r e c t e d to 
T i l l i c h who claimed t h a t Niebuhr "understands ontology 
as a way o f reducing the dynamic-dramatic h i s t o r y o f 
c r e a t i o n , f a l l , s a l v a t i o n , and consummation i n t o a s t a t i c 
system which i s determined by r a t i o n a l n e c e s s i t y . " T i l -
l i c h argues t h a t h i s own understanding o f ontology, which 
i s not based on a c a l c u l a t i n g reason but on a "logos-type" 
of reason, could accommodate these e x i s t e n t i a l c o n t r a -
d i c t i o n s (being and becoming, freedom and n e c e s s i t y , 
i n d i v i d u a l and u n i v e r s a l , e t c . ) q u i t e n i c e l y and t h e r e -
f o r e t h a t Niebuhr need not and should not have r e j e c t e d 
ontology a l t o g e t h e r . "Reinhold Niebuhr's D o c t r i n e o f 
Knowledge," i n Kegley and B r e t a l l , op. c i t . , p. 3 7 - 1 + 0 . 
Surely, however, i t i s p r e c i s e l y T i l l i c h ' s tendency 
towards monism which Niebuhr claims w i l l n ot do and 
th e r e f o r e T i l l i c h ' s arguments " w i l l h a r d l y a l l a y Nie-
buhr's su s p i c i o n of ontology." Thomas, "Niebuhr on 
Reason and Metaphysics," p. 1 7 » Cf. Niebuhr, An I n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n E t h i c s (Harper and Bro t h e r s , New 
York, 1935), p. 23=Us h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as ICE. 
*+CRPP, p. 1 8 2 . 
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At the other extreme of r a t i o n a l i s m i s the view 
of human existence which stresses roan's r e l a t i o n t o 
nature as the most important aspect o f man and which 
g e n e r a l l y appears i n the form of a "romantic p r o t e s t 
against rationalism„" This emphasis on the v i t a l i t i e s 
o f p h y s i c a l existence i s i n d i c a t i v e o f an i n t e r e s t i n 
the p a r t i c u l a r and concrete d r i v e s w i t h i n man and i n 
man's organic r e l a t i o n t o the world of nature as a whole. 
The p r o t e s t i s d i r e c t e d against r a t i o n a l i s t i c a sceticism 
i n i t s attempt t o d i v i d e the s e l f i n t o separate aspects 
of good and e v i l f o r i n so doing r a t i o n a l i t y robs human 
nature o f i t s energy and f o r c e , Niebuhr described t h i s 
as "the romantic f e a r o f the ene r v a t i o n o f impulsive 
spontaneity and v i t a l i t y through r a t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e . 
What i s being claimed by t h i s romantic n a t u r a l i s m i s not 
only t h a t the d i s c i p l i n e of reason i s " u n n a t u r a l " and 
does not do j u s t i c e to the whole man but also t h a t reason 
i s not "the o r g a n i z i n g and forming p r i n c i p l e o f human 
n2 
l i f e . " Man i s most b a s i c a l l y a creature subject to the 
v i c i s s i t u d e s o f nature a n d . i t i s t h a t nature which pro= 
vides the source o f value f o r human l i f e . Reason i s thus 
considered t o be a harmful capacity of man which has 
" d i s i n t e g r a t i n g and d i v i s i v e tendencies," the use of which 
can only r e s u l t i n f o r c i n g man t o become what he by nature 
i s not by some k i n d o f e x t e r n a l r e s t r a i n t . 3 Rather than 
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emphasising the freedom of man t o transcend the l i m i t a -
t i o n s o f existence through reason's a c t i v i t y , n a t u r a l i s m 
tends to st r e s s the n e c e s s i t i e s o f l i f e which determine 
and shape human beings as p a r t of the whole s t r u c t u r e of" 
nature. Yet t h i s romantic view of man i s inadequate, 
according t o Niebuhr, because i t moves too f a r t o the 
other extreme. 
I f r a t i o n a l i s m tends t o depreciate the s i g n i f i ~ 
cance, power, i n h e r e n t order and u n i t y of 
b i o l o g i c a l impulse, romanticism tends to appre-
c i a t e these w i t h o u t recognizing t h a t human 
nature knows no animal impulse i n i t s pure form. 
Thus, Niebuhr claims, i t w i l l not do j u s t i c e again to the 
whole nature o f man t o claim t h a t he i s not h i n g but a 
creature o f n a t u r e . N a t u r a l i s t s should recognise, he 
argues, t h a t 
Every b i o l o g i c a l f a c t and every animal impulse, 
however obvious i t s r e l a t i o n t o the world below 
man, i s a l t e r e d because o f i t s i n c o r p o r a t i o n 
i n t o the human psyche. The freedom o f man con° 
s i s t s not on l y , as i t were, of the windows o f 
mind which look out, from the second s t o r y ; but 
also of vents on every l e v e l which allow every 
n a t u r a l impulse a freedom which animals do not 
know. Romanticism i s t h e r e f o r e wrong i n 
a s c r i b i n g e i t h e r the u n i t y or the v i t a l i t y o f 
animal impulse i n man to pure nature. 2 
The way i n which reason modifies n a t u r a l impulses t o make 
them u n i q u e l y human i s thus not taken i n t o account by 
n a t u r a l i s t s and thus an adequate p i c t u r e of human exist° 
ence has not been rendered. 
I b i d . , p. 1 ^ 0 . 
2 I b i d . 
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Again, however, Niebuhr's concern w i t h i r r a t i o n a l " 
ism i s more p e n e t r a t i n g than t h i s since he does share 
w i t h t h i s view o f man a basic m i s t r u s t o f ontology and 
of r a t i o n a l systems of any k i n d . I t would seem then t h a t 
he would share w i t h the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s an emphasis on 
the a c t u a l s e l f o f man as i t i s i n h i s t o r i c a l existence, 
an existence which always eludes systematic f o r m u l a t i o n s 
or the discernment o f patterns."'' However, Niebuhr i s not 
w i l l i n g t o s t r e s s the "stark incoherences" which i r r a = 
t i o n a l i s m p o i n t s out t o the e x c l u s i o n o f the "basic 
coherences" t h a t r a t i o n a l i t y may discover i n existence. 
Niebuhr s t a r t s not from an assumption but from 
r e a l l i f e as he has found i t , and there he d i s -
covers a p a r a d o x i c a l admixture o f r a t i o n a l i t y 
and i r r a t i o n a l i t y . Not only are there coher-
ences i n human experience but there are also 
non-personal " v i t a l i t i e s " which l i m i t the 
r a t i o n a l w i l l which seeks t o c o n t r o l therm 
Consequently every " t u r n i n g p o i n t " o f h i s t o r y 
i s a p o i n t at which r a t i o n a l i t y and mystery 
i n t e r s e c t , and the i r r a t i o n a l i t y , the myster-
ious n o n - i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , i s j u s t as important 
as the r a t i o n a l i t y . ^ 
I t i s by comparison w i t h the " i r r a t i o n a l i s t e x i s t e n t i a l i s m " 
of a t h e o l o g i a n l i k e B a r t h t h a t Niebuhr's r e f u s a l t o r e l y 
s o l e l y on the un m i t i g a t e d mystery o f the meaning of l i f e 
becomes c l e a r . For Niebuhr i s u n w i l l i n g t o accept the 
two a l t e r n a t i v e s o f f e r e d by i r r a t i o n a l i s m i n i t s d e s c r i p -
t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n of man and p a r t i c u l a r l y of man's 
Indeed Niebuhr quotes the words of Kierkegaard 
i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the system-builders who d i s p l a y "the 
i d e a l i s t i c passion f o r a u n i v e r s a l system" (NJDM I , p 0 8 l ) » 
See Kierkegaard, Concluding U n s c i e n t i f i c P o s t s c r i p t , 
t r a n s l . David E. Swenson (P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 
Pr i n c e t o n , 191*1), Part I I , Chapter 2 0 
Richardson, op. c i t . , p. 221 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p t o God; e i t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l becomes 
"his own c r e a t o r and end" and, since, there i s 'nothing 
beyond man t o re q u i r e h i s c o n f o r m i t y , passionate sub-
j e c t i v i t y r a t h e r than r a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s determines the 
c r i t e r i o n f o r action;"*" or one r e l i e s , as i n the r e l i g i o u s 
i r r a t i o n a l i s m of Ba r t h , on the " l i g h t n i n g f l a s h " o f 
r e v e l a t i o n as a r e s u l t o f which "the whole commerce 
between the fo o l i s h n e s s o f the Gospel and the wisdom o f 
the world . . . i s disavowed." Niebuhr thus r e j e c t s a 
too simple i r r a t i b n a l i s m i n which the use o f reason i s 
al t o g e t h e r abrogated. One commentator i s l e d t o claim 
t h e r e f o r e t h a t : 
Niebuhr's appeal as an a p o l o g i s t l i e s i n h i s 
honest r e f u s a l e i t h e r t o r a t i o n a l i z e the s t a r k 
incoherences of human existence i n some academic 
theory o f metaphysical i d e a l i s m or on the other 
hand to deny the basic coherences o f our exper-
ience i n the i n t e r e s t o f some i r r a t i o n a l i s t or 
e x i s t e n t i a l i s t view o f the type which i s nowa-
days so f a s h i o n a b l e . 3 
We must examine Niebuhr's own i n s i g h t i n t o the nature and 
existence of man i n which t h i s t w o f o l d aspect o f l i f e i s 
described. 
The sources f o r Niebuhr's understanding of man are 
to be found b o t h i n the b i b l i c a l r e v e l a t i o n o f the 
encounter between God and man and i n h i s own c r i t i c a l 
a n a lysis of Western c u l t u r a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y , 
1SDH, p. 67-8. Cf. CRPP, p. 192-3. 
2CRPP, p. 1 9 1 * . 
3 
Richardson, op. c i t . , p. 221=2„ 
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He begins t h e r e f o r e w i t h the understanding t h a t there 
can be no pre s u p p o s i t l o n l e s s i n q u i r y i n t o t h i s matter 
but t h a t , by the same token, one's presuppositions can 
be j u s t i f i e d e m p i r i c a l l y by reference t o man hi m s e l f . 
Since "experience and f a i t h i n t e r p e n e t r a t e each other 
on every l e v e l , " i t would be a mistake to represent h i s 
method as a d e s c r i p t i o n of man w i t h o u t the i n s i g h t o f 
f a i t h t o which s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s claims can then 
be added by way of support or c o n f i r m a t i o n . 1 Niebuhr's 
h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s leads him t o the conclusion t h a t no 
adequate understanding o f man has yet been o f f e r e d , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y since the r a t i o n a l i s t s and i r r a t i o n a l i s t s 
a r r i v e a t c o n t r a d i c t o r y conclusions. What i s needed, 
Niebuhr c l a i m s , is" "a p r i n c i p l e o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which 
can do j u s t i c e t o both the height o f human s e l f -
transcendence and the organic u n i t y between the s p i r i t 
of man and h i s p h y s i c a l l i f e " and both the one=sided 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s f a i l t o achieve such a p r i n c i p l e . 2 i t 
i s here then t h a t r e l i g i o u s claims are important f o r man 
i s "unable t o comprehend him s e l f i n h i s f u l l s t a t u r e o f 
freedom w i t h o u t a p r i n c i p l e of comprehension which i s 
beyond h i s c o m p r e h e n s i o n . F r o m the perspective of the 
W i l l i a m J. Wolf, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine o f 
Man," i n Kegley and B r e t a l l , op. c i t . , p, 232=3. This 
l a t t e r type o f anal y s i s i s done by Aquinas and t h i s , i n 
Niebuhr's view, i s why .Aquinas ? method i s inadequate. 
See CRPP, p„ l88=9» 
2NDM I , p. 123. 
3 I b i d . , p. 125° 
encounter between God and man, portrayed i n the Bible i n 
dramatic terms, man can be seen as he t r u l y i s , f o r here 
can be found a p r i n c i p l e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which, though 
i t transcends the f u l l grasp of man's reason, i t i l l u m i -
nates b o t h the source and the meaning of human l i f e . Thu 
Niebuhr can claim t h a t "the C h r i s t i a n view o f man i s 
sharply d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a l l a l t e r n a t i v e views by the 
manner i n which i t i n t e r p r e t s and r e l a t e s three aspects-
of human existence t o each o t h e r , " and proceed t o demon-
s t r a t e the way i n which t h i s view presents the most 
adequate account of human e x i s t e n c e . 1 
but cannot s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e x p l a i n i s man's creaturehood, 
and Niebuhr considers i t i r o n i c t h a t 
a c u l t u r e , i n t e n t upon understanding nature and 
boasting o f ever more impressive achievements 
i n the "conquest" o f na t u r e , has become in v o l v e d 
i n ever more serious misunderstandings of human 
natu r e , of the s e l f i n i t s uniqueness, and i n 
it's d r a m a t i c - h i s t o r i c a l environment.2 
Both n a t u r a l i s m and r a t i o n a l i s m , however, prove t h e i r 
inadequate understanding of man's nature i n a f u r t h e r 
sense, because, as Niebuhr argues, they o f f e r two a l t e r -
n a t i v e and mu t u a l l y exclusive bases f o r moral d e c i s i o n . 
One o f these, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f romanticism, claims t h a t 
man's u n i t y w i t h nature i s a p o s i t i v e good which i s t o 
be enjoyed and f u l f i l l e d through " n a t u r a l , " and t h e r e f o r e 
e t h i c a l , a c t i o n s . The other a l t e r n a t i v e , o f f e r e d by 
The t r u t h about man which n a t u r a l i s m emphasises 
I b i d . 8 p. l£0. 2, SDH, p. l l ^ . 
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mysticism or i d e a l i s m , stresses the d i s u n i t y between 
man's e s s e n t i a l nature and h i s p h y s i c a l nature and 
encourages e t h i c a l a ctions i n which man can deny and 
r i s e above h i s creatureliness<• The viewpoint on man's 
nature which Niebuhr would suggest, based on the 
b i b l i c a l understanding, claims t h a t 
the f i n i t e n e s s , dependence and the i n s u f ~ 
f i c i e n c y of man's mortal l i f e are f a c t s 
which belong t o God's p l a n of c r e a t i o n and 
must be accepted w i t h reverence and 
h u m i l i t y «.l 
This means t h a t an emphasis on the goodness of man's 
n a t u r a l l i f e r e q u i r e s the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h i s goodness 
i s based upon God's e v a l u a t i o n o f h i s c r e a t i o n j only 
t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n can save such an emphasis from becoming 
d i s t o r t e d , p e r v e r t e d , and u l t i m a t e l y from f a i l i n g alto° 
gether to provide an adequate fo u n d a t i o n f o r moral 
d e c i s i o n . The goodness o f man as a creature i s thus 
h i s goodness i n r e l a t i o n t o God and i t i s t h i s r e l a t i o n 
which can prevent the d e p r e c i a t i o n o f man's n a t u r a l l i f e 
i n t o something e v i l which could stand between man and God. 
The b i b l i c a l view can t h e r e f o r e i n s i s t upon 
man's weakness, dependence, and f i n i t e n e s s , on 
hi s involvement i n the n e c e s s i t i e s and c o n t i n -
gencies of the n a t u r a l w o r l d , w i t h o u t , however, 
regarding t h i s f i n i t e n e s s as, o f i t s e l f , a 
source o f e v i l i n raan.2 
The c r e a t u r e l i n e s s of man can be most r e a l i s t i c a l l y 
judged from the perspective o f God's a f f i r m a t i o n 
1NDM I , p 0 l 6 7 o 2 I b i d . , p, l ^ O o 
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of t h a t l i f e , an a f f i r m a t i o n which also provides the 
basis f o r e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n s . 
Likewise, r a t i o n a l i s m grasped a t r u t h about man 
which i t attempted but f i n a l l y f a i l e d t o formulate 
adequately. Man i s a creature " i n the image o f God"? 
he has a cap a c i t y f o r transcending h i m s e l f and f o r using 
h i s r a t i o n a l f a c u l t y t o i n t e r p r e t and order h i s existence 
i n the w o r l d . Man thus e x h i b i t s a freedom from the 
n e c e s s i t i e s of nature and an i n d i v i d u a l i t y expressed i n 
hi s c r e a t i v e dealings w i t h h i s own l i f e . Likewise, 
however, even r a t i o n a l i s m cannot do j u s t i c e t o t h i s 
c a p a city of man f o r Niebuhr would claim t h a t an aspect 
of t h i s freedom of man i s p r e c i s e l y h i s a b i l i t y t o choose 
to stand outside h i s reason, t o take perspectives on h i s 
l i f e which go beyond h i s r a t i o n a l f a c u l t i e s t o c r e a t e . 
This q u a l i t y of imagining indeterminate per-
spectives i s more mysterious than what the 
r a t i o n a l i s t s c a l l h i s reason because man can 
ask whether reason can comprehend the order 
of r e a l i t y and whether such order as i t may 
see comprehends the whole o f r e a l i t y . 1 
R a t i o n a l i t y does not take i n t o account i t s own l i m i t a -
t i o n s , according t o Niebuhr, and the person who so l i m i t s 
h i s l i f e w i l l miss other viewpoints which h i s c a p a c i t y 
f o r transcendence may o f f e r and which may prove more t r u e 
to human r e a l i t y as he experiences i t . Indeed Niebuhr 
considered i t p a r t of the general r e v e l a t i o n of God t o 
man t h a t man could,at the l i m i t of h i s consciousness, 
^Wolf, op. c i t . , p. 2 3 6 o 
258 
confront an "other" standing over against h i s r a t i o n a l 
a b i l i t i e s . "The s o u l , " he claims, "which reaches the 
outermost rims of i t s own consciousness, must also come 
i n contact w i t h God, f o r He impinges upon t h a t conscious^ 
n e s S o " 1 I n t h a t impingement man can f i n d b o t h the 
a f f i r m a t i o n o f h i s capacity f o r self-transcendence and 
a judgement against i t s overextension. I n r e l a t i o n t o 
God, 
the s p i r i t o f man f i n d s a home i n which i t can 
understand i t s s t a t u r e of freedom. But there 
i t also f i n d s the l i m i t s o f i t s freedom, the 
judgment which i s spoken against i t and, u l t i -
mately, the mercy which makes such a judgment 
s u f f e r a b l e . 2 
This second aspect of man's l i f e i s t h e r e f o r e viewed most 
c l e a r l y also from the viewpoint of r e v e l a t i o n . 
I t i s i n h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the t h i r d aspect of 
human l i f e , however, t h a t Niebuhr i n d i c a t e s h i s most 
serious concern w i t h the analysis o f the nature and 
de s t i n y of man and i t i s i n discussing t h i s character*-
i s t i c t h a t the l o g i c of Niebuhr's argument becomes c l e a r . 
For Niebuhr has been c a r e f u l l y and i n great h i s t o r i c a l 
and c u l t u r a l d e t a i l o u t l i n i n g an onlook regarding man 
from which Niebuhr's moral concerns are n o t , nor can they 
be, separated. God's r e v e l a t i o n o f h i m s e l f t o man not 
only provides the fou n d a t i o n f o r an adequate and r e a l i s t i c 
assessment of the character of human l i f e but also i n d i - -
cates the moral a t t i t u d e which i s appropriate towards t h a t 
l i f e . Niebuhr does not describe the nature of human l i f e 
1NJDM I , p. 127. 2 I b i d . , p. 126. 
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t h e r e f o r e w i t h o u t reference t o the a t t i t u d e which man 
ought t o adopt towards h i s own existence. Indeed he 
f i n d s a t t i t u d e s i m p l i c i t i n the other accounts o f human 
existence and argues t h a t these a t t i t u d e s are e i t h e r 
naive or p r e t e n t i o u s . They are'naive since "both the 
majesty and the tragedy of human l i f e exceed the dimen-
sion w i t h i n which modern c u l t u r e seeks t o comprehend 
human e x i s t e n c e . " 1 They are p r e t e n t i o u s not only because 
they make the r e l a t i v e and p a r t i c u l a r i n s i g h t s o f men 
i n t o absolute t r u t h s but also because they do not take 
i n t o account the p o s s i b i l i t y and the presence o f r a d i c a l 
e v i l i n human l i f e . 
The f a c t t h a t a c u l t u r e which i d e n t i f i e s God 
w i t h some l e v e l of human consciousness, e i t h e r 
r a t i o n a l or s u p e r - r a t i o n a l , or w i t h some order 
of n a t u r e , i n v a r i a b l y f a l s i f i e s the human 
s i t u a t i o n and f a i l s t o appreciate e i t h e r the 
t o t a l s t a t u r e o f freedom i n man or the com-
p l e x i t y of the problem of e v i l i n him, i s the 
most t e l l i n g negative proof f o r the B i b l i c a l 
f a i t h . 2 
Thus th e r e i s a need f o r t h i s new perspective on human " 
l i f e which i s given t o man from beyond h i s existence t o 
provide man w i t h an understanding of the moral character 
of h i s l i f e . 
The advantage of the b i b l i c a l p erspective i s t h a t 
I t a f f i r m s t h a t the e v i l i n man i s a conse° 
quence of h i s i n e v i t a b l e though not necessary 
u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o acknowledge h i s dependence, 
t o accept h i s f i n i t e n e s s and t o admit h i s 
i n s e c u r i t y , an u n w i l l i n g n e s s which i n v o l v e s 
I b i d . , p. 122. 
2 I b i d . , p. 131o 
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him i n the v i c i o u s c i r c l e of accentuating the 
i n s e c u r i t y from which he seeks escape.^ 
Niebuhr thus defines the s i n of man as h i s " w i l l f u l 
r e f u s a l t o acknowledge the f i n i t e and determinate char-= 
acter of h i s exi s t e n c e " and i t i s t h i s moral a t t i t u d e on 
the p a r t of those who would understand t h a t l i f e apart 
from any r e l i g i o u s a f f i r m a t i o n s which Niebuhr considers 
f a t a l t o them» The e v i l i n human existence i s not the 
r e s u l t of man's freedom t o transcend h i m s e l f and i t i s 
not caused by the c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s f i n i t u d e j e v i l cannot 
be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h e i t h e r aspect of human life<> Nor i s 
e v i l the r e s u l t of t h i s dual nature of l i f e , f o r man was 
created b o t h f i n i t e and f r e e and was proclaimed good 0 
What i s e v i l i s man's "wi l l - t o - p o w e r which overreaches 
the l i m i t s of human c r e a t u r e l i n e s s , " and i t i s t h i s 
i n t e n t i o n t o become something other than human which l i e s 
at the r o o t of s i n . The c o n t r a d i c t i o n of f i n i t u d e and 
freedom does, however, serve as the "occasion" f o r s i n 
since man i s insecure i n t h i s d u a l i t y and seeks a resolu= 
t i o n of i t . On the one hand, he seeks such a r e s o l u t i o n 
by emphasising h i s freedom. 
Man i s ign o r a n t and i n v o l v e d i n the l i m i t a t i o n s 
o f a f i n i t e mind; but he pretends t h a t he i s 
not l i m i t e d . He assumes t h a t he can g r a d u a l l y 
transcend f i n i t e l i m i t a t i o n s u n t i l h i s mind 
becomes i d e n t i c a l w i t h u n i v e r s a l mindo^ 
This s i n of p r i d e has a complement i n the s i n of s e n s u a l i t y 
by which man seeks t o resolve the d u a l i t y a t the other 
1 I b i d . , p. l50o 3 I b i d . , p. 178-9* 
2Ibid.„ p D 1780 
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extreme. 
Sometimes man seeks to solve the problem of 
the c o n t r a d i c t i o n of f i n i t e n e s s and freedom, 
not by seeking t o hide h i s f i n i t e n e s s and 
comprehending the world i n t o h i m s e l f , but by 
seeking t o hide h i s freedom and by l o s i n g 
h i m s e l f i n some aspect of the world's 
v i t a l i t i e s o 1 
I t i s t h i s i n t e n t i o n t o attempt t o escape one's humanity 
which Niebuhr describes as s i n f u l and i t i s an i n t e n t i o n 
which can only be overcome when one adopts the i n t e n t i o n 
of God w i t h regard t o one's l i f e . 
For Niebuhr t h e r e f o r e , the r o o t of s i n i s unbe= 
l i e f or the r e f u s a l t o see and acknowledge t h a t one's 
l i f e i s t o be l i v e d i n r e l a t i o n t o God,,^ This i s the 
reason he can claim t h a t 
when l i f e i s seen i n i t s t o t a l dimension, the 
sense of God and the sense of s i n are i n v o l v e d 
i n the same act of self-consciousness; f o r t o 
be self-conscious i s t o see the s e l f as a 
f i n i t e o b j e c t separated from e s s e n t i a l r e a l i t y ! 
but also r e l a t e d t o i t , or there could be no 
knowledge o f separation. 3 
I n the n o t i o n of s i n the r e l i g i o u s and moral dimensions 
of l i f e come together f o r i t i s defined as both a 
r e l i g i o u s and a moral phenomenon 
The r e l i g i o u s dimension of s i n i s man's r e b e l " 
l i o n against God, h i s e f f o r t t o usurp the 
place of God. The moral and s o c i a l dimension 
of s i n i s i n j u s t i c e . The ego which f a l s e l y 
makes i t s e l f the centre o f existence i n i t s 
p r i d e and w i l l - t o - p o w e r i n e v i t a b l y subordi<= 
nates other l i f e t o i t s w i l l and thus does 
i n j u s t i c e t o other l i f e . 4 
• I b i d . , p. 179. 
2 I b i d . , p. 182-3. 
3ICE, p. 67. 
**NDM I , p. 179. 
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The v e r t i c a l dimension of s i n i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e r e f o r e 
by man's un w i l l i n g n e s s t o view h i s existence as one t o 
which God i s r e l a t e d and i n which he became i n v o l v e d ; 
corresponding t o t h i s i s the h o r i z o n t a l dimension of s i n 
i n which man's p r i d e and s e l f - l o v e manifest themselves 
i n u n j u s t and u n l o v i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h h i s neighbours<» 
Therefore we need t o examine the way i n which man comes 
to recognise the e s s e n t i a l l i f e from which he i s separated, 
what r e l a t i o n s h i p God has to l i f e as i t ought t o be, and 
how thse r e c o g n i t i o n of the law o f l i f e can be e f f e c t e d i n 
the moral decisions which are a p a r t of man's s o c i a l and 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e * 
Niebuhr claims t h a t "the sense of s i n i s p e c u l i a r l y 
the product of r e l i g i o u s i m a g i n a t i o n " and " i s the conse-
quence o f measuring l i f e i n i t s t o t a l dimension and d i s -
covering the s e l f both r e l a t e d t o and separated from l i f e 
i n i t s essence„"1 Prom the human p e r s p e c t i v e , i t i s 
possib l e t o f i n d a good deal of evidence f o r the f a i l u r e s 
and wickedness o f men and t h i s Niebuhr does throughout h i s 
w r i t i n g s . Thus i t i s t r u e t o say t h a t he o f f e r s the 
d o c t r i n e of o r i g i n a l s i n "not so much as a d o c t r i n e of 
r e v e l a t i o n as a t r a n s c r i p t of experience when man looks 
at h i m s e l f w i t h h i s guards down 0"^ The c o r o l l a r y o f t h i s 
assessment o f the human s i t u a t i o n i s the r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t 
"the human s p i r i t i s set i n t h i s dimension o f depth i n 
1ICE, p„ 65c 
2 
Wolf, op. c i t . , , p„ 2l+0o 
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such a way t h a t i t i s able t o apprehend, but not t o 
comprehend, the t o t a l dimension. This r e c o g n i t i o n , 
which man comes t o as a r e s u l t o f the f r e e transcendence 
of h i s s p i r i t , has t h e r e f o r e b o t h a p o s i t i v e and a nega~ 
t i v e aspect; i t i s p o s i t i v e t o the e x t e n t t h a t i t con° 
s t i t u t e s the greatness o f human l i f e and i t i s negative 
i n t h a t i t shows man as a p r i s o n e r o f f i n i t u d e from which 
he c o n t i n u a l l y seeks escape<, 
The f a c t t h a t man can transcend h i m s e l f i n 
i n f i n i t e r e g r e s s i o n and cannot f i n d the end 
of l i f e except i n God i s the mark of h i s 
c r e a t i v i t y and uniqueness; c l o s e l y r e l a t e d 
. t o t h i s c a pacity i s h i s i n c l i n a t i o n t o t r a n s -
mute h i s p a r t i a l and f i n i t e s e l f and h i s 
p a r t i a l and f i n i t e values i n t o the i n f i n i t e 
good. Therein l i e s h i s s i n . , 2 
What man can recognise from h i s perspective i s thus t h a t 
t here i s an "other" or a beyond t o which he i s r e l a t e d , 
a r e c o g n i t i o n whose meaning i s t o be shown by an encounter 
w i t h God i n the person of Jesus„ This "consciousness and 
memory o f an o r i g i n a l p e r f e c t i o n " i s , f o r Niebuhr, the 
"locus o f o r i g i n a l righteousness" i n man by which he knows 
the demand of e s s e n t i a l l i f e r e q u i r i n g obedience i n h i s 
moral decisions,,-^ 
This r e c o g n i t i o n from the human perspective by 
which man comes t o see h i s greatness and h i s s i n must 
i t s e l f be balanced w i t h the avareness t h a t only i n God'a 
r e v e a l i n g of h i m s e l f has the source, the g o a l , and the 
1 3 I C E , p e 66. I b i d o , p 0 276=7. 
*TNDM I , p 0 122. 
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meaning of l i f e been demonstrated i n i t s f u l l n e s s . Man's 
s p i r i t 
i s always capable of envisaging p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
of order, u n i t y , and harmony above and beyond 
the contingent and a r b i t r a r y r e a l i t i e s of i t s 
p h y s i c a l existence; but i t i s not capable 
(because of i t s f i n i t e n e s s ) ' o f i n c a r n a t i n g , 
a l l the higher values which i t d i s c e r n s j nor 
even of adequately d e f i n i n g , the unconditioned 
good which i t dimly apprehends as the ground 
and goal o f a l l i t s contingent values.1 
I t i s here t h a t , t o use Ramsey's phrases, "autonomous 
reason" and "Christonomous reason" can be seen i n dialogue 
w i t h each other, f o r what i s revealed i n C h r i s t i s what has 
been dimly perceived by man i n h i s most intense s t r u g g l e s 
t o come t o terms w i t h the meaning of l i f e . , 
The e t h i c a l norm of h i s t o r y as comprehended by 
the " n a t u r a l " .resources of man, by h i s sober 
examination of the f a c t s and requirements of 
l i f e i n human s o c i e t y , i s mutual l o v e . Man 
knows b o t h by experience and by the demand f o r 
coherence i n h i s r a t i o n a l n a t u r e , t h a t l i f e 
ought not t o be l i v e d at cross purposes, t h a t 
c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the s e l f , and between the s e l f 
and o t h e r s , i s an e v i l . I n t h a t sense love i s 
the law of l i f e according t o the i n s i g h t s Cvf 
n a t u r a l r e l i g i o n and m o r a l i t y . 3 
What Niebuhr claims i s t h a t the l i f e o f love which C h r i s t 
l e d and by which God reveals h i s i n t e n t i o n f o r human l i f e 
has a t h r e e f o l d r e l a t i o n t o t h i s n a t u r a l i n s i g h t of man0 
I t (a) completes what i s incomplete i n t h e i r 
apprehensions o f meaning; (b) i t c l a r i f i e s 
o b s c u r i t i e s which t h r e a t e n the sense o f 
ICB B p. 66. 
2 
Paul Ramsey, "Reinhold Niebuhr% C h r i s t i a n Love 
and N a t u r a l Law," i n Nine Modern M o r a l i s t s , p. This 
essay was o r i g i n a l l y published i n Kegley and B r e t a l l , 
op. c i t . e p. 80=123. 
3NDM I I , p. 81=2. 
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meaning; and (c) i t f i n a l l y c o r r e c t s f a l s i f i -
c a t ions o f meaning which human egoism i n t r o -
duces i n t o the sense of meaning by reason o f 
i t s e f f o r t to comprehend the whole of l i f e 
from an inadequate centre o f comprehension. 
The f u l l and unambiguous meaning o f t h i s law of l i f e i s 
thus t o be found by coming t o terms w i t h the l i f e and 
the teachings of Jesus C h r i s t i n whom "transcendent 
agape" i s present i n h i s t o r y . 
I t i s i n C h r i s t t h a t man discovers b o t h the t r u e 
nature o f human l i f e i n i t s heights and i t s depths and 
the character of God who from beyond h i s t o r y makes 
present the i d e a l p o s s i b i l i t y f o r meaningful human l i f e . 
I n h i s r e l a t i o n t o human existence, C h r i s t i s the "second 
Adam" f o r i n him "the norm of human n a t u r e " i s i n c a r n a t e d . 
His l i f e a c t u a l i z e s the f u l l e s t p o s s i b i l i t i e s of human 
l i f e and at the same time reveals the l i m i t a t i o n s of t h a t 
l i f e i n i t s f i n i t e n e s s and s i n f u l n e s s . A m o r a l i t y which 
would base i t s e l f on Jesus' l i f e and a c t i o n cannot make 
h i s l i f e or the kingdom of the f u t u r e about which he 
preached i n t o a simple i d e a l or goal which man i s capable 
of achieving by h i s own e f f o r t s . I t was t h i s k i n d of 
m o r a l i t y which was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the l i b e r a l C h r i s -
t i a n i t y t h a t Niebuhr so r a d i c a l l y opposed. A t e l e o l o g i c a l 
e t h i c which encourages man's f u l f i l l m e n t of some i d e a l , 
i n t h i s case the kingdom o f God, by man's e f f o r t t o f o l l o w 
the example of Jesus f a i l s i n a t l e a s t two respects f o r 
Niebuhr. I t i s naive i n i t s assessment of man's a b i l i t y 
I b i d . , p. 8lo 
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t o overcome s i n f u l n e s s by h i s own e f f o r t s and thus becomes 
g u i l t y of too much pr i d e i n human accomplishment„ I n t h i s 
sense, Niebuhr claims t h a t l i b e r a l i s m was founded on a 
"utopian i l l u s i o n " which had not accepted the lessons o f 
h i s t o r y and was u n w i l l i n g t o recognise the thoroughness 
of sin's hold upon l i f e . ^ " I t s second f a i l u r e i s i t s 
tendency t o make absolute what i s h i s t o r i c a l l y and 
c u l t u r a l l y r e l a t i v e , thus i d e n t i f y i n g what ought t o be 
w i t h some f a c e t of man's existence i n e i t h e r i t s personal 
or i t s s o c i a l form* L i b e r a l i s m has f a i l e d t o take account 
of man's a b i l i t y always t o transcend what he now i s and t o 
assess h i s h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n from a new p e r s p e c t i v e ! 
thus i t becomes complacent and self°satisfied as a way o f 
l i f e 0 The type of e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n encouraged by liberal° 
ism i s a r a t i o n a l e t h i c of prudence i n which the moral 
agent c a l c u l a t e s h i s own and o t h e r s ' i n t e r e s t s t o achieve 
some k i n d of mu t u a l l y acceptable s o l u t i o n . Against t h i s 
See Niebuhr's arguments against l i b e r a l i s m i n 
NDM I , p. 1U5-6, 279=80, 287-8j NDM I I , p. 121-6, 72-H* 
and throughout ICE, F a i t h and H i s t o r y (Nisbet and Co., 
London, 19H9), and R e f l e c t i o n s on the End of an Era 
(Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1936). See also those 
who oppose Niebuhr's understanding of l i b e r a l i s m i n 
"Symposium," e s p e c i a l l y Theodore M. Green, "My Reactions . 
to Niebuhr," p. 3=73. and George F. Thomas, op. c i t . , p. 21 0 
See also D a n i e l Day W i l l i a m s , "Niebuhr and L i b e r a l i s m , " i n 
Kegley and B r e t a l l , op. c i t . , i n which he sayss "Wherever 
we encounter the b e l i e f t h a t ' a l l s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are 
being brought p r o g r e s s i v e l y under the law o f C h r i s t , ' and 
wherever we see the C h r i s t i a n Gospel expressed as a moral 
pronouncement which can be made i n t e l l i g i b l e as a p u r e l y 
r a t i o n a l e t h i c a l i d e a l , there we have encountered the 
l i b e r a l C h r i s t i a n s p i r i t as Niebuhr sees i t " (p. 198)„ 
The q u o t a t i o n i s from Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral 
Society (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1960), p„ xxi„ 
2See F a i t h and H i s t o r y , p. 178, h e r e a f t e r c i t e d 
as F&H. Of. NDM I I . p. B i f f . . 2k7o 
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i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the s i g n i f i c a n c e of Jesus f o r the moral 
l i f e , Niebuhr sets the " i m p o s s i b i l i t y " o f Jesus' command 
to l o v e 0 
I n genuine prophetic C h r i s t i a n i t y the moral 
q u a l i t i e s o f the C h r i s t are not only our hope, 
but our despair. Out of t h a t despair a r i s e s 
a new hope centred i n the r e v e l a t i o n o f God 
i n C h r i s t . I n such f a i t h C h r i s t and the Cross 
reve a l not only the p o s s i b i l i t i e s but the l i m i t s 
of human f i n i t u d e i n order t h a t a more u l t i m a t e 
hope may a r i s e from the c o n t r i t e r e c o g n i t i o n of 
those l i m i t s . C h r i s t i a n f a i t h i s , i n other 
words, a type of optimism which places i t s u l t i = 
mate confidence i n the love o f God and not the 
love of man, i n the u l t i m a t e and transcendent 
u n i t y of r e a l i t y and not i n t e n t a t i v e and super-
f i c i a l harmonies of existence which human 
i n g e n u i t y may c o n t r i v e . I t i n s i s t s , q u i t e 
l o g i c a l l y , t h a t t h i s u l t i m a t e hope becomes 
possible only t o those who no longer place 
t h e i r confidence i n p u r e l y human p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
Repentence i s thus the gateway i n t o the Kingdom 
of God.l 
To discover i n C h r i s t the norm o f human l i f e i s thus, f o r 
Niebuhr, t o acknowledge the gap between l i f e as i t i s and 
l i f e as i t ought t o be, a gap which cannot be bridged by 
any form of human s e l f - a s s e r t i o n . 
On the other hand, however, Niebuhr also opposed 
any form o f mysticism i n which man must deny him s e l f as 
he i s i n order t o f u l f i l l the demands o f the C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c a l l i f e . Obedience t o C h r i s t according t o t h i s 
understanding of e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n would r e q u i r e t h a t the 
soul o f man become free d from n a t u r a l impulses and d r i v e s 
and from any d i s t r a c t i o n s or r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s so t h a t i t -
might contemplate the e t e r n a l . ^ Again t h i s view of man's 
ICE, p. 120=1. 2NDM I I , p. 9ko 
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r e l a t i o n s h i p t o C h r i s t e r r s i n i t s estimate of human l i f e 
i n t h a t man's creaturehood, h i s f i n i t u d e and l i m i t a t i o n s , 
are considered obstacles t o h i s p e r f e c t i o n , obstacles 
which must be denied or overcome i f one i s t o enter the 
kingdom. This i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the s i n f u l n e s s of human 
l i f e w i t h man's h i s t o r i c a l or n a t u r a l existence ignores 
the character of s i n as a f u n c t i o n of man's i n t e n t i o n s 
w i t h regard t o t h a t l i f e and thu3 cannot do j u s t i c e t o 
God's own assessment of the l i f e he created. The r e s u l t 
o f t h i s m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of human existence i s , however, 
t h a t mysticism, or any other form of world-denying e t h i c , 
u l t i m a t e l y denies the relevance of God's a c t i o n i n C h r i s t 
t o h i s t o r y . Thus, Niebuhr claims t h a t the i d e a l of love 
i s n ot an i d e a l m a g i c a l l y superimposed upon 
l i f e by a r e v e l a t i o n which has no r e l a t i o n t o 
t o t a l human experience. The whole conception 
of l i f e revealed i n the Cross of C h r i s t i a n 
f a i t h i s not a pure negation o f , or i r r e l e v a n c e 
toward, the moral i d e a l s of " n a t u r a l man." 
While the f i n a l h eights of the love i d e a l con-
demn as w e l l as f u l f i l l the moral canons o f 
common sense, the i d e a l i s in v o l v e d i n every 
moral a s p i r a t i o n and achievement. I t i s the 
genius and the task of pr o p h e t i c r e l i g i o n t o 
i n s i s t on the organic r e l a t i o n between h i s t o r i c 
human existence and t h a t which i s b o t h the 
ground and the f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h i s e x i s t e n c e , 
the transcendent.^ 
Against such a view of God's r e l a t i o n t o man's existence 
i n h i s t o r y , Niebuhr claims t h a t the "God o f C h r i s t i a n 
r e v e l a t i o n i s not disengaged from, but engaged i n , the 
world by His most m a j e s t i c a t t r i b u t e s ! i t i s consequently 
not the highe s t p e r f e c t i o n f o r man t o achieve a u n i t y of 
ICE, p. 10U-5. 
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being from which a l l n a t u r a l and h i s t o r i c a l v i t a l i t i e s 
have been subtracted.""'" -> 
There i s a t w o - f o l d aspect t o man's encounter 
w i t h C h r i s t t h e r e f o r e which leads man t o r e a l i s e b o t h 
the e x t ent o f h i s separation from what he ought t o be 
and the urgency w i t h which he ought t o seek i t s f u l f i l l -
ment i n h i s present s i t u a t i o n . 
The f u l l dimension of human l i f e i n c l u d es not 
only an impossible i d e a l , but r e a l i t i e s of s i n 
and e v i l which are more than simple imperfec° 
t i o n s and which prove t h a t the i d e a l i s some-
t h i n g more than the product of a morbidly 
s e n s i t i v e r e l i g i o u s f a ntasy. Anything l e s s 
than p e r f e c t love i n human l i f e i s d e s t r u c t i v e 
of l i f e . A l l human l i f e stands under an 
impending doom because i t does not l i v e by 
the law of love.2 
Such a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t what i s necessary i s impossible, 
t h a t what i s required of human l i f e i s p e r f e c t l o v e , t h a t 
"the i d e a l i n i t s p e r f e c t form l i e s beyond the c a p a c i t i e s 
of human n a t u r e , " i s the paradox which one who would have 
f a i t h i n C h r i s t must be prepared t o accept. I t , i s a 
paradox which w i l l be manifest i n every e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n 
which would a c t u a l i s e love i n the human s i t u a t i o n . 3 
What i s revealed i n the l i f e of C h r i s t , however, 
i s n ot j u s t an i n s i g h t i n t o the nature o f man and an under= 
standing of the law by which t h a t l i f e i s f u l f i l l e d b ut 
also the nature o f God who acts i n human h i s t o r y t o b r i n g 
i t towards the f u l f i l l m e n t o f h i s kingdom. I t i s God who' 
comes t o man i n the i n c a r n a t i o n and i n t h i s respect 
1NDM I I , p. 9l * - 5 . 3 I b i d . , p. 111. 
2ICE, p. 60 e 
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Niebuhr speaks of the paradox of C h r i s t , 
The love o f C h r i s t , His d i s i n t e r e s t e d and 
s a c r i f i c i a l agape, as the hi g h e s t p o s s i b i l i t y 
of human existence, stands i n p a r a d o x i c a l , 
r a t h e r than c o n t r a d i c t o r y , r e l a t i o n t o the 
majesty of God . , . what C h r i s t i a n f a i t h 
has always apprehended beyond a l l metaphysical 
s p e c u l a t i o n s , [ i s ] the paradoxical r e l a t i o n o f 
a d i v i n e agape, which stoops t o conquer, and 
the human agape, which r i s e s above h i s t o r y i n 
a s a c r i f i c i a l a c t . ^ 
The presence of d i v i n e love i n C h r i s t has, as does 
C h r i s t ' s humanity, a t w o - f o l d i m p l i c a t i o n f o r C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n . I n i t s negative aspect, t h i s presence 
reveals t h a t what i s req u i r e d i n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n i s the 
p e r f e c t i o n of man r e a l i s e d i n acts o f s a c r i f i c i a l l o v e 0 
This i s a p e r f e c t i o n which cannot be "a sum t o t a l of 
various v i r t u e s or an absence of t r a n s g r e s s i o n of various 
laws," f o r i t i s simply "not a t t a i n a b l e i n h i s t o r y , " 2 
Here the harshness o f Niebuhr's judgement of h i s t o r y can 
be seen i n a l l i t s f o r c e d i r e c t e d against the p r e t e n t i o u s -
ness of s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n , Niebuhr r e l i e s on the one 
hand upon an e m p i r i c a l argument which claims t h a t no such 
s a c r i f i c i a l love has ever been f u l l y a c t u a l i s e d by man i n 
h i s t o r y , except i n the l i f e of Christo 
There i s , i n s h o r t , no problem o f h i s t o r y and 
no p o i n t i n s o c i e t y from which one may n o t 
observe t h a t the same man who touches the 
f r i n g e s o f the i n f i n i t e i n h i s moral l i f e 
remains imbedded i n f i n i t e n e s s , t h a t he 
increases the e v i l i n h i s l i f e i f he t r i e s t o 
overcome i t w i t h o u t regard t o h i s l i m i t a t i o n s , 3 
NDM I I , p, 7 1 o ^ICE, p. 1 3 £ 0 
I b i d , , p. 6 8 0 
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Yet, as Ramsey has pointed out, Niebuhr gains a v i c t o r y 
only by saying t h a t what i s e s s e n t i a l t o s a c r i f i c i a l 
love i s heedlessness of s e l f , w i l l i n g n e s s t o s u f f e r f o r 
another's good, and the a b i l i t y t o s a c r i f i c e one's own 
w e l l - b e i n g f o r t h a t of another w i t h o u t the c a l c u l a t i o n 
o f b e n e f i t s , a l l o f these being f e a t u r e s which emphasise 
the o v e r t character of t h a t love,, Ramsey argues; 
The numerical infrequency of s e l f - s a c r i f i c i a l 
acts open t o e x t e r n a l view does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
i n d i c a t e the absence, much less the i m p o s s i b i l i t y , 
of the motive of. s e l f - g i v i n g love i n the mundane 
l i v e s of o r d i n a r y people, who may not have found 
i n themselves the s t r e n g t h f o r martyrdom simply 
because they have not found reason f o r i t or a 
s i t u a t i o n a c t u a l l y c a l l i n g f o r it„l 
I n t h i s sense, the f o r c e o f Niebuhr's polemic against any 
form of sentimentalism regarding love and against any 
form of e t h i c which r e l i e s upon the easy accomplishments 
of love has l e d him t o exaggerate the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of 
2 
t h i s r e c o n c i l i n g love among mens 
Yet, i n a d d i t i o n t o measuring "the f a c t s of 
h i s t o r y " against the r e v e l a t i o n , a comparison which gives 
Ramsey, op. c i t . , p. 136. 
2 
I b i d . Cf. Ho D. Lewis' argument i n Freedom and 
H i s t o r y , the Muirhead L i b r a r y of Philosophy ( A l l e n and 
Unwin, L t d . , London, 1962), t h a t Niebuhr makes a parody 
of human freedom by c l a i m i n g t h a t man cannot e f f e c t the 
v i s i o n of love which he sees as a r e s u l t of s e l f -
transcendence ( p , 225=6). See also Ramsey's claim t h a t 
"Niebuhr's r i g i d dualism between ' w i t h i n h i s t o r y * and 
'beyond h i s t o r y , ' or between what may be t r u e ' i n p r i n -
c i p l e ' and ' i n f a c t , ' may prove more disas t r o u s than a l l 
the supposed r i g i d i t i e s of the t r a d i t i o n a l theory of 
n a t u r a l law, since the former places l i m i t s upon God's 
agape and p r o v i d e n t i a l redemptive power while the l a t t e r 
only i n d i c a t e s a r e c a l c i t r a n c e i n the human nature and 
h i s t o r y which are subject t o redemption. " I b i d . , p. ll|Oo 
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r i s e t o a c e r t a i n pessimism on Niebuhr's p a r t , he also 
asserts t h a t the meaning of t h a t h i s t o r y i s t o be found 
i n t h a t which transcends i t and here the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t 
of the d i v i n e presence i s t o be f e l t . God's a c t i o n o f " 
love f o r man i n C h r i s t , by which he both reveals the t r u t h 
about man i n h i s r e l a t i o n t o God and makes a v a i l a b l e the 
resources f o r man to l i v e and act meaningfully, becomes 
the centre of the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o u s l i f e and the source 
of moral m o t i v a t i o n . 
Just as the Cross symbolizes the meaning of 
l i f e which stands i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o a l l 
conceptions o f the " t r u t h , " seeking t o com-
p l e t e the meaning of h i s t o r y from the inade-
quate centre of the hopes and ambitions o f a 
p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n or c u l t u r e , so also i t 
symbolizes the f i n a l goodness which stands 
i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o a l l forms o f human good-
ness i n which s e l f - a s s e r t i o n and love are 
compounded.1 
What i s important i n coming t o understand C h r i s t and the 
cross i s t h a t what i s experienced n e g a t i v e l y as a judge-
ment against human existence i s also known p o s i t i v e l y as 
the opening of a new p o s s i b i l i t y f o r l i f e i n r e l a t i o n t o 
God. Niebuhr can claim t h a t "the i n v a s i o n of the s e l f 
from beyond the s e l f i s t h e r e f o r e an i n v a s i o n of both 
'wisdom' and 'power,' o f b o t h ' t r u t h * and 'grace. 1 
I t i s t h i s aspect of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s which i s s p e c i f i c -
a l l y r e l i g i o u s and which c o n s t i t u t e s f o r Niebuhr i t s 
s u p e r i o r i t y over other forms of e t h i c a l systems t h a t 
become hardened and r i g i d . At the r o o t of the C h r i s t i a n 
experience i s the encounter w i t h a l o v i n g God who shows 
1NDM I I , p. 8 9 . 2 I b i d . , p. 100. 
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man t o h i m s e l f , reveals the meaning of human existence, 
and allows the f u l f i l l m e n t of t h a t meaning through con-
t i n u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Him. I n C h r i s t i s both 
" e s s e n t i a l humanity u n d i s t o r t e d " and "love i t s e l f , " 
b o t h the pinnacle of human freedom and the epitome of 
God's s e l f -giving.'*" 
I n C h r i s t t h e r e f o r e man becomes r e l a t e d t o what 
i s beyond human existence and i t i s the "comprehension 
of the dimension of depth i n l i f e " which Niebuhr then 
c a l l s "the d i s t i n c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n of r e l i g i o n t o 
m o r a l i t y . " 2 I t i s r e l i g i o u s f a i t h which perceives t h i s 
depth and which at the same time becomes committed t o a 
newness of l i f e w i t h i n h i s t o r y . 
A r e l i g i o u s m o r a l i t y i s constrained by i t s 
sense o f a dimension o f depth t o trace every 
f o r c e w i t h which i t deals t o some u l t i m a t e 
o r i g i n and to r e l a t e every purpose t o some 
u l t i m a t e end. I t i s concerned not only w i t h 
immediate values and d i s v a l u e s , b ut w i t h the 
problem of good and e v i l , not only w i t h immed-
i a t e o b j e c t i v e s , but w i t h u l t i m a t e hopes.3 
Moral decisions which f l o w from t h i s p e r c e p t i o n w i l l s t r i v e 
f o r the f u l f i l l m e n t of t h a t depth which God reveals and 
a f f i r m s . Indeed one's sense o f moral o b l i g a t i o n i s i n c o r -
porated i n t o t h i s r e l i g i o u s i n s i g h t by Niebuhr. M o r a l i t y 
does not c o n t r a d i c t r e l i g i o u s f a i t h nor i s i t i d e n t i f i e d 
w i t h t h a t f a i t h . 
^Ramsey, op. c i t . , p. lU7o 
2ICB„ p. $o 
3 I b i d . 
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The dimension of depth i n the consciousness 
of r e l i g i o n creates the tension between what 
i s and what ought t o be. I t bends the bow 
from which every arrow of moral a c t i o n f l i e s . 
Every t r u l y moral act seeks t o e s t a b l i s h what 
ought t o be, because the agent f e e l s o b l i g a t e d 
t o the i d e a l , though h i s t o r i c a l l y u n r e a l i z e d , 
as being the order of l i f e i n i t s more e s s e n t i a l 
r e a l i t y . Thus the C h r i s t i a n b e l i e v e s t h a t the 
i d e a l of love i s r e a l i n the w i l l and nature of 
God, even though he knows of no' place i n h i s t o r y 
where the i d e a l has been r e a l i z e d i n i t s pure 
form. And i t i s because i t has t h i s r e a l i t y t h a t 
he f e e l s the p u l l of o b l i g a t i o n . The sense o f 
o b l i g a t i o n i n morals from which Kant t r i e d t o 
derive the whole s t r u c t u r e of r e l i g i o n i s r e a l l y 
derived from the r e l i g i o n i t s e l f . The " p u l l " or 
" d r i v e " of moral l i f e i s a p a r t o f the r e l i g i o u s 
t e n s i o n of l i f e . Man seeks t o r e a l i z e i n h i s t o r y 
what he conceives t o be already the t r u e s t 
r e a l i t y - = t h a t i s , i t s f i n a l essence.I 
The acknowledgement of the transcendent f o u n d a t i o n and 
meaning of l i f e complements man's r e c o g n i t i o n o f human 
s i n f o r both of these imply a depth of understanding 
which i s beyond what man as a r a t i o n a l or even a moral 
being can grasp. Yet t h i s transcendent i s i m p l i c i t i n 
man's s t r u g g l e f o r freedom and f o r the r e a l i s a t i o n of the 
"ought" i n h i s t o r y j u s t as s i n f u l n e s s i s , and i t i s only 
on the basis of h i s knowledge t h a t man, as bot h f i n i t e 
and f r e e , i s loved by God, t h a t Niebuhr can say, "The 
e t e r n a l i s i n v o l v e d i n every moral judgment." 2 
I n the moment of transcending h i m s e l f and the 
world towards the v i s i o n of an i d e a l p o s s i b i l i t y f o r l i f e , 
man and God encounter one another and man discovers the 
"universe of meaning" t o which human l i f e i s fundamentally 
I b i d . , p. 8 = 9 . Underlines mine. 
I b i d . , p 0 6 9 o 
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r e l a t e d . This r e l a t i o n i s expressed by the f a c t t h a t 
human l i f e p o i n t s beyond i t s e l f t o a f u l f i l l m e n t which 
transcends the contingencies of p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l 
or c u l t u r a l circumstances and by the f a c t t h a t no m o r a l i t y 
w i l l be adequate t o t h a t l i f e which does not r e s t upon 
such an u l t i m a t e source. What the C h r i s t i a n claims i s 
t h a t the love of C h r i s t i s the f i n a l norm of human l i f e j " ' " 
agap_e " i s the f i n a l norm of a human nature which has no 
f i n a l norm i n h i s t o r y because i t i s not completely con= 
t a i n e d i n h i s t o r y . " i t i s love alone which can serve 
as an adequate law f o r the freedom which i s character-
i s t i c of man; love i s thus "the only f i n a l s t r u c t u r e of 
freedom." Thus freedom and love correspond t o one 
another as nature and norm, and i n t h i s sense Niebuhr 
accepts a rev i s e d v e r s i o n of a n a t u r a l law theory of 
e t h i c s . ^ 
As we have already suggested, Niebuhr argued t h a t 
mutual love could be judged t o be an adequate norm of 
l i f e according t o a r a t i o n a l assessment of the human 
s i t u a t i o n . Furthermore, evidence of such an assessment, 
1Niebuhr, The Chil d r e n of L i g h t and the Children 
of Darkness (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1960), 
p. 159J h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as CLCD. 
2NJDM I I , p. 75 = 
3 
Niebuhr, " C h r i s t i a n F a i t h and N a t u r a l Law," 
Theology (February 19^0), p. 89. 
^Cf. Ramsey, op. c i t . , p. 117o 
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he argued, could be found i n the moral codes which are 
i n f a c t adopted by i n d i v i d u a l s and s o c i e t i e s . Thus: 
I n s p i t e of the r e l a t i v i t y of morals every 
conceivable moral code and every philosophy 
of morals en j o i n s concern f o r the l i f e and 
welfar e of the other and seeks t o r e s t r a i n 
the u n q u a l i f i e d a s s e r t i o n of the i n t e r e s t s 
of the s e l f against the other„l 
A l l forms of m o r a l i t y thus are "grounded i n " and "p o i n t 
towards an u l t i m a t e p e r f e c t i o n i n u n i t y and harmony, not 
r e a l i z a b l e i n any h i s t o r i c s i t u a t i o n . " ^ This i s more 
than a matter o f o f f e r i n g a d e f i n i t i o n of m o r a l i t y which 
i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a separation between what ought t o be 
and what i s the case. Rather, Niebuhr considers i t 
evidence f o r the v a l i d i t y of love as an e t h i c a l norm. 
Not only i s i t t r u e t h a t " a l l human l i f e i s informed w i t h 
an inchoate sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y toward the u l t i m a t e 
law o f l i f e — t h e law o f l o v e , " 3 but t h i s law i s also "a 
v i s i o n of h e a l t h which even a s i c k man may envisage."^ 
Against t r a d i t i o n a l n a t u r a l law t h e o r i e s , Niebuhr asserted 
t h a t the law of love i s not merely added on t o the n a t u r a l 
sense of m o r a l i t y which man has nor does i t represent an 
accomplishment of man's reason. Bather, i t i s t h a t which 
shows the meaning of the moral quest i n which man i s 
n a t u r a l l y i n v o l v e d . Thus, Niebuhr claims, 
men are not completely b l i n d e d by s e l f - i n t e r e s t 
or l o s t i n t h i s maze o f h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i v i t y . 
What always remains w i t h them i s not some 
ICE, p. 1 0 6 o 3 I b i d p. 1 1 2 . 
2 I b i d . k NDM I , p. 2 8 7 . 
uncorrupted b i t of reason, which gives them 
u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d standards of j u s t i c e . What 
remains w i t h them''is something higher--namely, 
the law of l o v e , which they dimly recognize as 
the law of t h e i r being, as the s t r u c t u r e of 
human freedom, and which, i n C h r i s t i a n f a i t h , 
C h r i s t c l a r i f i e s and redefines? which i s why 
He i s c a l l e d the "second Adam."-*-
This dim p e r c e p t i o n can be recognised i n the "proximate 
p r i n c i p l e s " by which men l i v e and order t h e i r moral 
l i v e s o These p r i n c i p l e s , which Niebuhr c a l l s "schemes" 
of j u s t i c e , j u s t i c e , equal j u s t i c e , e q u a l i t y , freedom and 
mutual l o v e , i n d i c a t e an ascending scale of approximation 
of the law o f l o v e , each one of them p o i n t i n g towards 
love as the i d e a l t o which they are r e l a t e d as p r a c t i c a l 
or r e l a t i v e solutions,, 
I t i s , however, i n t h e i r descending order t h a t 
these proximate p r i n c i p l e s are j u s t i f i e d and, as Ramsey 
has so c l e a r l y shown, t h i s i s r e a l l y the way i n which 
Niebuhr has r a d i c a l l y r e v i s e d n a t u r a l law ethics„^ What 
i s important about the,^proximate p r i n c i p l e s i s not t h a t 
they can be j u s t i f i e d by reason but t h a t they are grounded 
i n the law o f love and are thus d i r e c t i v e s which f o l l o w 
from i t 0 
I n other words, since love r e q u i r e s t h a t human 
l i f e be a f f i r m e d , p o s i t i v e freedom t o possess 
the a f f i r m e d f r u i t i o n i s the f i r s t i m p l i c a t i o n 
and==in a world o f competing claims==-equality 
of o p p o r t u n i t y i s the second i m p l i c a t i o n drawn 
from the law o f love i t s e l f . ^ 
-•-"Christian F a i t h and N a t u r a l Law," p. 9 3 o 
2ICE, p 0 106-111. 
3 
Ramsey, pp. cit„, p„ 1 2 2 = 3 1 ° 
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I t i s here t h a t the d i a l e c t i c i n Niebuhr's thought i s 
obvious. On the one hand, Niebuhr i n s i s t s t h a t reason 
continue t o perform i t s duty i n moral reasoning by 
t r y i n g " to e s t a b l i s h a system of coherence and consistency 
i n conduct as w e l l as i n the realm o f t r u t h " and f u r t h e r 
by seeking t o formulate laws by which such a discerned 
u n i t y of meaning can be applied i n the world of h i s t o r i c a l 
events."*" Yet such p r i n c i p l e s are u l t i m a t e l y grounded i n 
the law of love as the i d e a l p o s s i b i l i t y f o r mankind so 
t h a t , on the oth e r hand, love alone j u s t i f i e s what reason 
seeks t o establish„ Niebuhr t h e r e f o r e argues t h a t 
the p r i n c i p l e s of " n a t u r a l law" by which 
j u s t i c e i s defined are, i n f a c t , n ot so much 
f i x e d standards of reason as they are r a t i o n a l 
e f f o r t s t o apply the moral o b l i g a t i o n , i m p l i e d 
i n the love commandment, t o the co m p l e x i t i e s 
of l i f e and the f a c t o f s i n . 2 
Thus, as Niebuhr h i m s e l f claims, "there i s a d i a l e c t i c a l 
r e l a t i o n between love and law" such t h a t the preci s e 
d i s t i n c t i o n between them becomes b l u r r e d . "The law," 
Niebuhr claims, "seeks f o r a t o l e r a b l e harmony o f l i f e 
w i t h l i f e , s i n presupposed. I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , an a p p r o x i -
mation of the law o f love on the one hand and an instrument 
of love on the other hand."-^ Niebuhr t h e r e f o r e argues 
1ICB, p. 2 0 U = 5 o 
2F&H, p. 1 8 8 0 
3 
CRPP, p„ 1 7 1 ~ 2 0 Cf 0 Niebuhr's statement i n 
CLCD t h a t the profoundest p r i n c i p l e s of. j u s t i c e " a c t u a l l y 
transcend reason and l i e rooted i n r e l i g i o u s conceptions 
o f the meaning o f e x i s t e n c e " (p. 7 1 K 
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"the relevance o f an impossible e t h i c a l i d e a l " i n the 
f o l l o w i n g ways 
Love i s thus the end term of any system of 
moralso I t i s the moral requirement i n which 
a l l schemes of j u s t i c e are f u l f i l l e d and 
negated. They are f u l f i l l e d because the 
o b l i g a t i o n of l i f e to l i f e i s more f u l l y met 
i n l ove than i s p o s s i b l e i n any scheme of 
e q u i t y and ju s t i c e , . They are negated because 
love makes an end of the n i c e l y c a l c u l a t e d 
less and more of s t r u c t u r e s o f j u s t i c e . I t 
does not c a r e f u l l y a r b i t r a t e between the 
needs of the s e l f and o f the o t h e r , since i t 
meets the needs of the other w i t h o u t concern 
f o r the s e l f . 3 -
Thus p r o p h e t i c r e l i g i o n transcends r a t i o n a l u n i v e r s a l l s m , 
the former being dynamically r e l a t e d t o an u l t i m a t e 
r e a l i t y which f i n a l l y transcends any of i t s r a t i o n a l and 
moral approximations« 
The r o l e of the i n d i v i d u a l moral agent i s t h e r e -
f o r e t o m a i n t a i n a constant t e n s i o n between the proximate 
moral and p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s enforced by a p a r t i c u l a r 
s o c i e t y and h i s freedom t o transcend b o t h h i s t o r y and 
nature t o enquire i n t o the meaning of human l i f e ' o I t i s 
t h i s n e c e s s i t y f o r transcendence which Niebuhr urged i n 
two of h i s major works on s o c i a l e t h i c s and i t i l l u m i n a t e s 
i n a personal way the r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e l i g i o u s 
i n s i g h t and moral d e c i s i o n s * ^ 
These profound questions about l i f e from the 
perspective o f the i n d i v i d u a l who i s able t o 
see the whole h i s t o r y of h i s n a t i o n (and o f 
a l l n a t i o n s f o r t h a t matter) as a f l u x i n . 
time, imply eternity„ Only a consciousness 
NDM I , p„ 2 9 5 o 
^ o r a l Man and Immoral Society and CLCD. 
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which transcends time can define and circum-
s c r i b e the f l u x of time. The man who searches 
a f t e r b o t h meaning and f u l f i l l m e n t s beyond the 
ambiguous f u l f i l l m e n t s and f r u s t r a t i o n s of 
h i s t o r y e x i s t s i n a height of s p i r i t which no 
h i s t o r i c a l process can completely c o n t a i n . 
This h e i g h t i s not i r r e l e v a n t t o the l i f e of 
the community, because new richness and a 
higher p o s s i b i l i t y of j u s t i c e come t o the 
community from t h i s h e i g h t o f awareness.1 
The r e a l hope f o r the renewal o f s o c i e t y and of h i s ~ 
t o r i c a l a c t u a l i t i e s which i s expressed by t h i s passage 
r e s t s on Niebuhr's c o n v i c t i o n t h a t "the d i v i n e power 
which bears h i s t o r y can complete what even the h i g h e s t 
human s t r i v i n g must leave incomplete, and can p u r i f y the 
co r r u p t i o n s which appear i n even the purest human 
a s p i r a t i o n s , " and i t i s t h i s hope which Niebuhr claims 
t o be "an indispensable p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r d i l i g e n t f u l ~ 
f i l l m e n t o f our h i s t o r i c t a s k s . " The t e l o s o f human 
existence, expressed i n the b e l i e f t h a t man i s made f o r 
lo v e , i s thus f u l f i l l e d i n and by the d i v i n e presence and, 
since i t has become a r e a l i t y w i t h i n man's own h i s t o r y , i t 
becomes the source of moral imperatives d i r e c t e d towards 
i t s f u l f i l l m e n t i n human l i f e . ^ R e l i g i o u s m o r a l i t y i s 
t h e r e f o r e c h a r a c t e r i s e d by f a i t h and hope, f o r , though i t 
"understands the fragmentary and broken character of a l l 
h i s t o r i c achievements," y e t i t "has confidence i n t h e i r 
meaning." The source of t h i s confidence i s the knowledge 
1CLCD, p. 8 U ~ 5 . 
2 I b i d . , p. 1 8 9 o 
Cf. George A Lindbeck, "Revelation, N a t u r a l Law, 
and the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr," N a t u r a l Law Forum, 
V o l . k, No. 1 ( 1 9 5 9 ) , p. 1U9. 
t h a t t h e i r completion i s " i n the hands of a Divine Power, 
whose resources are g r e a t e r than those of men, and whose 
s u f f e r i n g love can overcome the c o r r u p t i o n s of man'3 
achievements, w i t h o u t negating the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f our 
s t r i v i n g , , 
CLCD, p, l 8 9 ° 9 0 „ 
CHAPTER V I I I 
EXISTENTIAL ETHICS 
The e x i s t e n t i a l i s t e t h i c of Rudolf Bultmann 
represents a very i n t e r e s t i n g s t y l e of t h i n k i n g about 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n d i c a t i v e and imperative i n 
C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n , not the l e a s t because he 
deals w i t h t h i s issue i n a q u i t e e x p l i c i t way throughout 
h i s w r i t i n g s . The context o f Bultmann's e t h i c i s 
provided by an a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s i n which he 
uses the categories of contemporary e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
philosophy, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of Heidegger. Unlike 
Niebuhr, whose a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l a s s e r t i o n s are the r e s u l t 
o f an extensive a n a l y s i s and c r i t i q u e of i n t e l l e c t u a l and 
c u l t u r a l h i s t o r y , Bultmann's understanding i s derived 
from a Daseinsanalyse f o r which the most basic element 
i s m a n ~ i n ~ p a r t i c u l a r or ma n = i n ~ s i t u a t i o n . The conclu-
sions o f t h i s a n a l y s i s , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h regard t o the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of human 
existence and i t s o n t i c s i t u a t i o n , w i l l make c l e a r the 
f i r s t set of i n d i c a t i v e s which are important t o the 
understanding of e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n Bultmann develops. 
Secondly, however, Bultmann's e t h i c i s set i n the context 
of a d i s c i p l i n e d and thorough b i b l i c a l exegesis and t h i s 
f u r t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s h i s thought from t h a t of the others 
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we have so f a r examined. I t i s i n the context of the 
b i b l i c a l kerygma and i n the struggle" t o understand t h i s 
witness i n the contemporary world t h a t Bultmann analyses 
the character of r e l i g i o u s claims regarding the a c t i o n 
of God i n the w o r l d . A study of h i s demythologising 
p r o j e c t w i l l be important i n determining what r o l e 
h i s t o r i c a l i n d i c a t i v e s p l a y i n h i s understanding of 
e t h i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s . F i n a l l y an examination o f e t h i c a l 
decision-making both as " r a d i c a l obedience" and as the 
a p p r o p r i a t i o n of a "new s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g " w i l l be 
important since the r e l a t i o n s h i p between God and man 
im p l i e d by Bultmann's a n a l y s i s continues t o be one of 
the more problematic elements i n h i s theology„ 
Bultmann's anthropology c o n s i s t s o f a t w o f o l d 
observation regarding the nature o f man and these obser-
vat i o n s f u r n i s h the background and the fundamental c a t e ~ 
g o r i e s f o r h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of e t h i c a l decision=making. 
On the one hand, man can be understood as having an 
o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e which defines h i s p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
f o r being i n the world and thus which characterises the 
p a r t i c u l a r l y human way o f being. Fundamentally the 
o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f human existence i s defined as 
p o s s i b i l i t y j man's being i s a p o s s i b i l i t y o f being. As 
such, Bultmann claims t h a t there are b a s i c a l l y two ways 
of choosing w i t h regard to one's existence i n the w o r l d , 
and man i s a creature who stands before these two alter° 
n a t i v e s . I t i s only by d e c i s i o n t h a t h i s being i n the 
world w i l l be determined. Thus, Bultmann claims t h a t 
2Qk 
man's existence 
i s never t o be found i n the present as a f u l -
f i l l e d r e a l i t y , but always l i e s ahead o f him. 
I n other words, h i s existence i s always an 
i n t e n t i o n and a quest, and i n i t he may f i n d 
h i m s e l f or lose h i s g r i p upon h i m s e l f , gain 
h i s s e l f or f a i l t o do s o A 
Because human existence i s never a f u l l y present r e a l i t y , 
man l i v e s by p r o j e c t i n g h i m s e l f i n t o the f u t u r e towards 
h i s existence.. " L i v i n g i s always a 'walking'" i n which 
man l i v e 3 " f o r " or " t o " something, the content of which 
p 
i s determined by concrete d e c i s i o n s . Here also we f i n d 
the i n i t i a l clue t o Bultmann's understanding of a u t h e n t i c 
existence i n which man intends and acts so as t o keep h i a 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r existence open and thus maintain h i s 
genuine selfhood. The character o f l i f e as openness 
towards an as y e t undetermined f u t u r e can e i t h e r be 
appropriated or be denied i n man's choosing and these 
two p o s s i b i l i t i e s are the background against which man's 
concrete, h i s t o r i c a l decisions are s e t . 
The presence of these p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o man can 
be seen by an examination of three Pauline terms which 
are used t o ch a r a c t e r i s e man's existence. The most com-
prehensive of these, Bultmann claims, i s soma, i n d i c a t i v e 
of man's being i n the world as a body. Man's body belongs 
t o h i s very essence so t h a t man h i m s e l f can be denoted as 
''"Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, t r a n s l . 
by Kendrick Grobel, V o l . I (Charles Scribner's Sons, New 
York, 1 9 5 1 ? V o l . I I , 1 9 5 5 ) , p. 2 2 7 ; h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as 
TNT I or I I . 
2 I b i d . , p. 2 1 0 . 
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a whole person by the term soma. What man's b o d i l y 
existence s i g n i f i e s i n terms o f h i s o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e 
i s t h a t man i s a being who i s "able t o make h i m s e l f the 
obj e c t o f h i s own a c t i o n or t o experience h i m s e l f as the 
subject t o whom something happens."-1- This experience of 
knowing oneself as both the subject and object of a c t i o n 
i m p l i e s f o r Bultmann t h a t man i s capable of having a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o h i m s e l f , a r e l a t i o n s h i p which i t i s the 
unique c o n t r i b u t i o n of h i s b o d i l y existence t o make 
present t o him. 
He can be c a l l e d soma, t h a t i s , as having a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p to h i m s e l f — a s being able i n a 
c e r t a i n sense t o d i s t i n g u i s h h i m s e l f from 
h i m s e l f . Or, more e x a c t l y , he i s so c a l l e d 
as t h a t s e l f from whom he, as su b j e c t , d i s -
t i n g u i s h e s h i m s e l f , the s e l f w i t h whom he can 
deal as the o b j e c t of h i s own conduct, and 
also the s e l f whom he can perceive as sub= 
j e c t e d t o an occurrence t h a t springs from a 
w i l l other than h i s own. I t i s as such a 
s e l f t h a t man i s c a l l e d soma. 2 
As soma t h e r e f o r e man faces d i f f e r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e s w i t h 
respect t o knowing h i m s e l f as subject or ob j e c t and these 
a l t e r n a t i v e s are r e a l i s e d i n concrete d e c i s i o n s . Man can-
also be cha r a c t e r i s e d as pneuma or psyche, both of which 
s i g n i f y the presence t o man of an inner s e l f , a s e l f which 
knows i t s e l f to be the subject o f i t s own w i l l i n g and 
doing. These phenomena of s p i r i t and soul do n o t , f o r 
Bultmann, i n d i c a t e the presence i n man of "some higher 
p r i n c i p l e . . . or some s p e c i a l i n t e l l e c t u a l or s p i r i t u a l 
1 I b i d . , p. 1 9 5 . 3 I b i d . , p. 2 0 3 . 
2 I b i d . , p. 1 9 6 . 
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f a c u l t y of h i s " but r a t h e r s p e c i f y another way i n which 
man knows hi m s e l f as a p a r t i c u l a r being.^ Man can be 
described t h e r e f o r e as "a s t r i v i n g , w i l l i n g , purposing 
s e l f , " a s e l f which has i n t e n t i o n s and commitments and 
which can decide courses of a c t i o n and thus engage i n 
g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i v i t y . These three a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l 
terms s i g n i f y f o r Bultmann what i s "the s p e c i f i c a l l y 
human s t a t e of being a l i v e " and through each of them, 
man experiences the a l t e r n a t i v e s w i t h respect to which 
h i s p a r t i c u l a r and unique s e l f w i l l be def i n e d . Thus, 
The various p o s s i b i l i t i e s of regarding man, 
or the s e l f , come to l i g h t i n the use of the 
a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l terms soma, psyche, and 
pneuma. Man does not c o n s i s t of two p a r t s , 
much less of three J nor are psyche and pneuma 
. s p e c i a l f a c u l t i e s or p r i n c i p l e s ( w i t h i n the 
soma) of a mental l i f e h i g h er than h i s animal 
l i f e . Rather, man i s a l i v i n g u n i t y . He i s a 
person who can become an o b j e c t t o h i m s e l f . 
He i s a person having a r e l a t i o n s h i p t o h i m s e l f 
(soma). He i s a person who l i v e s i n h i s i n t e n -
t i o n a l i t y , h i s p u r s u i t of some purpose, h i s 
w i l l i n g and knowing (psyche, pneuma).3 
Bultmann claims t h a t the f a c t of having c e r t a i n " 
o n t o l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s i t s e l f e t h i c a l l y n e u t r a l | 
i t i s simply the case t h a t man's existence i s so charac= 
t e r i s e d . Thus, "the f a c t t h a t he i s soma i s i n i t s e l f 
n e i t h e r good nor b a d " j ^ n e i t h e r i s the f a c t t h a t man i s an 
i n t e n t i o n a l or w i l l i n g s e l f good or bad. These charac-
t e r i s t i c s of man's existence merely i n d i c a t e the formal 
1 I b i d . , p, 2 0 6 0 ^ I b i d . , p. 2 0 9 o 
2 I b i d . , p 0 2 0 5 . * * I b l d . , p. 1 9 8 . 
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p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f human l i f e . 
This s t a t e o f l i v i n g toward some go a l , having 
some a t t i t u d e , w i l l i n g something and knowing 
something, belongs t o man's very nature and 
i n i t s e l f i s n e i t h e r good nor bad. The goal 
toward which one's l i f e i s o r i e n t e d i s l e f t 
s t i l l undetermined i n the mere o n t o l o g i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e of having some o r i e n t a t i o n or oth e r ! 
but t h i s s t r u c t u r e (which f o r Paul i s , o f 
course, the g i f t of the l i f e - g i v i n g Creator) 
o f f e r s the p o s s i b i l i t y of choosing one's g o a l , 
of d e c i d i n g f o r good or e v i l , f o r or against 
God.1 
What Bultmann claims t o be doing t h e r e f o r e i s simply 
i n d i c a t i n g the "horizons" of human p o s s i b i l i t i e s , or, as 
Macquarrie has put i t , Bultmann i s d e s c r i b i n g the " l i m i t s 
w i t h i n which every i n d i v i d u a l existence must f a l l . " Man 
i s a being who, i n terms of o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e a t 
l e a s t , i s b a s i c a l l y undetermined and t o examine t h i s 
s t r u c t u r e i s merely t o show the "formal, n e u t r a l possi° 
b i l i t i e s " which man i s capable of t a k i n g i n any d i r e c t i o n 
he chooses,3 
Yet the content of these a l t e r n a t i v e s i s c l e a r l y 
not n e u t r a l f o r Bultmann, f o r one o f them i s considered good 
and the other e v i l . I n considering the o n t o l o g i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e of human exis t e n c e , t h e r e f o r e , the choice 
between good and e v i l i s the choice between a l t e r n a t i v e 
ways o f being i n the world and, f u r t h e r , of a l t e r n a t i v e 
x I b i d . , p. 209o 
2 
John Macquarrie, An E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Theology; A 
Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann (Harper and Row, New 
York, 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 3 1 * . 
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ways of r e l a t i n g oneself w i t h God. Thus Bultmann can 
claim w i t h regard t o man's b o d i l y existence t h a t "Since 
i t belongs t o man's nature to have such a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
t o h i m s e l f , a double p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s ; t o be at one 
w i t h h i m s e l f or at. odds (estranged from himself)."'*" 
Man's r e l a t i o n s h i p to h i m s e l f can e i t h e r be "an appropriate 
one" i n which he i s i n c o n t r o l of h i s own i n t e n t i o n s and 
actio n s or i t can be a "perverted one" i n which man loses 
h i s f r e e p o s s i b i l i t i e s , or loses "his g r i p on h i m s e l f " by 
being mastered by another power. What ch a r a c t e r i s e s 
man's existence as a n e u t r a l f a c t , namely h i s responsi= 
b i l i t y f o r h i s own choices and h i s determination o f the 
way he w i l l walk i n t o the. f u t u r e , yet i m p l i e s t h a t one 
way o f walking w i l l c l e a r l y maintain man's a b i l i t y t o 
d i r e c t h i s own l i f e and the other w i l l take t h a t freedom 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y away. Indeed i t i s , f o r Bultmann, 
man's a b i l i t y t o judge or t o understand the character o f 
h i s l i f e which determines these a l t e r n a t i v e s as good or 
e v i l . As the term nous makes c l e a r , man's s e l f i s also 
a conscious v o l i t i o n , 
[an] understanding w i l l w i t h the a l t e r n a t i v e 
of being f o r God or against Him. Man's voli° 
t i o n i s not an i n s t i n c t i v e s t r i v i n g but i s an 
understanding act o f w i l l which i s always an 
"e v a l u a t i n g " act and t h e r e f o r e n e c e s s a r i l y 
moves i n the sphere of decisions between good 
and e v i l . ^ 
I t would seem t h e r e f o r e t h a t the r e s u l t o f such an assess-
ment of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s present t o man i n h i s o n t o l o g i c a l 
1 I b i d . , p. 196. 2 I b i d . , p. 213. 
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s t r u c t u r e which i s c a r r i e d out by man's mind i s t h a t 
these p o s s i b i l i t i e s are considered t o be a u t h e n t i c or 
i n a u t h e n t i c , good or e v i l . Yet, Bultmann claims t h a t 
the aim of the nous, or man's s e l f which i s the subject 
of h i s w i l l i n g , i s . i n n a t e l y t o do what i s r i g h t . Thus, 
" I t belongs t o the nature o f man ( i . e . t o h i s o n t o l o g i c a l 
s t r u c t u r e ) t o desire 'what i s good,' inasmuch as t h i s 
good i s nothing other than ' l i f e ' i t s e l f . " " * ' Character-
i s t i c of man's o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e i s t h e r e f o r e not 
only the presence t o him of a l t e r n a t i v e s , but furthermore 
the n a t u r a l f a c t , or even n a t u r a l n e c e s s i t y , t h a t man 
fundamentally intends to f i n d l i f e , t o a f f i r m h i m s e l f , 
t o do t h a t which i s good.. Since he wants t o maintain 
the importance o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s and o f man's 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t a k i n g up one or the other o f them, 
Bultmann speaks of t h i s desire f o r the good as a hidden 
tendency, or an innate d e s i r e , expressed as the i n n e r -
most desires o f the h e a r t . "The w i l l i n g of the 'good' 
. . . i s the s e l f ' s innermost tendency which i s covered 
up and hidden by the conscious desires which b r i n g f o r t h 
deeds"; or again, "what he w i l l s at h e a r t , an i n t e n t i o n 
which can be perverted i n h i s concrete w i l l . . . " i s to 
f i n d a u t h e n t i c e x i s t e n c e . Thus, "because [man] must 
f i r s t f i n d h i s l i f e ( t h a t which i s 'good'--meaning the 
existence t h a t a t heart he wants), t h i s existence comes 
to have f o r him the character of the 'good'==in the 
1 I b i d . , p. 2 1 2 . 2 I b i d . , p. 2 2 1 * . 
sense of t h a t which i s r e q u i r e d of him." 
On the other hand, man can be described as he 
r e a l l y i s i n the w o r l d , t h a t i s , i n terms of h i s o n t i c 
s i t u a t i o n , as one who has already decided, already 
chosen, and has thus determined h i s l i f e according t o 
one of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o r i g i n a l l y open t o him. Again, 
Bultmann uses Pauline terms t o i n d i c a t e the nature of 
man's o n t i c s i t u a t i o n and these a t t e s t to the f a c t t h a t 
"Man has always already missed the existence t h a t at 
heart he seeks . . „ " 2 Sarx, i n a d d i t i o n t o being a 
n e u t r a l term designating'man's m a t e r i a l c o r p o r e a l i t y , " 
s i g n i f i e s the sphere i n which a man moves or the stan-
dards by which he makes decisions i n the w o r l d . To be 
" i n the f l e s h " i s thus n a t u r a l to human l i f e , but to act 
"according t o the f l e s h " i s t o walk i n a way which i s 
i n a u t h e n t i c and which u l t i m a t e l y w i l l lead t o one's loss 
of power over oneself. The man who i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d 
o n t o l o g i c a l l y as being a soma and t h e r e f o r e as having a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o h i m s e l f i s known o n t i c a l l y as one who 
c o n t i n u a l l y allows t h a t somatic existence t o be r u l e d by 
sarx and who thus can no longer get h o l d of h i s o r i g i n a l 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s . To l i v e according t o the f l e s h , kata 
sarka, i s t o adopt an a t t i t u d e towards one's existence 
"*"Ibid., p. 227. This i s expressed i n the 
Johannine l i t e r a t u r e also i n the assumption t h a t "man's 
l i f e i s pervaded by the quest f o r r e a l i t y ( a l e t h e i a ) , 
the quest f o r l i f e . " Thus " i t i s presupposed Lby John3 
t h a t man does know of l i g h t ( i n general) and i s i n quest 
of i t . " TNT I I , p. 26. 
2 I b i d o 
i n which the standard o f judgement i s t h a t which i s 
e x t e r n a l , e a r t h l y , and t r a n s i t o r y . 1 For Bultmann, t h i s 
a t t i t u d e r e s u l t s i n s e l f - d e l u s i o n since i t i s based 
upon an erroneous judgement as t o the character o f l i f e . 
Whereas the judgement which i s appropriate i s t h a t the 
f l e s h denotes the sphere o f man's n a t u r a l e a r t h l y l i f e 
and as such i n d i c a t e s the realm i n which man's decisions 
are t o be made, the judgement which i s i n f a c t made by 
man i s t h a t t h i s sphere should become "the determinative 
norm" f o r h i s l i f e . 2 To put one's confidence i n the 
f l e s h as a p r i n c i p l e upon which t o act r e s u l t s f o r B u l t -
mann i n boasting and p r i d e i n man's own e x t e r n a l deeds 
or accomplishments and i n f e a r or a n x i e t y . I t i s f e a r or 
care which motivates nan t o run from the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open 
to him and t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f against a f u t u r e which i s 
unknown and undetermined, and, once one chooses to l e t 
sarx become the dec i d i n g f a c t o r i n one's decisions, t h i s 
a n x i e t y continues t o c h a r a c t e r i s e man's o n t i c s i t u a t i o n 
as a v i c i o u s c i r c l e from which there i s no escape. What 
begins t h e r e f o r e as a genuine w i l l i n g t o l a y hold o f l i f e 
becomes perverted and, in s t e a d o f being d i r e c t e d outward 
towards others and towards h i s own genuine f u t u r e , man's 
w i l l turns inward upon h i m s e l f and h i s need t o secure the 
foundation f o r h i s own l i f e . 
^ • I b i d . , p. 2 3 7 - 8 . Cf. Macquarrie, op. c l t . 8 
"The f l e s h i s t o be understood as a way o f being, not 
a substance" (p. 1 0 6 ) o 
2 I b i d . , p. 2 3 9 o 
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Bultmann can then describe man's o n t i c existence 
as an a l i e n a t i o n or an estrangement i n which man i s n o t 
only separated from h i s o r i g i n a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s but has 
also become the v i c t i m of e x t e r n a l powers which, though 
they were dependent o r i g i n a l l y Upon man's choosing them 
f o r t h e i r power, have now passed out of h i s c o n t r o l 
a l t o g e t h e r * Thus sarx and hamartia become "powers t o 
which man has f a l l e n v i c t i m and against which he i s 
powerless. The p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of these powers expresses 
the f a c t t h a t man has l o s t t o them the cap a c i t y t o be the 
subject o f h i s own a c t i o n . " 1 Man becomes unable t o make 
h i s o r i g i n a l and n a t u r a l i n t e n t i o n t o do good e f f e c t i v e 
i n h i s a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n , even though t h i s i n c l i n a t i o n 
stays w i t h him as the only remainder' of h i s a u t h e n t i c 
l i f e . Thus man i s d i v i d e d against h i m s e l f ! he i s inwardly 
s p l i t . 
Man f a i l s t o achieve [ h i s selfhood] by 
attempting s e l f - r e l i a n t l y t o r e a l i z e i t i n -
"d e s i r e . " I n t h i s f a l s e w i l l toward s e l f -
hood man's d e s t i n a t i o n t o be a s e l f — h i s 
w i l l toward " l i f e " — i s p e r v e r t e d l y preserved % 
t h a t i s just, the reason why i t i s po s s i b l e t o 
describe human existence as the s t r u g g l e 
between " s e l f " and " s e l f " w i t h i n a man.2 
This s p l i t i s also s i g n i f i e d by the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
w i l l i n g and doing, between the way a man intends t o l i v e 
h i s l i f e and the deeds which he performs t o b r i n g about 
I b i d . , p. IhSo This i s the r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e 
f o r Bultmann of Paul's claim i n Romans 7»17 t h a t " . . . 
i t i s no longer I t h a t do i t , but s i n which dwells w i t h i n 
me." Quotations are from the Revised Standard Version, 
B i b l e . ed. by H. G. May and B. M. Metzger (Oxford Univer-
s i t y Press, New York, 1962). 
2 I b i d . , p„ 21+6. 
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t h a t i n t e n t i o n . Whereas man " i n a l l h i s doing . . . 
acts because i n a l l h i s doing he intends t o achieve his 
a u t h e n t i c i t y " and thus to l a y hold of the ob j e c t o f h i s 
w i l l i n g , l i f e , the r e s u l t o f h i s doing i s not l i f e but a 
loss o f selfhood."*" Therefore, 
I t i s p r e c i s e l y through h i s w i l l i n g t o be 
him s e l f t h a t man f a i l s t o f i n d the authen-
t i c i t y t h a t he w i l l s t o achieve . . . But 
j u s t because the w i l l t o be au t h e n t i c i s 
preserved i n the f a l s e w i l l t o be o n s e l f , 
even i f only d i s g u i s e d l y and d i s t o r t e d l y , 
i t i s po s s i b l e so t o speak of the s p l i t i n 
man's existence t h a t the authen t i c I i s set 
over against the f a c t u a l one.2 
Man's a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n i n the world can thus be described 
as one o f a l i e n a t i o n or of f a l l e n n e s s i n which man has 
not r e t a i n e d h i s a b i l i t y t o choose between a l t e r n a t i v e 
ways of being and can no longer e f f e c t h i s desire f o r 
au t h e n t i c l i f e . 
I t i s necessary, however, t o speak o f God when 
speaking of man f o r , according t o C h r i s t i a n a f f i r m a t i o n s 
about human l i f e , i t i s God who i s the Creator of t h a t 
l i f e , who gives i t the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a u t h e n t i c and 
i n a u t h e n t i c modes of existence, and who a f f i r m s the 
aut h e n t i c as h i s own t r u e i n t e n t i o n f o r human l i f e * 
Thus, Bultmann says t h a t the choice between good and e v i l 
Bultmann, "Romans 7 and the Anthropology o f 
Paul," Existence and F a i t h ; Shorter W r i t i n g s o f Rudolf 
Bultmann, selected and t r a n s l a t e d by Schubert Ogden 
(World P u b l i s h i n g Co., New York, 1960), p. 152; here-
a f t e r c i t e d as E&F. 
2 I b i d . , p. 156o 
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i s also the choice t o be f o r or against God."1" Man i s 
c o n s t a n t l y one who i s "placed before God. The o n t o l o g i ~ 
c a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f being good or e v i l i s simultaneously 
the o n t i c p o s s i b i l i t y of having*a r e l a t i o n s h i p t o God 
. . . " This r e l a t i o n s h i p t o God i s expressed i n the 
term anthropos, which means "man i n h i s c r e a t u r e l y 
humanity, and t h a t means also man i n h i s r e l a t i o n t o 
God. As the Creator of l i f e , God b o t h a f f i r m s and 
demands l i f e and, f o r Bultmann, i t i s God's claim upon 
man t h a t r e q u i r e s o f him t h a t he also choose l i f e . This 
means, i n terms o f the o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f human 
l i f e , t h a t man ought t o choose a u t h e n t i c selfhood, which 
i s a t the same time a selfhood t h a t can remain open t o 
i t s own f u t u r e since i t i s open t o Godj and i t means, i n 
terms of the o n t i c s i t u a t i o n of human existence, t h a t man, 
i n choosing t o secure h i m s e l f against h i s own f u t u r e , has 
missed a u t h e n t i c l i f e , and t h a t i s at the same time t o 
have sinned against God's i n t e n t i o n . 
Because man i s a s e l f who i s concerned w i t h 
h i s a u t h e n t i c i t y and can f i n d i t (as t h a t o f 
a creature) only when he surrenders h i m s e l f 
t o the claim of God, there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f s i n . Because from the beginning the claim 
of God has t o do w i t h man's a u t h e n t i c e x i s t -
ence, there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f misunder-
standing: the man who i s c a l l e d t o authen-
t i c i t y f a l s e l y w i l l s to be h i m s e l f . k 
1TNT I , p. 2 0 9 o 
2 I b l d o , p. 228. 
-Ubid., p„ 2 3 1 . Underlines mine* 
^E&P, p. l£7* . ' . 
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To t a l k of man as a creature before God i s t o t a l k of 
man faced w i t h two a l t e r n a t i v e ways o f l i f e , one of which 
would f u l f i l l man's own r e a l i n t e n t i o n which i s God's 
w i l l f o r human l i f e , and the other o f which would be 
falsehood as w e l l as disobedience« 
I t i s important at t h i s p o i n t t o examine care-
f u l l y the nature o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between the under-
standing of man derived from Daseinsanalyse and t h a t 
which involves s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s claims, f o r i t i s 
here t h a t the s p e c i a l f e a t u r e s of Bultmann's understanding 
of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n become c l e a r . On the one 
hand, Bultmann b e l i e v e d i n the usefulness o f a philosophy 
of existence i n so f a r as i t i l l u m i n a t e d the p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
and the l i m i t s of human l i f e . I t i s by an o n t o l o g i c a l 
a n a l y s i s t h a t the two fundamental a l t e r n a t i v e s become 
c l e a r and man can be seen as one who l i v e s w i t h i n these 
choices by d e c i s i o n . Thus the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s 
precedes the work o f exegesis and the one who sets out 
to e x p l a i n the meaning of r e l i g i o u s claims ought f i r s t 
t o make c l e a r the presuppositions from which he i n t e r -
p r e t s these c l a i m s o 1 I t i s e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy 
which Bultmann b e l i e v e d could o f f e r the most adequate 
framework f o r such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . . 
Jesus C h r i s t and Mythology (Charles Scribner's 
Sons, New York, 1 9 5 ^ ) , P° » Sk"S> h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as 
JC&Mo C f o Essays P h i l o s o p h i c a l and T h e o l o g i c a l , t r a n s l . 
by J„ C„ G„ Greig (SCM Press, London, 1 9 5 5 ) , P» 23Uf0 
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E x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy t r i e s to show what 
i t means to e x i s t by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between 
man's being as "existence" and the being o f 
a l l w o r l d l y beings which are not " e x i s t i n g " 
but only "extant" (vorhanden) . » . I t may 
be enough to say t h a t e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy 
shows human existence t o be t r u e only i n the 
act of e x i s t i n g . E x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy i s 
f a r from pretending t h a t i t ' secures f o r man a 
self - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h i s own personal existence 
. . . [ f o r i t ] makes personal existence my own 
personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y „ . . 1 
Yet Bultmann on the other hand acknowledges the l i m i t s 
o f such an understanding of human existence and thus only 
accepts such an an a l y s i s f o r i t s formal d e s c r i p t i o n o f 
the s t r u c t u r e s o f t h a t existence. Thus e x i s t e n t i a l i s t 
philosophy does not f u r n i s h us w i t h "an i d e a l p a t t e r n o f 
human e x i s t e n c e " but merely describes the phenomenon o f 
existence*3 
E x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy does not say t o me 
" i n such and such a way you must e x i s t " j i t 
says only "you must e x i s t " ; o r, since even 
t h i s claim may be too l a r g e , i t shows me what 
i t means to exist . U 
Bultmann claims t h e r e f o r e t h a t a philosophy of existence, 
w h i l e f u r n i s h i n g a framework w i t h i n which t o discuss the 
meaning and i m p l i c a t i o n s of r e l i g i o u s claims, does not 
e n t a i l any set of concrete demands upon the one who 
engages i n an ana l y s i s o f t h a t e xistence, e i t h e r i n terms 
I b i d . , p . 56. 
Macquarrie, "Philosophy and Theology i n B u l t = 
mann's Thought," i n Charles W. Kegley, ed., The Theology 
of Rudolf Bultmann (SCM Press, London, 1 9 6 6 ) , p . 1 2 9 = 3 0 o 
3JC&M, p o 55, 57° 
* * I b l d . , p . 55o 
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of s p e c i f i c b e l i e f s about the q u a l i t y of t h a t existence or 
i n terms of actions which might r e a l i s e or f u l f i l l t h a t 
e x i s t e n c e . Thus he claims 
t h a t there w i l l never be a r i g h t philosophy i n 
the sense o f an a b s o l u t e l y p e r f e c t system, a 
philosophy which could give'answers t o a l l 
questions and c l e a r up a l l r i d d l e s o f human 
existence. Our question i s simply which 
philosophy today o f f e r s the most adequate 
perspective and conceptions f o r understanding 
human e x i s t e n c e . ! 
Here Bultmann reveals h i m s e l f as the t h e o l o g i a n whose 
major concern i s an understanding of the b i b l i c a l reve = 
l a t i o n of God and i t s claims regarding the nature of 
human existence and i t i s f o r j u s t t h i s reason t h a t a 
philosopher l i k e Jaspers can argue t h a t Bultmann only 
uses philosophy as propaedeutic t o theology.^ 
Behind Bultmann ?s use o f philosophy seems t o be 
the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t i t i s the task of philosophy t o 
analyse or to describe and t h a t any decisions regarding 
a personal way of l i f e cannot be given or e n t a i l e d by 
such a d e s c r i p t i o n . One t h e r e f o r e does not make choices 
on the basis o f Daseinsanalyse f o r i t "does n o t claim t o 
i n s t r u c t me about my personal self-understanding."3 I t 
i s j u s t here t h a t r e l i g i o u s claims are o f s i g n i f i c a n c e 
f o r i t i s Bultmann ?s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t r e l i g i o u s statements 
1 I b l d . 
^ a c q u a r r i e , "Philosophy and Theology i n Bult° 
mann's Thought," p. 139. See also K a r l Jaspers, The 
Perennial Scope of Philosophy, t r a n s l . by Ralph Manheim 
( P h i l o s o p h i c a l L i b r a r y , New York, 19U9)„ 
3JC&M, p. 58o 
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are kerygma, by which he means personal address or c h a l -
lenge, and i t i s kerygma which makes'plain one's r e l a t i o n -
ship t o God and the demands which such a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i n v o l v e s . Therefore, he argues: 
The p u r e l y formal a n a l y s i s of existence does 
not take i n t o account the r e l a t i o n between man 
and God, because i t does not take i n t o account 
the concrete events of the personal l i f e , the 
concrete encounters which c o n s t i t u t e personal 
existence . . . t h i s a n a l y s i s u n v e i l s a sphere 
which f a i t h alone can understand as the sphere 
of the r e l a t i o n between man and God sl 
For Bultmann, as Macquarrie has argued, "Theology cannot 
be absorbed i n t o philosophy because i t knows and proclaims 
what God has done about t h a t human s i t u a t i o n which 
philosophy can only analyze." The p h i l o s o p h i c a l d e s c r i p -
t i o n of existence i s t h e r e f o r e n e u t r a l since t h i s r e l a t i o n -
ship w i t h God has been e l i m i n a t e d , the r e s u l t o f the 
e l i m i n a t i o n being t h a t "My personal r e l a t i o n w i t h God 
can be made r e a l by God onl y , by the a c t i n g God who meets 
me i n His Word." Bultmann's d e s c r i p t i o n o f the o n t o l o g i -
c a l s t r u c t u r e and the o n t i c s i t u a t i o n of man i s important 
since i t shows us the meaning of r e l i g i o u s proclamations 
thereby i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the r e a l source of moral impera-
t i v e s i s not t o be found i n an an a l y s i s o f human existence 
alone but i n God's a f f i r m a t i o n s and i n t e n t i o n s regarding 
t h a t existences 
1 I b i d . 
a c quarrie, op. c i t . , p. 131• 
JC&M, p. 59. 
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That r e l i g i o u s claims r e q u i r e such an i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n i n terms o f personal existence i s the major 
premise upon which Bultmann's demythologising program 
i s b u i l t and i t i s by t h i s method t h a t he intends t o 
examine the character o f the divine-human r e l a t i o n s h i p 
upon which e t h i c a l decisions i n human l i f e are t o be 
founded, Demythologising makes two important presup-
p o s i t i o n s regarding the actions o f God which are t o 
serve as the basis f o r moral d e c i s i o n , one o f them nega-
t i v e and the other p o s i t i v e , and i t i s important t h a t we 
examine each o f these as they pose s p e c i a l problems to 
Bultmann's asse r t i o n s regarding the nature o f those 
d e c i s i o n s o N e g a t i v e l y , demythologisation presupposes 
t h a t t o speak of God and h i s a c t i o n i n o b j e c t i v e , mytho-
l o g i c a l terms can lead t o a r e a l misunderstanding o f the 
meaning o f those actions and can put a stumbling block 
i n the way of any modern-day understanding and acceptance 
of the r e a l i t y and s i g n i f i c a n c e o f these a c t i o n s . Mytho-
l o g i c a l language, much of which i s used i n the b i b l i c a l 
witness t o the a c t i v i t y of God, speaks about d i v i n e 
actions as o b j e c t i v e phenomena i n t h i s w o r l d . 
I t speaks o f gods who represent the power 
beyond the v i s i b l e , comprehensible w o r l d . 
I t speaks o f gods as i f they were men and o f 
t h e i r actions as human a c t i o n s , although i t 
conceives o f the gods as endowed w i t h supers 
human power and o f t h e i r a ctions as i n c a l c u l -
able, as capable o f breaking the normal, 
o r d i n a r y order of events. I t may be said 
t h a t myths give to the transcendent r e a l i t y 
an immanent, t h i s - w o r l d l y o b j e c t i v i t y . Myths 
give w o r l d l y o b j e c t i v i t y t o t h a t which i s 
un w o r l d l y . 1 
1 I b i d . , p. 1 9 . 
The problem w i t h myth i s not only i t s attempt t o compre-
hend d i v i n e a c t i o n i n terms of human r e a l i t y but more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y i t s f a i l u r e t o o f f e r any k i n d o f reasonable 
e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s a c t i v i t y i n the modern world. I n so 
f a r as the n a t u r a l world i s concerned, Bultmann considers 
the v i c t o r y o f s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g t o be so complete t h a t 
we cannot make sense o f any k i n d o f break i n the causal 
nexus. Thus, he claims, " I n t h i s modern conception o f 
the world the cause-and-effeet nexus i s fundamental . . „ 
modern science does not be l i e v e t h a t the course of nature 
can be i n t e r r u p t e d or, so t o speak, p e r f o r a t e d , by super-
n a t u r a l powers."^ The same i s t r u e apparently f o r our 
understanding of h i s t o r y i n which, Bultmann claims, 
"nothing happens w i t h o u t r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n s . " 2 For the 
modern C h r i s t i a n t h e r e f o r e there must be another way i n 
which t o understand the a c t i o n of God i n the h i s t o r i c a l 
figure', Jesus C h r i s t , and h i s promise t o b r i n g i n the 
Kingdom of God. This new way w i l l h o p e f u l l y n o t off e n d 
the r a t i o n a l mind of modern man but w i l l open up the 
deeper meaning o f m y t h o l o g i c a l r e l i g i o u s claims. 
The p o s i t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of demythologising 
i s t h e r e f o r e t h a t behind these o b j e c t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n s o f 
God's a c t i v i t y i s an understanding o f human l i f e i n 
r e l a t i o n t o God which the w r i t e r i s attem p t i n g t o express, 
by using m y t h o l o g i c a l language<> 
I b i d . , p. 15. Cf. p. 6 O - I 0 
1 
I b i d o , p„ l6o 
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Myths express the knowledge t h a t man i s n o t 
master of the world and of h i s l i f e , t h a t the 
world w i t h i n which he l i v e s i s f u l l of r i d d l e s 
and mysteries and t h a t human l i f e also i s f u l l 
of r i d d l e s and mysteries. Mythology expresses 
a c e r t a i n understanding of human existence. 
I t b elieves t h a t the world and human l i f e have 
t h e i r ground and t h e i r l i m i t s i n a power which 
i s beyond a l l t h a t we can c a l c u l a t e or c o n t r o l . 
The deeper meaning of language which describes God's 
a c t i o n i n o b j e c t i v e terms i s thus t o express what i s 
r e a l l y a s u b j e c t i v e phenomenon, namely man's dependence 
upon God. To demythologise t h e r e f o r e means t o s t r i p 
away the ancient view o f the world which i s presupposed 
by the b i b l i c a l witness t o God's a c t i v i t y and t o under-
stand these claims as personal address intended not only 
t o challenge one's understanding o f oneself i n r e l a t i o n 
t o God but also to demand a response t o God's w i l l . 
I t i s Bultmann's i n t e n t i o n t h e r e f o r e t o make c l e a r 
the e x i s t e n t i a l meaning of r e l i g i o u s claims and i n t h i s 
way to- understand the nature o f r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f and 
r e l i g i o u s m o r a l i t y . Bultmann maintains t h a t statements 
about God's a c t i o n must be understood a n a l o g i c a l l y on the 
basis o f our understanding o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between human beings. 
How, then, must we speak of God as a c t i n g i f 
our speech i s n o t t o be understood as mytho-
l o g i c a l speech? God as a c t i n g does n o t r e f e r 
t o an event which can be perceived by me w i t h -
out myself being drawn i n t o the event as i n t o 
God's a c t i o n , w i t h o u t myself t a k i n g p a r t i n i t 
as being acted upon. I n oth e r words, t o speak 
I b i d . , p. 1 9 o 
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of God as a c t i n g i n v o l v e s the events of per-
sonal existence . . . When we speak o f Go.d 
as a c t i n g , we mean t h a t we are confronted 
w i t h God, addressed, asked, judged, or 
blessed by God.l 
I n one sense t h e r e f o r e we do not understand God at a l l 
unless we understand h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o us or what he 
means f o r our l i v e s and there seem t o be at l e a s t two 
reasons f o r t h i s i n Bultmann's thought. On the one hand, 
r e l i g i o u s language cannot be an impersonal or o b j e c t i v e 
r e p o r t i n g of events which the hearer can t r e a t i n a 
n e u t r a l f a s h i o n w i t h o u t i n v o l v i n g h i s own b e l i e f s and 
commitmentso Thus, 
The a f f i r m a t i o n t h a t God i s c r e a t o r cannot be 
a t h e o r e t i c a l statement about God as c r e a t o r 
mundi i n a general sense. The a f f i r m a t i o n can 
only be a personal confession t h a t I understand 
myself t o be a creature which owes i t s existence 
to God. I t cannot be made as a n e u t r a l s t a t e -
ment, but only as tha n k s g i v i n g and surr e n d e r . 2 
This i s t r u e also o f the words of Jesus which Bultmann 
claims must be understood as f u l l of e x i s t e n t i a l meaning,, 
When we encounter the words o f Jesus i n h i s t o r y , 
we do not judge them by a p h i l o s o p h i c a l system 
w i t h reference t o t h e i r r a t i o n a l v a l i d i t y ! they 
meet us w i t h the question of how we are t o i n t e r -
p r e t our own existence.3 
Language about God and h i s a c t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e , f o r B u l t -
mann, s e l f - i n v o l v i n g since i t b o t h expresses the s e l f -
understanding of the speaker i n h i s r e l a t i o n t o God and 
demands of the hearer a response i n v o l v i n g h i s i n t e n t i o n s , 
and opinions. 
I b i d . , p. 68. Underlines mine. 
2 I b i d . , p. 69o 
3 
Jesus and the Word, t r a n s l . by L. P. Smith and 
E. H 0 Lantero (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958) p 
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However, the second reason goes even f u r t h e r than 
t h i s , f o r Bultmann goes on t o maintain t h a t we can only 
speak o f God i n terms of h i s s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r us. We 
cannot deal w i t h God "as He i s i n Himself b ut only w i t h 
God as He i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r man, f o r man's res p o n s i -
b i l i t y and man's s a l v a t i o n . " 1 Thus' Bultmann can claim 
i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Pauline theology t h a t we can 
understand t h i s theology best i f i t i s t r e a t e d as "his 
d o c t r i n e o f man." 
Every a s s e r t i o n about God i s simultaneously 
an a s s e r t i o n about man and v i c e versa. For 
t h i s reason and i n t h i s sense Paul's theology 
i s , at the same time, anthropology.3 
This seems also t o be the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f Bultmann's 
understanding o f n a t u r a l knowledge of God and of the 
moral demand and i t i s here t h a t the question of the 
autonomous character of h i s e t h i c a r i s e s . He claims t h a t 
"Man does have i n advance a r e l a t i o n t o God," and quotes 
Augustine i n support o f t h i s c l a i m . 
Man has a knowledge of God i n advance, though 
not o f the r e v e l a t i o n of God, t h a t i s , o f His 
a c t i o n i n C h r i s t . He has a r e l a t i o n t o God i n 
h i s search f o r God, conscious or unconscious. 
Man's l i f e i s moved by the search f o r God 
because i t i s always moved, consciously or 
unconsciously, by the question about h i s own 
personal existence. The question o f God and 
the question of myself are i d e n t i c a l . 4 
p. 1 1 i h e r e a f t e r c i t e d as J&W. 
•'"TNT I , p o 1 9 1 o 3 I b i d . 
2 u 
I b i d . JC&M, p . 53o 
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This preunderstanding of God, which i s independent of the 
C h r i s t i a n f a i t h s p e c i f i c a l l y , seems t o be present t o man 
i n h i s own s t r u g g l e t o f i n d h i m s e l f , t o f i n d a u t h e n t i c 
l i f e . That each man knows hi m s e l f t o be separated from 
what he ought t o be i s the purpose of Daseinsanalyse t o 
show. However, i s t h a t knowledge of one's o n t i c s i t u a t i o n 
i n c o n t r a s t to the o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of human l i f e the 
same as or i d e n t i c a l w i t h knowledge o f God's demand? 
Bultmann here seems t o be caught on h i s own presuppositions 
f o r there i s simply no way t o speak about God's demand 
except i n terms o f i t s e x i s t e n t i a l meaning and i t i s thus 
d i f f i c u l t i f not impossible t o e x p l a i n how an understanding 
of oneself i s d i f f e r e n t from an understanding of God. As 
Oden has suggested, Bultmann makes two as s e r t i o n s which 
must be held i n c o n t r a s t w i t h h i s claim aboves "(a) the 
o b j e c t of man's self-knowledge i s not God and (b) . . . 
such self-knowledge leads t o an impasse which only the 
r e v e l a t i o n of God can i l l u m i n e . I t i s Oden's b e l i e f , 
a f t e r a perceptive a n a l y s i s of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i n B u l t -
mann 's thought, t h a t t h i s i s a par a d o x i c a l though n o t a 
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
As the ontology of man may be e x i s t e n t i a l l y 
analyzed by adequate philosophy, i t may be 
seen t h a t every man knows h i m s e l f t o be under 
requirements to be who he ought t o be, t o 
become an au t h e n t i c s e l f . The t h e o l o g i a n 
sees the demand o f God as none other than 
a u t h e n t i c selfhood. Thus man as such has a 
-•-Thomas C. Oden, Radical Obedience; The E t h i c s 
of Rudolf Bultmann (Westminster Press, P h i l a d e l p h i a , 
1964), p. 62o 
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c e r t a i n kind of knowledge o f God i n t h a t he 
knows h i m s e l f t o be under t h i s requirement. 
But i n h i s o n t i c s i t u a t i o n , he has always 
already l o s t t h e . p o s s i b i l i t y of becoming who 
he ought t o be. The o n t i c p o s s i b i l i t y f o r 
a u t h e n t i c l i f e i s given only i n the address 
of the C h r i s t i a n p r o c l a m a t i o n . ! 
I n attempting t o understand human l i f e we are t h e r e f o r e 
i n v o l v e d i n understanding God at the same time; y e t there 
are s p e c i f i c h i s t o r i c a l events i n which God reveals him-
s e l f t o man by showing man t o h i m s e l f and by g i v i n g him 
the povier t o become what he t r u l y i s . 
I t i s time t h e r e f o r e t o examine those h i s t o r i c a l 
events which f o r Bultmann are s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h a t God 
makes h i m s e l f present t o man and acts i n h i s b e h a l f and 
i n t h a t they f u r n i s h i n d i c a t i v e s upon which e t h i c a l 
imperatives regarding the act i o n s o f the b e l i e v e r are 
based. Since i t i s the case t h a t we cannot speak o f the 
a c t i o n of God i n any o b j e c t i v e sense but only i n terms o f 
hi s r e l a t i o n t o human existence, Bultmann holds 'the same 
to be t r u e o f h i s t o r i c a l i n d i c a t i v e s i n which God's 
a c t i o n i s described. Bultmann's understanding of h i s t o r y 
has been another very problematic aspect of h i s thought 
and i t i s important t o h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of e t h i c a l 
d e c i s i o n i n so f a r as i t shows us what he considered t o 
x I b i d . , p. 61;. Cf. H. P. Owen, "Revelation," i n 
Kegley, op. c i t . "[Bultmann] c e r t a i n l y does not wish t o 
i d e n t i f y r e v e l a t i o n w i t h self-awareness. Rather he says 
t h a t self-awareness i s the human element i n r e v e l a t i o n . 
I n t h i s he i s s u r e l y r i g h t . The b e l i e v e r cannot regard 
God w i t h the detached, t h e o r e t i c a l , i n t e r e s t w i t h which 
the p h y s i c i s t regards an atom. To know God i s to know 
o n s e l f as the ob j e c t of h i s p r o v i d e n t i a l and redemptive 
care" ( p . 1+9)« 
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be the e s s e n t i a l elements of God's r e v e l a t i o n of h i m s e l f 
t n the C h r i s t - e v e n t . The view o f h i s t o r y which i s d e c i -
sive f o r Bultmann's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the New Testament 
i s , as Macquarrie has argued, a view i n which the possi° 
b i l i t i e s of human existence f o r a u t h e n t i c or i n a u t h e n t i c 
l i f e are c r u c i a l . Therefore, f o r Bultmann, 
h i s t o r i c a l study i s concerned not so much w i t h 
f a c t s as w i t h p o s s i b i l i t y , f o r man hi m s e l f i s 
the primary h i s t o r i c a l , and h i s existence i s 
c o n s t i t u t e d by p o s s i b i l i t y , , We study man as 
he has been i n order to know what the p o s s i -
b i l i t i e s of h i s Being are. But we can study 
man as he has been only because we ourselves 
are men and are h i s t o r i c a l i n our Being. To 
understand the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of h i s t o r y i s a t 
the same time t o have our own p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
d i s c l o s e d t o us.-l-
What i s important as the C h r i s t i a n seeks t o understand 
events o f the past i n which God has revealed h i m s e l f i s 
t h a t he become engaged, not as an observer who can remain 
n e u t r a l t o the f a c t s he uncovers, but as one whose own 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s and self-understanding are a t stake. We 
could perhaps f i x the dates and places of h i s t o r i c a l 
events and i n t h i s sense h i s t o r y maintains some k i n d o f 
o b j e c t i v i t y ( K i s t o r i e ) ; but the meaning of h i s t o r i c a l 
events i s what i s important (Geschichte), and t h i s can 
only be known by one who i s prepared t o engage i n a k i n d 
of dialogue w i t h i t . 2 The events o f Jesus' l i f e , i n 
which Bultmann took l i t t l e f a c t u a l i n t e r e s t , are r e a l l y 
understood when we encounter them w i t h our own 
•^Macquarrie, op. c i t . , p D 135° 
2J&W, p 0 6 0 
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e x i s t e n t i a l problems and f i n d i n them bot h demands and 
s o l u t i o n s by which our own h i s t o r i c a l existence can 
become meaningful.^ 
We do not stand outside h i s t o r i c a l f o r c e s as 
n e u t r a l observers; we are ourselves moved by 
them; and only when we are ready t o l i s t e n t o 
the demand which h i s t o r y makes on us do we 
understand at a l l what h i s t o r y i s about. This 
dialogue i s no cl e v e r exercise o f s u b j e c t i v i t y 
on the observer's p a r t , but a r e a l i n t e r r o g a t i n g 
o f h i s t o r y , i n the course o f which the h i s t o r i a n 
puts t h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y o f h i s i n questi o n , and 
i s ready t o l i s t e n t o h i s t o r y as an a u t h o r i t y . 2 
I n t h i s sense, i t i s c o r r e c t t o say t h a t Bultmann some-
what "brackets" the question o f h i s t o r i c a l f a c t u a l i t y and 
makes the t h r e a t of s u b j e c t i v i t y more l i k e l y . 3 
What i s c r u c i a l about God's r e v e l a t i o n o f h i m s e l f 
i n C h r i s t and what i s important f o r anyone who examines 
the l i f e o f C h r i s t t o understand, i s t h a t what occurs here 
i s the r e s t o r a t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a u t h e n t i c l i f e 
which man i n h i s o n t i c s i t u a t i o n has l o s t . 
I n t h i s respect Bultmann f o l l o w e d the conclusions 
of A. Schweitzer t h a t n o t h i n g could be known o f the b i o -
graphy of Jesus except h i s preaching of the coming escha-
t o n . See The Quest of t h e . H i s t o r i c a l Jesus (Macmillan, 
New York, 1965), e s p e c i a l l y Chapters 19 and 20. Cf. also 
the i n t r o d u c t i o n t o J&W. For t h i s reason, Paul's preaching 
i s considered by Bultmann t o hold the r e a l clues as t o the 
nature of C h r i s t i a n l i f e and e t h i c s , p a r t i c u l a r l y since 
h i s s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g before and a f t e r f a i t h i s expressed 
so v i v i d l y i n h i s l e t t e r s . 
c I b i d . , p. k> 
^See Owen, op. c i t . , p. £0. Against Bultmann's 
understanding of h i s t o r y he wr i t e s ? "The h i s t o r i c a l 
nature of [God's] r e v e l a t i o n demands t h a t we accept 
h i s t o r i c a l knowledge(with a l l i t s p a r t i c u l a r u n c e r t a i n -
t i e s ) as one among the many elements t h a t c o n s t i t u t e the 
t o t a l evidence f o r f a i t h . " Cf. Macquarrie, op. c i t . , 
p. l i | l . "But can the question o f h i s t o r i c a l f a c t u a l ! t y 
be simply bracketed, so t h a t the t h e o l o g i c a l question and 
the questions of h i s t o r i c a l research have n o t h i n g what-
ever t o do w i t h each other?" 
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This, then, i s the d e c i s i v e t h i n g which d i s -
t i n g u i s h e s the New Testament from philosophy 
and the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h from a " n a t u r a l " 
understanding of .existence: the New Testament 
speaks about and the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h knows 
about a deed o f God which f i r s t makes po s s i b l e 
man's s e l f - s u r r e n d e r (Hingabe), h i s f a i t h , h i s 
l o v e - = i n s h o r t , h i s a u t h e n t i c l i f e * 
Since man, as we have seen, has i n h i s o n t i c s i t u a t i o n 
p r o j e c t e d h i s p o s s i b i l i t i e s onto an a l i e n power which 
now c o n t r o l s h i s choices, he s u f f e r s a loss o f s e l f and 
a l o s s o f any capacity f o r a u t h e n t i c decision,, I t i s 
thus only by a "mighty act of God" t h a t man can be 
re s t o r e d t o h i m s e l f again and t h i s means once again to 
f i n d the o r i g i n a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f h i s existence open t o 
him and r e q u i r i n g h i s d e c i s i o n . The act o f God i n C h r i s t 
i s p r i m a r i l y an act of grace. 
Grace i s the event i n which God r e s t o r e s t o 
me and places w i t h i n my grasp my l o s t p o s s i ~ 
b i l i t y of authen t i c being, t h a t i s t o say p 
the being which God intended i n c r e a t i o n and 
from which man has f a l l e n away i n s i n . Such 
grace i s an act of forgiveness which d e l i v e r s 
from past g u i l t and breaks the power of s i n -
over human l i f e . 2 
This breaking of the power o f s i n occurs i n h i s t o r y as 
C h r i s t ' s death and r e s u r r e c t i o n f o r i t i s t h i s event 
which i s the e s c h a t o l o g i c a l deed of salvation,, God's 
grace, f o r Bultmann, i s a "s i n g l e deed" and "consists 
i n the f a c t t h a t He gave C h r i s t up t o die-=to die as a 
p r o p i t i a t o r y s a c r i f i c e f o r the sins of men,,"3 This death 
Kerygma and Myth, ed. by H D W. Bartsch, t r a n s l . 
by R. H o P u l l e r (Harper and Row, New York, 1961), p D 33° 
Underlines mine. 
p 
Macquarrie, An E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Theology, p. 15U° 
3TNT I , p. 289 e 
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and the r e s u r r e c t i o n "are bound together i n the u n i t y o f 
one s a l v a t i o n = o c c u r r e n c e , a n d i t i s t h i s event o f 
s a l v a t i o n which, Bultmann claims, " i s naught else than 
the r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h a t destined goal o f ' l i f e ' and 
selfhood which are. God's w i l l f o r man and man's own 
r e a l i n t e n t i o n , but which were perverted under s i n . " 2 
I t i s t h i s event which becomes the basis f o r C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n . 
Since, as we have already suggested, h i s t o r i c a l 
events take on s i g n i f i c a n c e only when they are viewed as 
expressing a c e r t a i n understanding of human existence and 
since God reveals h i m s e l f t o man only i n h i s r e l a t i o n t o 
t h a t e x i s t e n c e , t h i s salvation-occurrence i s t o be under-
stood i n terms of the "new p o s s i b i l i t y " which i s thereby 
created f o r human l i f e i n the w o r l d . Since man's o n t i c 
s i t u a t i o n i n the world i s cha r a c t e r i s e d b o t h by estrange-
ment from h i s own t r u e s e l f and by domination o f the power 
of s i n , i t i s God alone who can put r i g h t the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of man w i t h h i m s e l f and w i t h h i s Creator. By making t h i s 
righteousness a "present r e a l i t y , " God has created the 
co n d i t i o n s f o r r e c e i v i n g s a l v a t i o n or " l i f e " and thus 
o f f e r s t o man the p o s s i b i l i t y of achieving the l i f e he 
has wanted but f a i l e d t o o b t a i n . Bultmann claims t h a t , 
"Righteousness does not mean any q u a l i t y at a l l , but a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , " ^ a r e l a t i o n s h i p which i s po s s i b l e now due 
1 I b i d . , p. 293. 3 I b i d . , p. 270. 
2 I b l d . , p. 269. *+Ibid., p. 272. 
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t o God's judgement t h a t man i s to be "acknowledged inno-
cent," "pronounced r i g h t e o u s , " and "given a favourable 
standing" before God.^ This act o f r i g h t w i s i n g by which 
the power o f s i n i s broken by God's v e r d i c t i s also 
represented by the term " r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . " This a c t i o n 
i s t o be understood, Bultmann claim's, both as an event 
i n h i s t o r y and as a "new s i t u a t i o n which God Himself has 
opened up t o man."2 R e c o n c i l i a t i o n i s conferred "not by 
[God's] removing t h e i r s u b j e c t i v e resentment toward Him 
but by removing the o b j e c t i v e s t a t e of enmity which, i n 
consequence of s i n s , e x i s t e d between Him and men."^ Con= 
s i s t e n t w i t h the demands of demythologising, t h i s event 
cannot be t r e a t e d or spoken about i n a n e u t r a l manner but 
must be proclaimed" i n preaching. I t i s kerygma, or "the 
pr o c l a i m i n g , a c c o s t i n g , demanding, and promising word o f 
preaching," which makes present God's h i s t o r i c a l a c t i o n 
by p r o c l a i m i n g what has occurred and by demanding a 
response t o the occurrence on the p a r t of i t s hearers.^ " 
For Bultmann, the r e l a t i o n s h i p of i n d i c a t i v e and 
imperative i n the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c i s seen most c l e a r l y i n 
h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of proclamation and of the f a i t h which 
responds t o i t i n obedience. On the one hand t h i s kerygma 
i s c o n s t i t u t e d by a claim t h a t something has occurred and 
t h a t something i s t h e r e f o r e t r u e of human existence. This 
•'•See Romans 2 . 1 3 , 3.U, and 9 . 2 8 . 
2TNT I , p. 285, 
3 I b i d . , p. 287 . ^ I b i d . , p. 302 . 
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claim c o n s i s t s o f statements regarding God's a c t i o n i n 
C h r i s t and the present r e a l i t y of a new p o s s i b i l i t y f o r 
a u t h e n t i c human l i f e . The f a i t h which responds to t h i s 
c laim i s knowledge or p i s t i s e l s , " b e l i e f i n " what God 
has done f o r man0 The importance o f such knowledge can 
be seen i n Paul's understanding o f h i s apos t l e s h i p as 
b r i n g i n g "the l i g h t of the knowledge of the g l o r y o f God 
i n the face o f C h r i s t . 1 , 1 For Bultmann i t i s knowledge 
which accepts the i n d i c a t i v e s upon which e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n 
i s then founded. Knowledge means accepting as t r u e the 
f a c t t h a t new l i f e i s present i n C h r i s t and i s t h e r e f o r e 
"knowledge of the mysteries of the h i s t o r y of s a l v a t i o n 
or o f the e s c h a t o l o g i c a l occurrence (Rom„ l l s 2 5 l I Cor. 
2 ; 7 i I5s5?l)."2 Bultmann sees i n knowledge an act o f 
acknowledgement, or a confession by which "the b e l i e v e r 
t u r n s away from h i m s e l f " and concentrates h i s a t t e n t i o n 
on the. " o b j e c t of h i s f a i t h . " 3 To hear the kerygma i s 
thus t o hear the events o f God's l o v i n g act of r e c o n c i l i a = 
t i o n and t o respond i n f a i t h i s t o acknowledge t h a t these, 
things are so. B e l i e f i s t h e r e f o r e c o n s t i t u t e d by 
"w i l l i n g n e s s t o consider t r u e (= b e l i e v e ) the f a c t s 
reported of the p r e = e x i s t e n t Son of G o d — i n c a r n a t i o n , 
c r u c i f i x i o n , r e s u r r e c t i o n from the dead-~and t o see i n 
them a demonstration of the grace o f God."^ Thus f a r 
1See I I Corinthians I 4 . 6 . Cf. 2.1l(.o 
2TNT I , p. 327c Cf. TNT I I , p.. 73~U<> 
3 I b i d . , p. 319o 
^ I b i d c , p. 300. Cf. Bultmann and A. Weiser, 
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Bultmann's understanding of the knowledge of f a i t h 
corresponds f a i r l y c l o s e l y w i t h Evans' d e s c r i p t i o n of 
the v e r d i c t i v e element i n p a r a b o l i c onlooks. For a 
judgement i s c a l l e d f o r on the p a r t of those who hear 
the kerygma, a judgement which asserts not only t h a t 
something has taken place but also t h a t i t i s a c e r t a i n 
k i n d of event, namely one i n which the grace of God i s 
enacted."*" 
The kerygma i s also present t o i t s hearers, 
however, as demand and t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s the imperative 
element of proclamation. I f what i s proclaimed i s the 
presence of a new p o s s i b i l i t y f o r man and one which l i e s 
a l t o g e t h e r outside h i s own power t o e f f e c t , then the 
demand i s f i r s t and most fundamentally f o r obedience t o 
the God who has so acted. The kerygma must t h r u s t man 
i n t o genuine d e c i s i o n regarding h i s l i f e and t h i s means 
a d e c i s i o n t o be f o r or against a u t h e n t i c l i f e i n 
obedience to the Creator, F a i t h which responds t o t h i s 
proclamation i s thus c h a r a c t e r i s e d also by commitment, 
by a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the b e l i e v e r ' 3 existence from the 
ol d t o the new creation., 
" F a i t h , " t h a t i s , also has, on the other hand, 
"undogmatic" character i n s o f a r as the word of 
proclamation i s no mere r e p o r t about h i s t o r i c a l 
i n c i d e n t s : I t i s no teaching about e x t e r n a l 
matters which could simply be regarded as t r u e 
F a i t h , K i t t e l ' s B i b l e Key Words, t r a n s l o D„ M„ Barton 
(A. & C„ Black, London, 1 9 6 1 ) , p„ 7 0 - 1 , 8 7 ° 8 ° 
"^Evans, pp. c l t . , p. 1 3 3 ° U o See above, p„ 1^6=7 <> 
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w i t h o u t any t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the hearer's 
own e x i s t e n c e * ! 
What c o n s t i t u t e s the t r a n s i t i o n from i n a u t h e n t i c t o 
aut h e n t i c l i f e i s t h e r e f o r e a d e c i s i o n t o accept the 
new p o s s i b i l i t y f o r l i f e i n " r a d i c a l obedience" and t o 
commit oneself t o the actions of love which allow t h a t 
l i f e t o be f u l f i l l e d i n the wo r l d . Indeed t h i s commit-
ment i s already present throughout the understanding of 
f a i t h as knowledge, f o r to know the act of grace i n 
which God r e c o n c i l e s man t o h i m s e l f i s t o know also the 
w i l l of God, or t o have a grasp of e t h i c a l d u t i e s . 
Knowledge of t h i s w i l l does n o t , however, imply, as i t 
does f o r Brunner, t h a t one's l i f e i s henceforth to be 
determined by God's imperatives. Rather, f o r Bultmann, 
i t means t h a t a person sees h i s own a u t h e n t i c l i f e 
demanding h i s co n f o r m i t y and a l l o w i n g f o r the f i r s t time 
the r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y of l i v i n g i t i n the present.-^ I t i s 
i n obedience t o t h i s demand f o r a u t h e n t i c l i f e t h a t the 
C h r i s t i a n way of l i f e i s a c t u a l i s e d . 
For Bultmann, these two aspects o f the kerygma 
and of the f a i t h which responds t o i t are the i n d i c a t i v e 
and imperative e x i s t i n g i n d i a l e c t i c a l t e n s i o n w i t h one 
another. I n the very important s e c t i o n of h i s Theology 
of the New Testament devoted t o Paul's understanding o f 
1TNT I , p. 318-190 
2 I b i d . , p. 327o 
J C f . No H. G. Robinson, The Groundwork of 
C h r i s t i a n E t h i c s , p. l8lj. 0 
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the salvation-occurrence, Bultmann expresses t h i s r e l a -
t i o n s h i p as i t i s manifest i n the d e c i s i o n of f a i t h . 
A homogeneous concept of f a i t h - b e l i e f and a 
s i n g l e d e c i s i v e act o f f a i t h - b e l i e f would be 
detectable only i f the dec i s i o n - q u e s t i o n 
whether a man i s w i l l i n g t o give up h i s o l d 
understanding of h i m s e l f and he n c e f o r t h under-
stand h i m s e l f only from the grace of God and 
the question whether he w i l l acknowledge Jesus 
C h r i s t as the Son of God and Lord should t u r n 
out t o be one and the same question. That i s 
j u s t what they e v i d e n t l y are i n the r e a l 
i n t e n t i o n of P a u l . l 
The beginning of the C h r i s t i a n moral l i f e i s thus a 
de c i s i o n which i s both an acknowledgement regarding God's 
actions and at the same time a commitment t o seeing 
oneself i n r e l a t i o n to those a c t i o n s . Thus, as Oden has 
put i t , i n Bultmann 1s e t h i c the imperative and i n d i c a t i v e 
are "as two sides of a c o i n . " Only together do they 
describe the whole nature of f a i t h . "The imperative i s 
'hidden' w i t h i n the i n d i c a t i v e , and the i n d i c a t i v e i s 
'hidden' w i t h i n the i m p e r a t i v e . " For the C h r i s t i a n moral 
l i f e , the i n d i c a t i v e i s the fou n d a t i o n f o r the imperative 
and obedience t o the imperative f u l f i l l s the i n d i c a t i v e . 
This i s expressed by Bultmann i n a phrase which charac-
t e r i s e s C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n : "Become what thou 
a r t . ' " 3 As Oden has suggested, 
1TNT I , p. 300-301. 
20den, op. c i t . , p. 95. Cf. Walter Schmithals, 
An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann, t r a n s i t 
John Bowden (SCM Press, London, 196b), p. 271*: ''Thus the 
imperative does not c o n t r a d i c t the i n d i c a t i v e , nor does i t 
t e m p o r a r i l y deprive the i n d i c a t i v e of i t s f o r c e . " 
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Becoming who one i s . . . i s the heart of the 
e t h i c s of the New Testament, i n s o f a r as the 
C h r i s t event i s understood as the f o r e n s i c 
e s c h a t o l o g i c a l deed of God i n which man has 
been made new by v i r t u e of God's saving deed 
and i n s o f a r as man i s c a l l e d t o become the 
new creature which he already is_ according 
t o God's v e r d i c t . 1 
This i s the meaning f o r Bultmann of the paradoxical 
statement of Paul, " I f we l i v e by the S p i r i t , l e t us also 
walk by the S p i r i t , " 2 t h a t "the faith-bestowed p o s s i b i l i t y 
of ' l i v i n g by the S p i r i t ' must be e x p l i c i t l y l a i d h old o f 
by 'walking by the S p i r i t . ' The i n d i c a t i v e i s the founda-
t i o n f o r the imperative."-^ 
Bultmann considers f a i t h , i n i t s two aspects o f 
knowledge and commitment, t o be b o t h " r a d i c a l obedience" 
and a "new s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g " and i t i s the r e l a t i o n 
between these two which c o n s t i t u t e s the primary diffi° 
c u l t y i n h i s understanding of the d i a l e c t i c a l t e n s i o n 
of i n d i c a t i v e and imperative i n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n . B u l t -
raann claims t h a t " U l t i m a t e l y ' f a i t h ' and 'knowledge' are 
i d e n t i c a l as a new understanding o f one's 3 e l f . . . " 
and i t i s the l i v i n g out o f t h i s new se l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
which u n i t e s the i n d i c a t i v e and imperative elements. 
^Oden, op. c i t . , p. 95° 
Galatians 5°25. 
3TNT I , p. 333. Cf. Bultmann's disc u s s i o n o f 
the Johannine m o t i f of love i n which t h i s paradox i s 
also expressed. "Out of the love we have received 
a r i s e s the o b l i g a t i o n t o love . . . " TNT I I , p. 80-1, 
Cf. I John U - l l V 19 and John 13.3U° 
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F a i t h ' s obedient submission t o God's "grace," 
the acceptance of the cross of C h r i s t , i s the 
surrender of man's ol d understanding of him-
s e l f , i n which he l i v e s "unto h i m s e l f , " t r i e s 
to achieve l i f e by hi s own s t r e n g t h , and by 
t h a t very f a c t f a l l s v i c t i m t o the powers of 
si n and death and loses h i m s e l f . . . The new 
self - u n d e r s t a n d i n g which i s bestowed w i t h 
" f a i t h " i s t h a t of freedom i n which the b e l i e v e r 
gains l i f e and thereby h i s own s e l f . 1 
This freedom which comes t o the b e l i e v e r w i t h h i s deci° 
si o n t o accept the new p o s s i b i l i t y f o r l i f e i s a freedom 
which opens up the f u t u r e . For Bultmann, "Freedom i s 
not h i n g else than being open f o r the genuine f u t u r e , 
l e t t i n g one's s e l f be determined by the f u t u r e . " I n 
t h i s sense, what f a i t h r e a l l y means i s an a t t i t u d e o f 
openness i n which the b e l i e v e r decides t o r e t u r n t o 
auth e n t i c existence w i t h the knowledge t h a t such authen-
t i c i t y r e q u i r e s him t o l i v e i n l o v e , h u m i l i t y and open-
ness toward o t h e r s . Here the i n d i c a t i v e s which are 
d e s c r i p t i v e of man's au t h e n t i c existence and which 
d e l i n e a t e the two p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r l i f e i n the world 
appear t o be the most c r i t i c a l ones i n determining the 
de c i s i o n of the man of f a i t h to adopt a new understanding 
of h i m s e l f . The other f a c t which Bultmann claims i s 
e s s e n t i a l as w e l l i s the presence of man's new p o s s i b i l i t y 
made a v a i l a b l e by God's gracious act i n C h r i s t . Yet i t i s 
p r e c i s e l y because such an i n d i c a t i v e regarding the s i g n i f -
icance of C h r i s t can only be known through personal 
d e c i s i o n and, furthermore, because i t i s to be understood 
1 I b i d . , p. 3 3 0 - 1 . 2 I b i d . , p. 335. 
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as a claim about and upon human existence i t s e l f , t h a t 
i t s importance as an i n d i c a t i v e f o u n d a t i o n f o r e t h i c a l 
imperatives i s v i t i a t e d . 
The c o n t i n u i n g problem i n Bultmann's e t h i c s 
i s t h a t on the one hand he argues t h a t man's 
knowledge of o b l i g a t i o n i s self-knowledge and 
subject t o e x i s t e n t i a l a n a l y s i s ; y e t on the 
other hand, he proposes t h a t the unique demand 
of the present moment c o n s t i t u t e s the demand 
of the transcendent God who i s beyond a l l 
human grasping, but whose demand i s made c l e a r 
i n the event o f C h r i s t i a n proclamation and i s 
d i s c e r n i b l e i n the moment.! 
This confusion o f heteronomous and autonomous elements 
i n Bultmann's understanding of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n , 
i n which r a d i c a l obedience and a new se l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
become one, makes i t d i f f i c u l t t o determine p r e c i s e l y 
which f a c t s are r e a l l y d e c i s i v e i n h i s e x p l i c a t i o n . 
I n h i s a n a l y s i s of Bultmann's e t h i c , Robinson 
claims t h a t 
i t i s not immediately c l e a r whether the ques-
t i o n of obedience can even be r a i s e d or n o t . 
Everything depends on whether there i s someone 
to obey, f o r whom to decide i n obedience. I t 
depends, i n other words, on the r e a l i t y o f a 
superhuman w i l l t o which i n h i s d e c i s i o n a man 
can render obedience 
I f there i s such a heteronomous element i n Bultmann's 
e t h i c , i t must be demythologised according t o the l o g i c 
of h i s analysis of r e l i g i o u s claims,, Thus, " t h i s act of 
God must be understood i n a completely n o n - o b j e c t i f y i n g 
manner and . . . t h e r e f o r e the e s c h a t o l o g i c a l event i s 
•^Oden, op. c l t . , p. 121. 
^Robinson, op. cit.„ p„ lQ$a 
f o r him w i t h o u t c o l o u r , character, or content. B u l t -
mann's l a c k of c l a r i t y on the issue of self-knowledge 
and knowledge o f God r e s u l t s i n the loss o f any d i s t i n c 
t i v e d i f f e r e n c e which r e l i g i o u s a f f i r m a t i o n s might make 
to e t h i c a l decision-making » 
What Bultmann needs t o be able' t o say at t h i s 
p o i n t i s t h a t man as such stands in" r e l a t i o n 
t o God. This , however, he cannot do because 
i t would i n v o l v e using the word "God" i n an 
o b j e c t i f y i n g manner, whereas f o r Bultmann the 
word i s meaningless or my t h o l o g i c a l apart from , 
an e x i s t e n t i a l apprehension. Consequently the 
r e a l i t y f o r which i t stands, or p a r t of i t , i s 
brought w i t h i n the o n t o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of 
man h i m s e l f . 2 
Indeed, the conclusion which Robinson would draw from 
such an i n s i g h t i s t h a t f o r Bultmann C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l 
d e c i s i o n i s r a d i c a l l y autonomous and represents e x a c t l y 
the opposite emphasis t o t h a t of Brunner. I n d i c a t i v e s 
regarding the nature of man's being which are derived 
from Daseinsanalyse are t h e r e f o r e the source of moral 
imperatives f o r a u t h e n t i c man. 
As i n the case of T i l l i c h , Bultmann assumes i n 
hi s e t h i c the importance and relevance of r e l i g i o u s 
a f f i r m a t i o n s which he then t r a n s l a t e s i n t o i n d i c a t i v e s 
about human existence. Thus, Robinson claims, 
What i s important t o n o t i c e , however, i s t h a t 
even i n Bultmann, i f the act of God i s a f f i r m e d 
i n a completely n o n - o b j e c t i f y i n g way, there can 
be no r a t i o n a l connection between i t and what 
i t i s al l e g e d t o make possible i n human e x i s t -
ence, a d e c i s i o n of love i n the concrete 
1 I b i d . , p 0 189o 2 I b i d . , p. 190. 
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encounter o f the moment. I t i s only by drawing 
i l l e g i t i m a t e l y and i n c o n s i s t e n t l y upon the 
more t r a d i t i o n a l understanding of C h r i s t i a n i t y 
t h a t we can continue t o say t h a t we love him 
because he f i r s t loved us. I f Bultmann's 
p o s i t i o n i s c o n s i s t e n t l y maintained there can 
be no r a t i o n a l connection ( o n l y a b l i n d 
causative one) between the sheer act of God 
and the demand and de c i s i o n of l o v e . Accordingly, 
the kerygmatic side of Bultmann's thought, 
upon which he p a r a d o x i c a l l y i n s i s t s , does not 
i n the l e a s t i n f r i n g e the autonomous character 
of the C h r i s t i a n l i f e as he understands i t . l 
Bultmann does attempt t o maintain the t e n s i o n between a 
dec i s i o n = t h a t and a d e c i s i o n - t o which c o n s t i t u t e s the 
basic e t h i c a l a t t i t u d e i n f o r m i n g the C h r i s t i a n l i f e . 
However,, the emphasis on the s u b j e c t i v i t y of such an 
onlook, epitomised by the d e c i s i o n o f f a i t h , throws i n t o 
question the importance of r e l i g i o u s claims about man's 
r e l a t i o n t o God and c e r t a i n l y makes t h e i r o b j e c t i v e t r u t h 
impossible. I f t o choose t o see oneself i n r e l a t i o n t o 
God i s to b_e i n r e l a t i o n t o him, and i f any d e c i s i o n on 
God's p a r t t o love man can only be understood when we 
examine i t s e f f e c t upon man's p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r l i f e , 
then the d e c i s i o n - t h a t , or the knowledge i m p l i c i t i n 
f a i t h , i s not the acceptance of s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l i g i o u s 
a f f i r m a t i o n s regarding human l i f e . The d e c i s i v e i n d i c a = 
t i v e s i n Bultmann's e t h i c are t h e r e f o r e those which 
describe the nature of man and h i s p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r 
l i v i n g i n t h i s w o r l d . However, i t i s by God's a c t i o n 
I b i d . a p„ 239o 
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i n C h r i s t t h a t these p o s s i b i l i t i e s are opened up t o 
man i n h i s o n t i c s i t u a t i o n and the f o u n d a t i o n of B u l t = 
mann's e t h i c , t h o u g h ' l i m i t e d by h i s understanding of 
the m y t h o l o g i c a l nature of o b j e c t i v e a s s e r t i o n s about 
t h i s a c t i o n , i s nevertheless dependent upon the r e a l i t y 
of such an event and the b e l i e v e r ' s acknowledgement 
t h a t i t i s d e c i s i v e f o r the f o r m a t i o n of h i s new s e l f -
understanding. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE LOGIC OP CHRISTIAN DECISION 
This examination of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l theory 
has been designed to expose the source, f o u n d a t i o n s , and 
goal o f a way o f l i f e i n the context of which the 
decisions of the C h r i s t i a n moral agent can be viewed,, 
We have t r i e d t o a l l o w the p a r t i c u l a r v i s i o n of the 
wo r l d , of man and of God t o emerge from the authors 
themselves as they develop t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e s t y l e s of 
e t h i c a l a n a l y s i s and t o view the problems w i t h which 
such analyses are concerned from within,, W i t h i n each 
account the complexities of C h r i s t i a n moral language 
can be recognised and the v a r i e t i e s of r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
i n d i c a t i v e s t o imperatives can be appreciated„ Each 
t h e o l o g i a n has attempted t o e x p l i c a t e the foundations 
upon which the C h r i s t i a n moral l i f e depends and from 
which i t flows and has o f f e r e d an account of the way i n 
which such a l i f e i s j u s t i f i e d and f u l f i l l e d , I t remains 
f o r us t o draw some general conclusions about the way i n 
which i n d i c a t i v e s regarding the being and a c t i o n of God 
and imperatives f o r moral a c t i o n are r e l a t e d t o one 
another w i t h i n t h i s way of l i f e and t o e s t a b l i s h the 
nature o f i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c v i s i o n of the w o r l d 0 
For T i l l i c h , moral d e c i s i o n i s a matter of 
rec o g n i s i n g one's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Being and o f a l l o w i n g 
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one's a t t i t u d e t o existence and one's i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h 
others t o be determined by the a c t i v i t y of B e i n g = i t s e l f . 
This a c t i v i t y of Being by which i t overcomes se p a r a t i o n 
and the t h r e a t of meaninglessness brought about by non-being 
i s understood by T i l l i c h n o t only as a d e s c r i p t i o n of what 
i s going on a t the o n t o l o g i c a l l e v e l but also as a 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f man's r e l a t i o n t o Being. I t i s on t h i s r 
basis t h a t T i l l i c h makes h i s appeal f o r moral a c t i o n . 
What man ought to be doing i n h i s f i n i t e existence i s 
understood as a f u n c t i o n of what i s happening o n t o l o g i c a l l y 
and decisions are made w i t h respect t o t h i s law, t h a t man 
become e x i s t e n t i a l l y what he i s e s s e n t i a l l y . I f Being 
i s overcoming the separation between p a r t i c u l a r beings, 
and i f i t i 3 the nature of human l i f e t o be a p a r t i c i p a n t 
i n Being, then overcoming sepa r a t i o n through l o v e , power f i 
j u s t i c e and courage i s the app r o p r i a t e t h i n g f o r human 
beings t o be doing i n order to be t r u e to themselves e 
What can be seen from a n a l y s i n g T i l l i c h 1 s 
ontology, however, i s t h a t such a d e s c r i p t i o n o f Being-
i t s e l f conceals a hidden premise regarding the w i l l o f 
God and assumptions regarding the a c t i v i t y of God. These 
assumptions are t h a t God has conquered the t h r e a t o f 
e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement i n and through the l i f e of C h r i s t , 
t h a t God l o v e s , f o r g i v e s and accepts the unloveable, un- . 
f o r g i v e a b l e , and unacceptable, and t h a t God i s i n some way 
responsible f o r the d i r e c t i o n of h i s t o r y towards the 
f u l f i l l m e n t or r e u n i f i c a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r beings w i t h 
t h e i r ground and source of power,, These n o t i o n s are 
323 
i m p l i c i t throughout T i l l i c h ' s account of r e l i g i o u s m o r a l i t y 
though they cannot be made e x p l i c i t f o r two reasons. T i l l l c h 
argues on the one hand t h a t a l l language about God i s 
n e c e s s a r i l y symbolic and t h a t i t i s n o t only p o s s i b l e 
t o f i n d i n a l l t r u t h - c l a i m s about God the o n t o l o g i c a l 
meaning of these claims, but t h i s i s also the t r u e or r e a l 
meaning of language about God. T i l l i c h goes f u r t h e r than 
t h i s t o argue t h a t t r u t h - c l a i m s about God can be t r a n s l a t e d 
w i t hout l o s s of meaning i n t o statements about B e i n g - i t s e l f , 
w i t h a l l i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s regarding the nature o f human 
existence. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between God's w i l l and the 
w i l l o f p a r t i c u l a r human beings i s t h e r e f o r e e s t a b l i s h e d 
by c l a i m i n g t h a t the w i l l of God i s the symbolic 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the movement o f B e i n g - i t s e l f i n which 
we a l l p a r t i c i p a t e by n a t u r e o The o n t o l o g i c a l i n d i c a t i v e s 
upon which T i l l i c h would found moral d e c i s i o n t h e r e f o r e 
have been transformed by T i l l i c h ' s b e l i e f s about the 
a c t i o n and character of God<, What i s assumed throughout., 
t h i s account i s t h a t imperatives f o r moral a c t i o n can be 
r e l a t e d t o claims regarding the nature of God and h i s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o man only i f such claims are t r a n s l a t e d 
i n t o terms regarding B e i n g - i t s e l f . Such a t r a n s l a t i o n 
has the u n f o r t u n a t e r e s u l t o f masking the r e a l f o u n d a t i o n 
upon which C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l behaviour r e s t s and also o f 
deemphasising the r o l e o f d e c i s i o n i n the adoption of basic 
moral a t t i t u d e s , , T i l l i c h ' s account of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s 
t h e r e f o r e emerges as a v i s i o n of Being r e u n i t i n g w i t h i t s e l f , 
a v i s i o n which T i l l i c h holds t o be compelling n o t only 
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because of i t s a b i l i t y t o i l l u m i n a t e and resolve the human 
predicament but also because of i t s power t o r e v e a l the 
meaning i m p l i c i t i n t r a d i t i o n a l r e l i g i o u s claims about God. 
For Brunner, moral d e c i s i o n i s a matter of sheer 
obedience t o the commandments of God, f o r what i s good i s 
p r e c i s e l y what God w i l l s f o r human l i f e * M o r a l i t y i s 
thus dependent upon one's coming t o know God and a l l o w i n g 
one's l i f e t o be r u l e d by God's i n t e n t i o n s . There are 
two p i c t u r e s by means of which Brunner understands the 
w i l l of God and i n both of these God i s described as a 
being who reveals h i m s e l f , h i s i n t e n t i o n s and a u t h o r i t y 
over human l i f e through h i s a c t i v i t i e s i n r e l a t i o n to man. 
I n t h i s r e v e a l i n g of h i s person and exercise of h i s 
a u t h o r i t y , he shows h i m s e l f t o be the only source o f t h a t 
which i s u l t i m a t e l y good. I t i s the nature of r e l i g i o u s 
knowledge, i n Brunner's a n a l y s i s , t h a t i t i n v o l v e s both a 
judgement as t o the decisiveness of God's w i l l f o r human 
l i f e and a commitment t o a c t i n g i n one's own l i f e i n 
conformity w i t h t h i s w i l l . One comes to understand good 
by w i l l i n g n e s s t o acknowledge the claim which God has upon 
l i f e , and i t i s a claim which Brunner argues can be shown 
to f u l f i l l the inadequacies of other bases f o r moral 
d e c i s i o n . Conformity t o God's w i l l i s t h e r e f o r e funda-
mentally conformity to God's a u t h o r i t a t i v e onlook, f o r i t 
i s h i s judgement upon and i n t e n t i o n f o r h i s c r e a t i o n which 
f u r n i s h e s the context of C h r i s t i a n moral a c t i o n . 
Brunner's understanding of the fundamental C h r i s t i a n 
a t t i t u d e i s marred by d i f f i c u l t i e s which are r a i s e d by h i s 
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i n s i s t e n c e t h a t m o r a l i t y i s a matter of God's a c t i v i t y and 
not man'So This i s se'en both i n Brunner's r e l i a n c e upon 
the f a c t t h a t God alone i s good, t h a t indeed there i s no 
goodness t o be found independently of God's g i v i n g i t , and 
i n h i s argument t h a t the C h r i s t i a n l i f e begins w i t h a 
r a d i c a l s e l f - s u r r e n d e r t o determination by Godc The reason 
f o r such claims would appear to be Brunner's i n t e r e s t i n 
ma i n t a i n i n g the transcendence and the autonomy of the moral 
"ought" by making i t completely independent of any t i e s 
w i t h man's nature or the s t r u c t u r e of the world* His concern 
t o avoid any r o l e which " n a t u r a l " knowledge of the good 
might p l a y i n e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n , except the p u r e l y negative 
one by which i t i n d i c a t e s the s i n f u l pretensions o f man, 
leads him to make some c o n t r a d i c t o r y statements r e g a r d i n g 
the nature of moral reasoning. On the one hand, no such 
reasoning i s p o s s i b l e f o r , as the term "theology of c r i s i s " 
i m p l i e s , there are no general p r i n c i p l e s o f a c t i o n which 
can be formulated a p r i o r i and ap p l i e d t o p a r t i c u l a r 
s i t u a t i o n s , . E t h i c a l d e c i s i o n i s a matter of remaining 
open t o the a c t i v i t y of God, of p l a c i n g oneself w i t h i n the 
context o f h i s action,. Yet Brunner does appeal t o and r e l y 
upon human judgement i n acknowledging God as the Creator and 
Redeemer and t h i s i s an e s s e n t i a l element i n the l o g i c of 
C h r i s t i a n f a i t h o C h r i s t i a n moral reasoning would then be 
a matter o f deepening and tr a n s f o r m i n g one's understanding 
of the good and one's moral p r i n c i p l e s by a l l o w i n g them t o 
be judged, reformed and r e d i r e c t e d by the i n t e n t i o n s and 
judgements of God 0 This understanding would a l l o w f o r God"s 
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w i l l to be r e l a t e d t o man'3, not because man's i s 
destroyed, but because i t i s transformed and r e d i r e c t e d 
by man's b e l i e f s about the r e a l i t y of God's i n t e n t i o n s 
and by h i s commitment t o becoming p e r s o n a l l y i n v o l v e d i n 
the a c t i v i t y of God„ Thus, moral a c t i o n could be 
c o n s i s t e n t l y r e l a t e d t o the whole idea of God since he i s 
the acknowledged locus of the good t o which moral decisions 
conform o 
Niebuhr's understanding of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l 
d e c i s i o n revolves around two p o l a r i t i e s which through 
i n t e r a c t i o n and synthesis form the e t h i c a l i d e a l t o be 
approximated i n human action,, On the one hand, Niebuhr's 
e t h i c i s informed by h i s analysis o f the nature and 
de s t i n y of man i n which h i s t o r i c a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
i n s i g h t s are considered and measured f o r t h e i r appro= 
p r i a t e n e s s 0 This i n v e s t i g a t i o n of man i s one which 
Niebuhr recognises as having moral i m p l i c a t i o n s , f o r i n 
each account o f which he i s c r i t i c a l , what man ought t o do 
i s i n t i m a t e l y bound up w i t h the d e s c r i p t i o n of what man is<. 
What he argues i s t h a t n e i t h e r i n terras o f the d e s c r i p t i o n 
nor i n terms of the e v a l u a t i o n i s any p i c t u r e o f man 
adequate which does not take i n t o account the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of man w i t h God„ Fundamental t o C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l t h e o r y , 
according to Niebuhr, i s the acknowledgement o f the i n h e r e n t 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n man's n a t u r e , by which he knows h i m s e l f t o 
be b o t h f i n i t e and f r e e , both c r e a t u r e and made i n the 
image o f God Q Such an acknowledgement c o n s t i t u t e s the 
v e r d i c t i v e element i n the f o r m a t i o n of an onlook r e g a r d i n g 
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human existence and i t i s bound up w i t h a commitment t o 
viewing man i n terms of h i s whole being and to behaving 
i n accordance w i t h t h i s image <> Thus one pole of C h r i s t i a n 
e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n i s formed by an e v a l u a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n 
of man which Niebuhr argues i s convincing and reasonable e 
At the other pole of d e c i s i o n i s the judgement and 
w i l l of God which, f o r Niebuhr, f u r n i s h e s both the proper 
perspective t o take upon human existence and e s t a b l i s h e s 
the l i m i t s on the appropriate moral attitude<, God r e v e a l s 
h i s i n t e n t i o n f o r human l i f e through the l i f e o f C h r i s t and 
i t i s here t h e r e f o r e t h a t the norm of human a c t i o n i s found 
and r e a l i s e d o This norm, f o r Niebuhr, i s not one which 
c o n t r a d i c t s the " n a t u r a l " assessment of human l i f e , as one 
sees i n the case of Brunner, but r a t h e r one which b r i n g s 
to f u l f i l l m e n t the p a r t i a l , incomplete and inadequate 
understandings o f l i f e which are deri v e d independently o f 
God's v e r d i c t . What i s p e c u l i a r t o the r e l i g i o u s apprehen° 
si o n o f human l i f e i n i t s f u l l e s t dimensions i s the recogn-
i t i o n of the a t t i t u d e and behaviour which c h a r a c t e r i s e s 
the whole of human existence, namely man's s i n f u l s e l f -
a s s e r t i o n e I t i s t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n , by which man comes t o 
acknowledge God and h i s own s i n i n the same act o f 
consciousness, which then can f u l f i l l and deepen man's 
understanding of h i m s e l f and h i s commitment t o moral 
a c t i o n , adding t o h i s previous moral knowledge a bre a d t h 
and depth which would otherwise be l a c k i n g D The t e n s i o n 
of these two p o l a r i t i e s formed by n a t u r a l law and the law 
of God i s a constant dialogue i n Niebuhr's an a l y s i s and 
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r e s u l t s i n the judgement t h a t the meaning o f human l i f e 
i s t o be found i n obedience t o the law of lo v e * Love 
becomes the e t h i c a l i d e a l i n co n f o r m i t y w i t h which man 
becomes most t r u l y human and experiences the r e a l i t y o f 
God's love f o r man* E t h i c a l d e c i s i o n i s thus a matter 
of r e a l i s t i c a l l y assessing the nature of the s i t u a t i o n , 
which i n v o l v e s b o t h a r e c o g n i t i o n o f the s i n f u l and 
r e l a t i v e elements i n human h i s t o r y and s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n 
as w e l l as an acceptance o f the r e a l i t y of God's judgement 
and f o r g i v e n e s s , and of approximating the law of love 
through the p r a c t i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s a t one's disposal*, 
I n t h i s way Hiebuhr hoped t o u n i f y b o t h d e o n t o l o g i c a l 
and t e l e o l o g i c a l elements i n the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c by 
arguing t h a t love i s not only the u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e by 
which we should measure our behaviour but also the goal 
towards which e t h i c a l d e c i s i o n should be directed„ 
I n d i c a t i v e s r e g a r d i n g the nature and d e s t i n y of man and 
those regarding the powerful judgement and f o r g i v i n g love 
of God thus combine t o form the basis of e t h i c a l impera° 
tiveSo 
I t i s i n the w r i t i n g s of Bultmann t h a t the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of i n d i c a t i v e and imperative i s e x p l i c i t l y 
analysed and the r o o t s o f the C h r i s t i a n moral l i f e i n 
the e t h i c a l teachings o f the New Testament are e x p l o r e d 0 
Bultmann c h a r a c t e r i s e s the new a t t i t u d e which i s funda° 
mental t o the C h r i s t i a n l i f e as a new self"Understanding 
i n which the C h r i s t i a n allows h i s behaviour and opinions 
t o be informed by the new p o s s i b i l i t y f o r l i f e which has 
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opened up by God's a c t i o n i n Christ„ I n the context of 
C h r i s t i a n preaching about the events and the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of the death and r e s u r r e c t i o n o f Jesus, c e r t a i n implica° 
t i o n s are present regarding the nature o f human l i f e i n 
the world and the e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s from which man 
i s estrangedo I t i s Bultmann's i n t e n t i o n , i n much the 
same way as T i l l i c h , t o draw out these a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l 
and o n t o l o g i c a i a s s e r t i o n s and t o f i n d through them the • 
means f o r coming t o terms w i t h r e l i g i o u s claims about 
God's character and a c t i o n . Thus Bultmann claims t h a t 
the source of the C h r i s t i a n onlook i s an a c t i o n of God 
which i s r e v e a l i n g and p o w e r f u l , which b o t h i l l u m i n a t e s 
the nature of l i f e and creates the c o n d i t i o n s f o r i t s 
f u l f i l l m e n t , , This" h i s t o r i c a l event, Bultmann argues, 
cannot be understood o b j e c t i v e l y as an act o f God, since 
t h i s would be t o speak m y t h o l o g i c a l l y , b ut must be appro~ 
priate.d s u b j e c t i v e l y through the acknowledgement i m p l i c i t 
i n f a i t h o Yet i t i s p r e c i s e l y Bultmann's i n a b i l i t y t o 
speak of these h i s t o r i c a l f a c t s except i n terms of t h e i r 
e f f e c t upon man's sel f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t r e s u l t s i n a 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i n h i s analysis„ Bultmann seems t o 
have adopted the view t h a t s t a t i n g f a c t s i s a p u r e l y 
non°evaluative act and t h a t f a c t s themselves, e i t h e r 
h i s t o r i c a l or metaphysical, only have s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r 
moral a c t i o n when i t can be said t h a t t o know or under= 
stand them i s t o know or understand one's own s e l f D 
This severely l i m i t s the r o l e o f i n d i c a t i v e s r egarding a 
f a c t u a l core o f events around which the C h r i s t i a n onlook 
i s formulatedo 
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Indeed, t h i s leads t o the f u r t h e r confusion regard^ 
i n g those i n d i c a t i v e s which r e a l l y dp serve as the basis 
f o r Bultmann's understanding of C h r i s t i a n moral decision,. 
I n d i c a t i v e s derived from h i s Daseinsanalyse are important 
as a source o f moral imperatives since i t i s i n coming t o 
understand ourselves, our o n t i c existence and our onto~ 
l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t we come t o know the goodo The 
demand t o become what one i s i s derived from the judgement 
t h a t man has l o s t the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r a u t h e n t i c existence 
which he r e a l l y desires and t h a t t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y can only 
be returned t o him by h i s d e c i s i o n t o take i t up and act 
upon i t o Such a d e c i s i o n cannot be made, however, w i t h o u t 
the a c t u a l presence i n h i s t o r y o f the new p o s s i b i l i t y i n 
which God opens up human authenticity» I f t h i s i s a 
pu r e l y causal or p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between ' 
i n d i c a t i v e s r e g a r d i n g God's a c t i o n on be h a l f o f man and impsr= 
a t i v e s t o obey God's i n t e n t i o n i n t h i s a c t i o n , then i t i s 
s t i l l unclear i n Bultmann's an a l y s i s how he can,-describe, 
or be said t o know anything about the event i n which t h i s 
power i s made a v a i l a b l e . There must, i n o t h e r words, be 
some minimal o b j e c t i v e and f a c t u a l core which cannot be 
equated w i t h statements about man's being which i s pre= 
supposed by Bultmann but which he cannot make any claims 
about, since t h i s would be t o speak m y t h o l o g i c a l l y 0 The 
v e r d i c t i v e element i n the f o r m a t i o n of the primary 
C h r i s t i a n onlook i s thus d i f f i c u l t t o understand i n 
Bultmann's a n a l y s i s s i n c e , although i t has f a c t u a l pre= 
suppositions regarding the being and a c t i v i t y of God, i t 
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i s n ot at a l l c l e a r how knowledge of God and assertions 
regarding h i s demands and purposes d i f f e r from knowledge 
of one's own s e l f and ass e r t i o n s about a u t h e n t i c human 
life<> Thus, wh i l e Bultmann argues t h a t the i n d i c a t i v e and 
imperative are two sides of a c o i n , being u n i t e d i n terms 
of a new se l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i t i s n o t s e l f - e v i d e n t t h a t 
such a u n i t y can be achieved w i t h o u t s a c r i f i c i n g the 
uniqueness and importance of assert i o n s about Godo 
I n h i s a n a l y s i s o f C h r i s t i a n e t h i c a l theory, 
K e i t h Ward has argued f o r the existence of f a c t u a l pre° 
suppositions regarding God and h i s a c t i o n i n the l i f e o f 
C h r i s t which provide the framework f o r moral a t t i t u d e s 
and behaviour?~ I n h i s argument against B r a i t h w a i t e , he 
suggests t h a t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c moral a t t i t u d e of the 
C h r i s t i a n way of l i f e embodies " c e r t a i n a s s e r t i o n s about 
matters o f f a c t , " and i s n o t t h e r e f o r e merely a set o f 
p r i n c i p l e s which one adopts as guid es f o r behaviours 
I f the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c ' i s dependent upon the b e l i e v e r ' s 
assuming a stance w i t h regard t o h i s own l i f e , the being 
o f God and the i r r e l a t i o n s h i p , then i t can also be argued 
t h a t such a stance i n v o l v e s claims about these subjects 
which the b e l i e v e r holds t o be t r u e , adequate, and perhaps 
even r a t i o n a l * Thus, as Ward has s a i d , 
o 0 o i t i s a l o g i c a l t r u t h t h a t the expression 
of an a t t i t u d e e n t a i l s the existence of some 
^Ward, " C h r i s t i a n E t h i c s and the Being of God," 
S c o t t i s h Journal o f Theology, V o l D 2 2 , No D 1 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , p« 
7 t i = 5 9 o _ — 
2 I b i d o S p 0 8 2 ? 
3 3 2 
f a c t u a l as w e l l as e v a l u a t i v e b e l i e f s i n the 
mind of the person who expresses i t a One 
could not say of anyone t h a t they expressed 
an a t t i t u d e i f they d i d not have c e r t a i n 
f a c t u a l b e l i e f s about i t s o b j e c t ; and one 
could not describe t h e i r a t t i t u d e c o r r e c t l y 
without mentioning the o b j e c t t o which i t i s 
directed,,^ 
What i s c l e a r i n examining the l o g i c of C h r i s t i a n deci= 
s i o n i s t h a t these presuppositions not only are i n d i c a t i v e 
of the t o t a l scheme w i t h i n which moral a c t i o n i s t o take 
place but also provide adequate grounds f o r the d e r i v a t i o n 
of i m p e r a t i v e s 0 
The C h r i s t i a n e t h i c i s n o t , t h e r e f o r e , as B r a i t h = 
waite had suggested, the attachment of an a p r i o r i commit^ 
ment t o a p a r t i c u l a r set of f a c t s which the moral agent 
f i n d s supportive and encouraging,. One's i n t e n t i o n s t o act 
w i t h i n t h i s way of l i f e are not chosen independently of 
the context of r e a l i t y i n which one believes oneself t o be 
i n v o l v e d o I n d i c a t i v e s regarding t h i s r e a l i t y are self° 
i n v o l v i n g i n the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c ; they are not mere con° 
3 t a t i v e s but r a t h e r imply and depend upon the o r i e n t a t i o n 
of the b e l i e v e r ' s i n t e n t i o n s and judgements i n t o c o n f o r m i t y 
w i t h them 0 Thus 
o o o the C h r i s t i a n e t h i c c o n s i s t s i n adopting 
a t o t a l a t t i t u d e t o experience, and depends 
e s s e n t i a l l y on the ( l o g i c a l l y ) p r i o r acceptance 
of f a c t u a l b e l i e f s about the being and nature 
of Godo I t i s i n these b e l i e f s , i n t h e i r 
f u n c t i o n of s p e c i f y i n g a p a r t i c u l a r way o f 
l i f e , and i n these alone, t h a t the distinctive<=> 
ness of C h r i s t i a n e t h i c s consists„2 
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Such an understanding o f the fundamental onlook i n the 
C h r i s t i a n moral l i f e i s o f f e r e d i n support of the 
i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between i n d i c a t i v e and i m p e r a t i v e 
which i s c r i t i c a l t o understanding the l o g i c of e t h i c a l 
decision-makinge 
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